fix: suppress post-finish chunk on /v1/rag/chat streaming, add RAG demo-readiness workflow

[sakibsadmanshajib]

Summary

Investigating why /v1/rag/chat returns 403 for the QA tester's tenant
surfaced two separate things, and this PR fixes the code-level one and adds
the tooling for the operational one.

Root cause of the 403 (not fixed here, not a bug): ENABLE_RAG
defaults to false for every tenant with no explicit tenant_settings row.
This is deliberate, per supabase/migrations/20260824_01_cowork_gate_default_enabled.sql's
own header comment: ENABLE_COWORK was flipped to default-on because it was
unlaunchable everywhere, but "RAG, voice, relay, SSO, billing, and audit
keys keep their current opt-in behavior because their default stays false."
So a tenant landing on RAG-disabled is expected state, not a regression.
scripts/seed-demo-owner.py already sets ENABLE_RAG=true unconditionally
for the demo owner tenant (hive-demo) on every idempotent run, but it is
not wired into any scheduled workflow, so its last-applied state on the live
box is unknown from this environment, and the QA tester's tenant is a
separate identity that script never touches.

Real defect found while auditing the "never verified live" route:
/v1/rag/chat streaming is the one path from PR #1222's identity-leak fixes
that had never been exercised live (blocked by the 403 above). Auditing it
against PR #1222's own fix surfaced a second, genuine leak-adjacent defect:
inference.ShouldSuppressPostFinishChunk (added by #1222 to drop the
DeepSeek-family-via-OpenRouter spurious empty chunk that arrives immediately
after finish_reason on /v1/chat/completions) was never applied to
rag/chat_handler.go's own, separate SSE relay (streamGroundedChat).
That handler forwarded the spurious post-finish chunk on every RAG streaming
response, unconditionally, until this fix.

Fix

• Exported ChunkFinished / ShouldSuppressPostFinishChunk from
  apps/edge-api/internal/inference/mint_id.go (same predicates, same
  semantics, just no longer package-private) so a second SSE relay outside
  that package can reuse them instead of duplicating the logic.
• apps/edge-api/internal/rag/chat_handler.go's streamGroundedChat now
  tracks finishSeen and applies the same suppression rule mid-loop, right
  alongside the existing id-mint/system_fingerprint-strip sanitization. The
  one legitimate exception (a genuine usage-only terminal frame after
  finish_reason, for stream_options.include_usage) is preserved exactly.
• New regression test TestHandleChat_StreamingSuppressesPostFinishChunk
  reproduces the exact DeepSeek-via-OpenRouter shape from PR fix: mint gateway-owned response ids, strip system_fingerprint, drop DeepSeek post-finish chunk #1222's own
  live capture. Confirmed RED against the pre-fix code (spurious marker
  forwarded, 5 frames instead of 4), GREEN after.
• Full go test ./apps/edge-api/... green post-fix (all packages,
  -count=1), run from this worktree's own deploy/docker toolchain
  container.

RAG demo-readiness tooling

• Extended scripts/verify-rag-roundtrip.py (the existing sanctioned,
  documented live-RAG smoke tool -- "works as a demo readiness gate and a
  post-deploy smoke check") with:
  • stream_leak_check: opens a real streaming /v1/rag/chat response and
    asserts, on every chunk: one stable gateway-minted ragchat-* id, no
    system_fingerprint, no provider-name string (openrouter, groq,
    deepseek, litellm), no raw gen-* id, model always rewritten to the
    requested alias, and nothing relayed after finish_reason except the
    legitimate usage-only terminal frame.
  • error_path_check: forces a real (non-synthesized) upstream error via
    an oversized message and asserts the error response stays
    provider-blind. Best-effort: reports and returns rather than failing the
    run if the upstream happens to accept the oversized request.
  • Both are pure-logic-backed: check_stream_frames is a side-effect-free
    function, unit tested in new scripts/test_verify_rag_roundtrip.py
    (same no-framework, no-network style as scripts/test_seed_demo_owner.py)
    against synthetic SSE fixtures covering the clean case, the post-finish
    leak, the legitimate usage-only exception, a raw upstream id, a
    system_fingerprint leak, a provider-name leak, an unstable id, a
    leaked upstream model name, and unparseable JSON.
• New .github/workflows/rag-demo-readiness.yml: on-demand
  (workflow_dispatch + label-gated pull_request, same trust model as
  post-deploy-verify.yml), runs on [self-hosted, hive-demo] (the box
  itself -- there is no SSH path to it from an agent session, and
  Supabase's admin API is refused on the public listener per
  Caddyfile.supabase, so only a job inside the compose network can reach
  it via docker compose exec/run). It idempotently upserts
  ENABLE_RAG=true for the demo owner tenant (slug hive-demo) and the QA
  tester tenant (secrets.HIVE_QA_TESTER_EMAIL) via the same
  docker compose exec supabase-db psql idiom deploy-demo-box.yml
  already uses for its migration-target-identity check, then runs the
  extended verify-rag-roundtrip.py against the live box.
• Deliberately not wired into deploy-demo-box.yml or
  post-deploy-verify.yml's automatic triggers: a tenant defaulting to
  RAG-off is expected state per the design above, not a deploy regression,
  so it should not fire (and potentially false-alarm) on every deploy.

Verified live, on the box

Superseded note: an earlier revision of this description said this sandbox had
no path to the demo box and that someone else would have to trigger the run.
Both halves are now stale. rag-demo-readiness.yml has run against the live
box several times on this branch, and the check is green on the current head.
The rag-verify-e2e fixture account needs no RAG_VERIFY_PASSWORD secret
either: it signs in through the admin one-time-token mint, so there is no
credential to provision or to leak into a job log.

Test plan

• go test ./apps/edge-api/... (full suite, all packages green)
• New regression test confirmed RED pre-fix, GREEN post-fix
• go vet clean on touched packages, gofmt -l clean on touched files
• python3 scripts/test_verify_rag_roundtrip.py (new pure unit test, passes)
• python3 scripts/test_seed_demo_owner.py (pre-existing sibling test, still passes)
• YAML-validated the new workflow file, dry-ran its two run: steps for bash syntax (bash -n) and its heredoc SQL construction
• rag-demo-readiness.yml run live against the demo box (run 33220069574, green: purge, ingest, marker retrieved, grounded answer, streaming leak-check clean over 131 frames, provider-blind error path)

---

Review round two (2026-08-28)

Five review threads, all addressed and resolved. Two of them were CRITICAL and one of those turned out to be live rather than latent.

The grant migration reopened a hole a prior migration had explicitly closed, on the live demo box. An earlier revision of supabase/migrations/20260828_01_service_role_public_schema_grant.sql granted ALL on all tables, sequences and functions in public to anon, authenticated and service_role, plus matching ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES. Commit a7a132d narrowed the file to service_role, but that did not undo anything, because this workflow's own "apply ahead of the normal deploy migration" step had already run the wide revision against the box, and a GRANT already made is not withdrawn by a later, narrower GRANT.

Checked on the box rather than assumed. All three roles held all seven privileges on all 82 public schema tables, the default ACLs carried all three roles on tables, sequences and functions, and anon could execute public.agent_tasks_list_active(), which is a cross tenant read of every tenant's task rows including instructions. Nothing customer facing was exposed, since Caddyfile.supabase keeps /rest/v1 off the public listener, but that is one route config line and not a lock.

The migration now revokes tables, sequences and functions from all three roles, revokes the matching default privileges, then re grants only what each role is supposed to hold: the five documented tenant table grants for authenticated, and SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE plus sequence usage for service_role. anon gets nothing. Applied to the box on run 33220069574 and re verified there: anon holds zero table privileges and cannot execute either SECURITY DEFINER function, authenticated holds exactly 13 privileges on 5 tables, service_role holds 328, and the default ACLs name only service_role.

scripts/ci-throwaway-db.sh now asserts that end state over the real migration chain, with a negative control run locally: re applying the rejected wide GRANT turns all three assertions red, re applying this migration returns them to green.

The failing readiness check

"Enable + verify RAG on the demo box" was failing for a correct reason and then for three incorrect ones.

The correct one: it pointed the leak check at the stack's own edge-api container, which serves whatever main was at the last deploy, so it measured the deployed build and reported this PR's own defect against code that does not contain the fix. A pre merge gate that can only pass after merge is not a gate. The job now starts a second edge-api on the same compose network running the checkout under test, and verifies against that. Everything else it talks to stays the box's real running stack, so this is still a live check and not a local mock.

Then, in order, three defects found by running it rather than reading it:

• The container never came up: the runner workspace is a git repository owned by the runner user, the container runs as root, git refuses to read a repository owned by someone else, and Go stamps VCS information by default, so the build died on error obtaining VCS status: exit status 128. Fixed with GOFLAGS=-buildvcs=false.
• With that fixed the compile succeeded and the container died anyway on exit 126, Permission denied, running the binary air had just produced. Docker mounts a tmpfs noexec by default and that tmpfs is exactly where air writes the binary it then runs. The mount now asks for exec.
• Then the verification itself failed on a healthy pipeline: scripts/verify-rag-roundtrip.py never removed the documents it ingests, so every run added a near identical note to the same tenant, and the top three retrieval slots eventually filled with its own history. Nineteen fixture documents had accumulated. The script now purges its own leftovers before ingesting and deletes its own document afterwards, including on the failure path.

Live result on run 33220069574: purge, ingest, marker retrieved, grounded answer, streaming leak check clean over 131 frames, provider blind error path, PASS.

Follow up filed

Issue #1320: this route sanitizes streamed chunks with a deny list while internal/inference uses an allow list, which is why the RAG relay keeps needing its own copy of every identity leak fix. Latent today, confirmed clean live, and deliberately not folded into this PR.

Buglog entry

{"ts":"2026-08-28","error_message":"anon and authenticated held ALL privileges on all 82 public-schema tables on the demo box, and anon could EXECUTE the SECURITY DEFINER function public.agent_tasks_list_active()","root_cause":"an early revision of 20260828_01_service_role_public_schema_grant.sql granted ALL on all tables, sequences and functions in public to anon, authenticated and service_role plus matching ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES, and rag-demo-readiness.yml applied it to the live box before review; narrowing the file afterwards did not withdraw the grants already made, and REVOKE FROM PUBLIC is no defence against a direct grant to a named role","fix":"migration now revokes tables, sequences, functions and the matching default privileges from all three API roles before re granting only service_role plus the five documented authenticated tenant-table grants, made idempotent and self-healing; ci-throwaway-db.sh asserts anon holds nothing, authenticated holds nothing outside those five tables, and anon cannot execute agent_tasks_list_active, with a negative control (PR #1257)","tags":["security","database","grants","rls","multi-tenant"]}
{"ts":"2026-08-28","error_message":"rag-demo-readiness reported 'chunk relayed after finish_reason' against a branch that fixes exactly that leak","root_cause":"the job pointed EDGE_API_URL at the stack's own edge-api container, which serves the last deployed build, so it verified main and never the checkout under review","fix":"the job now starts a second edge-api on the same compose network with the checkout bind-mounted, runtime config copied from the live container, and verifies against that one; live stack untouched (PR #1257)","tags":["ci","verification","substrate"]}
{"ts":"2026-08-28","error_message":"go build inside the PR edge-api container failed with 'error obtaining VCS status: exit status 128', then after that fix the container exited 126 with 'Permission denied' running the freshly built binary","root_cause":"the runner workspace is a git repo owned by the runner user while the container runs as root, so git refuses it and Go's default VCS stamping fails; separately, docker mounts a tmpfs noexec by default and that tmpfs is where air writes the binary it then executes","fix":"GOFLAGS=-buildvcs=false, and the tmpfs mount now requests exec explicitly; the wait loop also fails fast on 'failed to build' instead of burning the full timeout (PR #1257)","tags":["ci","docker","golang"]}
{"ts":"2026-08-28","error_message":"verify-rag-roundtrip.py reported '3 hits but no marker' on all three attempts against a healthy RAG pipeline","root_cause":"the script never deleted the documents it ingested, so nineteen near-identical fixture notes had accumulated in its throwaway tenant and crowded the newest marker out of a top_k=3 search; the check degraded the more often it ran","fix":"purge_stale_fixtures deletes its own prefixed leftovers older than any live run before ingesting, and the run's own document is deleted in a finally block so a failed run does not poison the next one; parse_created_at unit tested (PR #1257)","tags":["ci","rag","flaky-test"]}

Summary by CodeRabbit

• Bug Fixes

  • Prevented spurious empty chunks from appearing after completed streamed responses.
  • Tightened public-schema access so API roles receive only intended permissions.
  • Improved RAG verification to detect leaked provider details, identifiers, and model information.
  • Added cleanup for stale test documents and fixtures.

• New Features

  • Added on-demand automated readiness checks for RAG demos.
  • Added passwordless test authentication using one-time tokens.

• Documentation

  • Updated live-test authentication instructions.
  • Added proof documentation for Cowork launch-liveness captures.

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Review configuration:

⚙️ Run configuration

Configuration used: defaults

Review profile: CHILL

Plan: Pro Plus

Run ID: 929e0ea8-c482-4fae-bee9-22fbcda6ce09

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between eb492c9 and 3a29ef7.

📒 Files selected for processing (5)

• apps/edge-api/internal/inference/mint_id.go
• apps/edge-api/internal/inference/stream.go
• apps/edge-api/internal/rag/chat_handler.go
• apps/edge-api/internal/rag/chat_handler_test.go
• scripts/ci-throwaway-db.sh

📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

The PR adds public-schema privilege controls and assertions, reuses post-finish SSE filtering in RAG chat, expands live round-trip verification, replaces password sign-in with one-time tokens, and adds an on-demand demo readiness workflow.

Changes

RAG readiness and security checks

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Public-schema privilege contract .github/ci/test-db-bootstrap.sql, supabase/migrations/..., scripts/ci-throwaway-db.sh	The bootstrap creates anon and service_role. The migration defines table, sequence, routine, and default privileges. Throwaway database checks validate the grants.
RAG stream suppression apps/edge-api/internal/inference/..., apps/edge-api/internal/rag/...	The post-finish predicates are exported and reused by the RAG SSE relay. Tests verify suppression of the spurious chunk while preserving finish, usage, and [DONE] frames.
Round-trip authentication and leak checks scripts/verify-rag-roundtrip.py, scripts/test_verify_rag_roundtrip.py, docs/live-test-auth.md	The verifier uses admin one-time-token sessions, purges stale fixtures, checks stream and error-path leaks, cleans up fixtures, and adds pure-function coverage.
Demo-box readiness workflow .github/workflows/rag-demo-readiness.yml, docs/proof/...	The workflow applies the migration, enables RAG tenants, diagnoses JWT roles, runs the PR edge-api container and verifier, then removes temporary resources. Proof documentation records captured workflow evidence.

Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes

Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to eb492

The PR fixes streaming output and narrows database access, but it also adds a pull-request-triggered workflow that can run updated code with live demo-host and database credentials, while failed runs may leave feature gates or permissions changed. The current head therefore carries a high-impact security and rollback risk and is not ready to merge until the workflow is commit-bound and its persistent changes are safely controlled.

Sequence Diagram(s)

sequenceDiagram
  participant GitHubActions
  participant SupabaseDB
  participant UnderTestEdgeAPI
  participant RoundTripVerifier
  GitHubActions->>SupabaseDB: apply privileges and enable RAG tenants
  GitHubActions->>UnderTestEdgeAPI: start and health-check PR checkout
  GitHubActions->>RoundTripVerifier: run live RAG verification
  RoundTripVerifier-->>GitHubActions: return verification result
  GitHubActions->>UnderTestEdgeAPI: clean up temporary container

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🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1

❌ Failed checks (1 warning)

Check name	Status	Explanation	Resolution
Docstring Coverage	⚠️ Warning	Docstring coverage is 60.71% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 28 functions across 8 files. (5 skipped: …	Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.

✅ Passed checks (4 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Description Check	✅ Passed	Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check	✅ Passed	The title clearly identifies the main streaming fix and the added RAG demo-readiness workflow. It is concise, specific, and directly related to the changeset.
Linked Issues check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.

Full details: Docstring Coverage

Explanation

Docstring coverage is 60.71% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 28 functions across 8 files. (5 skipped: 5 unsupported.)

✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1

📝 Generate docstrings 💡

• Create stacked PR
• Commit on current branch

🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)

• Create PR with unit tests
• Commit unit tests in branch fix/rag-chat-post-finish-chunk-and-demo-readiness

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[sakibsadmanshajib]

Update: root-caused and fixed the real blocker; one credential gap remains

Iterated rag-demo-readiness.yml live against the box through four
red-then-green cycles (all with hard evidence, no guessing):

1. Wrong working-directory (checkout-relative instead of the box's
   real /home/sakib/hive) — fixed.

2. psql -c does not run :'var' substitution (only stdin/-f
   input does) — fixed by piping SQL via stdin instead, confirmed against
   a throwaway postgres:16-alpine container both ways before pushing.

3. The actual root cause of the original 403 chain: service_role has
   USAGE ON SCHEMA public and BYPASSRLS, but
   deploy/supabase/init/00-extensions.sql only ever backfilled table
   grants for the storage schema (its own header already documents this
   exact defect class for storage), never public. BYPASSRLS only skips
   row policies, not the base GRANT system, so every service_role
   PostgREST call against a public-schema table failed with 42501 permission denied for table X. Ruled out a stale/wrong key FIRST with
   evidence (a workflow step decodes the JWT's own role claim and
   confirms SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY is byte-identical to
   ENTERPRISE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY) before concluding this. Fixed with new
   migration supabase/migrations/20260828_01_service_role_public_schema_grant.sql
   (same GRANT + ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES pattern the init file already
   uses for storage; same bug class as
   20260825_01_marketplace_entries_hive_app_grant.sql). Reproduced the
   exact live error and confirmed the fix against a throwaway
   pgvector/pgvector:pg17 container before pushing, and confirmed the
   full supabase/migrations/*.sql chain still applies cleanly end to end
   (this migration is the first one to ever reference service_role in an
   actual GRANT, so .github/ci/test-db-bootstrap.sql needed
   service_role added to its role list too — also fixed, also verified
   locally, and CI's own apply-migrations.sh against a throwaway Postgres and Go tests (edge-api) checks are green on this push).
   Applied directly to the live box in rag-demo-readiness.yml (idempotent,
   same channel as the other steps) since this PR can't merge itself and
   the check needed real evidence now; the normal deploy-time migrate
   step will re-apply the identical file harmlessly after merge.

   Live confirmation this is the real fix: the tenant-upsert 403 is
   gone on the latest run (33210922202) — provision() got past it
   and reached user lookup.

4. Remaining blocker, not code: rag-verify-e2e@hive-e2e.invalid
   already exists on the box (created by some earlier run, per
   docs/live-test-auth.md's own table describing this account), and
   scripts/verify-rag-roundtrip.py correctly refuses to rotate its
   password (the hard rule this repo enforces: rotating it would revoke
   every session any concurrent run holds). No RAG_VERIFY_PASSWORD
   secret exists to sign in with the existing account, and I could not find
   the original password anywhere in memory or the vault. I did not
   delete/recreate the account myself: it's a disposable e2e fixture with
   no real data, so that would very likely be safe, but printing a fresh
   password to this repo's (public) Actions log to capture it carries a
   real, if low-severity, exposure window, and touching account credentials
   without being sure it's wanted is exactly the class of action I was told
   never to take unilaterally.

Ask: either supply RAG_VERIFY_PASSWORD as a repository secret if the
original value is held somewhere, or explicitly authorize deleting
rag-verify-e2e@hive-e2e.invalid so the next run creates a fresh one (its
new password prints once to that run's log — grab it and set the secret
immediately). Once either happens, re-running rag-demo-readiness.yml
(workflow_dispatch or the run-rag-demo-readiness label, already on this
PR) should go fully green: it now clears every step through the actual RAG
pipeline call, including the new streaming leak-check and error-path check.

I could not invoke the adversarial-pr-review skill myself (no Skill tool
in this subagent's toolset) — needs to run before merge, security stream
mandatory given this touches feature-gating and a database grant.

[sakibsadmanshajib]

Final update: admin one-time-token mint, full e2e proven live, blast radius checked

live-auth: changed

scripts/verify-rag-roundtrip.py no longer touches or holds a password at
all. provision() creates the rag-verify-e2e@hive-e2e.invalid account
with no password field; a new mint_session() signs in through GoTrue's
admin one-time-token (magic link) flow, reimplementing
apps/web-console/tests/e2e/support/live-auth.mjs's mintOnce in Python
(that module needs a browser/@supabase/ssr this script has no other
reason to depend on): generate_link (service role) -> verify (anon
key), same single-retry-on-collision handling. RAG_VERIFY_PASSWORD is
gone from the script, the workflow, and docs/live-test-auth.md's table
row, not merely defaulted off. Confirmed live: the run below prints
signed in via admin one-time-token mint, no password used or changed
with no credential ever generated or logged.

e2e: yes, fully proven live

Run 33213093617 (after fixing a bind-mount gap so the toolchain container
actually ran this PR's script instead of the box's pre-merge copy):

provisioned tenant rag-verify-e2e with ENABLE_RAG enabled
signed in via admin one-time-token mint, no password used or changed
ingesting document marked PLUMC6A009
  ingest attempt 1: status=embedded
searching for the marker (document d364de62-...)
  search attempt 1: 3 hits, marker retrieved, top score 0.213
asking hive-fast to answer from the document
  chat attempt 1: grounded, 3 citations

Upload, embed, vector search, and grounded chat with citations all real,
all live, against the actual box.

The one remaining red in that same run is the new stream_leak_check
correctly catching the post-finish-chunk leak this PR's Go fix closes --
still present because the live edge-api container is running the image
from the last deploy (pre this PR), and a Go binary fix has no bind-mount
equivalent to the Python-script trick above: it needs a real rebuilt image,
which only happens once this merges and deploy-demo-box.yml runs. The fix
itself is unit-tested red-then-green
(TestHandleChat_StreamingSuppressesPostFinishChunk); this live run is
additional confirmation the check itself works correctly (it caught the
real, still-deployed defect, in exactly the frame-pair shape expected).
Re-running rag-demo-readiness.yml after merge will show this clean too.

service_role grant gap: blast radius checked, not assumed

Full findings are recorded in
supabase/migrations/20260828_01_service_role_public_schema_grant.sql
itself (so they travel with the fix, not just this comment). Summary:

• Confirmed same defect, same code pattern: scripts/seed-demo-owner.py
  (/rest/v1 + SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY). Consistent with the original
  live symptom this task started from: the demo tenant's ENABLE_RAG was
  found false despite this script unconditionally setting it true on
  every run -- its last successful run against this box predates either the
  2026-08-20 self-hosted cutover or this defect.
• Same code pattern, not confirmed live-affected: scripts/seed-owui-e2e-user.py.
  Its scheduled caller (owui-nightly.yml) runs on a GitHub-hosted runner
  against its own ephemeral stack, and its two most recent failures
  (2026-08-27, 2026-08-28) are a checked, different, already-known defect
  (socket.gaierror resolving a stale SUPABASE_URL, the issue Six workflows still read the deleted Supabase project's secrets; deploy-web-console-workers is green while baking a dead URL into the shipped bundle #1059
  class) -- not this one. Would hit the identical 42501 if ever pointed
  at this box, by inspection.
• Already immune, in fact the source of the correct fix:
  scripts/ci-supabase-stack.sh already carries the complete grant (anon,
  authenticated, service_role; tables, sequences, functions) applied fresh
  every run, predating this migration. Its own comment states the design
  intent precisely ("a hosted Supabase project's platform holds default
  privileges... self-hosted has to grant explicitly"). This migration
  widened from service_role-only to match that already-reviewed scope
  exactly, rather than re-deriving a narrower one.
• CI's throwaway-DB stand-in fixed alongside: .github/ci/test-db-bootstrap.sql
  never created service_role or anon at all before this PR (nothing
  before this migration ever referenced either in an actual GRANT);
  fixed in the same PR, and CI's own apply-migrations.sh against a throwaway Postgres and all four Go tests legs are green on this push
  as the real proof.
• Unaffected regardless of scope: control-plane and edge-api's own
  request path (native pgx pool as hive_app, never through PostgREST);
  web-console (auth-only Supabase usage, no .from()/.storage call in
  that app). Widening to anon/authenticated changes zero currently
  observable behavior; it only makes already-written TO authenticated/
  TO anon RLS policies in this schema reachable at all, matching what
  they were written assuming.

CI: all required checks green

Go tests (edge-api/control-plane/storage/agent-engine), Web console,
Repo policy lints, apply-migrations.sh against a throwaway Postgres all
pass on the latest push (e20b0d25c). Enable + verify RAG on the demo box (this PR's own non-required, on-demand workflow) is red for the
documented, expected, pre-deploy reason above, not a required check
(.github/branch-protection-main.json lists neither it nor
post-deploy-verify for main).

Still unable to run adversarial-pr-review myself (no Skill tool in this
subagent's toolset) -- flagged previously, repeating so it isn't missed at
the bottom of a long thread.

[sakibsadmanshajib]

Independent review of the database grants, the feature gate, the credential change and the streaming fix.

Three of the five things I was asked to check come out clean, and I want to say so plainly before the one that does not.

The credential change is right. mint_session is the documented protocol, not an approximation of it: POST /auth/v1/admin/generate_link with the service role, read properties.hashed_token, then POST /auth/v1/verify with {type: magiclink, token_hash} under the anon key, with the same single retry on collision that live-auth.mjs uses. I read the whole script diff looking for a password being set, read or rotated and there is none: provision() sends no password field on either the create or the update path, sign_in() and random_password() are gone, and RAG_VERIFY_PASSWORD is removed from the script, the workflow and the doc table rather than defaulted off. The account is also its own throwaway address, not a shared fixture. This is exactly what docs/live-test-auth.md asks for.

The migration numbering collision with #1287 is not a real problem. scripts/apply-migrations.sh sets LC_COLLATE=C and iterates the plain supabase/migrations/*.sql glob, so apply order is full filename order, and hive_schema_migrations is keyed on filename with a table comment that already says the version prefix is not unique and names three existing duplicate prefixes. Two more pairs have landed on main since (20260824_01 and 20260825_01) and CI is green over both. For this pair specifically, service_role_public_schema_grant sorts before tenant_billing_accounts_hive_app_grant, and the two touch different roles and different objects, so the order between them is immaterial. Neither PR needs to renumber.

The red check is honest. I checked the job rather than taking the explanation on trust. Run 33213093617 bind mounts only scripts/verify-rag-roundtrip.py into the toolchain container and points EDGE_API_URL at http://edge-api:8080, which is the running container built at the last deploy. Nothing in that job rebuilds edge-api, and there is no bind mount equivalent for a compiled binary, so the new leak check is necessarily exercising pre-merge server code. The violations it reports are two post finish frames, and the fix suppresses every non usage only frame after finish_reason, not just the first, so both will be caught once the image is rebuilt. The job is also not in .github/branch-protection-main.json. I would not block on this one.

The Go fix is correct. The predicate is genuinely shared rather than reimplemented, the ordering matches executeStreaming (read finishSeen, then update it, then decide), the suppression sits after the usage extraction so a suppressed frame still contributes its token counts to RAG_CHAT_COMPLETED, continue skips only the marshal and write with nothing after it in the loop body, and line[6:] is guarded by the HasPrefix above. The Python check_stream_frames mirrors the same rule with the same ordering. I have one smaller note on that path inline.

The grant migration is where I cannot sign off. The service_role half is well evidenced and I agree with it. The widening to anon and authenticated is not, and it silently reverses four earlier migrations that were written specifically to close the holes it reopens. Details inline on the three grant lines.

On the review streams themselves, so their absence is not read as a pass:

• CodeRabbit: SKIPPED, rate limited repo wide. The bot's own comment on this PR says "Review limit reached". No CodeRabbit pass has run on this diff.
• Codex adversarial review: SKIPPED, over quota. The connector's comment on this PR says "You have reached your Codex usage limits for code reviews".
• Database, security, Go and plain adversarial passes: run, findings above and inline.

One process note for whoever picks this up: I have no Skill tool in my own toolset either, so I followed the adversarial-pr-review pipeline protocol by reading the skill file directly rather than invoking it. Flagging that rather than letting it pass as a normal invocation.

[github-actions]

Cowork visual proof, captured in CI

Captured against a stack booted from refs/pull/1257/merge on a hosted
runner, with a real Apptainer sandbox behind the socket arm of the agent
engine, in run 33219175434.

launch-liveness-01-empty-console

launch-liveness-02-sandbox-launched

Run log (screenshot stamps carry no URL, and the log is redacted and linted by `lint:proof-tokens`)

scenarios: launch-liveness
launcher runtime dir: /mnt/agent-runtime, live sessions at start: 0
signed in as user 96b3fd38-0c19-41f2-92ae-cbce2731b5b1
token claims: aal,amr,app_metadata,aud,email,exp,iat,is_anonymous,iss,owui_role,phone,role,session_id,sub,tenant_id,tenants,user_metadata
token tenant claim: 343d76e0-6f54-eb32-3a70-451fb91d790d · role=OWNER · aal=aal1
--- scenario: launch-liveness ---
wrote /home/runner/work/hive/hive/docs/proof/agent-visual-proof/run-33219175434/launch-liveness-01-empty-console.png
create answered HTTP 201 in 66ms, status=queued
wrote /home/runner/work/hive/hive/docs/proof/agent-visual-proof/run-33219175434/launch-liveness-02-sandbox-launched.png
row "proof-33219175434 liveness: list the fil…" reached Cancelled
scenario launch-liveness: ok

[github-actions]

Cowork visual proof, captured in CI

Captured against a stack booted from refs/pull/1257/merge on a hosted
runner, with a real Apptainer sandbox behind the socket arm of the agent
engine, in run 33220069531.

launch-liveness-01-empty-console

launch-liveness-02-sandbox-launched

Run log (screenshot stamps carry no URL, and the log is redacted and linted by `lint:proof-tokens`)

scenarios: launch-liveness
launcher runtime dir: /mnt/agent-runtime, live sessions at start: 0
signed in as user 4be24adf-7850-462e-af30-c88a4c22f888
token claims: aal,amr,app_metadata,aud,email,exp,iat,is_anonymous,iss,owui_role,phone,role,session_id,sub,tenant_id,tenants,user_metadata
token tenant claim: 67231c28-6929-c822-d048-831a6a2f1e77 · role=OWNER · aal=aal1
--- scenario: launch-liveness ---
wrote /home/runner/work/hive/hive/docs/proof/agent-visual-proof/run-33220069531/launch-liveness-01-empty-console.png
create answered HTTP 201 in 64ms, status=queued
wrote /home/runner/work/hive/hive/docs/proof/agent-visual-proof/run-33220069531/launch-liveness-02-sandbox-launched.png
row "proof-33220069531 liveness: list the fil…" reached Cancelled
scenario launch-liveness: ok

[sakibsadmanshajib]

Second adversarial review round

Streams run against the branch after the five original threads were addressed.

Antigravity (gemini-3.1-pro-high, high effort), RAN. Five findings, all accepted and fixed in 436d4f3. Area 1, the grant migration itself, came back clean.

1. The readiness job read the image name off the live container and assumed it compiles from /app at start. True of the hot reload image the stack runs today, but against an image that executes a binary baked in at build time the bind mount would be inert and the job would report PASS while measuring the deployed build. It now refuses to run unless the image actually starts air, and says what would have to change instead. Hardcoding the image, which was the suggested fix, would have swapped a silent wrong answer for silent drift, so the check is on the property that matters rather than on the name.
2. The grant assertions only looked at table privileges, while the revision they exist to catch granted functions and sequences too. Routine grants and sequence privileges are asserted now. Negative control re run over all five: the rejected wide GRANT turns every one red, including 322 routine grants and 4 sequences the previous three assertions did not see, and re applying the migration returns all five to green.
3. parse_created_at returned 0.0 on an unreadable timestamp, which reads as ancient and would let the purge delete a document a concurrent run still needed if the API's date format changed. The suggested float('inf') would have been worse in the other direction: the purge would stop working silently and the crowding this fixes would come back. It returns None now, and the caller keeps the document and prints why, so a format change surfaces in the log instead of as either failure.
4. Copying the live container's environment took every non empty line, so a value containing a newline would leave a bare fragment, which docker reads as "inherit this name from the host environment" and can echo back, putting part of a secret in the job log. Strict KEY=VALUE lines only now, and a dropped line aborts the step rather than silently running with a truncated configuration. The count is reported, never the content.
5. The tmpfs mount point could be created by docker as root inside the workspace. Real, but non blocking: the leftover is an empty root owned directory whose parent belongs to the runner, so the runner can still remove it, confirmed by hand on the box. Creating it as the runner first is one line, so it is in as insurance rather than as a fix.

CodeRabbit CLI, NOT YET RUN. Four attempts: three refused with "Review limit reached, you have used all 3 included reviews currently available" and one died on "WebSocket subscription completed unexpectedly". Retrying on a long backoff. This is an unavailable stream, not a clean pass, and it will be reported either way rather than quietly dropped.

Visual proof: not applicable, deliberately. Nothing in this PR touches a user visible surface. /v1/rag/* is called by no front end in this repository: no reference exists in apps/web-console, apps/agent-console, or the Open WebUI fork's source. The changed files are a database migration, a CI workflow, a verification script and its unit test, plus the original Go fix on an API only route. The live evidence for this PR is the readiness run's own log, which is a real request against the running box.

Live state after the fix

The grant repair has been applied to the demo box by this workflow, and re verified there afterwards: anon holds no privilege on any table in public and cannot execute agent_tasks_list_active() or custom_access_token_hook, authenticated holds exactly 13 privileges across the 5 documented tenant tables, service_role holds 328, and the default ACLs name only service_role. console-hive, chat-hive and api-hive all answer normally afterwards, and the readiness run itself proves GoTrue admin token mint and PostgREST service_role calls both still work post revoke.

[github-actions]

Cowork visual proof, captured in CI

Captured against a stack booted from refs/pull/1257/merge on a hosted
runner, with a real Apptainer sandbox behind the socket arm of the agent
engine, in run 33220730222.

launch-liveness-01-empty-console

launch-liveness-02-sandbox-launched

Run log (screenshot stamps carry no URL, and the log is redacted and linted by `lint:proof-tokens`)

scenarios: launch-liveness
launcher runtime dir: /mnt/agent-runtime, live sessions at start: 0
signed in as user 59c5a51b-4bba-40bf-a668-bfb2e1ad5803
token claims: aal,amr,app_metadata,aud,email,exp,iat,is_anonymous,iss,owui_role,phone,role,session_id,sub,tenant_id,tenants,user_metadata
token tenant claim: 64cfc86a-0f2b-8575-9199-fa6b40c7809f · role=OWNER · aal=aal1
--- scenario: launch-liveness ---
wrote /home/runner/work/hive/hive/docs/proof/agent-visual-proof/run-33220730222/launch-liveness-01-empty-console.png
create answered HTTP 201 in 55ms, status=queued
wrote /home/runner/work/hive/hive/docs/proof/agent-visual-proof/run-33220730222/launch-liveness-02-sandbox-launched.png
row "proof-33220730222 liveness: list the fil…" reached Cancelled
scenario launch-liveness: ok

[github-actions]

Cowork visual proof, captured in CI

Captured against a stack booted from refs/pull/1257/merge on a hosted
runner, with a real Apptainer sandbox behind the socket arm of the agent
engine, in run 33225338616.

launch-liveness-01-empty-console

launch-liveness-02-sandbox-launched

Run log (screenshot stamps carry no URL, and the log is redacted and linted by `lint:proof-tokens`)

scenarios: launch-liveness
launcher runtime dir: /mnt/agent-runtime, live sessions at start: 0
signed in as user c69600ad-277c-42ff-9d39-e07c28edb489
token claims: aal,amr,app_metadata,aud,email,exp,iat,is_anonymous,iss,owui_role,phone,role,session_id,sub,tenant_id,tenants,user_metadata
token tenant claim: 3f742a86-d216-1fb0-b583-5ff13d4a5a19 · role=OWNER · aal=aal1
--- scenario: launch-liveness ---
wrote /home/runner/work/hive/hive/docs/proof/agent-visual-proof/run-33225338616/launch-liveness-01-empty-console.png
create answered HTTP 201 in 68ms, status=queued
wrote /home/runner/work/hive/hive/docs/proof/agent-visual-proof/run-33225338616/launch-liveness-02-sandbox-launched.png
row "proof-33225338616 liveness: list the fil…" reached Cancelled
scenario launch-liveness: ok

[github-actions]

Cowork visual proof, captured in CI

Captured against a stack booted from refs/pull/1257/merge on a hosted
runner, with a real Apptainer sandbox behind the socket arm of the agent
engine, in run 33227250185.

launch-liveness-01-empty-console

launch-liveness-02-sandbox-launched

Run log (screenshot stamps carry no URL, and the log is redacted and linted by `lint:proof-tokens`)

scenarios: launch-liveness
launcher runtime dir: /mnt/agent-runtime, live sessions at start: 0
signed in as user 7694ae76-b828-461c-8623-937e30101541
token claims: aal,amr,app_metadata,aud,email,exp,iat,is_anonymous,iss,owui_role,phone,role,session_id,sub,tenant_id,tenants,user_metadata
token tenant claim: 2aab272e-de8b-6864-eb2f-ac07781c2c5e · role=OWNER · aal=aal1
--- scenario: launch-liveness ---
wrote /home/runner/work/hive/hive/docs/proof/agent-visual-proof/run-33227250185/launch-liveness-01-empty-console.png
create answered HTTP 201 in 55ms, status=queued
wrote /home/runner/work/hive/hive/docs/proof/agent-visual-proof/run-33227250185/launch-liveness-02-sandbox-launched.png
row "proof-33227250185 liveness: list the fil…" reached Cancelled
scenario launch-liveness: ok

[github-actions]

Cowork visual proof, captured in CI

Captured against a stack booted from refs/pull/1257/merge on a hosted
runner, with a real Apptainer sandbox behind the socket arm of the agent
engine, in run 33228676274.

launch-liveness-01-empty-console

launch-liveness-02-sandbox-launched

Run log (screenshot stamps carry no URL, and the log is redacted and linted by `lint:proof-tokens`)

scenarios: launch-liveness
launcher runtime dir: /mnt/agent-runtime, live sessions at start: 0
signed in as user 45c5b3ae-58b6-4aa4-a400-7dc2c056aa52
token claims: aal,amr,app_metadata,aud,email,exp,iat,is_anonymous,iss,owui_role,phone,role,session_id,sub,tenant_id,tenants,user_metadata
token tenant claim: 5a2e7e7a-fd9e-6324-cdbc-bca3a13b8e61 · role=OWNER · aal=aal1
--- scenario: launch-liveness ---
wrote /home/runner/work/hive/hive/docs/proof/agent-visual-proof/run-33228676274/launch-liveness-01-empty-console.png
create answered HTTP 201 in 66ms, status=queued
wrote /home/runner/work/hive/hive/docs/proof/agent-visual-proof/run-33228676274/launch-liveness-02-sandbox-launched.png
row "proof-33228676274 liveness: list the fil…" reached Cancelled
scenario launch-liveness: ok