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An array passed as the tls option parsed as an empty TLSOptions dictionary, so the socket was created without TLS. Bun.listen and Bun.connect have no SNI array form. Throw a TypeError instead.
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Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to Array-valued TLS options now fail instead of silently producing plaintext sockets, while object-based TLS connections retain coverage. No current merge-blocking risk remains. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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Addressed the test comment in 9d1ac3d: both socket handler objects now wire On the double read of |
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Updated 1:32 AM PT - Sep 6th, 2026
❌ @robobun, your commit fea0d55 has 1 failures in 🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 41490That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-41490 --bun |
A generated dictionary is an options bag. An array has none of its named members, so it parsed as an empty dictionary. Throw the same TypeError as for a non-object instead. This replaces the tls-specific array check in SocketConfig::from_js.
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Moved the check into the generated dictionary conversion in aa2b87f. The Rust guard and its comment are gone. An array now fails in |
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Inline comments:
In `@src/codegen/bindgenv2/internal/dictionary.ts`:
- Line 221: Update the dictionary conversion guard in the generated converter
around JSC::isJSArray to use an ECMAScript-compliant IsArray predicate that
recognizes non-revoked proxies targeting arrays, while preserving rejection of
arrays and invalid objects. Add regression coverage for proxied-array tls values
through Bun.listen and Bun.connect if no existing coverage exercises this path.
In `@test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts`:
- Around line 1053-1056: Replace the parameterized for-loop around the invalid
TLS assertions with describe.each(), defining the three TLS inputs as separate
named cases. Keep both Bun.listen and Bun.connect expectations in each case so
failures identify the specific TLS input.
- Line 1071: Update the Promise callback wiring around SocketHandler.error and
SocketHandler.connectError so each handler receives both socket and error, then
explicitly calls reject with the error argument rather than passing reject
directly. Preserve the existing rejection behavior while ensuring the socket
object is not used as the rejection value.
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src/codegen/bindgenv2/internal/dictionary.tstest/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts
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LGTM — both earlier concerns are addressed: the array check now lives in the generated dictionary conversion so tls is read once, and the round-trip test wires error/connectError to reject.
What was reviewed: the isJSArray guard in dictionary.ts sits on the single value.getObject() read, so no double getter invocation; enumerated all *.bindv2.ts consumers (SocketConfig, SSLConfig, FakeTimersConfig) — none legitimately accept an array; the test covers [], [tls], and multi-entry arrays for both listen and connect plus a positive TLS round-trip.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
The PR now consists of a one-line guard in the bindgenv2 dictionary code generator (src/codegen/bindgenv2/internal/dictionary.ts) that makes generated convertDictionary C++ reject JS arrays with the existing "must be an object" TypeError, plus a test in test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts. The earlier revision that re-read opts.get(global_object, "tls") in Handlers.rs after the generated parse is gone — commit aa2b87f moved the check into the generator, so the value is inspected exactly once at value.getObject(). Commit 9d1ac3d wired error: reject on the server socket and error: reject / connectError: reject on the client, addressing the second inline comment.
Security risks
The motivating bug is a fail-open: tls: [...] silently produced a plaintext socket. This change makes it fail closed with a TypeError, which is the direction REVIEW.md's "Security checks fail closed" asks for. The guard is additive (strictly narrows accepted inputs) and cannot itself downgrade a connection. I confirmed via glob that only three .bindv2.ts dictionaries exist — SocketConfig, SSLConfig/TLSOptions, and FakeTimersConfig — matching the PR description's enumeration; none of these has a legitimate array-shaped input, so the shared-generator change does not break other consumers. Bun.serve's SNI array path does not go through bindgenv2.
Level of scrutiny
Medium. The codegen edit is shared infrastructure, so I enumerated consumers rather than trusting the description. The actual code delta is a single boolean disjunct on an existing guard, reusing the existing throw path and error message — low surface for regression. The test asserts the specific message, exercises both Bun.listen and Bun.connect across three array shapes, and includes a positive control that a plain-object tls still yields a working TLS handshake.
Other factors
Both inline comments from the prior review round were acted on in follow-up commits, and no third-party CHANGES_REQUESTED reviews are outstanding. The test uses port: 0, using for the server, Promise.withResolvers, and now rejects on every failure event. The added codegen comment is one line and states the non-obvious invariant (an array has none of the named members), which clears the src/CLAUDE.md comment bar.
…n the test JSC::isArray follows a Proxy to its array target and also matches an Array subclass, where isJSArray matched the plain JSArray type only.
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All earlier feedback is addressed — the array check now lives in the generated convertDictionary (single property read), uses JSC::isArray with RETURN_IF_EXCEPTION so Proxy-wrapped arrays and Array subclasses are caught, and the round-trip test forwards the actual error object from error/connectError to reject. I didn't find any remaining bugs. Because this is an intentional breaking change applied at the bindgenv2 dictionary layer (so it affects every current and future .bindv2.ts options bag, not just TLSOptions) on a TLS-config path, a human sign-off on that scope decision is still worthwhile.
What was reviewed:
- Generated C++:
JSC::isArray(&globalObject, value)is guarded byRETURN_IF_EXCEPTION(throwScope, {})before the result is read; the non-object branch was split back out sogetObject()failure and array rejection both go throughctx.throwNotObject. - Blast radius: only three
*.bindv2.tsdictionaries exist (SocketConfig,SSLConfig,FakeTimersConfig), matching the PR description; none legitimately accepts an array. - Tests:
describe.eachcovers plain/SNI/empty/Proxy/subclass arrays for bothBun.listenandBun.connectwith the exact message asserted; the positive-control TLS round-trip usesport: 0,using, and rejects onerror/connectErrorwith the error argument (not the socket).
Extended reasoning...
Overview
The PR changes the bindgenv2 dictionary code generator (src/codegen/bindgenv2/internal/dictionary.ts) so the generated C++ convertDictionary<T> rejects JS arrays with the same "must be an object" TypeError it already throws for non-objects. The motivating bug: Bun.listen({ tls: [{ key, cert }] }) silently started a plaintext listener because the array parsed as an empty TLSOptions dictionary and SSLConfig::from_generated returned None. Tests in test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts cover the array-variant matrix for both Bun.listen and Bun.connect, plus a positive control that a plain-object tls still yields a working TLS round-trip.
Over four commits the implementation moved from a post-parse re-read of opts.tls in Handlers.rs (which fired the getter twice) to a single check inside the generated converter, then from JSC::isJSArray (misses Proxy/subclass) to JSC::isArray with the required RETURN_IF_EXCEPTION. The test evolved from a for loop to describe.each with Proxy and Array-subclass cases, and the socket error/connectError handlers now destructure (_s, err) and reject with the error rather than the socket.
Security risks
The change is security-positive: it fails closed where the previous behavior silently downgraded a requested-TLS listener/connection to plaintext. There's no new parsing of untrusted input — JSC::isArray is a JSC intrinsic, and the exception it can raise (via a Proxy getPrototypeOf trap) is propagated correctly. No credential handling, no new network surface.
Level of scrutiny
Medium-high. The code change is seven lines of generated C++ and mechanically simple, but it lives in shared codegen — every present and future bindgenv2 dictionary inherits this rejection. I verified only three dictionaries exist today (SocketConfig, SSLConfig, FakeTimersConfig), and none has a legitimate array input, so today's blast radius matches the PR's claim. Still, "reject arrays for every options bag at the codegen layer" is a design decision (vs. rejecting only in the TLSOptions union arm), and it's on a TLS-configuration path where the fix direction matters. That warrants a human maintainer's sign-off rather than bot approval.
Other factors
All inline feedback from the three prior review rounds has been addressed in the current diff: single getter read, JSC::isArray + RETURN_IF_EXCEPTION, describe.each variant matrix including Proxy and Array subclass, and error handlers that reject with the actual error object. The PR description states the relevant suites were run (socket, tls, fake-timers, node-tls) and that Bun.serve's SNI array path checks isArray before reaching the dictionary, so it's unaffected. No CODEOWNERS entry covers these paths.
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CI status: the only red lane is |
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Superseded by #44618, which consolidates the open TLS pull requests. This fix and its tests are in there, either as written, rewritten smaller, or merged with the other PRs that patched the same cause (see the "By area" list in that PR). Closing in favor of it. |
Bun.serve takes `tls: [...]`. Given to Bun.listen, Bun.connect, upgradeTLS or fetch, the array landed in the dictionary arm of the union with no member set, parsed as "no TLS options", and the socket was plain TCP with no error. convertDictionary now throws "must be an object" for an array.
Bun.serve takes `tls: [...]`. Given to Bun.listen, Bun.connect, upgradeTLS or fetch, the array landed in the dictionary arm of the union with no member set, parsed as "no TLS options", and the socket was plain TCP with no error. convertDictionary now throws "must be an object" for an array.
Bun.serve takes `tls: [...]`. Given to Bun.listen, Bun.connect, upgradeTLS or fetch, the array landed in the dictionary arm of the union with no member set, parsed as "no TLS options", and the socket was plain TCP with no error. convertDictionary now throws "must be an object" for an array.
Bun.serve takes `tls: [...]`. Given to Bun.listen, Bun.connect, upgradeTLS or fetch, the array landed in the dictionary arm of the union with no member set, parsed as "no TLS options", and the socket was plain TCP with no error. convertDictionary now throws "must be an object" for an array.
…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
2 participants
Problem
Bun.listen({ tls: [{ key, cert }], ... })starts a plaintext TCP listener. No error, no warning. A raw client is served in the clear, and a TLS client fails withERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBERbecause its ClientHello lands in the app'sdatahandler.Bun.connectwith the same shape opens a plaintext connection.tlsoption is a union of null, boolean, and theTLSOptionsdictionary (src/runtime/socket/SocketConfig.bindv2.ts:38). The generated dictionary conversion accepts any object, so an array lands in the dictionary arm with none of the named members set.SSLConfig::from_generated(src/runtime/socket/SSLConfig.rs:148) then returnsNone, andSocketConfig::from_generated(src/runtime/socket/Handlers.rs:500) builds the socket withssl: None.Fix
convertDictionary(src/codegen/bindgenv2/internal/dictionary.ts) now rejects an array with the sameTypeErrorit throws for a non-object:TLSOptions must be an object. It usesJSC::isArray, the ECMAScriptIsArraypredicate, so a Proxy around an array and an Array subclass are rejected too. A bindgen dictionary is an options bag, and an array has none of its named members, so it is never a valid input.tls?: TLSOptions | booleanfor listen and connect). OnlyBun.serveaccepts an array of TLS options (SNI), and it checks for an array before it reaches the dictionary, so its array form is unchanged.tls: {}keeps its current meaning (no TLS).Bun.servetreats an empty object the same way for backwards compatibility, so this change does not touch it.test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts(newdescribe.each"tls option is an array": five shapes, each forBun.listenandBun.connect, fails on the released bun; plus a TLS round trip with a plain object). Also rantcp-server.test.ts,bun-server.test.ts,test/js/bun/tls/,test/js/bun/test/fake-timers/,node-net-server.test.ts,node-tls-server.test.ts, andnode-tls-connect.test.ts.Background
SocketConfigis the parsed form of the options object forBun.listenandBun.connect. Itstlsfield is generated by bindgen fromSocketConfig.bindv2.tsas an ordered union: the converter tries null, then boolean, then theTLSOptionsdictionary.src/codegen/bindgenv2/) generates the C++ that converts a JS options object into a typed struct for Rust. Three dictionaries use it today:SocketConfig,SSLConfig(TLSOptions), andFakeTimersConfig.SSLConfigis the native TLS configuration (key, cert, ca, ciphers, ...).SSLConfig::from_generatedreturnsNonewhen no member of the dictionary was present, which callers read as "no TLS".Notes
tls: [entry]servedSECRETto a plainBun.connectclient with notlsoption.SocketConfig::from_jsafter the generated parse. That read thetlsproperty twice and needed a comment to explain itself. The dictionary-level check reads the value once and also covers the otherTLSOptionsconsumers (fetch,SecureContext,upgradeTLS, valkey).should not call drain before handshake(no outbound DNS forwww.example.com),allows listen on IPV6(no IPv6 here), andSNICallback runs even when the requested servername matches the bind hostname(localhostresolves to::1only). All fail the same way withUSE_SYSTEM_BUN=1.tls: []also throws.Bun.servetreats[]as no TLS, butBun.listennever accepted an array, so there is no compatibility to keep.no test proof · iteration 1 · platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine, deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts