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No actionable comments were generated in the recent review. 🎉 ℹ️ Recent review info⚙️ Run configurationConfiguration used: Repository: oven-sh/bun/.coderabbit.yaml Review profile: ASSERTIVE Plan: Essentials Run ID: 📒 Files selected for processing (5)
Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 10 included reviews per hour; 0 remain after this review. WalkthroughThe changes align TLS validation, IPC closed-channel behavior, and HTTP socket-assignment errors with Node-compatible codes and messages. Declarations, runtime behavior, native error templates, and tests are updated. ChangesNode error compatibility
Suggested reviewers: Priority: ➖ Normal Severity of issue fixed: Medium 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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Updated 7:13 PM PT - Sep 19th, 2026
✅ @robobun, your commit 03893f3274741f569912f8b2bfb526952a3a7a1d passed in 🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 43594That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-43594 --bun |
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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.
Additional findings (outside the current diff — GitHub can't attach inline comments there):
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src/js/node/tls.ts— Users constructing tls.Server or https.Server with an empty-string minVersion or maxVersion plus a secureProtocol now get ERR_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_CONFLICT, where Node's tls.Server drops falsy minVersion and maxVersion in setSecureContext and does not report a conflict. setSecureContext at src/js/node/tls.ts:1268 calls validateSecureContextOptions on the raw options, and the new guard at src/js/internal/tls.ts:86 tests minVersion != null, so '' counts as a conflict. Fix: mirror Node's tls.Server normalisation by treating falsy minVersion and maxVersion as absent before the conflict check on the server path (setSecureContext and buildSharedCreds), while keeping createSecureContext's own != null semantics.Extended reasoning...
Server(options) at src/js/node/tls.ts:1497 calls this.setSecureContext(options). setSecureContext at :1268 calls validateSecureContextOptions(options) with the user's object untouched. That function at :220 calls validateSecureProtocol(secureProtocol, minVersion, maxVersion). At src/js/internal/tls.ts:86
'' != nullis true, so ERR_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_CONFLICT is thrown with version ''. Node's lib/_tls_server.js setSecureContext stores this.minVersion only when options.minVersion is truthy and otherwise sets undefined, then calls createSecureContext with this.minVersion, so '' never reaches the conflict guard and the server starts. The base branch also rejected '' but with ERR_TLS_INVALID_PROTOCOL_VERSION from tls.ts:262, so the PR changes the code and message rather than introducing the throw; the dismissing finder did not open Node's setSecureContext to compare. Population is config-driven servers that build options from environment variables where an unset variable becomes ''. Remedy: normalise falsy minVersion and maxVersion to undefined on the Server path before validation.Verification: nit — triggers when a caller passes tls.Server/https.createServer a falsy-but-non-nullish minVersion or maxVersion ('' / 0 / false) together with a truthy secureProtocol. Mechanism verified: src/js/node/tls.ts:1497
this.setSecureContext(options)-> :1268validateSecureContextOptions(options)on the raw user object -> :220validateSecureProtocol(secureProtocol, minVersion, maxVersion)->…
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I re-reviewed the two follow-up commits and found no bugs; a human look is still worthwhile because the change touches src/js/builtins.d.ts, which is CODEOWNER-owned, and adjusts TLS option validation across three entry points.
What was reviewed:
src/runtime/ipc_host.rsnow only rewords theprocess.send()arm; the Bun.spawnSubprocess.send()messages are intact. The new!this.connectedbranch inChildProcess#sendreads the same nativeis_connected()the Rust check uses, so it only changes the message, not when the error fires, and it runs before message validation like Node.tls.Server's falsy-drop ofminVersion/maxVersion/secureProtocolmatches Node'ssetSecureContext. The same drop is not mirrored in the httpsServerctor, sohttps.createServer({ ...cert, minVersion: "", secureProtocol: "TLS_method" })throws the conflict where Node does not — an edge case, not raised inline.- The updated comment in
_http_server.tsnow describes the validate-first behavior; theErrorCode.cpptable rows and the three new tests line up with the messages Node v26 emits.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
The PR (three commits) aligns four ERR_* messages with Node and adds the ERR_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_CONFLICT check. Touched: ErrorCode.cpp (two table rows gain quotes, two constant messages reworded), src/js/internal/tls.ts (validateSecureProtocol gains min/max args and throws the conflict before the type check), its two callers in tls.ts and _http_server.ts, a new early-return in ChildProcess#send, the process.send() arm of ipc_host.rs::do_send, builtins.d.ts declarations, and tests. The second and third commits addressed the earlier inline feedback: the Subprocess/SubprocessExited arms in ipc_host.rs keep their original rich messages, and the stale "secureProtocol wins" comment in _http_server.ts was rewritten.
Security risks
None introduced. The TLS change only tightens validation (rejects a combination that was previously silently resolved in favor of secureProtocol); it does not alter cipher, version, or certificate handling. The IPC change swaps a message and moves the not-connected check to JS using the same native predicate (Subprocess.connected getter → is_connected()), so no new state or send path is reachable.
Level of scrutiny
Moderate. The diff is small and test-backed, but it modifies user-visible error contracts across node:tls, node:https, node:http, and node:child_process, and src/js/builtins.d.ts matches the *.d.ts CODEOWNERS rule, which rules out auto-approval. One residual Node divergence remains: the falsy-drop added to tls.Server is not applied in the https Server ctor, so an empty-string minVersion/maxVersion combined with secureProtocol throws the conflict on https.createServer where Node's tls.Server.setSecureContext would have discarded it first. This is an unlikely input and was left as a note rather than an inline finding. The previously noted cert-gating of the https TLS block (no validation when no cert/key/ca/pfx is given) is pre-existing and the author explicitly scoped it out.
Other factors
error-code-messages.test.ts covers the conflict matrix for all three entry points plus the null and falsy cases, the assignSocket message, and the fork/disconnect/send path with the callback awaited via Promise.withResolvers; node-http.test.ts was updated for the new message, and the ported test-child-process-send-after-close.js regains its upstream message assertion. The bug-hunting pass exited on dry_streak with no findings, and every point I raised on the earlier pushes was either fixed in a later commit or explicitly declined with a stated reason.
…TOCOL_VERSION_CONFLICT ERR_HTTP_SOCKET_ASSIGNED, ERR_IPC_CHANNEL_CLOSED, ERR_TLS_INVALID_PROTOCOL_VERSION and ERR_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_CONFLICT now print the text from Node's lib/internal/errors.js. The TLS values are formatted with JSON.stringify, like Node's %j. child_process.send() on a closed channel emits ERR_IPC_CHANNEL_CLOSED from the compat layer. process.send() says Channel closed too. The Bun.spawn Subprocess.send() messages do not change. tls.createSecureContext(), tls.Server and https.createServer reject secureProtocol together with minVersion or maxVersion, the way Node's createSecureContext() does. The two server paths drop a falsy value first, like Node's tls.Server.setSecureContext().
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I re-reviewed the latest push and found no bugs; the points raised in earlier rounds are now reflected in the code (Subprocess.send() text restored, %j quoting moved to the call sites, https comment reworded, child-side process.send() test added). Because src/js/builtins.d.ts is covered by CODEOWNERS, a human look is still the right final step.
What was reviewed:
- child_process.ts
send()closed-channel branch against Node'starget.send(nextTick callback /errorevent,falsereturn) and theconnectedgetter; the ported test-child-process-send-after-close.js edit restores upstream text verbatim. - validateSecureProtocol ordering (conflict before typeof/method check),
!= nullvs truthiness for min/max, and the tls.Server / http Server falsy-drop matching Node's setSecureContext. - ErrorCode.cpp: the CONFLICT simpleErrorMessages row already existed on base; both changed constant messages have no other producer sites (grepped src/js, src/runtime, src/jsc).
Extended reasoning...
Overview
The diff (10 files, +138/-22) aligns four Node ERR_* messages and adds the ERR_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_CONFLICT throw. It touches the built-in JS compat layer (src/js/internal/tls.ts, src/js/node/tls.ts, src/js/node/_http_server.ts, src/js/node/child_process.ts), two constant strings in src/jsc/bindings/ErrorCode.cpp, one string literal in src/runtime/ipc_host.rs, a .d.ts declaration, and tests. The C++ simpleErrorMessages row for the conflict code and the ErrorCode.ts entry already exist on the base commit, so the new $ERR_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_CONFLICT call resolves.
Security risks
None identified. The TLS change only adds a validation throw and drops falsy minVersion/maxVersion/secureProtocol in the server paths before validation; it does not loosen any TLS setting (a falsy value already mapped to "use native default" via tlsStringToProtocolVersion returning 0). The IPC change adds an early return on a closed channel before reaching the native send. Message text changes carry no security implication.
Level of scrutiny
Moderate. The behavioral pieces are small and each mirrors a specific Node code path: target.send in lib/internal/child_process.js (nextTick callback or error emit, false return), createSecureContext's conflict check ordering, and Server.setSecureContext's truthiness filtering. I checked that ChildProcess.connected reads the native handle's connected flag, so the new branch fires after disconnect() and after close (the ported test previously reached the native error with the same code, so the handle is non-null there). The ported Node test edit un-comments a line that matches upstream verbatim. The one remaining gap (https.createServer without a certificate not validating TLS version options) is pre-existing gating that the description explicitly names and explains; it is not introduced here.
Other factors
The bug hunt ran dry (dry_streak) with no findings. Every inline thread from earlier rounds is now addressed in code, including the child-side process.send() test added in the final commit. I did not run the test suite in this environment (no debug build present), so the "tests pass" claim rests on the author. src/js/builtins.d.ts matches the *.d.ts CODEOWNERS rule, which rules out an automated approval regardless of the diff's simplicity; a codeowner sign-off is the appropriate final step.
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Superseded by #44618, which consolidates the open TLS pull requests. This fix and its tests are in there, either as written, rewritten smaller, or merged with the other PRs that patched the same cause (see the "By area" list in that PR). Closing in favor of it. |
…N_CONFLICT (#43594) secureProtocol together with minVersion/maxVersion was accepted and secureProtocol silently won; Node throws ERR_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_CONFLICT from createSecureContext, tls.Server, https.Server and tls.connect. tls.Server and https.Server treat a falsy value as absent, as Node does. ERR_TLS_INVALID_PROTOCOL_VERSION formats the value with %j, ERR_HTTP_SOCKET_ASSIGNED and ERR_IPC_CHANNEL_CLOSED use Node's messages, and ChildProcess#send() on a closed channel reports ERR_IPC_CHANNEL_CLOSED.
…N_CONFLICT (#43594) secureProtocol together with minVersion/maxVersion was accepted and secureProtocol silently won; Node throws ERR_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_CONFLICT from createSecureContext, tls.Server, https.Server and tls.connect. tls.Server and https.Server treat a falsy value as absent, as Node does. ERR_TLS_INVALID_PROTOCOL_VERSION formats the value with %j, ERR_HTTP_SOCKET_ASSIGNED and ERR_IPC_CHANNEL_CLOSED use Node's messages, and ChildProcess#send() on a closed channel reports ERR_IPC_CHANNEL_CLOSED.
…N_CONFLICT (#43594) secureProtocol together with minVersion/maxVersion was accepted and secureProtocol silently won; Node throws ERR_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_CONFLICT from createSecureContext, tls.Server, https.Server and tls.connect. tls.Server and https.Server treat a falsy value as absent, as Node does. ERR_TLS_INVALID_PROTOCOL_VERSION formats the value with %j, ERR_HTTP_SOCKET_ASSIGNED and ERR_IPC_CHANNEL_CLOSED use Node's messages, and ChildProcess#send() on a closed channel reports ERR_IPC_CHANNEL_CLOSED.
…N_CONFLICT (#43594) secureProtocol together with minVersion/maxVersion was accepted and secureProtocol silently won; Node throws ERR_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_CONFLICT from createSecureContext, tls.Server, https.Server and tls.connect. tls.Server and https.Server treat a falsy value as absent, as Node does. ERR_TLS_INVALID_PROTOCOL_VERSION formats the value with %j, ERR_HTTP_SOCKET_ASSIGNED and ERR_IPC_CHANNEL_CLOSED use Node's messages, and ChildProcess#send() on a closed channel reports ERR_IPC_CHANNEL_CLOSED.
…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
2 participants
Problem
.messagethan node v26.3.0:ERR_HTTP_SOCKET_ASSIGNED(Socket already assigned),ERR_IPC_CHANNEL_CLOSED(Channel closed.in the template,Subprocess.send() can only be used if an IPC channel is open.fromchild.send()),ERR_TLS_INVALID_PROTOCOL_VERSIONandERR_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_CONFLICT(no quotes around the values).tls.createSecureContext({ minVersion: "TLSv1.2", secureProtocol: "TLSv1_2_method" })does not throw. Node throwsERR_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_CONFLICT. Bun pickssecureProtocolin silence (src/js/node/tls.ts,secureProtocolToVersionRange).src/jsc/bindings/ErrorCode.cpp:2305and:2430. The TLS call sites (src/js/node/tls.ts:258) pass the bare value. Thechild.send()text comes fromsrc/runtime/ipc_host.rs:118.Fixes #43520.
Fix
lib/internal/errors.js. Node formats the two TLS values with%j, so the call sites pass them throughJSON.stringify: a string is quoted and escaped, a number is bare. The table rows inErrorCode.cppdo not change.child.send()on a closed channel is handled inchild_process.ts: it emitsERR_IPC_CHANNEL_CLOSED(Channel closed) on the next tick, like Node'starget.send.process.send()saysChannel closedtoo. TheBun.spawnSubprocess.send()messages do not change.validateSecureProtocolinsrc/js/internal/tls.tsnow takesminVersionandmaxVersionand throws the conflict first, the way Node'screateSecureContext()does.tls.createSecureContext,tls.Serverandhttps.createServerall call it.tls.Server.setSecureContext()and thehttpsserver drop a falsyminVersion,maxVersionorsecureProtocolbefore that, like Node'stls.Server.test/js/node/errors/error-code-messages.test.ts(four new tests, stock bun fails all of them and the first one). Alsotest/js/node/tls/,test/js/node/child_process/,spawn.ipc.test.ts,node-http.test.tsand the portedtest-tls-*andtest-child-process-send-after-close.js.process.send()error through the C++ constant case. Every Rust.err()site passes its own message, and there is no C ABI entry for a code with no message.Background
$ERR_FOO(a, b). The build turns it into a call ofjsFunctionMakeErrorWithCodeinErrorCode.cpp, which builds the message: acasefor a constant message, or a row insimpleErrorMessagesfor fixed text around one or two arguments.secureProtocolis the legacy way to pin the TLS version (TLSv1_2_method).minVersionandmaxVersionare the modern way. Node rejects both at once.child.send(),process.send()andSubprocess.send()share one Rust entry,ipc_host::do_send.child_process.tsnow checksconnectedbefore it reaches that entry, so the Node text lives in the compat layer.Notes
{ minVersion: "TLSv9", secureProtocol: "bad_method" }gives the conflict), andminVersion: nulldoes not conflict. The helper keeps that order.%jisJSON.stringify. The first push put the quotes in the table rows, which quoted a number ("0") and did not escape an inner quote. The call sites now stringify the value instead. Checked on node v26.3.0:minVersion: 0gives0 is not a valid minimum TLS protocol version,minVersion: 'a"b'gives"a\"b" is not ....Server.setSecureContext()storesminVersion,maxVersionandsecureProtocolonly when truthy. Sonew tls.Server({ minVersion: "", secureProtocol: "TLS_method" })starts in Node. The first push threw the conflict there. Thetls.Serverandhttpsserver paths now drop falsy values first. This also stopsnew tls.Server({ minVersion: "" })from throwingERR_TLS_INVALID_PROTOCOL_VERSION, which it did before this PR and Node does not.Subprocess.send()sayChannel closedas well. That genericized a Bun-native message for a Node compat fix, so it was reverted. The Node text now comes fromchild_process.tsand from theprocess.send()arm inipc_host.rs.https.createServeronly enters its TLS block whencert,key,caorpfxis given (_http_server.ts:300-332). Without a certificate the conflict is not checked, and neither isminVersion: "TLSv9". That gating is older than this change and is not touched here. The http server ctor cannot tellhttps.createServerfromhttp.createServer, so a check outside that block would also throw for plain http servers, which Node does not.node-http.test.ts:1551(toThrow("Socket already assigned")) and the first test oferror-code-messages.test.ts. Both now expect Node's text. The portedtest-child-process-send-after-close.jsgets its upstreammessage: 'Channel closed'assertion back.test/js/node/tls/has one failure in this container that is not related:SNICallback runs even when the requested servername matches the bind hostnamefails on main without this diff (ECONNREFUSED).test/js/node/child_process/has two that fail on main too (default shell,extra stdio pipes are not double-closed on GC).error-code-messages.test.ts.[human-review] gate passed · iteration 1 · 10 files touched
fails on main (without fix)
passes on PR (with fix)
diff hotspot
gate history · 2 passed · 0 rejected · iteration 1
evidence per changed file
root cause · written by the author bot
Four Node error codes in
src/jsc/bindings/ErrorCode.cppcarried message templates that diverged from Node'slib/internal/errors.js, andtls.createSecureContextnever raisedERR_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_CONFLICTwhenminVersionormaxVersionwas combined withsecureProtocol. The fix rewrites theERR_HTTP_SOCKET_ASSIGNEDandERR_IPC_CHANNEL_CLOSEDconstants to Node's exact text, quotes the TLS protocol values at the call sites to match Node's%jformatting, and adds the missing conflict check in the TLS validation path. It also makeschild.send()on a closed channel return `…