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…ertSign BoringSSL patch: path building matches candidate issuers by name and authority key identifier only, as OpenSSL 3 does, and checks keyCertSign on each issuer edge in internal_verify. A self-signed leaf pinned via NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS or tls.ca anchors its own chain. getPeerCertificate(true): the issuer walk stops at a self-signed certificate by EXFLAG_SS, which no longer depends on keyCertSign, so the pinned leaf does not get found in the store again up to the cap.
…, an issuer without it is not
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Updated 9:41 PM PT - Oct 2nd, 2026
✅ @robobun, your commit 924c19bdb013babbccefb3bcca1b48bb16875971 passed in 🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 44441That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-44441 --bun |
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The next BORINGSSL_COMMIT bump fails configure with the instruction to land the patch in oven-sh/boringssl and drop the patch file.
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October 2, 2026 16:19
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Included review availability: This review used your included allowance. Your plan provides up to 10 included reviews per hour; 2 remain after this review. WalkthroughBoringSSL now separates issuer matching from key-usage validation. Bun applies the patch and stops the TLS issuer walk when the store returns the previous certificate. Tests cover pinned self-signed certificates, issuer key usage, extra CA certificates, and certificate verification errors. ChangesTLS Trust Anchor Handling
Suggested reviewers: Priority: ➖ Normal Severity of issue fixed: Medium Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to Explicitly pinned self-signed certificates without keyCertSign can now be trusted, while distinct issuers lacking signing permission remain rejected. No concrete material issue blocks merging this change. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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Review comments at
@patches/boringssl/self-signed-anchor-without-keycertsign.patch:
- Around line 289-300: Extend SelfSignedAnchorWithoutKeyCertSign with a
BoringSSL regression test for a non-self-issued trusted certificate lacking
keyCertSign that terminates a partial chain and verifies successfully. Keep a
separate assertion that issuer checks below the anchor still fail.
Review comments at @test/js/node/tls/test-node-extra-ca-certs.test.ts:
- Around line 182-184: Update the generated main.js fixture to use module-scope
ES imports for the node:tls, node:fs, and node:events modules instead of require
calls.
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Beyond the inline findings, I also checked the Rust side of the issuer walk in src/runtime/socket/tls_socket_functions.rs: the new X509_get_extension_flags import matches BoringSSL's uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *) and the local EXFLAG_SS = 0x2000 matches the value in the patched header; the get1_issuer references are still freed on the success path, the to_js error path, and the cap/break path, so the refcount balance is unchanged. Two further candidates (multiple same-subject self-signed certs in one bundle, and pinning via the OS trust store rather than ca/NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS) were examined and not posted as findings.
Extended reasoning...
The PR adds a 319-line vendored BoringSSL X.509 verification patch that relaxes EXFLAG_SS and the path-builder issuer predicate, plus a small Rust change to the getPeerCertificate issuer walk and new TLS tests; this is squarely in the certificate-verification security surface. Seven inline findings were posted (a CI test break on the pin regex, several behavioral divergences from Node in the relaxed verification, and cyclic issuerCertificate output), so a human needs to weigh the patch regardless. The note only records what was additionally ruled out on the Rust/FFI side.
Findings marked 🟡 are optional suggestions and need no follow-up push.
Additional findings (outside the current diff — GitHub can't attach inline comments there):
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🟡
src/runtime/socket/tls_socket_functions.rs— Users who pin a self-signed cert without keyCertSign (the PR's headline case) and call getPeerCertificate(true) get a cyclic object that JSON.stringify rejects, where Node returns a finite leaf -> store copy chain. tls_socket_functions.rs:604 and :617 self-link whenever EXFLAG_SS is set, but Node self-links only when X509_check_issued(cert, cert) passes, which still requires keyCertSign. The new test in test-node-extra-ca-certs.test.ts asserts issuerCertificate === peer, cementing the divergence. Fix: match Node's shape for node:tls: walk get1_issuer while X509_check_issued(last, last) fails, stop when the store returns the same certificate again, and only self-link when X509_check_issued(last, last) == 0.Why this was flagged
Trigger: NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS or tls.ca pins a self-signed leaf whose keyUsage lacks keyCertSign; the handshake is now authorized and the app calls getPeerCertificate(true) (test/js/node/tls/test-node-extra-ca-certs.test.ts:197 shows the exact call). Node 26's walk (crypto_x509.cc GetLastIssuedCert) loops while X509_check_issued(cert,cert) != X509_V_OK, which fails for this cert, so it appends the store copy and ends without a self-link. Bun after this change: tls_socket_functions.rs:576 never enters the loop because EXFLAG_SS is set (patch line 75 dropped the keyCertSign requirement), tls_socket_functions.rs:604 sets last_is_self_issued = true, and :617-618 writes prev_obj into its own issuerCertificate. Any consumer that serializes the detailed certificate (JSON.stringify, structuredClone, logging) throws a cyclic-structure TypeError on Bun and succeeds on Node. REVIEW.md makes Node's observed behavior the spec for node:tls, and the new test locks in the non-Node shape.
Verification: In src/runtime/socket/tls_socket_functions.rs, line 576 skips the walk, line 604 sets last_is_self_issued from EXFLAG_SS, and lines 617-618
if last_is_self_issued { prev_obj.put(global, b"issuerCertificate", prev_obj); }create the self-cycle whenever EXFLAG_SS is set. The vendored patch now sets EXFLAG_SS without the keyCertSign requirement, so this cert gets the cycle.
…s asked about getPeerCertificate(true) walks X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer while X509_check_issued(cert, cert) fails. A pinned self-signed certificate without keyCertSign fails that test forever and the store returns it every time, so the walk now stops on that repeat, as Node does. The chain is leaf -> pinned copy, with no self-link. Also widens the pin regex in process.test.js for the exported BORINGSSL_COMMIT, and asserts DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT for the unpinned, unexpired self-signed certificate over tls.connect.
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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.
Still open from earlier reviews (4):
- Unresolved: 4 minor or pre-existing.
Additional findings (outside the current diff — GitHub can't attach inline comments there):
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🟡
src/runtime/socket/tls_socket_functions.rs— nit: the SAFETY comment on this unsafe block no longer describes every release path. It states every issuer returned by get1_issuer is collected inextrasand freed after the terminal check, but the new break at src/runtime/socket/tls_socket_functions.rs:587-589 frees the issuer immediately without collecting it. Fix: update the SAFETY comment so it covers both release sites (collected inextras, or freed on the spot when it equalslast_cert), keeping it accurate for the Err path at 596-606 too.Why this was flagged
The unsafe block at src/runtime/socket/tls_socket_functions.rs:546 is justified by the SAFETY comment at lines 541-545, which says every +1 issuer from X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer is collected in
extrasand released after its fields are copied into JS. The diff adds a third exit at lines 587-589 that calls boringssl::X509_free(issuer) and breaks before pushing toextras. The comment is now stale relative to the code it covers; a later reader auditing ownership of the +1 reference would conclude the break path double-frees or leaks until they re-read the loop. On the base branch the comment matched the only two release paths. The repository review rules require SAFETY comments to stay accurate after refactors; no release-tracking bug results from this, so it is a nit.Verification: nit. Triggering condition: any reader auditing the unsafe block. The SAFETY comment at src/runtime/socket/tls_socket_functions.rs:541-545 is byte-identical to base. The diff adds a new exit at lines 587-590 where the +1 issuer is freed on the spot and never pushed to
extras. So the comment no longer describes every release path of the +1 reference.
…n the SAFETY note
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @src/runtime/socket/tls_socket_functions.rs:
- Line 585: Update the issuer-repeat check using ffi::X509_cmp to compare issuer
with last_cert regardless of whether extras is empty, before converting the
issuer with X509::to_js, so a repeated certificate is not added to the chain.
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Superseded by #44618, which consolidates the open TLS pull requests. This fix and its tests are in there, either as written, rewritten smaller, or merged with the other PRs that patched the same cause (see the "By area" list in that PR). Closing in favor of it. |
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…ertSign (#44441) A `dotnet dev-certs` certificate names itself as its issuer but may not sign certificates, so BoringSSL does not take it for self-signed, finds no issuer and reports UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE even when `ca` or NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS holds it. Node trusts it. us_x509_verify_cert sets X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN on the parameters of that one verification, before it runs, only when the leaf is self-issued, is not flagged self-signed, has the purpose of the peer's role, and the store holds a byte-identical copy. Validity and CRLs are still checked. Any other certificate takes the path it took, with the error it had. The HTTP/3 client shares it.
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…ertSign (#44441) A `dotnet dev-certs` certificate names itself as its issuer but may not sign certificates, so BoringSSL does not take it for self-signed, finds no issuer and reports UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE even when `ca` or NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS holds it. Node trusts it. us_x509_verify_cert sets X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN on the parameters of that one verification, before it runs, only when the leaf is self-issued, is not flagged self-signed, has the purpose of the peer's role, and the store holds a byte-identical copy. Validity and CRLs are still checked. Any other certificate takes the path it took, with the error it had. The HTTP/3 client shares it.
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…ertSign (#44441) A `dotnet dev-certs` certificate names itself as its issuer but may not sign certificates, so BoringSSL does not take it for self-signed, finds no issuer and reports UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE even when `ca` or NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS holds it. Node trusts it. us_x509_verify_cert sets X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN on the parameters of that one verification, before it runs, only when the leaf is self-issued, is not flagged self-signed, has the purpose of the peer's role, and the store holds a byte-identical copy. Validity and CRLs are still checked. Any other certificate takes the path it took, with the error it had. The HTTP/3 client shares it.
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…ertSign (#44441) A `dotnet dev-certs` certificate names itself as its issuer but may not sign certificates, so BoringSSL does not take it for self-signed, finds no issuer and reports UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE even when `ca` or NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS holds it. Node trusts it. us_x509_verify_cert sets X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN on the parameters of that one verification, before it runs, only when the leaf is self-issued, is not flagged self-signed, has the purpose of the peer's role, and the store holds a byte-identical copy. Validity and CRLs are still checked. Any other certificate takes the path it took, with the error it had. The HTTP/3 client shares it.
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…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
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Fixes #44365
Problem
NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTSortls.cawhen itskeyUsagelackskeyCertSign(thedotnet dev-certsshape):UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE. Node trusts it.X509_check_issued(crypto/x509/v3_purp.cc), which requireskeyCertSign. The leaf never matches its own store copy, so the chain has no anchor.Fix
patches/boringssl/self-signed-anchor-without-keycertsign.patchsplitsX509_check_issuedas OpenSSL 3 does: path building matches by name and authority key identifier, andinternal_verifycheckskeyCertSignon each issuer edge.EXFLAG_SSno longer depends onkeyCertSign.keyCertSignis still rejected.tls_socket_functions.rs: thegetPeerCertificate(true)issuer walk stops when the store returns the certificate it was asked about, so the chain is leaf, then the pinned copy, as in Node.fetch.tls.test.ts,test-node-extra-ca-certs.test.ts,node-tls-connect.test.tsfail on main. Self-reviewed: 5 concerns, 3 addressed, 2 rejected (Notes).Background
x509_vfy.cc).X509_check_trusttrusts a store entry withEXFLAG_SS.X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAINon every store: it rescues the leaf after rejection and trusts any bare intermediate inca. The patch fixes the predicate itself.patches/entry (as tls: apply CA name constraints to the subject CN of certificates without a DNS subjectAltName #37758, tls: support IPv4 and IPv6 CA name constraints #42254) plus aworkarounds.tscheck that trips at the next pin bump. Maintainer action: land the patch in the fork, bump the pin, delete both.Downsides
keyCertSign:DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT(expired:CERT_HAS_EXPIRED),KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN,INVALID_CA. Code matching the old strings sees the new ones.objdump, novalgrindhere), no allocation, no syscall.libcrypto.a.text+384 bytes (size, release build of the fork).Notes
Variant table (all self-signed, all pinned via
NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, Bun main / Node 26 / this PR):The trigger is
keyUsagepresent withoutkeyCertSign.basicConstraintsdoes not matter.OpenSSL 3 reference.
ossl_x509_likely_issued(name, AKID, signature algorithm) is whatbuild_chainandX509_STORE_CTX_get1_issueruse.ossl_x509_signing_allowed(keyCertSign) runs ininternal_verifyon each edge withxs != xi.EXFLAG_SSstopped depending on keyUsage in 3.0 (node's owntest-https-selfsigned-no-keycertsign-no-crash.jsdocuments the 1.1.1h minimum). That vendored test still self-skips under Bun becausecrypto.constants.OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBERreports 1.1.1g. The new Bun tests use its fixture (test/js/node/test/fixtures/keys/selfsigned-no-keycertsign).Probes with Node 26 (OpenSSL 3.5) for the sibling cases, matched by this PR: unpinned leaf without keyCertSign ->
DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT. Leaf issued by a pinned CA:TRUE root whose keyUsage isdigitalSignature, cRLSign-> rejected,node:tlscodeUNSPECIFIED(OpenSSL error 32,KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN, has no entry in thenode:tlserror table; Bun's table is the same).fetch()maps error 32 toKEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN.getPeerCertificate(true). Node's walk yields
leaf -> store copy -> store copyfor the pinned leaf (it breaks whenget1_issuerreturns the same pointer twice). Bun's walk adds the store copy once and stops when the store returns it again:leaf -> pinned copy, finite, no self-link (the leaf cannot sign, soX509_check_issued(leaf, leaf)fails, as in Node). Without the Rust change the walk would add the store copy 16 times (the cap).Suites run. All of
test/js/node/tls/, node's vendoredtest-tls-*andtest-https-*,test/js/node/https,http2,quic,test/js/bun/net,crypto.x509.test.ts, and the TLS files undertest/js/bun/httpandtest/js/web/websocket.Self-review. Addressed: a self-obsoleting
workarounds.tsentry for the patch, theopenssl req -x509wording (only with akeyUsageextension), and the error-code downside. Rejected: moving the diff to oven-sh/boringssl (not possible from this session) and dropping thex509_test.cchunk (it is the fork's test for the change).BoringSSL tests.
crypto_test(1866 tests) andssl_test(474) pass with the patch. NewX509Test.SelfSignedAnchorWithoutKeyCertSigncovers the six shapes (trusted stack and store), the unpinned case, a same-subject non-identical copy (stillDEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT), a trusted root without keyCertSign (KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGNat depth 1), an untrusted intermediate without it (INVALID_CA), andX509_check_issuedunchanged.X509Test.PurposeexpectedUNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLYfor that intermediate and now expectsINVALID_CA, as OpenSSL 3 reports.Not changed. An exact-match anchor skips the purpose/EKU checks on itself (
check_chain_extensionschecks untrusted certificates only). That was already so for a self-signed CA anchor and forallowPartialTrustChain.test-https-timeout.jshangs intermittently on the debug build with and without this change (10 ms timeout race, listed inscripts/runner.node.ts).Fixtures.
test/js/node/tls/fixtures/ca-no-keycertsign-cert.pem(CA:TRUE, keyUsagedigitalSignature, cRLSign) andagent-no-keycertsign-ca-{cert,key}.pem(P-256 leaf for localhost / 127.0.0.1 issued by it, 100 years).no test proof · iteration 0 · platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine, deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/web/fetch/fetch.tls.test.ts, test/js/node/process/process.test.js