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Status: fix pushed, waiting for CI. How I reproduced it: a local HTTPS origin ( On Linux x64 the proxied cost grew 3.1 to 3.6 times per doubling and the direct cost about 2 times. A gdb counter on the Windows: CI ran the named-pipe test on Windows 2019 x64 and Windows 11 aarch64 (8 pass, 0 fail). |
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Included review availability: This review used your included allowance. Your plan provides up to 10 included reviews per hour; 3 remain after this review. WalkthroughSSLWrapper replaces separate memory BIOs with one custom BIO backed by incoming and outgoing ciphertext queues. TLS traffic handling uses those queues for input, output, pending-data checks, and shutdown. New tests cover large transfers, proxy tunnels, named pipes, and Duplex-backed TLS streams. ChangesTLS ciphertext queue
Suggested reviewers: Priority: ➖ Normal Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The previously identified RSS test failure is fixed, and no remaining issue has been established that would prevent merging after normal checks. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.
Beyond the inline nit, I also checked that no RefCell borrow of Ciphertext is live across an SSL_* call or the write handler (take_outgoing detaches before the callback, bio_read/bio_write hold the borrow only for the copy), that a record straddling the VecDeque seam is safe because BoringSSL's read-buffer fill loops on short positive reads, and that handle_writing re-checks ssl liveness after the handler before recycling the buffer — none of these turned up a bug.
Extended reasoning...
The change rewrites the ciphertext transport of the Rust SSLWrapper in src/uws/lib.rs (used by UpgradedDuplex, Windows named pipes, CONNECT tunnels and WebSocket-over-proxy), replacing two BIO_s_mem with one custom BIO method backed by a Vec and a VecDeque, plus new BoringSSL externs and tests in four suites. It touches a TLS data path, so it is security-relevant even though it does not alter verification or crypto decisions. The only surviving finding is a test-isolation nit; the re-entrancy, ring-wrap, and liveness concerns were examined against the diff and BoringSSL's buffer-fill behavior and ruled out.
A BoringSSL memory BIO moves every unread byte to its front after each read. SSLWrapper drained its write BIO 64 KiB at a time and BoringSSL read the input BIO one TLS record at a time, so both directions cost quadratic time in what was queued. One BIO with a custom method is now both ends of the SSL. Its state is two queues in the wrapper: BoringSSL reads incoming ciphertext from the front of a ring, and handle_writing detaches the outgoing buffer and gives it to the write handler in one call. Other queues that are drained from the front are not changed here. The custom BIO externs follow the ones in #34037.
…counting process.cpuUsage() on Windows advances in scheduler ticks that are longer than either measurement, so the ratio was 0/0. The pooled-tunnel test counted CONNECT lines in a log that earlier tests in the file also write to.
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Updated 6:28 PM PT - Oct 5th, 2026
❌ @robobun, your commit 7ef745e has 2 failures in
🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 44464That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-44464 --bun |
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Actionable comments posted: 2
- 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @test/js/bun/http/proxy.test.ts:
- Line 1157: Update the retainedMiB calculation in the test’s console.log to
report retained / MiB without rounding, so the assertion checks the measured RSS
value against the bound.
Review comments at @test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts:
- Line 1069: Update the split-record test’s `data` handler so the test waits for
a `data` event before pushing the remaining pieces, and assert that the handler
pushed at least one piece. Preserve the existing integrity assertion.
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test/js/bun/http/proxy.test.tstest/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts
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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.
Beyond the inline finding, I also checked the new BIO's lifetime and re-entrancy: BIO_set_data targets Ciphertext inside the boxed Inner (stable address, set after the box exists, and deinit frees the SSL/BIO before ciphertext.free()); no RefCell borrow of either queue is held across an SSL_* call or a handler (take_outgoing detaches before trigger_wanna_write_callback, bio_read/bio_write borrow only within the hook); and SSL_set_bio(ssl, bio, bio) with equal pointers transfers the single reference, so there is no double free. The previously noted proxy-log reset is now in place in the second commit.
Extended reasoning...
The change replaces SSLWrapper's two BIO_s_mem with a custom queue-backed BIO in src/uws/lib.rs plus FFI declarations in src/boringssl_sys/boringssl.rs and small owner updates in UpgradedDuplex.rs and socket_body.rs, with new tests in four files. It touches the TLS engine used by CONNECT tunnels, node:tls over Duplex and named pipes, which is security- and memory-safety-sensitive. The hunt ended on max_bugs rather than running dry, and the pointer-lifetime, RefCell re-entrancy, and single-BIO ownership checks above were examined by hand and ruled out; a human look at the BoringSSL interaction remains worthwhile.
…ests Each comment added in src/ is now one line, or a SAFETY note. The pooled-tunnel test compares the unrounded RSS figure. The ring test asserts that some ciphertext was pushed from inside a 'data' event.
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I reviewed the latest revision and found no bugs. Because it replaces the ciphertext I/O of the TLS engine behind CONNECT tunnels, node:tls over a Duplex and named pipes with new unsafe BIO hooks, a human look is still worthwhile.
What was reviewed: both earlier inline points are addressed in the current code (the proxy log is reset before the fixture runs in test/js/bun/http/proxy.test.ts; the three queue-growth sites in src/uws/lib.rs go through try_reserve().unwrap_or_oom()).
Checked the custom BIO lifecycle: SSL_set_bio consumes the single reference when rbio == wbio, BIO_set_data/BIO_set_init run before start, SSL_free releases the BIO before the queues are dropped, and no RefCell borrow is held across an SSL_* call or a handler (bio_read/bio_write do not call out).
Checked that returning only the ring's front slice is safe because BoringSSL's read-buffer fill loops on BIO_read, and that all four write handlers clamp to i32 and buffer partial writes, so the larger single slices handed out by handle_writing are fine.
For a human to weigh: the CPU-ratio assertion (large/small < 4) in node-tls-connect.test.ts is timing-based on a shared CI host, and the perf figures in the description were not re-measured after the try_reserve change and the merge of main.
Extended reasoning...
The change replaces two BIO_s_mem BIOs in SSLWrapper (src/uws/lib.rs) with one custom BIO backed by a Vec outgoing queue and a VecDeque incoming ring, adds the BIO_meth_* externs in src/boringssl_sys/boringssl.rs, trims two comments, and adds tests in four files. It touches the TLS engine used by HTTPS CONNECT tunnels, node:tls over Duplex and Windows named pipes, i.e. security-sensitive crypto I/O with new unsafe extern "C" callbacks, though no key, verify or auth logic changes. The bug hunt ran dry with no findings and the two prior nits were fixed in later commits, but the size and intricacy of the re-entrancy and lifetime reasoning, plus a timing-based CPU-ratio test, make this one a human should also read rather than an auto-approve. No CODEOWNERS entry covers the changed files and no third-party objection is outstanding in the timeline metadata.
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Superseded by #44618, which consolidates the open TLS pull requests. This fix and its tests are in there, either as written, rewritten smaller, or merged with the other PRs that patched the same cause (see the "By area" list in that PR). Closing in favor of it. |
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SSLWrapper kept its ciphertext in two BIO_s_mem. A writable memory BIO moves every unread byte to its front after each read, so both directions cost time quadratic in what was queued: a write was copied out 64 KiB at a time, a chunk from the transport was taken out one TLS record at a time. One 32 MB chunk into a TLS socket over a Duplex took 12 s of CPU, a 64 MB fetch() body through a CONNECT proxy 1.9 s. The buffer of a memory BIO never shrinks either, so a pooled tunnel kept an allocation the size of the largest body it had sent. One custom BIO is now both ends of the SSL. BoringSSL reads incoming ciphertext from the front of a ring, and handle_writing takes the whole outgoing buffer and gives it to the `write` handler in one call. The frame that hands bytes out owns them, so a write made from inside the handler queues behind them. A queue that empties with more than 128 KiB of capacity gives it back. All four owners (TLS over a Duplex, Windows named pipes, fetch and WebSocket through a CONNECT proxy) now get one `write` per flush instead of 64 KiB pieces. init_with_ctx has no fallible step left between SSL_new and the wrapper that owns the SSL, so its two scopeguards go. BIO and BIO_METHOD become opaque: their by-value layouts did not match the vendored BoringSSL.
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SSLWrapper kept its ciphertext in two BIO_s_mem. A writable memory BIO moves every unread byte to its front after each read, so both directions cost time quadratic in what was queued: a write was copied out 64 KiB at a time, a chunk from the transport was taken out one TLS record at a time. One 32 MB chunk into a TLS socket over a Duplex took 12 s of CPU, a 64 MB fetch() body through a CONNECT proxy 1.9 s. The buffer of a memory BIO never shrinks either, so a pooled tunnel kept an allocation the size of the largest body it had sent. One custom BIO is now both ends of the SSL. BoringSSL reads incoming ciphertext from the front of a ring, and handle_writing takes the whole outgoing buffer and gives it to the `write` handler in one call. The frame that hands bytes out owns them, so a write made from inside the handler queues behind them. A queue that empties with more than 128 KiB of capacity gives it back. All four owners (TLS over a Duplex, Windows named pipes, fetch and WebSocket through a CONNECT proxy) now get one `write` per flush instead of 64 KiB pieces. init_with_ctx has no fallible step left between SSL_new and the wrapper that owns the SSL, so its two scopeguards go. BIO and BIO_METHOD become opaque: their by-value layouts did not match the vendored BoringSSL.
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SSLWrapper kept its ciphertext in two BIO_s_mem. A writable memory BIO moves every unread byte to its front after each read, so both directions cost time quadratic in what was queued: a write was copied out 64 KiB at a time, a chunk from the transport was taken out one TLS record at a time. One 32 MB chunk into a TLS socket over a Duplex took 12 s of CPU, a 64 MB fetch() body through a CONNECT proxy 1.9 s. The buffer of a memory BIO never shrinks either, so a pooled tunnel kept an allocation the size of the largest body it had sent. One custom BIO is now both ends of the SSL. BoringSSL reads incoming ciphertext from the front of a ring, and handle_writing takes the whole outgoing buffer and gives it to the `write` handler in one call. The frame that hands bytes out owns them, so a write made from inside the handler queues behind them. A queue that empties with more than 128 KiB of capacity gives it back. All four owners (TLS over a Duplex, Windows named pipes, fetch and WebSocket through a CONNECT proxy) now get one `write` per flush instead of 64 KiB pieces. init_with_ctx has no fallible step left between SSL_new and the wrapper that owns the SSL, so its two scopeguards go. BIO and BIO_METHOD become opaque: their by-value layouts did not match the vendored BoringSSL.
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SSLWrapper kept its ciphertext in two BIO_s_mem. A writable memory BIO moves every unread byte to its front after each read, so both directions cost time quadratic in what was queued: a write was copied out 64 KiB at a time, a chunk from the transport was taken out one TLS record at a time. One 32 MB chunk into a TLS socket over a Duplex took 12 s of CPU, a 64 MB fetch() body through a CONNECT proxy 1.9 s. The buffer of a memory BIO never shrinks either, so a pooled tunnel kept an allocation the size of the largest body it had sent. One custom BIO is now both ends of the SSL. BoringSSL reads incoming ciphertext from the front of a ring, and handle_writing takes the whole outgoing buffer and gives it to the `write` handler in one call. The frame that hands bytes out owns them, so a write made from inside the handler queues behind them. A queue that empties with more than 128 KiB of capacity gives it back. All four owners (TLS over a Duplex, Windows named pipes, fetch and WebSocket through a CONNECT proxy) now get one `write` per flush instead of 64 KiB pieces. init_with_ctx has no fallible step left between SSL_new and the wrapper that owns the SSL, so its two scopeguards go. BIO and BIO_METHOD become opaque: their by-value layouts did not match the vendored BoringSSL.
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…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
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Problem
fetch()body sent through a CONNECT tunnel costs quadratic CPU: 32 MB takes 431 ms, 46 ms direct. The stack isOPENSSL_memmove <- mem_read <- BIO_read <- SSLWrapper::handle_writing.SSLWrapperqueued ciphertext in twoBIO_s_mem(src/uws/lib.rs:517).mem_readmoves all unread bytes after each read, in both directions.Fix
handle_writinggives the whole outgoing buffer to thewritehandler in one call.test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts(2 of 4 new tests fail before). More in Notes.Background
SSLreads and writes ciphertext through.BIO_s_memis the built-in one over a growable buffer.SSLWrapperis the TLS engine for CONNECT tunnels,node:tlsover a Duplex and Windows named pipes.SSL_writecaps the memmove, it does not remove it.Downsides
writehandler gets one call per write: 1 chunk for a 1 MiB write over a Duplex (17 before, node 2). Tunnels still have no backpressure.Inner<T>grows from 224 to 296 bytes. It makes 1 BIO allocation, not 4.Notes
Reported by @Jarred-Sumner. The custom BIO externs follow the ones in #34037.
Not changed
ProxyTunnel::writeandWebSocketProxyTunnel::writestill report every write as taken, and the owner copies what the socket did not take. That needs thewritehandler to report what the sink took, which changes all four owners.mem_readin BoringSSL still moves the remainder. No other code in bun reads a writableBIO_s_mem.Out of memory
try_reserve(n).unwrap_or_oom(), the form the Rust conventions of this repo give for a runtime allocation failure.BIO_writeinto the memory BIO returned an error. A failedSSL_writeclosed that connection.receive_datadropped the bytes of a failed write and did nothing more.ProxyTunnel.rs:461,WebSocketProxyTunnel.rs:395) already end the process when they cannot grow.bun_uwscrate before the link-time optimization:bio_write43 -> 48 instructions (one call per sealed record),reserve_outgoing18 -> 23 (one call per write),push_incoming46 -> 53 (one call per chunk from the transport).Windows
node-tls-namedpipes.test.tson Windows 2019 x64 and Windows 11 aarch64 (build 122950): 8 pass, 0 fail, with the new 1 MiB round trip.process.cpuUsage()advances in steps of about 15.6 ms there, so both runs read 0 and the ratio wasNaNin build 122950. The other three Duplex tests run on Windows.bun run rust:check-allwas not rerun. CI built every target for the previous commit (build 123244, green).Review
VecDeque<u8>) and for the list under "Not changed". Both are done.src/is one line or aSAFETY:note, the RSS figure is compared unrounded, the ring test asserts that the'data'handler pushed a piece, and the queues grow throughunwrap_or_oom.Suites run
bun bd teston this branch merged with main at 13a98b0:node-tls-connect.test.ts175 pass, 1 skip, 4 fail.proxy.test.ts97 pass, 1 skip.websocket-proxy.test.ts40 pass, 4 skip.bun.shhost. On my machine they fail the same way with the released bun 1.4.3-canary.1+367d939d9:alpnProtocol is not http/1.1, andcert.infoAccessis undefined.end()over a Duplex, which run throughSSLWrapper::shutdown. They pass.proxy-stress-*suites (853 pass),fetch-backpressure,websocket-buffered-amount,node-tls-upgrade,tls-reject-before-client-certand the wss tunnel leak and reentrancy suites (305 pass), and the ported node teststest-tls-js-stream,test-tls-inception,test-tls-destroy-stream,test-tls-buffersize,test-tls-streamwrap-buffersize. Not rerun since.Tests
write()over a Duplex reaches the transport in 1 chunk (17 before). One 8 MB chunk from the transport costs under 4 times the CPU of the same bytes in 64 KiB chunks (36 to 44 times before, on a release build).'data'and from the transport'swrite()keep both streams in order. Ciphertext that arrives while an earlier chunk is partly decrypted is read in order.proxy.test.ts: a pooled tunnel keeps under half of a 64 MiB body in RSS. Skipped under ASAN, which keeps freed memory resident. On a release build it fails before (64 MiB kept).Measurements
Release builds on Linux x64, merge base bc7a813 against this branch. The host was heavily loaded. Untouched paths differ by up to 30% between the two builds, so treat that as the noise floor. The numbers predate the merge of main at 13a98b0 and the change to
try_reserve. They were not taken again.mem_readmemmove reached fromSSLWrapper(gdb counter): 0 calls on upload, download, Duplex write, wss, Duplex read and small records. Before: 391 calls / 1,596,151,407 bytes (3 x 8 MiB upload), 3,082 / 790,893,365 (download), 399 / 1,602,375,684 (Duplex write), 3,467 / 2,384,251,599 (wss).node:tlswrite over a Duplex 8 / 16 / 32 / 64 MB: 11 / 17 / 46 / 161 ms (before 36 / 120 / 424 / 1525, node v26.3.0 16 / 27 / 62 / 164).handle_writingto the handler call: 237 -> 25.size_of::<Inner<T>>(): 224 -> 296 bytes (mimalloc bin 224 -> 320).handle_writingper instantiation: 335 -> 308 bytes. Host functions +0.send()calls per tunnelled upload: 1 MiB 17 -> 2, 8 MiB 129 -> 4.no test proof · iteration 1 · platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine, deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/node/tls/node-tls-namedpipes.test.ts, test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts, test/js/bun/http/proxy.test.ts