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… and pipe sockets Node only resets a TCP handle: resetAndDestroy() on a TLSSocket or on a unix socket / named pipe connection throws ERR_INVALID_HANDLE_TYPE synchronously, before the connecting check. Bun reset and destroyed every socket. Bun's native handle is the same class for TCP and pipe connections, so net.ts now records which one a socket is where the connection is made: connect() (from the path option) and the server accept paths (the listener's path, or the one a cluster worker recorded). TLS sockets are recognized by their class, the way the IPC handle serializer already does for the same error.
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ChangesHandle-aware socket reset
Possibly related PRs
Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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Status: ready to merge on review; the diff is green, CI is blocked on infrastructure. Reproduced with the released bun (1.4.0) and node v26.3.0 side by side: CI: the last code change is 9fae45f (4528b72 is an empty retrigger). Both builds for it, 95304 and 95829, have 177 of 179 jobs passed with no failing test (the only annotations are tests that passed on retry, none in net/tls/cluster); the remaining two jobs are the two Related: #34507 has a test that calls |
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Updated 8:04 AM PT - Aug 14th, 2026
✅ @robobun, your commit 4528b72de61ba9447c1103591010339d49d15c10 passed in 🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 38232That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-38232 --bun |
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LGTM — clean Node compat fix with thorough coverage.
What was reviewed:
kIsPipeis initialized in the constructor and set at every point where net.ts decides the transport (connect(),onconnection,onClusterConnection); theonClusterConnectionassignment correctly followsconnect({fd})so it isn't clobbered.- The TLS check reuses the existing
typeof this[bunTlsSymbol] === "function"idiom already used at four other sites in net.ts, andERR_INVALID_HANDLE_TYPEis already registered in ErrorCode.ts. - Checked the one internal
resetAndDestroy()caller that hits TLS sockets (test/js/bun/http/proxy-stress-helpers.ts) — it unwraps to the raw TCP socket and already has acatch { client.destroy() }fallback, so it isn't broken by the new throw.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
This PR makes net.Socket.prototype.resetAndDestroy() throw ERR_INVALID_HANDLE_TYPE for TLS sockets and unix/named-pipe sockets, matching Node's if (!(this._handle instanceof TCP)) throw guard. Since Bun's native handle is the same class regardless of transport, a new per-socket kIsPipe symbol records the pipe/TCP decision at the four points where net.ts makes it: the Socket constructor (init to false), connect() (from options.path), onconnection (from handle.unix || self[kClusterUnixPath], the same two sources Server.prototype.address() reads), and onClusterConnection (from the faux handle's unix). TLS is detected with the existing bunTlsSymbol prototype-method check.
Security risks
None. This tightens an API to throw where it previously succeeded; it does not relax any check, touch credential handling, or affect trust decisions.
Level of scrutiny
Moderate — a Node-compat behavioral change in src/js/node/net.ts that turns a previously-succeeding call into a synchronous throw, and threads new per-socket state through four code paths including two cluster-worker accept paths. That said, the change is small (~30 production lines), follows established idioms in the file, and the check placement (inside if (this._handle), before the connecting branch) mirrors Node's exactly.
Other factors
- Test coverage is comprehensive across the variant matrix the review guidelines call for: pipe vs TCP × connecting/connected/accepted, TLS via
tls.connect()/ server-side /tls.connect({socket})over bothnet.SocketandDuplex, clusterSCHED_RRandSCHED_NONE, and a reused socket switching pipe→TCP. Each asserts the exact error name/code/message anddestroyedstate. - The PR description includes a probe table diffed against Node v26.3.0, and confirms the vendored
test-net-*reset*.jsparallel tests and the fullnode-net/node-tls/cluster/proxy-stress-lifecyclesuites still pass. - The one subtlety I checked — that
socket[kIsPipe] = !!this.unixinonClusterConnectionruns aftersocket.connect({fd})(which resetskIsPipetofalsesince nopathis passed) — is correctly ordered. - The acknowledged gap (fd-adopted sockets are treated as TCP where Node inspects the descriptor type) is stated in the PR body and does not regress anything.
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One correction to the review's reasoning: in the pushed revision |
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I reviewed this PR and didn't find any bugs. The kIsPipe bookkeeping and the guard in resetAndDestroy() look correct and are thoroughly tested against Node v26.3.0. Because it's a user-visible behavioral change (calls that previously succeeded now throw) in the core node:net compat layer, and there are outstanding comment-cop findings plus an acknowledged interaction with #34507, a human look would still be worthwhile.
What was reviewed:
kIsPipeis set on every path that decides the transport (connect()path/fd branches,onconnection,onClusterConnection) and initialized in the constructor — no stale-flag window on socket reuse.- The TLS check via
bunTlsSymbolmatches how the rest ofnet.tsdetectsTLSSocket; the underlyingnet.Socketin atls.connect({ socket })wrap correctly stays resettable. - Existing in-tree
resetAndDestroy()callers on TLS sockets (proxy-stress-helpers.ts) already fall back todestroy()in a try/catch;tls-low-prio-queue-fixture.tsuses plainnet.connectTCP sockets, so it's unaffected.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
Adds a Node-compat guard to Socket.prototype.resetAndDestroy() in src/js/node/net.ts: it now throws ERR_INVALID_HANDLE_TYPE synchronously for TLS sockets and unix-socket / named-pipe connections, matching Node's if (!(this._handle instanceof TCP)) check. Since Bun's native handle class is the same for TCP and pipe connections, the transport is recorded in a new per-socket kIsPipe symbol at each site that decides it (client connect(), server onconnection, cluster onClusterConnection, and reset on the connect({ fd }) early-return branch). Three test files gain coverage for pipe vs TCP × connecting/connected/accepted, socket reuse, TLS wrappers over both a net.Socket and a Duplex, and both cluster scheduling policies.
Security risks
None. This narrows an API's accepted inputs (fails closed on non-TCP handles) rather than widening it, and touches no auth/crypto/trust decisions.
Level of scrutiny
Medium-high. src/js/node/net.ts is core Node compat surface used by http, tls, cluster, and user code; the change is small but flips previously-succeeding calls to a synchronous throw. That's the correct Node behavior, and the failure mode for anyone relying on the old behavior is loud (a TypeError with a specific code), but it is still a user-facing behavioral change that a maintainer should sign off on.
Other factors
- Five outstanding
comment-copinline findings fromgithub-actions[bot]flag the new explanatory comments as too long; those haven't been addressed yet. - The author flagged an interaction with #34507, whose test expects
resetAndDestroy()on atls.connect({ socket })wrapper to succeed — whichever lands second needs adjusting. - I checked the other in-tree
resetAndDestroy()callers:proxy-stress-helpers.tsalready wraps the call in try/catch with adestroy()fallback (and unwraps to the raw TCP socket first),tls-low-prio-queue-fixture.tscalls it on plain TCPnet.connectsockets, and_http_server.ts's is a no-op stub on FakeSocket — none regress. - Test coverage is strong: the new tests assert the exact error class/code/message, cover both connection states and both sides, verify the flag is decided per-
connect(), and were confirmed to fail on the released build.
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Pushed the follow-ups (head is now 9fae45f):
No logic changes beyond the first bullet. |
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LGTM — a focused Node.js compat fix with thorough coverage.
What was reviewed:
- The
kIsPipeflag is set at every transport-decision point (connect()path/fd branches,onconnectionviahandle.unix/kClusterUnixPath,onClusterConnectionvia the faux handle'sunix) and read only inresetAndDestroy(); thebunTlsSymbolcheck matches the pattern used elsewhere in net.ts and Ipc.ts. $ERR_INVALID_HANDLE_TYPE()produces the exact TypeError/code/message the tests assert (via ErrorCode.cpp).- In-repo
resetAndDestroy()callers on TLS sockets (proxy-stress-helpers.tsrstClient) already wrap in try/catch with adestroy()fallback, so no existing tests regress. - Tests await real events, clean up in
try/finally, and cover the connecting/connected/server-side/reused/cluster matrix plus the TLS wrap shapes.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
Adds a private kIsPipe symbol on net.Socket to record whether the underlying transport is a unix socket / named pipe (vs TCP), and guards Socket.prototype.resetAndDestroy() to throw ERR_INVALID_HANDLE_TYPE for TLS sockets (detected via bunTlsSymbol, the same predicate Ipc.ts uses) and for pipe sockets. This mirrors Node's if (!(this._handle instanceof TCP)) guard, which Bun cannot reproduce directly because its native handle class doesn't distinguish TCP from pipe. The flag is set at each point where net.ts decides the transport: connect() (both the path and fd branches), onconnection (server accept, reading handle.unix || self[kClusterUnixPath]), and onClusterConnection (round-robin cluster worker, reading the faux handle's unix set by kClusterFauxListen). Tests are added in three files covering unix/TCP × connecting/connected/server-side, socket reuse, both cluster scheduling policies, and every TLS wrap shape (tls.connect(), server-side, tls.connect({ socket }) over a net.Socket and a Duplex, and an unstarted new TLSSocket(stream)).
Security risks
None. This is a Node compat behavioral change (throwing where Bun previously silently reset). No auth, crypto, permissions, or untrusted-input parsing is touched. The added flag is a private symbol only read by resetAndDestroy().
Level of scrutiny
Medium. It's a Node compat fix in the well-trodden src/js/node/net.ts layer with a narrow surface: one new symbol, five one-line flag assignments at existing transport-decision points, and a two-line guard in resetAndDestroy(). The behavior change is user-visible (a throw where there wasn't one), but it aligns Bun with Node's documented contract, and the only in-repo TLS callers (proxy-stress-helpers.ts rstClient) already wrap the call in try/catch with a destroy() fallback — the PR description confirms those tests pass. No native code, memory management, or hot-path perf concerns.
Other factors
- The
bunTlsSymbolcheck (typeof this[bunTlsSymbol] === "function") is the same idiom used throughout net.ts and in Ipc.ts for the same purpose. $ERR_INVALID_HANDLE_TYPE()is defined in ErrorCode.ts/ErrorCode.cpp and producesTypeErrorwith codeERR_INVALID_HANDLE_TYPEand message "This handle type cannot be sent", matching the tests' exact-string assertions.- The author self-identified and fixed the stale-flag case where
connect({ fd })returned before the flag assignment (7ede0a1), so everyconnect()call now decides the flag. - All comment-cop threads were addressed (comments trimmed to one line each; all threads resolved).
- Tests follow the repo's conventions:
once()for events,try/finallycleanup,port: 0, exact error class/code/message assertions, and a per-connect() reuse test to prove the flag isn't stale. The PR description documents verification against node v26.3.0,USE_SYSTEM_BUN=1failure, and the vendoredtest-net-*reset*.jssuite. - Not covered by CODEOWNERS.
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Automated review ran and found no bugs. Deferring to a human because this is a user-visible behavior change to resetAndDestroy() (previously-working calls on TLS and pipe sockets now throw) and introduces per-socket kIsPipe state that must stay in sync at every handle-attach point in net.ts.
What was reviewed:
- The
kIsPipeflag is derived from the same sourcesServer.prototype.address()already reads (handle.unix/kClusterUnixPath), and everyconnect()path (fd, path, host/port) decides it. - The TLS check reuses the
bunTlsSymbolpattern already used inIpc.tsfor the same error code;$ERR_INVALID_HANDLE_TYPE()produces the exact node message the tests assert. - The
onClusterConnectionassignment afterconnect({ fd })and the fd-branch reset — checked that the ordering is right so the RR worker's flag reflects the faux handle'sunix. - Tests cover the variant matrix (connecting/connected/server-side, pipe→TCP reuse, both cluster policies, all TLS shapes) and assert TCP still resets.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
The PR adds a handle-type guard to Socket.prototype.resetAndDestroy() in src/js/node/net.ts so it throws ERR_INVALID_HANDLE_TYPE for TLS sockets and unix/named-pipe connections, matching node's if (!(this._handle instanceof TCP)) check. Since bun's native handle class does not distinguish TCP from pipe, a new per-socket kIsPipe symbol records the transport at each point net.ts decides it: the Socket constructor (default false), connect({ fd }) (false), connect({ path }) vs host/port, onconnection (from the listener's handle.unix / kClusterUnixPath), and onClusterConnection (from the faux handle's unix, after the fd-connect that cleared it). TLS is detected via typeof this[bunTlsSymbol] === 'function', the same pattern Ipc.ts uses for this error. Three test files gain thorough coverage.
Security risks
None identified. The change makes an operation stricter (rejects instead of proceeding) and does not touch verification, credentials, or trust decisions. The TLS check is a class-level predicate, not a security gate.
Level of scrutiny
Moderate-to-high. src/js/node/net.ts is a large hot-path built-in and this is a user-visible behavior change: code that previously called resetAndDestroy() on a TLS or unix socket in bun and had it go through will now get a synchronous throw. The PR verified the in-tree proxy fixtures (which do this inside try/catch) still pass on their fallback path, and the vendored test-net-*reset*.js suite passes, but this is still the kind of compat-vs-existing-users trade-off a maintainer should sign off on. The PR also flags a known conflict with #34507's test.
Other factors
- The runtime diff is small (~15 lines) and follows existing idioms in the file (
bunTlsSymbolcheck, symbol-keyed private state,$ERR_*machinery). - The
kIsPipederivation reuses exactly the two sourcesServer.prototype.address()already reads to answer the same question, so it should stay consistent with what the server reports. - The PR explicitly documents its non-coverage (
connect({ fd }),listen({ fd }), IPC-received sockets treated as TCP; a barenew tls.TLSSocket()with no handle takes the ERR_SOCKET_CLOSED branch) — these follow from how bun attaches handles rather than from this check, but they are a documented divergence from node. - All comment-cop threads are resolved (comments trimmed to one line each in 39ea98d/9fae45f).
…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
Problem
socket.resetAndDestroy()on atls.TLSSocketor on a unix socket / named pipe connection resets and destroys the socket. Node throwsTypeError [ERR_INVALID_HANDLE_TYPE]: This handle type cannot be sentsynchronously for both (client or server side, connected or still connecting) and only resets plain TCP sockets.new tls.TLSSocket(socket)that has not started yet, the call went even further off: the reset ran and failed inside_destroywiththis._handle.terminate is not a function, delivered as the socket's'error'.Socket.prototype.resetAndDestroyinsrc/js/node/net.tshas no equivalent of node'sif (!(this._handle instanceof TCP)) throw new ERR_INVALID_HANDLE_TYPE()(lib/net.js, v26.3.0 L801-L815). Bun cannot use the handle's class for this: the native handle is the sameTCPSocketclass for a TCP and for a unix / named-pipe connection.Fix
resetAndDestroy()throws$ERR_INVALID_HANDLE_TYPE()when the socket has a handle and is either atls.TLSSocket(recognized by its class, the same checkIpc.tsuses to refuse sending a TLS socket) or a pipe connection. The check sits before theconnectingbranch, like node's.kIsPipe) at the points where net.ts decides the transport, which is where node would construct aPipeinstead of aTCPhandle:Socket.prototype.connect(): thepathoption; the fd branch sets it to false. Everyconnect()call decides it, so a reused socket follows its current connection;onconnection: the listener's bound path (handle.unix), orkClusterUnixPathfor a cluster worker accepting on the primary's shared fd (the two sourcesServer.prototype.address()already reads);onClusterConnection(round-robin cluster worker): the pathkClusterFauxListenstores on the faux handle, set after theconnect({ fd })that cleared it.TLSSocketwith a handle has a TLS wrap there, so the class is the exact predicate; for pipes, node's handle type is itself derived from the samepath/ listen-path decisions, so recording that decision reproduces it. The plainnet.Socketunderneathtls.connect({ socket })keeps a TCP handle in node and stays resettable here too.connect({ fd }),listen({ fd }), IPC-received sockets) count as TCP, where node inspects the descriptor type; and aTLSSocketthat has no handle at all yet (barenew tls.TLSSocket(),tls.connect({ socket })over a still-connecting socket, or a server-sidenew tls.TLSSocket(socket, { isServer: true })in the tick before its upgrade attaches) takes the existing no-handle branch (destroy(ERR_SOCKET_CLOSED)) where node, which wraps eagerly, throws. Both follow from how bun attaches handles, not from this check, and nothing in the repo callsresetAndDestroy()on either.test/js/node/net/node-net.test.ts, "resetAndDestroy() handle type": unix socket / named pipe while connecting, connected, and on the accepting side throw; TCP still resets in all three states; a socket reused for TCP after a pipe connection resets again.test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts, "TLSSocket.resetAndDestroy()":tls.connect()before and after the handshake, the server's socket,tls.connect({ socket })over anet.Socketand over aDuplex, and a not-yet-startednew TLSSocket(stream)all throw; the wrappednet.Socketstill resets.test/js/node/cluster.test.ts: SCHED_RR and SCHED_NONE workers; the unix-path server's accepted socket throws, the TCP server's resets.node-net.test.ts: the same 11 failures as without the change in this container (connect(port)localhost resolution and unref tests), nothing new.node-tls-connect.test.ts,cluster.test.ts,child_process_ipc_handle.test.ts, and the proxy tests whose fixtures callresetAndDestroy()on a TLS server socket inside a try/catch (proxy-stress-lifecycle.test.ts,proxy-stress-adversarial.test.ts, the handshake-reset cases inproxy.test.ts; on the TLS legs they now take theirdestroy()fallback, since bun does not expose a_parentto reset instead): all pass.test/js/node/test/parallel/test-net-*reset*.js(8 files) pass; the fulltest-net-*/test-tls-*set has no failures attributable to the change.Background
resetAndDestroy()(added in node 18.3) closes a TCP connection with an RST instead of a FIN; in node it callsTCP.prototype.reset, which only TCP handles have, hence the handle-type guard. Bun implements the RST with the nativeterminate(), which exists on every native handle, so nothing stopped the call from going through.net.Socketwraps aTCPhandle (TCP connection), aPipehandle (unix domain socket, or named pipe on Windows), or fortls.TLSSocketaTLSWraparound one of those.this._handle instanceof TCPis how node tells them apart; bun's native handle is aTCPSocketorTLSSocketobject regardless of the address family underneath.Symbol.for("::buntls::")(bunTlsSymbol): a method defined ontls.TLSSocket.prototype(and ontls.Server) that net.ts uses throughout to detect TLS sockets;new tls.TLSSocket,tls.connect()and server-accepted TLS sockets are all instances of that class.SCHED_RRthe primary accepts and hands each connection's fd to a worker, which wraps it via a faux listen handle (onClusterConnection); underSCHED_NONEthe worker listens on the primary's shared fd, so the native listener has no path and the server records it inkClusterUnixPath.Probe output (node v26.3.0 vs bun 1.4.0 vs this branch)
no test proof · iteration 1 · Platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine. Deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/node/cluster.test.ts test/js/node/net/node-net.test.ts