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WalkthroughChangesTLS session guard
Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to This change prevents late TLS session replacement from terminating Bun and adds regression coverage, but the new parameterized tests need to follow the repository's required suite structure before merge. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 2 | ❌ 2❌ Failed checks (2 warnings)
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Full details: Description checkExplanation The description is detailed and includes verification evidence, but it does not match the changeset or stated objective. It describes a BoringSSL patch that returns 0 and silently ignores late calls, while the PR adds handshake-state tracking and throws "Already started." The required template headings are also missing. Resolution Rewrite the description under "### What does this PR do?" and "### How did you verify your code works?". Describe the SSL handshake-start tracking, the late-call exception, the valid pre-handshake behavior, the regression tests, and the known CI failure.
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Updated 3:28 PM PT - Sep 6th, 2026
❌ @robobun, your commit 9f78f7f has 1 failures in 🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 41671That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-41671 --bun |
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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.
Beyond the inline findings, I checked that the new SSL_CTX_set_info_callback in us_ssl_ctx_build_raw doesn't collide with an existing info callback — it's the only SSL_(CTX_)set_info_callback call outside vendor/, so no handler is being clobbered. I also checked the other SSL_set_session call site at src/http/session_cache.rs:219 — it's the internal HTTP client cache applied pre-handshake and isn't user-reachable, so it doesn't need the same guard.
Extended reasoning...
The two inline findings cover the substantive concerns (Node-compat error contract and the misleading open handler JSDoc). Two adjacent questions the diff raised were checked and ruled out: SSL_CTX_set_info_callback has a single slot per context, and installing us_ssl_info_cb unconditionally would silently displace any prior handler — a grep across the repo (excluding vendor/) shows this is the only call, so nothing is overwritten. Separately, SSL_set_session is also called from the internal HTTP client's session cache (src/http/session_cache.rs:219); that path applies the session before the handshake starts and is not driven by user JS, so the abort is not reachable there and the guard is correctly scoped to the user-facing set_session host function.
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In `@test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts`:
- Around line 626-639: Replace the parameterized it.each suites with
describe.each in test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts lines 626-639 and
test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts lines 4724-4726, using a nested it test for each
suite’s existing assertions; preserve the current test cases and behavior.
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packages/bun-types/bun.d.tspackages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.cpackages/bun-usockets/src/libusockets.hsrc/runtime/socket/tls_socket_functions.rstest/js/bun/net/socket.test.tstest/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.tstest/js/node/tls/node-tls-set-session-after-start.fixture.ts
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Status Reworked on top of main and pushed as 7b00a05. The earlier version of this PR (an info callback and an ex_data slot, throwing How it was reproduced, linux x64:
What changed since the first version:
CI on 7b00a05: build 122884 passed, 181 of 181 jobs, on every platform lane. All review threads are resolved. What is left is the two maintainer questions in the PR body: ignore or throw, and patch file or fork commit. |
robobun
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September 30, 2026 08:43
BoringSSL's SSL_set_session calls abort() once the handshake has begun. patches/boringssl/set-session-return-0.patch makes it return 0 and leave the SSL unchanged. The setSession() host function returns undefined for that result, as it does for a session that does not parse.
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The walkthrough and the two pre-merge warnings above describe the previous revision of this PR (072dfc5). The title and the description are correct for the current head. The current head is 7b00a05 (2 commits, 9 files):
So the title stays as it is. |
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…t wraps (#37664) ### Problem - `new tls.TLSSocket(socket)` on the client side (STARTTLS) does nothing on main. A write throws `TypeError: socket.@Write is not a function`. `_start()` throws `ERR_MISSING_ARGS`. - Since #42181 (not released), `end()` throws an uncaught `TypeError: socket.shutdown is not a function` at `endNT (node:net)`. - Cause: the constructor stored the wrapped stream as `_handle` (`src/js/node/tls.ts`). Nothing replaced it with a TLS handle. ### Fix - The constructor runs the upgrade of `tls.connect({ socket })` (`kUpgradeClientTLS`, `src/js/node/net.ts`). `_handle` is never the stream. `_start()` is a no-op. - The wrap completes like node's `_finishInit`: `'secure'` and `ssl.verifyError()`. It gets no hostname check and no `'secureConnect'`, and `authorized` stays `false`. - Verified: `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts`. 16 of its 21 new tests fail on main. Also `test/js/node/tls/` and 657 vendored node tests. ### Background - STARTTLS changes a plaintext connection to TLS in place. The `mysql` driver 2.18.1 does it with this constructor. No user filed an issue for it. - In `node:net`, `_write`, `_final` and `_destroy` call into `_handle` as a native handle. - Only `tls.connect()` adds node's `onConnectSecure` (hostname check, `authorized`, `'secureConnect'`). A wrap gets `_finishInit` only. - Considered a start on `_start()`, as in node. Each handle call then needs a guard. ### Downsides - An unused wrap now sends a ClientHello of 1450 bytes (main and node: 0). `setServername()` and `setSession()` after construction have no effect on that handshake. - Unlike node, a wrap rejects an untrusted certificate unless the caller passes `rejectUnauthorized: false`. An app that does its own check must pass `false`. <details><summary>Notes</summary> **Scope.** This head is the core only, as the review of 2026-09-24 asked. The same review decided that a wrap rejects an untrusted certificate by default. Two parts of the earlier head are gone, because other changes own them. #42235 landed the forwarding of the `'error'` of a `Duplex`, and #43791 owns it for a `net.Socket`. #38028 owns the destroy of a wrapped socket that has not connected yet. The `UpgradedDuplex.rs` hunk landed with #36909. The review of 2026-09-25 asked for three more changes: commits 6657bc3 and ae669bf, and this body. The review of 2026-09-30 asked for one more: commit a460a9d. **Changes since the earlier head that the review did not list.** - The `open` handler of an upgraded socket applies the `session` option on the native socket. See "Sessions" below. - A wrap gives the `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` warning of `tls.connect()`. - `authorized` and `authorizationError` keep their initial values on a wrap, as in node. The earlier head set `authorized = true` for a good chain. The wrap checks no host name, so that value accepted a certificate of any host. The verdict is `ssl.verifyError()`. - A wrap does not get `onConnectEnd`. A peer that closes during the handshake gives `'end'`, `'finish'`, `'close'` and no `ECONNRESET`, as in node. `tls.connect({ socket })` keeps its `ECONNRESET`. - `servername` is passed into the upgrade. Before, it reached the ClientHello only when the caller gave no `secureContext`. - `kStandaloneWrap` is initialised in the `Socket` constructor. **Differences from node v26.3.0 that stay.** The review kept the start of the handshake in the constructor. The `mysql` driver, the main user of this API, calls `_start()` right after the constructor, so it sees no difference. | shape | node | this PR | | --- | --- | --- | | wrap that is never used | sends nothing | sends a ClientHello (1450 bytes) | | `setServername()` after the constructor | applies, the handshake starts later | too late. Pass `servername` as an option. | | `setSession()` after the constructor | applies | no effect. Pass `session` as an option. | | untrusted certificate, `rejectUnauthorized` absent or `true` | `'secure'`, the caller must read `ssl.verifyError()` | destroy with the verify error, `'_tlsError'`, no `'secure'` | | untrusted certificate, `rejectUnauthorized: false` | `'secure'`, data flows | the same | | `new TLSSocket(raw)`, then `tls.connect({ socket: raw })` | `EALREADY` on the wrap | `Invalid socket` on the `tls.connect` client (main: works, because its wrap does nothing) | Node never rejects a certificate on a wrap. It leaves the check to the app, so an app that forgets the check accepts any certificate. Here the wrap uses the rule of `tls.connect()`: it rejects unless the caller passes `rejectUnauthorized: false`, or `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` is `0`. Before commit 4d8b9e5, only `rejectUnauthorized: true` rejected, and a wrap with default options accepted each certificate, as in node. The `mysql` driver listens to `'secure'` and to `'_tlsError'`. If the wrap emitted `'secure'` and then destroyed itself, the driver would report a bad chain two times. The replay test asserts one report. **Sessions.** BoringSSL's `SSL_set_session` calls `abort()` when the handshake has started, in release builds too. `TLSSocket.prototype.setSession()` calls the native function at once, on main and on this head. #41671 puts the guard in the native function, for each caller: a late `setSession()` then throws `Already started.`. An earlier head of this PR made `setSession()` only store the session. The review asked to take that rule out, and commit ae669bf did. For a client-side wrap the review then asked for one narrow rule, in commit a460a9d: the `TLSSocket` constructor sets `kStandaloneWrap`, and `setSession()` returns at once when it is set. | shape | node | main | this PR | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | `new TLSSocket(raw)`, `setSession()`, `_start()` | resumes | throws `ERR_MISSING_ARGS` | no effect, full handshake | | `tls.connect({ socket })`, then `setSession()` | no effect | process aborted | process aborted | | `setSession()` inside `'secureConnect'` | no effect | process aborted | process aborted | | `tls.connect({ port })`, then `setSession()` before it connects | resumes | resumes | resumes | | `tls.connect({ port })`, then `setSession()` in the `'connect'` listener | full handshake | resumes | resumes | | `tls.connect({ socket, session })` | resumes | full handshake | resumes | | `new TLSSocket(raw, { session })` | resumes | throws `ERR_MISSING_ARGS` | resumes | In the first row, the wrap has sent its ClientHello when `setSession()` runs. Without the check in `setSession()`, that row aborts the process (exit 134). The rule also holds for a wrap over a socket that is still connecting: node resumes there, and this PR runs a full handshake. The last two rows come from one hunk that stays. `SocketHandlers2.open` applies the `session` option on the native socket. An fd upgrade assigns `_handle` after `open`, so `self.setSession()` dropped the option there. **Two bugs of main that this PR does not fix. An open PR owns each.** - The native `setSession()` has no check of the handshake state. `socket.setSession()` in the `handshake` callback of a `Bun.connect` socket aborts the process (exit 134, release build of main). #41671 fixes it in `set_session` in `src/runtime/socket/tls_socket_functions.rs`, for each caller. It makes a late `setSession()` throw `Already started.`. - Over a `Duplex`, TLS inside TLS, or a named pipe, a handshake that fails is reported as success. A peer that answers the ClientHello with plaintext gives `'secureConnect'` for `tls.connect({ socket: duplex, rejectUnauthorized: false })` on main, and `'secure'` for a wrap with `rejectUnauthorized: false` here. Node gives `ERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER`. Over a TCP socket the result is correct. The stream engine in `src/uws/lib.rs` reports no protocol error. #32929 fixes it there. One more door of the same bug: with `rejectUnauthorized: true` and the `session` of an earlier verified connection, `tls.connect({ socket: duplex })` emits `'secureConnect'` with `authorized` true on main, and a wrap emits `'secure'` with `ssl.verifyError()` null here. A write after that fails with `ERR_SOCKET_CLOSED`, and no byte reaches the transport. Reproduction for the first one (needs a key and a certificate, for example `test/js/node/tls/fixtures/agent1-*.pem`): ```ts const server = Bun.listen({ hostname: "127.0.0.1", port: 0, tls: { key, cert }, socket: { data() {}, open() {}, error() {} } }); await Bun.connect({ hostname: "127.0.0.1", port: server.port, tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false }, socket: { data() {}, error() {}, handshake(socket) { socket.setSession(socket.getSession()); /* the process aborts here */ } }, }); ``` Reproduction for the second one: ```js const tls = require("tls"), { Duplex } = require("stream"); let answered = false; const raw = new Duplex({ read() {}, write(chunk, encoding, callback) { callback(); if (!answered) { answered = true; setImmediate(() => this.push(Buffer.from("HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\n\r\n"))); } }, }); const socket = tls.connect({ socket: raw, rejectUnauthorized: false }); socket.on("secureConnect", () => console.log("secureConnect")); // main prints this socket.on("error", error => console.log(error.code)); // node prints ERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER ``` **Gaps that this PR does not close.** Each one also exists on main for `tls.connect({ socket })`, with the same result. | shape | node | this PR | owner | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | `end()` or `destroySoon()` before the socket connects | waits for `'connect'`, then sends the FIN | `'finish'` at once, no FIN | #42339 | | refused connection under a wrap | `'_tlsError'`, `'close'` | uncaught `ECONNREFUSED`, the wrap stays open | #38122 | | `end()` over a `Duplex` before the handshake completes | runs the `final()` of the `Duplex` | `'finish'`, no `final()` | #42350 | A wrapped `Duplex` that fails when it is read was in this list. #42235 landed, and the wrap now reports `'_tlsError'` and then `'close'`, as node does (measured on d31efd7). **Inherited options.** `kUpgradeClientTLS` passed a plain `{ socket, servername }` object to `Socket.prototype.connect`, and that function reads `rejectUnauthorized` through the prototype chain. With `Object.prototype.rejectUnauthorized = false`, the wrap accepted an untrusted certificate, also with an explicit `rejectUnauthorized: true`. Commit 6657bc3 passes the decision of the constructor as an own property, as `tls.connect()` does. Measured on this head under that pollution: a wrap with default options, with `{}` and with an explicit `true` rejects, and an own `false` accepts. `new TLSSocket(raw, { rejectUnauthorized: undefined })` with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` rejects. **`'finish'`.** `new TLSSocket(new PassThrough()).end()` emits `'finish'` and `'close'` on this head. The shutdown cells do not assert `'finish'`. A separate check reports that `'finish'` is lost there when #43962 is applied on top of this PR. This session did not build that combination. Cell by cell for the 21-cell matrix of #42330 on the earlier head: #37664 (comment) **Releases.** Earlier comments in this thread measured the same failures on Bun 1.4.0 and 1.4.3. This session measured main only. **User.** `Connection.prototype._startTLS` in mysql 2.18.1 (`lib/Connection.js`) is the known caller of the client-side constructor. The replay test matches that function line by line, and `lib/protocol/sequences/Handshake.js` sends the SSLRequest and starts TLS with no reply in between. The xmpp report in this thread is for `tls.connect({ socket })`, a different path. A search of the open and closed issues finds no report for the constructor. **Guard design.** #42330 kept the stream as `_handle` and added a guard at 2 of the 6 places that call it as a native handle. **Signatures on main.** `destroy()` on the wrap fails with `handle.close is not a function`. `end()`, `end(cb)` and `destroySoon()` throw `socket.shutdown is not a function` from `process.nextTick`. **Tests.** All are in `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts`, block `new tls.TLSSocket(socket) on the client side`. - Four reports come from `node-tls-client-wrap-fixture.mjs`. Bun calls its functions in the test process. Node runs the same file as a script. The expected report is the same for both. - `shutdown`: 16 cells. The methods are `end()`, `end(cb)`, `destroySoon()` and `destroy()`. The streams are a connected, a connecting and a never-connected `net.Socket`, and a `Duplex`. Each cell calls the method and then `destroy()`. It asserts no throw, no `'error'` and `'close'`. The cells run together. On main each cell fails with `socket.shutdown is not a function` or `handle.close is not a function`. - `mysql`: the calls of `Connection.prototype._startTLS` in mysql 2.18.1, in the driver's order and at its time. The driver writes the SSLRequest and starts TLS in the same turn, and the server sends no reply in between. Three configurations: `rejectUnauthorized: false`, the CA of the server, no CA. `onSecure` runs one time in each. - `peerCloses`: the peer closes when the ClientHello arrives. - `session`: the `session` option on the three paths, and `setSession()` before the socket connects. Each one resumes. - Both sides of `rejectUnauthorized` run in the test process only, because node accepts in each case. `unlike node, an untrusted certificate destroys the wrap with the verify error` has one case for default options and one for `true`. `with rejectUnauthorized: false, 'secure' fires for an untrusted certificate and a write goes out over TLS` is the other side. `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 turns the default off, as for tls.connect()` pins the environment variable. - `an inherited rejectUnauthorized cannot turn the check of a wrap off` runs in a child process with `Object.prototype.rejectUnauthorized = false`: default options and an own `true` reject, an own `false` accepts. It fails on d31efd7. ``an own `rejectUnauthorized: undefined` still rejects with NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0, as for tls.connect()`` pins that rule. - `setSession() on a wrap has no effect: it does not abort the process and does not throw` runs in a child process, because the failure is a process abort. Without the check it gets exit code 134. No test covers a late `setSession()` on a `tls.connect()` socket: it aborts the process until #41671 lands. - On main (canary 367d939, release build), 16 of the 21 tests in the block fail. 8 fail at once, and 8 fail by the timeout, because main starts no handshake. The 5 that pass are the http2-wrapper guard and the 4 rows that run node. - The SNI test fails when only the `servername` argument is reverted (`Expected: "sni.example"`, `Received: undefined`). **Cost for callers that never wrap a socket,** from the diff: - per `net.Socket`: one more property store in the constructor. - per TLS `connect()`, per client handshake and per `setSession()`: one more property read and branch. - per `internalConnect` and `internalConnectMultiple`: two property reads and branches fewer. Each `[buntls]` options object has one property fewer. - `tls.connect({ socket })` puts the same bytes on the wire as on main (1452). - This session did not measure instructions, syscalls or binary size: `perf`, `valgrind`, `strace` and `bloaty` are not in the test container. A separate differential check of d31efd7 merged onto main reports equal instruction counts: 10,162,756 (main) and 10,159,922 (this PR) for each TLS connection, and 2,195 and 2,200 for `new net.Socket()`. **Suites run with a debug build of this head.** - On the head a460a9d: `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts` gives 107 pass, 18 skip, 0 fail with a 30 s limit, in 2 of 2 runs. With the default 5 s limit, 4 to 8 tests reach the timeout in each run on this machine, and the set differs from run to run. Most of them came from main. The load average was 450 to 970 on 16 cores. - One of those tests from main (`server write() and end(data) from inside ALPNCallback`) takes the same time with the source of main and with this PR: 3.9 to 6.4 s and 3.8 to 6.0 s, 10 runs each. - `tsc --noEmit -p src/js/tsconfig.json` and `bun lint` pass on a460a9d. - The suites below ran on the head c81cee3, before the merge of main. - `test/js/node/tls/` (28 files): 2 failures in each run, and this change causes neither. `SNICallback runs even when the requested servername matches the bind hostname` fails on the release build of main too. `concurrent Workers all see the same CA certificate lists` fails 5 of 5 times with the `net.ts` and `tls.ts` of main on the same debug build. In the last run the machine was overloaded, and 2 more tests reached the 5 s timeout. Both pass alone in 3 of 3 runs, and neither builds a client-side wrap. - `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*` in `test/js/node/test/parallel` (657 files): no failure from this change. 10 files fail on main too (`test-https-proxy-request*.mjs`, `test-https-request-proxy-post.mjs`, `test-tls-client-allow-partial-trust-chain.js`). `test-https-timeout.js` hangs on a debug build, with the source of main too. - `test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts`: 94 pass, 1 fail. The failure needs DNS for `www.example.com` and fails on main too. </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:begin --> --- **[human-review]** gate passed · iteration 0 · 5 files touched <details><summary>fails on main (without fix)</summary> ```console ASAN without fix: 16 failed, 18 skipped $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts bun test v1.4.3 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts: (pass) should have checkServerIdentity [3.32ms] (pass) should thow ECONNRESET if FIN is received before handshake [351.98ms] (pass) initializes authorizationError to null in the TLSSocket constructor [9.71ms] (pass) setMaxSendFragment mirrors OpenSSL's [512, 16384] acceptance without throwing [175.18ms] (pass) should be able to grab the JSStreamSocket constructor [18.49ms] (skip) tls.connect > should work with alpnProtocols (pass) tls.connect > Bun.serve() should work with tls and Bun.file() [114.28ms] (pass) tls.connect > should have peer certificate when using self asign certificate [269.78ms] (skip) tls.connect > should have peer certificate (skip) tls.connect > getCipher, getProtocol, getEphemeralKeyInfo, getSharedSigalgs, getSession, exportKeyingMaterial and isSessionReused should work (skip) tls.connect > should process options correctly when connect is called with only options (skip) tls.connect > should process port ... (truncated) release without fix: 34 failed, 18 skipped bun test v1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts: (pass) should have checkServerIdentity [20.95ms] (pass) should thow ECONNRESET if FIN is received before handshake [48.67ms] (pass) initializes authorizationError to null in the TLSSocket constructor [0.39ms] (pass) setMaxSendFragment mirrors OpenSSL's [512, 16384] acceptance without throwing [5.88ms] (pass) should be able to grab the JSStreamSocket constructor [0.30ms] (skip) tls.connect > should work with alpnProtocols (pass) tls.connect > Bun.serve() should work with tls and Bun.file() [5.44ms] (pass) tls.connect > should have peer certificate when using self asign certificate [24.26ms] (skip) tls.connect > should have peer certificate (skip) tls.connect > getCipher, getProtocol, getEphemeralKeyInfo, getSharedSigalgs, getSession, exportKeyingMaterial and isSessionReused should work (skip) tls.connect > should process options correctly when connect is called with only options (skip) tls.connect > should process port and host correctly (skip) tls.connect > should process port, host, and callback correctly (skip) tls.connect > should handle the absence of a callback gracefully (skip) tl ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>passes on PR (with fix)</summary> ```console ASAN with fix: 18 skipped $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts bun test v1.4.3 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts: (pass) should have checkServerIdentity [3.27ms] (pass) should thow ECONNRESET if FIN is received before handshake [394.13ms] (pass) initializes authorizationError to null in the TLSSocket constructor [8.43ms] (pass) setMaxSendFragment mirrors OpenSSL's [512, 16384] acceptance without throwing [196.56ms] (pass) should be able to grab the JSStreamSocket constructor [33.22ms] (skip) tls.connect > should work with alpnProtocols (pass) tls.connect > Bun.serve() should work with tls and Bun.file() [298.86ms] (pass) tls.connect > should have peer certificate when using self asign certificate [101.96ms] (skip) tls.connect > should have peer certificate (skip) tls.connect > getCipher, getProtocol, getEphemeralKeyInfo, getSharedSigalgs, getSession, exportKeyingMaterial and isSessionReused should work (skip) tls.connect > should process options correctly when connect is called with only options (skip) tls.connect > should process port ... (truncated) release with fix: 18 skipped $ bun scripts/build.ts --profile=release [configured] bun-profile → bun (stripped) target linux-x64-gnu build type Release build dir ./build/release revision d31efd7 features lto, baseline 23 deps, 136 codegen, 1176 objects in 6018ms ninja: Entering directory `/workspace/bun/build/release' [1/4] fetch lolhtml [lolhtml] up to date [2/4] fetch rust-argon2 [rust-argon2] up to date [2/4] cargo plan → /workspace/bun/build/release/rust-target/plan.json 244 units: 172 lib, 16 proc-macro (host), 19 custom-build (host), 15 run custom-build, 17 lib (host), 4 run custom-build (host), 1 rlib [3/4] reconfigure [1/1499] mkdir stamps [2/1499] mkdir codegen [3/1499] install /workspace/bun bun install v1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939) Checked 26 installs across 65 packages (no changes) [231.00ms] [4/1499] rustc unicode_xid [5/1499] rustc heck [6/1499] rustc build_script_build [7/1499] rustc build_script_build [8/1499] rustc unicode_ident [9/1499] rustc build_script_build [10/1499] rustc build_script_build [11/1499] install /workspace/bun/packages/bun-error bun install v1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939) Checked 1 install across 2 packages (no changes ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>diff hotspot</summary> ``` src/js/internal/net/symbols.ts | 2 + src/js/node/net.ts | 68 ++-- src/js/node/tls.ts | 47 +-- test/js/node/tls/node-tls-client-wrap-fixture.mjs | 387 ++++++++++++++++++++++ test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts | 356 +++++++++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 806 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) ``` </details> **gate history** · 2 passed · 0 rejected · iteration 0 <details><summary>evidence per changed file</summary> ``` file reads edits tests src/js/internal/net/symbols.ts 0 0 72 src/js/node/net.ts 8 0 73 src/js/node/tls.ts 1 0 74 test/js/node/tls/node-tls-client-wrap-fixture.mjs 2 3 77 test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts 0 0 69 ``` </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:end -->
Jarred-Sumner
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### Problem - A TLS 1.2 server can kill a bun process that calls `fetch()` twice. It renegotiates on the idle keep-alive connection, and the next request that takes the pooled socket dies: `panic: abort() called`, stack `SSL_set_session` <- `session_cache::install` <- `HTTPClient::on_open`. Regression in 1.4.0. - `on_open` (`src/http/lib.rs`) runs per request. Its TLS setup was guarded by `SSL_is_init_finished(ssl) == 0`, also true during a renegotiation, so it offered the cached session again. BoringSSL aborts on that. ### Fix - The TLS setup (SNI, ALPN, inline reject, session offer) becomes `configure_tls`. Only `on_connect` calls it, the open callback of a new connection. The guard is gone. - Correct because uSockets starts the handshake after that callback returns, and only a new connection takes that path. - Verified: `test/js/web/fetch/fetch.tls.test.ts` (new test, fails on 1.4.3-canary). Also ran the fetch-keepalive, fetch-session, proxy and tls renegotiation suites. ### Background - fetch parks idle connections in a pool and caches one TLS session per origin (#36598). `SSL_set_session` offers it, legal only before a handshake starts. - A renegotiation is a second handshake on a live TLS 1.2 connection, started by the server. - Considered a guard in `session_cache::install` and a check at pool pickup. Both leave per-connection work on the per-request path. ### Downsides - A request that takes a socket mid-renegotiation still stalls until its timeout: uSockets does not retry the parked write (#37094). A `todo` test records it. - Cost, release builds: a new TLS connection goes from 1,427 to 1,415 instructions, a pooled request from 5,146 to 5,123. Text grows by 1,024 bytes. The stripped binary keeps its size. <details><summary>Notes</summary> **How to reach it.** No user code is needed beyond two `fetch()` calls to one HTTPS origin with verification on (the default). The server decides the rest. It does not have to withhold anything: a server that answers and then calls `renegotiate()` is enough when the second request starts inside the renegotiation. A server that never finishes the renegotiation keeps the window open for as long as it likes. **Why the guard was wrong.** `SSL_in_init()` is true whenever a handshake object exists and is not finalized. That covers the time before the first handshake step and the whole of a renegotiation. uSockets allows a client renegotiation (`ssl_renegotiate_explicit`) and runs it from its `SSL_read` loop, so the pool's idle data handler never sees the HelloRequest and the socket stays parked while it renegotiates. **What else the old block did to a renegotiating pooled socket.** It set SNI and ALPN again. `session_cache::install` took the cached session out of the cache before it offered it, so the next new connection could not resume. It replaced the armed session sink with an unarmed one. The new test checks the second point: after the pooled pickup, a new connection still resumes the cached session. **The test.** `fetch.tls.renegotiation-peer-fixture.mjs` runs under Node, because BoringSSL cannot send a HelloRequest. It is a TLS 1.2 keep-alive origin behind a TCP relay that can hold the client's bytes, plus a plain HTTP control server. The client fixture parks a connection, asks the origin to renegotiate, and gets the answer only when the relay holds the client's renegotiation ClientHello. Then it starts the request that takes the pooled socket. A control request queued behind it on the HTTP thread proves that the pickup ran. The test uses no timer. **Measured, linux x64.** - 1.4.3-canary.1 (`367d939d9`), release: the new test fails. The client prints `panic: abort() called` at the pooled pickup. - Debug build with ASAN of main `468efacace` without the change: the client exits with SIGABRT at the pooled pickup. - This branch, debug build with ASAN: the new test passes. `fetch.tls.test.ts` (62 pass, 1 todo), `fetch-keepalive.test.ts` (49), `fetch-session.test.ts` (34), `test/js/bun/http/proxy.test.ts` (97) and `test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts` (21) pass. With `--todo`, the todo test times out, as expected. `fetch-keepalive.test.ts` needed a second run with a longer per-test timeout: four tests hit the 5 s limit on the loaded build machine. - Without a relay (the origin answers, then renegotiates, and the client waits 1, 2 or 3 ms and fetches again), release builds, 5 runs per wait: main `80de08a1db` aborts in 13 of 15 runs. This branch aborts in 0 of 15. **What stays.** In 12 of those 15 runs on this branch the second request does not get an answer. The server reports that the renegotiation ended, and the request ends in a timeout. (Of the other 3, one got its answer and two failed with `EPROTO`, which main also shows in this cell.) The request write parks while the handshake runs, and uSockets dispatches the writable event only in its `HANDSHAKE_COMPLETED` state, which a renegotiation leaves until application data arrives. That is a separate defect in `packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c`, and #37094 has a fix for it. It does not come from the session cache: it also occurs with `BUN_FEATURE_FLAG_DISABLE_FETCH_TLS_SESSION_CACHE=1`. The todo test next to the new test awaits that request, so it flips when the write is retried. **Cost numbers.** Release builds of main `80de08a1db` and of this branch's source on the same commit. - Instructions from entry to return, nested calls included, counted with gdb single-steps. 3 runs, 3 consecutive calls per run. - Open callback of a new TLS connection (`Trampolines<uws_handlers::HTTPClient<true>>::on_open`): 1,427 on main, 1,415 here. All 9 calls of each build agree. - `HTTPContext<true>::connect` for a pooled TLS request, sixth request of the process: 5,146, 5,160, 5,146 on main and 5,123, 5,118, 5,123 here. Later requests vary more from run to run: 6,617 to 6,762 on main, 6,585 to 6,723 here. - `session_cache::install` calls: 1 per 1,000 keep-alive requests and 100 per 100 new connections, on both builds. - Size: `bun-profile` text is 80,727,274 bytes on main and 80,728,298 here (+1,024). The stripped `bun` is 80,868,936 bytes on both. Symbols: `HTTPClient::on_open::<true>` 1,474 to 280 bytes, `HTTPContext<true>::connect` 5,283 to 5,798, the open callback 375 to 1,582. The TLS block is now part of the open callback, and the compiler inlines the smaller `on_open` at the three pool reuse sites. - Tools: gdb 16.3, `llvm-nm`, `llvm-size`. `perf`, `valgrind` and `bloaty` are not installed on the machine. **Related.** #41671 covers the other way into the same BoringSSL abort, `socket.setSession()` after the handshake started. This change does not depend on it. **Other designs.** - A guard in `session_cache::install`: it stops the abort, but the cached session is still taken out of the cache and the sink is still replaced. - A stricter check in `on_open`: BoringSSL has no query for "the handshake has not started", so it needs a uSockets accessor or new per-socket state, and one branch stays on every pooled request. - Skip a socket that is mid-handshake at pool pickup: the abort stops only because `on_open` is not reached with such a socket. It also changes which requests reuse a connection. - Pass SNI, ALPN and the session to uSockets at connect time: a larger change across every TLS client. It is not needed to remove this defect. **Not run locally.** Windows and macOS. </details>
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Problem
socket.setSession(<valid session>)after the TLS handshake has started kills the process:panic(main thread): abort() called, exit 134.set_session(src/runtime/socket/tls_socket_functions.rs:1182) passes the session to BoringSSL'sSSL_set_session, which callsabort()once the handshake has begun (ssl/ssl_session.cc:1128).Fix
patches/boringssl/set-session-return-0.patch:SSL_set_sessionreturns 0 and leaves the SSL unchanged.set_sessionreturnsundefinedfor that 0. The session is not offered and the connection keeps working.node-tls-connect.test.ts,socket.test.ts. 12 late calls exit 134 on the released bun and returnundefinedhere. The legal window still resumes.Background
undefinedfrom a late call, and the connection can then fail withERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE. Bun returnsundefinedand keeps the connection. This difference is deliberate.set_session(needs BoringSSL's debug strings), a "started" bit per socket owner (stores on every connection's path), and an info callback (this PR's first version, against tls: keep per-connection TLS state on the owner, not in SSL ex_data #43863). The patch puts the check where every caller passes.Downsides
SSL_set_sessionlegal path: 34 -> 36 instructions per call. Release binary: 0 B change.--local-deps=boringsslbuild keeps the abort.Notes
Two questions for a maintainer. The PR stays in draft until they are answered.
!= 1branch throwsSSL_set_session erroron every late call.REVIEW.md:45("never swallow a failure") points that way.BORINGSSL_COMMITbump here, with the patch file deleted.Proof, three states (debug + ASAN, linux x64):
src/andpackages/at the base, patch applied: both fail. Every late call reportsthrew: "SSL_set_session error".node-tls-connect.test.ts122 pass,socket.test.ts104 pass. Its one failure needswww.example.comand fails on the released bun too.What the tests assert. The fixture runs each entry point in one process and prints one JSON object.
finishedis whatsetServername()reports, which throws once the handshake has finished. It separates the two states BoringSSL refuses:initial_handshake_complete(10 entry points) andhs->state != 0with the handshake in flight (bun-connect-failed-handshake,bun-connect-open-after-write).reusedisisSessionReused(). The legal entry point expectstrue. With the offer removed it reportsfalseand the test fails.getSession()blob taken atsecureConnecthas no ticket, so it is never offered.Measurements (release builds, base faac63e against this branch):
sizetext 80,705,363 both).SSL_set_session189 -> 183 B,TLSSocketPrototype__setSession1112 -> 1058 B (llvm-nm).SSL_set_sessionlegal path: 34 -> 36 instructions per call (gdb stepi, 3 runs each).setSession()call: 88,334 -> 88,334 instructions in 1 of 3 runs and 88,413 in 2, 119 -> 119 allocations.setSession: 0 changed instructions inus_internal_ssl_attach,_on_data,_on_writable,_writev(objdump diff).SSL_set_sessionreached 0 times in 30 connections.SSL_set_session:session_cache::installwith a cached session 582 -> 584 instructions. A pooled request is unchanged at 5,150.SSL_set_session. The whole latesetSession()costs 99,144, because the session is parsed first.Split out.
fetch()reaches the same abort when it reuses a pooled socket that the server renegotiates. That fix shares no file with this one and is tracked separately.Same lines in other open PRs. #37664 states that this PR throws
Already started.. That is no longer true. #40236 and #40385 rewrite theset_sessionlines and still carry the throw branch.Not run. Windows and macOS. The named-pipe SSL owner is Windows-only.
no test proof · iteration 0 · platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine, deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts