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… for a renegotiation - node:tls: an accepted socket that closes with no error while the server still owns it reports 'tlsClientError' (socket hang up), like node's onSocketClose. A socket that called end() while its handshake ran lost that report when its peer left. - ssl_renegotiate clears ssl_peer_chain_checked. A renegotiation that was refused after our close_notify reported the certificate check of the first handshake, and the client emitted 'secureConnect' twice. - Tests: the TCP relay of the client tests delivers the server's flight behind the client's FIN, in pieces. Two tests fail with an assertion where they could only time out. Two tests pin what the verify reader answers on a socket that shut down.
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Updated 12:28 PM PT - Sep 26th, 2026
✅ @robobun, your commit 153a582e2fdc4680d79492d4f93fdc5b939629ee passed in 🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 44021That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-44021 --bun |
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Status How to reproduce, on main (caa197e):
With this PR all of them pass. This PR is the follow-up to #43947, which is merged. |
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TLS client shutdown and renegotiation
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Inline comments:
In `@test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts`:
- Around line 479-480: Update the port-reading logic in the TLS renegotiation
test to accumulate stdout chunks until a newline is received before parsing the
port, then release the reader lock. Handle the stream ending before the port
line is complete so the test does not parse an incomplete value.
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packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.csrc/js/node/net.tstest/js/bun/net/socket.test.tstest/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.tstest/js/node/tls/node-tls-server.test.tstest/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts
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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.
Additional findings (outside the current diff — GitHub can't attach inline comments there):
-
🟣
packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c— pre-existing: a node:tls client whose server asks for one renegotiation too many still gets a second 'secureConnect' and then a silent close, with no error. The newssl_peer_chain_checked = 0at openssl.c:1966 only changes the report for a socket that already shut down; on an open socket the refused renegotiation at openssl.c:1978 still reports the SSL's cached X509 verdict of the first handshake, which net.ts:495-521 reads as an established session. Fix: a refused renegotiation should report a distinct failure (an EPROTO/renegotiation-limit error, or the empty verdict) on every socket state, not only after shutdown, so onClientHandshake never emits 'secureConnect' for it.Why this was flagged
A TLS 1.2 client (tls.connect or Bun.connect over TCP) whose server sends a 4th HelloRequest inside the 600 s window, or whose SSL_renegotiate fails, reaches ssl_renegotiate at openssl.c:1977-1984, which calls ssl_trigger_handshake(s, 0). That goes to ssl_failed_handshake_verify_error at openssl.c:1830: the shutdown gate at openssl.c:1831 is false for an open socket, so us_internal_ssl_verify_error returns the SSL's verify result, X509_V_OK for a trusted chain, which the Rust dispatch turns into a null error (socket_body.rs:1927-1934). onClientHandshake at src/js/node/net.ts:487 then sees success=false, verifyError=null and writableFinished=false, so none of the early returns at net.ts:488-518 fire; it sets _secureEstablished and emits 'secureConnect' a second time at net.ts:562, after which us_internal_ssl_on_data closes the socket at openssl.c:2540 with no error. The base branch behaves the same; this PR fixes only the shut-down socket (renegotiation.test.ts:447), and its description says the open-socket case is unchanged. A user with an 'on("secureConnect")' listener that writes a…
Verification: pre-existing; acknowledged in diff: the PR description's "Not in this PR" section states "A renegotiation that is refused on a socket that did not shut down is not changed: ssl_failed_handshake_verify_error looks at ssl_peer_chain_checked only on a socket that shut down" — that claim is accurate, and the base branch reaches the same misreport by the same route. Triggering condition: a TLS…
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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.
The port-read fix in 9eac367 addresses my earlier inline note. Beyond the inline finding on this push, I also checked the double-report path in src/js/node/net.ts: a handshake that fails after the peer leaves sets kerrorEmitted before the socket's 'close' fires, so onSocketTLSClose stays silent there; and the new ssl_peer_chain_checked reset in ssl_renegotiate has one sibling clear (us_internal_ssl_attach) and one reader (ssl_failed_handshake_verify_error), both consistent with the reset.
Extended reasoning...
The change adds a 'close' listener on server-accepted TLS sockets in src/js/node/net.ts that emits tlsClientError ECONNRESET when the socket closes without error before control was released, and clears ssl_peer_chain_checked in ssl_renegotiate in packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c; the rest is test additions and relay rework. It touches TLS handshake reporting, a security-adjacent surface, though no verification logic changes. The prior inline finding was addressed by the latest commit; the remaining inline finding is a test-matrix nit.
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@robobun wake up!! |
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@robobun wake up!! |
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I am awake. The state:
I now build that trial merge and run the five test files of the two PRs on it. I will post the result here. If you need something else from me, tell me what it is. |
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Result of the trial merge: main a4f1429 with this PR and #43957, debug build with ASAN, Linux x64. The machine had a load average of 300 to 700, so I ran each file with
The failures are not from these PRs:
This PR and #43957 can merge in either order, and neither needs a rebase after the other. I did not push. The heads and their CI results are the same as before. |
…r end() (#44290) Regression from #42181 (in no release). Merge before 1.4.3 is tagged, and before #43957 and #43962. ### Problem - After `end()` during its handshake, a node:tls client accepts a trusted certificate for another name: no error, and it reads the server's data. Node and Bun 1.4.2 report `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. - `on_handshake` (`src/runtime/socket/socket_body.rs`) passed its name verdict to the handler as the success flag. After `end()`, `onClientHandshake` (`src/js/node/net.ts:496`) reads a failure with no error as the client's own close and skips `checkServerIdentity`. ### Fix - `on_handshake` no longer runs the native name check for a node:tls socket. The handler's flag is the handshake result. - `Bun.connect` and `upgradeTLS` sockets do not change. - Verified: `node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts`, 19 new tests. `main` fails 18. Node v26.3.0 passes 49, skips 1. - Self-reviewed: 10 concerns raised, 10 addressed. One is #44422 (`onClientHandshake` reads some failed handshakes as established). ### Background - node:tls checks the name in JS (`checkServerIdentity`), on sockets that `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY` marks. The native check ran for them: another name gave `(false, null)`, like a handshake that fails after this side's FIN. - Considered a `getAuthorizationError()` test in the guard, or a second flag variable: both keep an unused native check. ### Downsides - Needs a maintainer's yes: the internal `socket._handle.authorized` and `getAuthorizationError()` of a node:tls client drop the name check (no reader in `src/js` or `test`). The public values do not change. - Still open (#43957): only the first such connection of a process reports if its server keeps its side open. <details><summary>Notes</summary> **The regression** (`tls.connect({ socket })` on a connected socket, then `end()`. Trusted chain, certificate for another name, server in the same process, 3 runs each) | Runtime | Output | |---|---| | Node v26.3.0 | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | | Bun 1.4.2 (744846f) | `error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | | Bun 1.3.13 | `end, finish, error ECONNRESET, close` | | canary 1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939, has #42181) | `finish, end, close`, no error | | this PR | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | - #42181 (44e51b7) is on `main` and is not an ancestor of the tag `bun-v1.4.2`. The client handler at that tag has no such guard. **Merge order, and why** - This PR first. Both later PRs let more handshakes complete after `end()`, and on `main` each of those accepts a certificate for another name. - #43957 removes the engine defect that today keeps the second and later connections of a process from completing such a handshake. Merged before this PR, it turns one silently accepted connection into all of them. Measured with five connections in one process (`tls.connect({ socket })`, another name, server keeps its side open): on `main` 1 of 5 handshakes completes, and the client reports no error for it. On `main` with the source change of #43957, 5 of 5 complete with no error. - #43962 sends a client's FIN after its ClientHello. It contains this PR's commits. - With #43957 only the test file conflicts: both PRs insert a block. Keep both. **Where the native check came from** - #31339 added the native name check for all clients. - #32359 proposed to remove it and was closed for #33755. #33755 added `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY`: the check stayed enforced for `Bun.connect`, and for node:tls it was computed but not enforced. It took node:tls sockets out of `reject_unauthorized` and out of the error argument. - #42181 then added the guard for "failed after our own FIN", which is the same pair as "computed, another name". - #43863 says "Each connection has one server name check", and lists node:tls as "checked after the handshake, in JS". - This PR is the node:tls half of #32359. It does not touch the check for `Bun.connect`. - #43865, #43924 and #43947 are the fixes of the chain check in the same test file. **What the client handler gets from the fd engine** (`packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c`) `on_handshake` calls the handler with `(socket, flag, error)`. For a node:tls client: | Case | Before | Now | |---|---|---| | Handshake completed, chain and name good | `true, null` | `true, null` | | Handshake completed, chain good, another name | `false, null` | `true, null` | | Handshake completed, chain bad | `true, X509 error` | `true, X509 error` | | Chain refused inside the handshake | `false, X509 error` | `false, X509 error` | | Handshake failed after this side's FIN | `false, null` | `false, null` | | Handshake failed with a TLS reason | `false, EPROTO` | `false, EPROTO` | | The peer closed before the handshake finished | `false, ECONNRESET` | `false, ECONNRESET` | - Row 2 and row 5 were the same pair. The guard that #42181 added for row 5 also caught row 2 once the client had ended. - With no `end()`, row 2 already reached `checkServerIdentity`, because the guard tests `writableFinished`. So a client that does not end behaves as before. - `Bun.connect` and `upgradeTLS` sockets do not carry `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY`. Their flag is `authorized`, as documented. **Rows that this PR does not change** The engine for a Duplex, a named pipe and TLS inside TLS (`SSLWrapper`, `src/uws/lib.rs`) reports no TLS reason. A failed handshake arrives as `(false, null)` after a verified chain and as `(false, X509 code)` otherwise. `onClientHandshake` reads both as an established session unless the client rejects the code. Measured on this PR with a client over a Duplex that does not call `end()`: | The peer answers the ClientHello with | `rejectUnauthorized` | `main`, Bun 1.4.2 and this PR | Node v26.3.0 | |---|---|---|---| | a fatal `handshake_failure` alert | `true` | `error UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, close` | `error ERR_SSL_SSL/TLS_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, close` | | a fatal `handshake_failure` alert | `false` | `secureConnect authorized=false authError=UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT`, `end` | `error ERR_SSL_SSL/TLS_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, close` | | bytes that are not TLS | `false` | `secureConnect authorized=false authError=UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT`, `end` | `error ERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER, close` | | a `close_notify` alert | either | no event | `end, error ECONNRESET, close` | - These rows are older than this PR: Bun 1.4.2 prints them too. The native socket is marked unusable after a failed handshake (`transport_unusable` in `on_handshake`). - Owners: #32929 (the engine reports the fatal alert over a Duplex), #44223 and #44021 (a refused renegotiation). - #44422 makes a handshake that did not complete terminal in `onClientHandshake`, as it is in the server handler. This PR is the step before it: while `(false, null)` could be a completed handshake, that arm could not go. It stays out of this PR so that this PR can land, or be reverted, alone. **What the native handle of a node:tls client reports** (trusted chain, another name, `rejectUnauthorized: false`, measured) | Value | `main` | This PR | |---|---|---| | `socket.authorized` | `false` | `false` | | `socket.authorizationError` | `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` | `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` | | `socket._handle.authorized` | `false` | `true` | | `socket._handle.getAuthorizationError()` | `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` | `null` | - The native check for these sockets had three effects on `main`: the flag in row 2 above, and the two internal values. - The in-handshake check (`server_identity`) already left node:tls sockets out. Both sites now agree. - `Flags::HOSTNAME_MISMATCH` has no reader on `main`. This PR does not remove it. - The hunk that stops the native check came from an optional finding of an automated review. No person has reviewed it yet. **Measured** (Linux x64, debug builds, Node v26.3.0, server in its own Node process, 40 s watchdog) `tls.connect({ socket })` on a connected socket, then `end()`. The chain is trusted, the certificate is for another name, `rejectUnauthorized: true`: | Server | TLS | Node | `main` (d115f54) | This PR | |---|---|---|---|---| | keeps its side open | 1.3 | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | `finish`, never exits | same as Node | | ordinary | 1.3 | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | `finish, end, close`, no error | same as Node | | keeps its side open | 1.2 | `finish`, never exits | `finish`, never exits | same as Node | | ordinary | 1.2 | `finish, end, error ECONNRESET, close` | same as Node | same as Node | - `end()` in the same tick and `end()` one `setImmediate` later give the same lines. - In the new tests the handshake completes after the client's `end()` under TLS 1.2 and over a Duplex as well. There `main` delivers `secret-banner` to a client with `rejectUnauthorized: true`. - A client that passes its own `checkServerIdentity` is asked: one test asserts the name that it gets, and `authorized=true` when it accepts. **Still open, the engine** - Each line of the table above is the first connection of its process. Five such connections, one after the other in one process, against a server that keeps its side open: with this PR the first reports and the other four print `finish` only. `main` does the same when the name is good. The flight that the first socket seals after its FIN takes the event loop's one spill slot and never leaves it. #43957 is open for that. - `tls.connect(port)` followed at once by `end()` still sends its FIN before its ClientHello, so no handshake runs there. #43962 changes that order. - #43957 is open for the spill slot. Measured with its source change on this PR: all five connections report, for another name and for a good name. - A handshake that fails after `end()` with no certificate still reports nothing. The tests of #42181 and #43947 for that case pass. **Tests** - 19 new tests against `main`: the name check after `end()` over a Duplex, over TCP behind a record proxy (TLS 1.2 and 1.3) and on a connected `net.Socket` (3 each), `end()` and `end("")` in the turn of `tls.connect()` over a socket that is still connecting and over a Duplex (6), and a resumed session (1, Bun only). - 7 of them are the commit of another branch (`robobun/baba0385/tls-early-end-hostname-check`), taken as it is. The resumed-session test now asserts `isSessionReused()`. - `main` (4b02e10) fails 18 of the 19. The one that passes is `end("")` over a Duplex. **Suites** (this machine ran at a load average of 200 to 800) - On this head: `node-tls-duplex-end-verify` (50 of 50), `node-tls-connect` (121), `tls-reject-before-client-cert` (121), `node-https-agent-checkserveridentity-reuse` (30), `renegotiation` (21), `node-tls-wrapped-socket-close` (15), `node-tls-connect-hostname-verification` (11), `node-tls-upgrade` (5), `node-tls-raw-end` (4), `node-https-checkServerIdentity` (4). - On the head before the rebase: 14 vendored Node tests that use `checkServerIdentity` or the name error, `fetch.tls` (61). `socket.test.ts`, `node-tls-cert` and `node-tls-server` had only failures that `main` has on this machine too (timeouts of child processes, and one test that needs `www.example.com`). - Not run on this machine: macOS, Windows. </details>
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3 participants
Follow-up to #43947.
Problem
end()during its handshake, and the peer then closes. The server emits notlsClientError. Node emitstlsClientError ECONNRESET.end(), and the server then asks for a renegotiation. The client emitssecureConnecttwice:ssl_peer_chain_checked(packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c) is set once for a socket, so the refused renegotiation reports the check of the first handshake.Fix
net.tsgets node'sonSocketCloserule: an accepted socket that closes with no error while the server still owns it reportstlsClientError("socket hang up").ssl_renegotiateclearsssl_peer_chain_checked.node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts. Self-reviewed: 3 concerns raised, 2 addressed.Background
_controlReleasedis true once the server emittedsecureConnection.loop.c).loop.c. It made 8 tests fail: a wrapped socket with no server closes with no error.Downsides
tls.Servernow emitstlsClientErrorfor a socket that it destroys with no error before the handshake completes. Node does the same.Bun.listenorBun.connectsocket that shut down getscloseand nohandshakecall when its peer leaves.'close'listener for each accepted TLS socket, 1 store for each renegotiation. Release.text(58301813 B) and strippedbun(80995912 B) do not change.Notes
Cases
A node:tls server socket calls
end()after the ClientHello. The proxy in front of the server holds the client's last flight.close,tlsClientError ECONNRESETclose, no reportclose, no reporttlsClientError ECONNRESET,closetlsClientError ECONNRESET, socketerror,closewith an errorclose, no reporttlsClientError ECONNRESET,closeA TLS 1.2 client calls
end()insecureConnect. A proxy holds the client's close_notify and FIN, and the server then asks for a renegotiation.secureConnectevents of the clientMechanism
loop.chas a branch for the peer's FIN on a socket that is shut down ("We got FIN back after sending it"). It callsus_internal_socket_close_raw.us_internal_ssl_close, which reports a handshake that is still pending, does not run.ssl_update_handshakereported a failed handshake from the writable event as soon as the socket had sent its FIN. That report was too early when the peer finished its flight, which is what tls: our own FIN does not fail a handshake that is still running #43947 fixed. It was the only report when the peer left after a part of its flight.us_cert_verify_cbsetsssl_peer_chain_checked, and onlyus_internal_ssl_attachcleared it.ssl_renegotiatereports a renegotiation that it refuses throughssl_trigger_handshake(s, 0). On a socket that sent its close_notify,ssl_failed_handshake_verify_errorthen read the SSL because the bit was still set.net.tsreads a failed handshake with an X509 code as an established session.The two tests that pin the verify reader of #43947
They pass on main and with this PR. No test ran these two branches before.
getAuthorizationError()before the handshake reports, on a socket that shut down:UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT. The SSL has no certificate to show.shutdown()with a chain that it read:handshake(false, UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE).Measurements
.text58301813 B both (size -A), strippedbun80995912 B both.us_internal_ssl_on_data, which holds the inlinedssl_renegotiate, grows from 2651 to 2655 B.'close'listener, which reads 2 fields. Per renegotiation: 1 store. A handshake on a client, and every socket that is not atls.Serversocket, pays nothing.Not in this PR
initAcceptedTLSSocketruns: for a socket that atls.Serveraccepts (anHttp2SecureServeris one), and for a socket thatserver.emit("connection")injects. It does not run for a raw socket that anHttp2SecureServerupgrades (_http2_upgrade.ts), and not forhttps.Server, which is not atls.Serverin Bun.ssl_failed_handshake_verify_errorlooks atssl_peer_chain_checkedonly on a socket that shut down. With a server that asks 4 times, the client still emits one moresecureConnectfor the request that it refuses, and then closes with no error. A build that is older than tls: our own FIN does not fail a handshake that is still running #43947 does the same.Bun.listenandBun.connectreport nothing for a handshake that the peer left on a socket that shut down. The socket getsclose.secureConnect. That is in 1.4.2 too. node:tls: report the fatal TLS alert when a handshake over a Duplex fails #32929 has the fix.Self-review
Rejected, with the reason:
net.tsfrom the reset of the bit and from the test repairs. Both production parts fix a regression of the same merged PR, each has its own test that fails on main, and together they are 12 lines.Tests
test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts: 4 new tests, the two cases under TLS 1.2 and under TLS 1.3. All four fail on main with a timeout, because the report never comes. With the repaired relay the four client tests with the flight in two reads fail on the tree before tls: our own FIN does not fail a handshake that is still running #43947 and pass on main.test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts: 1 new test. It fails on main with 2secureConnectevents.test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts: 1 new test and 1 extended test for the verify reader. The test of the rejecting client now fails with an assertion, not with a timeout.test/js/node/tls/node-tls-server.test.ts: the test of the pendingSNICallbacknow fails with an assertion, not with a timeout.test/js/node/tls/andtest/js/bun/net/together: 794 tests, 8 failures. Each of the 8 also fails or times out on main on the test machine, which had a load average above 200 during the run: 4 tests that wait for a garbage collection or for workers,should not call drain before handshake(needswww.example.com), a cluster test, and 2 tests that pass when they run alone.node-tls-raw-end.test.tsandnode-tls-wrapped-socket-close.test.tspass.no test proof · iteration 0 · platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine, deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/node/tls/node-tls-server.test.ts, test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts