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Updated 7:05 AM PT - Aug 14th, 2026
❌ @robobun, your commit 205cd0c has some failures in 🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 30314That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-30314 --bun |
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Found 3 issues this PR may fix:
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WalkthroughPins and exposes a CA-store runtime option, parses a ChangesCA Store Configuration and Resolution
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Actionable comments posted: 3
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In `@src/cli/Arguments.zig`:
- Around line 1046-1056: The env-var branch treats any presence of
NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CA (including "0") as true; change the condition so it checks
the actual value string from bun.env_var.NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CA.get() (e.g., match
on .?value and verify value != "0" and optionally not "false") before setting
Bun__Node__CAStore = .system; update the branch that currently uses
bun.env_var.NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CA.get() to only take effect when the env var's
value is truthy (not "0"/"false"), keeping the other symbols/use_bundled_ca,
use_openssl_ca, use_system_ca, and ctx.runtime_options.ca_store precedence
intact.
In `@test/js/node/tls/test-use-system-ca.test.ts`:
- Around line 125-136: The test currently asserts exitCode before checking
stdout/stderr for the spawned process; update the assertion order in the
spawn-result checks (the block using spawn(...), proc,
Promise.all([proc.stdout.text(), proc.stderr.text(), proc.exited]) and the
variables stdout, stderr, exitCode) so that you first assert stdout and stderr
expectations (expect(stdout.trim()).toBe("OK"); expect(stderr).toBe("");) and
only then assert expect(exitCode).toBe(0);; make the same reorder in the other
two similar blocks referenced (the blocks around the Promise.all usages at the
other spawn sites).
- Around line 183-210: The test currently only checks that
getCACertificates("default") returns an array which doesn't prove bun test
respected CA = "system"; modify the probe test (probe.test.ts) to export or
print the actual certificate count (e.g., call
getCACertificates("default").length and log it) and in the parent test compare
that numeric value against a known baseline—either the bundled CA baseline or
the value returned by defaultCertCount(["--use-system-ca"])—by spawning bun test
twice (or computing baseline separately) and asserting the spawned test's
printed count differs appropriately when the system CA is selected; update the
spawn invocation and expectations to parse the printed count from stdout and
assert the numeric comparison instead of Array.isArray.
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src/cli/Arguments.zigsrc/cli/bunfig.zigsrc/cli/cli.zigsrc/options_types/Context.zigtest/js/node/tls/test-use-system-ca.test.ts
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Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In `@docs/runtime/bunfig.mdx`:
- Around line 120-121: Update the sentence that currently reads "Applies to `bun
run` and `bun test`" so it also includes `bun auto`; locate the sentence in
docs/runtime/bunfig.mdx that mentions the CA certificate store applicability and
change it to explicitly state "Applies to `bun run`, `bun test`, and `bun auto`"
to match the implementation objective.
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docs/runtime/bunfig.mdx
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Actionable comments posted: 3
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In `@src/cli/repl_command.zig`:
- Around line 25-29: The call to bun.cli.Arguments.applyBunfigCAStore is
currently guarded by if (!ctx.debug.loaded_bunfig), so when bunfig is already
preloaded the CA from ctx.runtime_options.ca_store never gets copied into
Bun__Node__CAStore; remove the guard or call
bun.cli.Arguments.applyBunfigCAStore(ctx) unconditionally after the existing if
block (keep bun.cli.Arguments.loadConfigPath inside the if) so that
applyBunfigCAStore always runs and ensures ctx.runtime_options.ca_store is
copied into Bun__Node__CAStore regardless of ctx.debug.loaded_bunfig.
In `@test/js/node/tls/test-use-system-ca.test.ts`:
- Around line 77-90: The helper defaultCertCount currently inherits the test
runner's cwd when cwd is omitted, which can pick up an ambient bunfig.toml;
change defaultCertCount (and its use of spawn/bunExe/probe) to run in an
isolated temporary directory when cwd is undefined by creating a fresh temp
folder (e.g., mkdtemp) and passing that path as cwd to spawn; ensure the temp
dir is cleaned up after the proc completes so all calls to defaultCertCount
without an explicit cwd become hermetic.
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docs/runtime/bunfig.mdxsrc/cli/Arguments.zigsrc/cli/repl_command.zigsrc/cli/run_command.zigtest/js/node/tls/test-use-system-ca.test.ts
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All prior feedback has been addressed (thanks!) and I found no new issues, but I'm deferring to a human reviewer since this configures TLS trust-store selection and threads a new locked-global through five deferred bunfig-load sites — worth a second pair of eyes on the precedence/ordering.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
This PR adds a top-level CA key to bunfig.toml ("system" / "openssl" / "bundled") as a persistent equivalent to the --use-*-ca CLI flags. It touches 9 files: the bunfig parser, Arguments.zig (precedence logic + new Bun__Node__CAStore_locked global + applyBunfigCAStore() helper), five call sites that invoke applyBunfigCAStore after deferred bunfig loads (run_command.zig, repl_command.zig, bun.js.zig ×2, plus inside parse itself), the Context.zig options struct, cli.zig type re-export, docs, and ~170 lines of new tests.
Over the course of review I flagged two real ordering bugs (the .RunCommand deferred-load gap in ee2d55f and the standalone-executable gap in 9467c48), plus several test-quality and docs nits — all now resolved. The current bug-hunting pass found nothing new.
Security risks
The change selects which root CA store the runtime trusts for TLS verification. The mechanism itself is sound — it only routes between three pre-existing stores (bundled Mozilla, OpenSSL default, OS trust store), all of which were already reachable via CLI flags. The precedence (CLI > env > bunfig > default) is documented and tested, and the _locked flag prevents a late bunfig load from overriding an explicit CLI/env choice. I don't see an exploitable issue, but "which CAs do we trust" is inherently security-sensitive configuration and the multi-site application pattern (five applyBunfigCAStore calls covering different boot paths) is the kind of thing where a missed call site silently degrades to the wrong store — exactly the class of bug this PR already had to fix twice during review.
Level of scrutiny
Medium-high. This is a user-facing feature in production code paths (run/auto/test/repl/standalone), not a config tweak or refactor. The locking mechanism and the need to sprinkle applyBunfigCAStore after every deferred loadConfigPath(..., .RunCommand) is a design decision a maintainer should sign off on — particularly whether there's a cleaner single-point-of-application, and whether the top-level CA key name (vs. nesting under [run] or similar) is the desired surface.
Other factors
Test coverage is thorough for the happy paths and precedence rules across bun <file>, bun run <file>, and bun test. CI shows two unrelated pre-existing flakes (s3-storage-class, http-emit-close-on-abort). All review threads — mine and CodeRabbit's — are resolved. Given the security-adjacent surface and the non-trivial cross-cutting wiring, I'm not auto-approving.
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All prior feedback has been addressed and I didn't find anything new this round — deferring to a human since this is a security-adjacent feature (TLS CA store selection) with a non-trivial precedence/locking scheme spread across several deferred-load sites in both the Zig and Rust runtimes.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
Adds a top-level CA key to bunfig.toml ("system" / "openssl" / "bundled") as a persistent equivalent to the --use-*-ca flags. Touches 14 files: the bunfig parser (Zig + Rust), RuntimeOptions / BunCAStore type plumbing in options_types/, the CA precedence block in Arguments.{zig,rs}, a new applyBunfigCAStore helper plus a Bun__Node__CAStore_locked flag, call sites in run_command, repl_command, and bun.js.zig (boot / bootStandalone), docs, and tests.
Security risks
This directly controls which CA trust store the runtime uses for TLS verification. The change itself only adds a new source for an existing setting (the values map onto the same three stores already reachable via CLI flags / NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CA), so it doesn't introduce a new trust surface. The main risk is precedence/ordering: a bug here could cause a user's explicit --use-bundled-ca to be silently overridden by a project-local bunfig.toml, or vice versa. The _locked flag addresses exactly that, and the test suite covers CLI-over-bunfig and env-over-bunfig, but the number of distinct entry paths (auto, run, test, repl, standalone, preloaded --config) makes this worth a human pass.
Level of scrutiny
Medium-high. Not a trivial config tweak: it's a user-facing feature in security-adjacent code, the review surfaced two real ordering bugs (the .RunCommand deferred-load gap and the bootStandalone gap) that were fixed mid-review, and the most recent push ports the whole thing to the Rust runtime in parallel. The Zig and Rust implementations need to stay in lockstep.
Other factors
- All five rounds of my prior inline feedback (test assertion ordering, weak
bun testassertion,describe.concurrent, missing docs, dead anchors, thebun rundeferred-load bug, and thebun.js.zigstandalone gap) have been addressed and resolved. - robobun's CI comment currently shows
build-rustfailures on several targets for 88e7ded; worth confirming eee21cf (autofix) cleared those before merge. - Good test coverage for the precedence matrix (CLI > env > bunfig) and for
bun run/bun testpaths; no coverage for the standalone-executable path, which is harder to test but was fixed by inspection. - Design choices a maintainer may want to weigh in on: top-level
CAkey naming (vs. e.g.[run].ca), and accepting bothCAand lowercaseca.
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CI status: every executed lane passed on 19cacd8. The two remaining reds on build 57692 ( |
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Rebased onto main and force-pushed ( Conflict resolution: main deleted the Final diff is 7 files: the 5 Rust files, Verified the full precedence matrix directly against the debug build ( Note: |
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Rebased onto latest main ( Heads-up for whoever reviews: current main HEAD does not build, independent of this PR. I confirmed this reproduces with every file of this PR reverted to The CA feature itself compiles ( Once main's codegen path is fixed, a re-run (or trivial rebase) should go green. |
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Update: main fixed the codegen path (
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`bun run <file>` defers its bunfig.toml load to RunCommand.exec (it needs to resolve the script's directory first), so the CA precedence block in Arguments.parse runs before ctx.runtime_options.ca_store is populated, leaving `CA = "system"` silently ignored. Extract the precedence step into `applyBunfigCAStore()`, call it once from Arguments.parse (to cover .AutoCommand/.TestCommand which load bunfig eagerly), and again from RunCommand.exec/repl_command after the deferred load. A CLI flag or NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CA env var pins the store via a lock flag so the later call cannot downgrade it. Also fix two docs nits from the same review: say the CA key applies to `bun run`, `bun test`, and implicit `bun file.ts` invocations, and point the cross-reference at `install.ca and install.cafile`'s actual combined anchor.
Three review findings on ee2d55f: 1. Standalone `bun build --compile` binaries call `bun.js.Run.bootStandalone` which defers the bunfig load but never called `applyBunfigCAStore`, so `CA = "system"` was silently ignored in compiled executables. Same for `Run.boot` in bun.js.zig. Both sites now apply the bunfig value. 2. In `RunCommand.exec` / `repl_command` the apply call sat inside the `if (!loaded_bunfig)` guard — if bunfig was preloaded (e.g. via `--config`), the CA value was parsed but never copied into `Bun__Node__CAStore`. Call `applyBunfigCAStore` unconditionally; the lock flag still keeps a CLI flag / env var authoritative. 3. The test file: make `defaultCertCount`'s default cwd an empty temp dir so callers without an explicit `cwd` can't pick up an ambient `bunfig.toml`. Tighten the openssl test from "it parses" to "matches `--use-openssl-ca`", mirroring the system/bundled parity checks.
The Bun-in-Rust rewrite (#30412) landed between my PR and main — the CLI-argument parsing, bunfig.toml parsing, and the run/repl/standalone boot sites are now in Rust, and the Rust side didn't carry over the bunfig `CA = "system"` parsing or the deferred-load `apply` hook I added on the Zig side. Port the same shape 1:1: - `options_types/context.rs`: add `pub enum BunCAStore` and `runtime_options.ca_store: Option<BunCAStore>`, mirroring Context.zig. - `bunfig.rs`: parse top-level `CA` / `ca` for Run/Auto/Test commands into `ctx.runtime_options.ca_store`. - `cli/Arguments.rs`: replace local `BunCAStore` with a re-export from `bun_options_types::context`. Add `Bun__Node__CAStore_locked` and `apply_bunfig_ca_store(ctx)` with the same precedence contract as the Zig version (CLI flag > NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CA > bunfig > bundled). CLI/env branches pin the lock flag so a later bunfig load can't downgrade them. - `run_command.rs` (boot / boot_standalone / the fast-run bunfig reload site), `repl_command.rs`: call `apply_bunfig_ca_store(ctx)` after each deferred `load_config_path`. The Zig-side copies of the same sites still exist as dead code but match for consistency. All 12 tests in `test/js/node/tls/test-use-system-ca.test.ts` pass under bun bd; the two load-bearing tests (`CA = "system"` matches `--use-system-ca`, invalid-value diagnostic) fail under stashed src.
Both prior CI failures were infra/flake (libspng GitHub 502 during vendor fetch on one ASAN C++ build; streams-leak.test.ts known RSS threshold flake on debian-13-x64, same flake fired on 5 other platforms in the same run per the retry annotation). Neither touches this PR's diff.
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Re-reviewed after 76d5580 / 205cd0c — the call-site comments are now one line each, so the earlier nit (and the comment-cop warnings) are resolved. No issues found this pass.
Deferring final sign-off to a maintainer since this adds a new user-facing bunfig key (CA) that selects the runtime TLS trust store — the key name, accepted values, and precedence are API surface worth a human confirming.
What was reviewed
- Precedence logic in
Arguments.rs: CLI flag /NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CAset the lock beforeapply_bunfig_ca_store, andBun__Node__UseSystemCAis still written on every path. - All deferred
load_config_path(.., RunCommand)sites (run_command.rs×3,repl_command.rs) callapply_bunfig_ca_storeoutside theloaded_bunfigguard. BunCAStoremove tocontext.rskeeps#[repr(u8)]and the same discriminant order the C++ side reads viaBun__Node__CAStore.- Bunfig parser branch: invalid values error via
add_error_format(non-zero exit), and the top-levelCA/cakey doesn't collide with[install].ca.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
Adds a top-level CA = "system" | "openssl" | "bundled" key to bunfig.toml that selects the runtime TLS CA store, equivalent to the existing --use-*-ca CLI flags. Touches: bunfig.rs (parser branch), context.rs (moves BunCAStore enum + adds runtime_options.ca_store), Arguments.rs (precedence block + apply_bunfig_ca_store helper + Bun__Node__CAStore_locked static), three run_command.rs call sites and one repl_command.rs call site (deferred bunfig loads), docs, and tests.
Since my last comment (11:05 UTC), commits 76d5580 and 205cd0c trimmed every multi-line call-site/doc comment to a single line, addressing both my nit and the comment-cop bot's inline warnings. No logic changed.
Security risks
The change routes to one of three CA stores that are already selectable via CLI flags and NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CA; it does not introduce a new trust source or weaken verification. The precedence (CLI > env > bunfig > bundled) means an ambient bunfig.toml cannot override an explicit CLI/env choice — the lock flag is set before apply_bunfig_ca_store runs. The parser rejects unknown values with a hard error rather than silently falling through. I don't see a way this expands the attack surface beyond what the existing flags already permit.
Level of scrutiny
Medium-high. The implementation is mechanical plumbing of an existing capability, but (a) it's a new user-facing config key whose name and value set become permanent API, and (b) it's TLS-adjacent. Per the repo's review guidance on API design and security-sensitive paths, a maintainer should confirm the surface (uppercase CA with lowercase alias, string enum values, documented precedence) is what they want before it ships.
Other factors
This PR has been through several review rounds since May: the missed deferred-load sites (my earlier finding), the non-hermetic test cwd, the openssl parity assertion, the REPL guard placement, and the .zig dual-tracking have all been fixed or mooted by rebase. Test coverage is thorough — the full precedence matrix plus bun run, bun test, and invalid-value paths, verified to fail on baseline. All comment-cop and CodeRabbit threads are resolved. The remaining open item is my own nit thread, which the latest two commits address; nothing substantive is outstanding.
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CI for 205cd0c is effectively green: 177 of 179 jobs passed, and the build only reports failed because the two darwin 14 aarch64 test jobs expired waiting for an agent. The two flaky-test warnings (inspect-error-leak timeout, napi test_buffer) passed on retry and are unrelated to this change. Ready for maintainer review. |
anru
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This PR doesn't fix #17108 issue. Bun must take into account NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CA, NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED or other net/tls related ENV for network operations.
Bun should take this ENVs into account regardless of the command used. These environment variables should act as runtime-wide environment properties, not just for specific commands.
| | `"system"` | Bundled CAs merged with the OS trust store (Keychain on macOS, Windows Certificate Store on Windows, system PEM bundle on Linux). | | ||
| | `"openssl"` | OpenSSL's default CA store. | | ||
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| Precedence: CLI flag > `NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CA` env var > `bunfig.toml` `CA` > `"bundled"` (default). This does not affect `bun install`'s registry client — for that, see [`install.ca` and `install.cafile`](#install-ca-and-install-cafile). |
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This does not affect
bun install's registry client — for that, seeinstall.caandinstall.cafile.
This is flawed logic. See here #17325 for why.
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Ok, @robobun here is additional context for you why this is flawed logic (from issue #17325 ):
As a user who want adopt bun in SDLC - I don't want to commit the certificate itself or the path to it. I want to be able to set a single certificate for all operations performed through bun, like the NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS variable for a node. Or in other words, I want to configure my environment, via a variable once, and thus allow all bun commands to work correctly.
Bun must take into account NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CA, NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED or other net/tls related ENV for network operations.
Bun should take this ENVs into account regardless of the command used. These environment variables should act as runtime-wide environment properties, not just for specific commands.
I propose to expand the scope of this MR so that the bun actually takes these environmental variables into account at the proper level. In that case this will fix issue #17325
@Jarred-Sumner what do you think about this ?
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Also, can you reopen issue #17325 ? This issue is not resolved on main branch:
shell session with Bun v1.4.0 (revision 34cbb9a):
buni *1 ❯ NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=/etc/ssl/certs/internal-net.crt NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CA=1 bun install
bun install v1.4.0 (34cbb9a40)
HTTPThread: the CA is invalid
buni *1 ❯ echo $?
1
buni *1 ❯ NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=/etc/ssl/certs/internal-net.crt yarn install --silent --pure-lockfile
(node:15252) Warning: Setting the NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED environment variable to '0' makes TLS connections and HTTPS requests insecure by disabling certificate verification.
(Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created)
buni *1 ❯ echo $? 31s
0yarn install still works in this case.
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@anru You are right that this PR does not resolve #17108, and I removed the closing references to #17108 and #17325 from the PR body so they stay open. The scope here is #30313 only: make the existing CA-store selection configurable in bunfig.toml. The selection mechanism itself is unchanged. Today Bun reads the --use-*-ca flags and NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CA only for runtime commands (bun run, bun test, bun file.ts, and node compat mode). The bun install registry client has its own trust config (install.ca and install.cafile). That split predates this PR. Making the CA selection apply runtime-wide, including bun install, and honoring more TLS env vars is a real request. It needs its own change and review, and #17108 and #17325 now remain open to track it. |
…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
Fixes #30313
Related: #17325, #17108. This PR only makes the existing CA-store selection configurable in bunfig.toml. It does not extend that selection to
bun installor add new TLS env var handling, so those issues stay open.Feature
Adds a top-level
CAkey tobunfig.tomlthat accepts"system","openssl", or"bundled":So users can set a default once instead of passing
--use-system-ca(or--use-openssl-ca/--use-bundled-ca) on everybun run.Applied to run, auto, and test commands.
Precedence
CLI flag >
NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CAenv var >bunfig.toml CA> bundled (default).The existing CLI error about "choose exactly one" still fires only when multiple CLI flags are passed together. A bunfig value that disagrees with a CLI flag or env var just gets overridden silently, matching the existing
NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CAbehavior.Implementation
src/options_types/Context.zig: moves theBunCAStoreenum here and addsruntime_options.ca_store: ?BunCAStoreso bunfig can stash the parsed value without forcing a write to the exported global.src/cli/bunfig.zig: new parser branch for the top-levelCA/cakey (string-valued for easier validation than three booleans). Emits a diagnostic on unknown values.src/cli/Arguments.zig: CA-flag block now consultsctx.runtime_options.ca_storeas the lowest-precedence source after the CLI flags andNODE_USE_SYSTEM_CA.src/cli/cli.zig: exposesCommand.BunCAStorealongside the other context-type aliases.Verification
Extends
test/js/node/tls/test-use-system-ca.test.tswith:CA = "system"in bunfig matches--use-system-ca's cert countCA = "bundled"matches the plain defaultCA = "openssl"is accepted without error--use-bundled-cawins overCA = "system"in bunfigNODE_USE_SYSTEM_CA=1wins overCA = "bundled"in bunfigCAvalues emit a diagnostic and exit non-zerobun testreads the bunfig value tooAgainst the baked bun (no fix), the two key tests fail —
CA = "system"produces the bundled-only count (145) instead of 448 with system certs, and the invalid-value test exits 0 because the key is silently ignored.[review] gate passed · iteration 16 · 7 files touched
fails on main (without fix)
passes on PR (with fix)
diff hotspot
gate history · 1 passed · 0 rejected · iteration 16
evidence per changed file