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… connection URL A URL from TLS_DATABASE_URL or TLS_POSTGRES_DATABASE_URL starts the SSL mode at `require`. parseOptions read PGSSLMODE only while the mode was still `disable`, so PGSSLMODE=verify-ca or verify-full next to such a URL was never read. The connection used `require`, which does not check the server certificate. Read PGSSLMODE for every postgres connection and keep the stricter of the two modes. The variable name is now a floor of `require`. A URL `?sslmode=` and the tls/ssl options override both, as before. An invalid PGSSLMODE next to a TLS_* URL now throws ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE, as it does next to DATABASE_URL.
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Reproduction, on bun 1.4.3-canary (367d939) and on main: env -i PATH=$PATH TLS_DATABASE_URL=postgres://u@h:5432/db PGSSLMODE=verify-full \
bun -e 'console.log(new Bun.SQL().options.sslMode)'
# 2 (require). Expected: 4 (verify-full).
env -i PATH=$PATH DATABASE_URL=postgres://u@h:5432/db PGSSLMODE=verify-full \
bun -e 'console.log(new Bun.SQL().options.sslMode)'
# 4
State:
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Navigate logical layers of code changes, visualize relationships, and explore their blast radius. WalkthroughThe PostgreSQL option parser now applies ChangesPostgreSQL SSL mode
Suggested reviewers: Priority: ➖ Normal Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to Clarify the SSL override rules so users do not mistake PGSSLMODE=verify-full for a guarantee. This documentation gap is bounded and does not otherwise block merging. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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Review comments at @docs/runtime/sql.mdx:
- Around line 591-592: Update the SSL precedence wording in the documentation
paragraph containing PGSSLMODE: clarify that URL sslmode, ssl, and tls
parameters can override the URL variable’s SSL mode and PGSSLMODE, and that
explicit tls/ssl options set to false or a mode string can override the selected
mode. State that true and TLS option objects do not lower a stricter mode.
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docs/runtime/sql.mdxsrc/js/internal/sql/shared.tstest/js/sql/adapter-env-var-precedence.test.tstest/js/sql/postgres-pgsslmode-env.test.ts
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Updated 10:37 PM PT - Oct 2nd, 2026
✅ @robobun, your commit ed11597cbc12c67ac770a8d3def7e69653558126 passed in 🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 44498That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-44498 --bun |
The docs paragraph now names every setting that overrides the TLS_* variable name and PGSSLMODE, and points to the custom CA section. The wire-level tests remove NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED from the child environment. A value of 0 in the shell that runs the tests turns the certificate check off for a verify-* mode, and the verify cases then fail.
| if (envSslMode) { | ||
| // A TLS_* URL variable is a floor of `require`: PGSSLMODE raises the mode, it does not lower it. | ||
| const envMode = normalizeSSLMode(envSslMode); | ||
| if (envMode > sslMode) sslMode = envMode; |
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🔴 Apps passing tls.ca or rejectUnauthorized: true next to a TLS_* URL lose hostname verification when the environment has PGSSLMODE=verify-ca; the base verified the name. shared.ts:1870 raises sslMode to 3 first, so the sslMode < SSLMode.verify_ca guard at shared.ts:2158 skips the promotion to verify_full the base made from require. Fix: an env-derived mode must never lower what explicit tls options resolve to, e.g. apply the PGSSLMODE floor after the shared.ts:2158 upgrade, and change the expectation at adapter-env-var-precedence.test.ts:490. The PR lists this as a downside; for TLS_* users it is a 4->3 downgrade from base.
Why this was flagged
Environment has TLS_DATABASE_URL (or TLS_POSTGRES_DATABASE_URL) set to a postgres URL and PGSSLMODE=verify-ca, and the program calls new SQL({ tls: { ca: bundle } }) or new SQL({ tls: { rejectUnauthorized: true } }). On the base branch shared.ts:1864 skipped the env read because sslMode was already require (2); then shared.ts:2158-2161 saw $isObject(tls) && sslMode < SSLMode.verify_ca with tls.ca or rejectUnauthorized === true and set sslMode = SSLMode.verify_full (4). After this change shared.ts:1866-1870 sets sslMode = 3 before that block, the sslMode < SSLMode.verify_ca guard is false, and sslMode stays verify_ca (3). In src/sql_jsc/postgres/PostgresSQLConnection.rs:893-896 native_identity_hostname returns None unless ssl_mode == SSLMode::VerifyFull, so PostgresSQLConnection.rs:906-931 checks only the chain and never the server name. With rejectUnauthorized: true and no ca, any publicly trusted certificate for any host now passes. The new test at test/js/sql/adapter-env-var-precedence.test.ts:490-496 locks the 3 in.
Verification: After the change shared.ts:1864-1870 reads the env and sets sslMode=3; the promotion at shared.ts:2158-2161 is now skipped by the < verify_ca guard, so sslMode stays 3. src/sql_jsc/postgres/PostgresSQLConnection.rs:893-896 native_identity_hostname returns a hostname only when ssl_mode == SSLMode::VerifyFull, so a certificate from the trusted CA issued for a different host is now accepted where the base rejected it.
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The facts are right. In this one shape the resolved mode goes from 4 to 3 next to a TLS_* URL, and the hostname check is lost. The PR lists it under Downsides. I kept it because it is the rule that main applies on every other URL source:
DATABASE_URL+PGSSLMODE=verify-ca+tls: { ca }resolves 3 on main and on 1.4.2. So doestls: { rejectUnauthorized: true }. Averify-cathat something names is kept, and the options supply the CA.- Base resolved 4 next to a
TLS_*URL only because it never readPGSSLMODEthere. That is the bug.
The suggested fix does not hold as written. A PGSSLMODE floor after the upgrade at shared.ts:2158 also raises the mode again after a URL ?sslmode= or after tls: false. The URL and the options then no longer override the environment, and the "URL ?sslmode= overrides PGSSLMODE" tests pin that order.
Two changes keep 4 in this shape. Each one is a decision for a maintainer:
- Let the
tlsoptions lift an environmentverify-catoverify-fullon every URL source. That changesDATABASE_URL+PGSSLMODE=verify-ca+tls.cafrom 3 to 4, and a deployment whose certificate name does not match the host stops connecting. - Do that only next to a
TLS_*URL. That needs a flag that five later assignments clear, and the same environment then resolves differently by URL variable.
I left this thread open for that decision.
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Superseded by #44618, which consolidates the open TLS pull requests. This fix and its tests are in there, either as written, rewritten smaller, or merged with the other PRs that patched the same cause (see the "By area" list in that PR). Closing in favor of it. |
…/verify-full, and always sends SNI (#44498) parseOptions lost a request to verify the server in two places. PGSSLMODE was read only while the mode was still disable, and the name of a TLS_* URL variable had already made it require. `options.tls || options.ssl` dropped `ssl: "verify-full"` next to `tls: true`, an object or a weaker mode. Both now keep the stricter mode. Which place wins when two name a mode is unchanged: options over the URL over the environment. `tls: true`, `tls: {}` and `tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false }` sent no SNI: they were promoted to require after the step that fills in serverName, which skips a mode of disable. The promotion now comes first. The object handed to the native constructor has no prototype, so an inherited rejectUnauthorized or serverName is not read.
…/verify-full, and always sends SNI (#44498) parseOptions lost a request to verify the server in two places. PGSSLMODE was read only while the mode was still disable, and the name of a TLS_* URL variable had already made it require. `options.tls || options.ssl` dropped `ssl: "verify-full"` next to `tls: true`, an object or a weaker mode. Both now keep the stricter mode. Which place wins when two name a mode is unchanged: options over the URL over the environment. `tls: true`, `tls: {}` and `tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false }` sent no SNI: they were promoted to require after the step that fills in serverName, which skips a mode of disable. The promotion now comes first. The object handed to the native constructor has no prototype, so an inherited rejectUnauthorized or serverName is not read.
…/verify-full, and always sends SNI (#44498) parseOptions lost a request to verify the server in two places. PGSSLMODE was read only while the mode was still disable, and the name of a TLS_* URL variable had already made it require. `options.tls || options.ssl` dropped `ssl: "verify-full"` next to `tls: true`, an object or a weaker mode. Both now keep the stricter mode. Which place wins when two name a mode is unchanged: options over the URL over the environment. `tls: true`, `tls: {}` and `tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false }` sent no SNI: they were promoted to require after the step that fills in serverName, which skips a mode of disable. The promotion now comes first. The object handed to the native constructor has no prototype, so an inherited rejectUnauthorized or serverName is not read.
…/verify-full, and always sends SNI (#44498) parseOptions lost a request to verify the server in two places. PGSSLMODE was read only while the mode was still disable, and the name of a TLS_* URL variable had already made it require. `options.tls || options.ssl` dropped `ssl: "verify-full"` next to `tls: true`, an object or a weaker mode. Both now keep the stricter mode. Which place wins when two name a mode is unchanged: options over the URL over the environment. `tls: true`, `tls: {}` and `tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false }` sent no SNI: they were promoted to require after the step that fills in serverName, which skips a mode of disable. The promotion now comes first. The object handed to the native constructor has no prototype, so an inherited rejectUnauthorized or serverName is not read.
…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
Problem
TLS_DATABASE_URLorTLS_POSTGRES_DATABASE_URL,PGSSLMODE=verify-caorverify-fullhas no effect.new Bun.SQL().options.sslModestays2(require), which does not check the server certificate. The same URL inDATABASE_URLgives3or4.src/js/internal/sql/shared.ts:1864readPGSSLMODEonly while the mode wasdisable. ATLS_*variable name setsrequirefirst. Found by code inspection.Fix
parseOptionsreadsPGSSLMODEfor every postgres connection and keeps the stricter mode. TheTLS_*name is a floor ofrequire.?sslmode=and thetls/ssloptions apply later and still override it.test/js/sql/adapter-env-var-precedence.test.ts(20 new cases fail on main) andtest/js/sql/postgres-pgsslmode-env.test.ts(2 fail on main). Also ranadapter-override.test.tsandsql-tls-ip-literal-host.test.ts.PG_SSLMODE/PGSSLMODEandtls/ssl(see Notes).Background
sslModeis 0disable, 1prefer, 2require, 3verify-ca, 4verify-full. The Postgres handshake checks the certificate only for 3 and 4.parseOptionsalso overrides a URL?sslmode=. The environment lookup does not know the adapter.Downsides
TLS_*URL. WithPGSSLMODE=verify-caorverify-full, the handshake fails when the certificate does not verify. An invalidPGSSLMODE(no-verifyincluded) throwsERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE, as next toDATABASE_URL.TLS_*URL,PGSSLMODE=verify-cawithtls.caorrejectUnauthorized: trueresolvesverify-ca, notverify-full: main checked the hostname there.DATABASE_URLalready does.TLS_*URL reads 2 moreBun.envproperties pernew SQL().Notes
Measurements, main against this PR
internal/sql/shared.js: +25 bytes minified (45,611 to 45,636, the release-mode output ofsrc/codegen/bundle-modules.ts).parseOptions: 963 -> 963 instructions (4879 -> 4880 bytes). Instructions executed in the changed region pernew SQL(): postgres 17 -> 15, mysql and mariadb 9 -> 5, sqlite 0 -> 0, postgres withPGSSLMODEset 21 -> 22, postgres with aTLS_*URL 4 -> 14 with +2Bun.envreads. Source:BUN_JSC_dumpGeneratedBytecodes=1on the release-mode bundle, loaded from disk by a debug build.parseOptions+normalizeSSLMode: 2 -> 2.ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE: 792, 4->3: 12, off a postgresTLS_*source: 0). The matrix is 12 URL sources x 13 URL queries x 12PGSSLMODE/PG_SSLMODEsettings x 16 option shapes.options.tlsis the same in every changed row that does not throw. The 792 new throws arePGSSLMODE=bogus(396 rows) andPGSSLMODE=no-verify(396 rows).shared.tsis the same blob on the current base.Not changed here
PG_SSLMODEshadowsPGSSLMODE:PG_SSLMODE=prefer PGSSLMODE=verify-fullresolvesprefer. EveryPG_X || PGXpair in this file is first-wins, and sql(postgres): honour PGSSLMODE from the environment #36840 kept this pair that way. A stricter-of rule changes rows for callers that have noTLS_*URL.options.tls || options.ssl:{ tls: true, ssl: "verify-full" }resolvesrequireon all three adapters (shared.ts:2062).sslis the deprecated alias oftls, and the first truthy key wins.PGSSLMODE=no-verifyand?sslmode=no-verify(the node-postgres value for TLS without a certificate check) throwERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUEon every path. A draft of this PR mapped the value torequire. The self-review removed that arm: it changes 3,901 of the 29,952 rows, and 3,116 of them have noTLS_*URL.verify-castopstls.caandrejectUnauthorized: truefrom lifting the mode toverify-full, on every URL source. This PR bringsTLS_*URLs in line with that rule. A lift for an environmentverify-cais a separate decision: it changesDATABASE_URL+PGSSLMODE=verify-ca+tls.cafrom 3 to 4.?sslmode=maps todisable.getConnectionDetailsFromEnvironmentstill returnsSSLMode.require | null. A boolean says more, and it can follow sql: do not read the environment connection URL when options name a target #41586, which rewrites the caller.Related open PRs
TLS_*variable from forcingrequireonto a target that the options name. sql: a verify-ca or verify-full sslmode always verifies the certificate #41589 makesverify-caandverify-fullalways setrejectUnauthorized. Both are independent of this PR.tlswithtoMatchObject, so sql: a verify-ca or verify-full sslmode always verifies the certificate #41589 can addrejectUnauthorizedto it.selfSignedTlsServerhelper to the same test file. The second PR to land keeps one of the two.Tests
adapter-env-var-precedence.test.tsand 2 inpostgres-pgsslmode-env.test.ts. In those 2, the client connects to a self-signed server and sends the startup packet.postgres_tlscontainer. They assert that no StartupMessage reaches the server, and a real server cannot report that.Other designs
TLS_*name as a boolean: the same resolved rows, a larger diff, and a conflict with sql: do not read the environment connection URL when options name a target #41586.PGSSLMODEafter the URL loop: it changes which invalid values throw forDATABASE_URLcallers.no test proof · iteration 0 · platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine, deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/sql/adapter-env-var-precedence.test.ts