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fix: reclaim build cache inside the deploy disk gate (issue #1419) - #1424
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The disk gate added in PR #1369 refused three consecutive deploys on 2026-08-29 at 14G free against its 15G floor. It was right to. What it was not is sustainable: nothing on this box reclaims build cache in a way that reaches it, every merge to main deploys, and every deploy builds. Measured at the point of refusal, images were 26.72GB with 1.391GB reclaimable while build cache was 37.68GB with 12.42GB reclaimable, so the growth is cache rather than images. An unfiltered `docker builder prune -f` recovered the whole 12.42GB and took the box from 14G to 23G free without touching an image, a volume or the rollback path. The deploy job already ends with `docker builder prune -f --filter until=24h`, and that filter is exactly why it reclaims nothing on the days that matter: after roughly 43 merges in one day every cache record is younger than 24 hours, so the filter excludes the records consuming the disk. That step stays, with its comment corrected, because it is the only cleanup that runs on a box healthy enough for the guard to exit silently. The reclaim goes inside scripts/check-deploy-disk.sh rather than into a step before it. That is what makes "a failed reclaim cannot skip the disk check" structural rather than a promise: there is no second step whose failure or cancellation could stop the comparison from running, and no `if:` expression to get wrong. The prune is bounded by `timeout 300`, and a prune that fails or times out is annotated and then ignored, with the thresholds applied to whatever df actually reports. Three properties keep pruning before the check from masking a genuine disk problem. It only runs below the warn line, so a healthy box is never pruned. The pre-reclaim and post-reclaim readings are both printed and both written to the step summary, so a box whose problem is not build cache shows a small delta and is still refused by the floor. And any run that needed a reclaim carries a warning annotation, so a box that only deploys because of this step is loud on every deploy.
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe disk gate now reads free space through a reusable function, reclaims unused Docker build cache below the warning threshold, and reapplies thresholds to the post-reclaim reading. Tests cover sequential readings, prune failures, and workflow descriptions reflect the new behavior. ChangesDisk Gate Build-Cache Reclaim
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The deployment guard now reclaims unused Docker build cache before migration or build work when space is low, while still refusing deployment if cleanup fails or space remains insufficient. The fixed 300-second cleanup timeout is not configurable for runner-specific conditions, so merge is reasonable with explicit owner awareness and follow-up. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant DeployDemoBoxWorkflow
participant CheckDeployDisk
participant Docker
DeployDemoBoxWorkflow->>CheckDeployDisk: run disk gate
CheckDeployDisk->>CheckDeployDisk: read free space
CheckDeployDisk->>Docker: docker builder prune -f
Docker-->>CheckDeployDisk: prune result
CheckDeployDisk->>CheckDeployDisk: read post-reclaim free space
CheckDeployDisk-->>DeployDemoBoxWorkflow: allow or refuse deployment
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Linked Issues checkExplanation The changes satisfy issue Full details: Out of Scope Changes checkExplanation All changes support the linked issue. The script implements cache reclaim, the tests validate the new behavior, and the workflow changes clarify the updated guard behavior. No unrelated or destructive cleanup changes are present. Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 50.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 4 functions across 2 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Inline comments:
In `@scripts/check-deploy-disk.sh`:
- Line 139: Update the Docker builder prune flow around timeout to read the
reclaim timeout from an environment variable instead of hard-coding 300 seconds.
Validate that configuration as a positive integer during script startup, and use
the validated value in the timeout command.
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.github/workflows/deploy-demo-box.ymlscripts/check-deploy-disk.shscripts/test-deploy-disk-gate.sh
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Review finding from the Antigravity adversarial pass, and a correct one. The `reclaim-reports-both-numbers` check searched the whole output for the pre-reclaim and post-reclaim readings separately. The guard already prints the pre-reclaim reading unconditionally on its first line, so the "before" number was present in the output even for an implementation that dropped it from the reclaim line entirely. The test would have passed against exactly the regression it exists to catch. It now asserts the transition as one string, in the log and in the step summary, and the two summary branches were unified onto one sentence so a single assertion covers both. A new case exercises the branch where the reclaim clears the warn line outright, which had no coverage.
Adversarial review, two streamsStream 1: CodeRabbit CLIRan against the committed diff on this branch, base No findings. Recorded as a real run rather than an assumed pass: this is the CLI, not the GitHub App check. If the App's check reports Stream 2: Antigravity,
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CodeRabbit GitHub App: SKIPPED, not passed
That is a green check that cannot go red. It reviewed nothing, and counting it as a passing review stream would be exactly the quiet-absence shape this repository has spent the day removing. Reported as SKIPPED. The CodeRabbit CLI did run against this branch and its result is recorded in the review comment above. That is the CodeRabbit signal for this pull request; the App's green square is not. |
What this will do on the next deploy, stated in advanceRead off the box a few minutes ago, read only, nothing pruned: The box is at 20G free: below the 25G warn line, above the 15G floor. Build cache has grown back to 31.57GB with 7.2GB reclaimable since it was pruned by hand this afternoon, which is the recurrence this pull request exists to stop. So the first deploy after this merges should, in the migrate job's first step:
Nothing else should change: no image removed, no volume touched, no rollback path affected. That is a falsifiable prediction rather than a description, and it is the acceptance test for this change. If the run reports something else, the reasoning here is wrong and the step should come back out. Written down before the merge on purpose, because "it deployed and nothing broke" is not evidence that the reclaim did anything. |
…ing) CodeRabbit flagged the hard-coded 300 second ceiling on the build cache reclaim, and the argument holds: 300 was measured against a 12.42 GB reclaim on this box, and a box that had accumulated much more would have its reclaim killed partway by a limit nobody can move without a release. Deleting cache is incremental, so a killed prune keeps whatever it freed, but the run would be quietly less effective than it looks. HIVE_DEPLOY_DISK_RECLAIM_TIMEOUT_S now carries it, validated by the same loop that already refuses a non-numeric floor or warn line, for the same reason: an unvalidated value here does not fail, it silently stops working. Zero is refused separately. It is a valid argument to `timeout` and means no limit at all, so it would let a wedged prune run until the job's own timeout-minutes killed it, and that kill takes the disk check with it, which is precisely what this guard exists to be immune to.
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CI green: all 9 required checks pass or skip on One dependency verified on the box rather than assumed, since the whole step rests on it: |
## Summary This is the batched buglog follow-up for the pull requests merged to `main` on 2026-08-29. Its diff is `.wolf/buglog.jsonl` and nothing else. Per `.claude/rules/openwolf.md`, every fixed bug, error, failed test or failed build must be logged, but the line may never be appended on a fix branch. `merge=union` in `.gitattributes` resolves concurrent appends locally and is ignored by GitHub's server side merge, so two branches that both appended land in hard conflict there. An unmergeable pull request gets no `refs/pull/N/merge`, no `pull_request` run and therefore zero checks, and the required status gate then blocks the merge for a reason the page never states (issue #873). Each fix accordingly carried its entry in its own pull request body, and this pull request copies them onto `main` in one batch, which the protocol explicitly prefers over one pull request per entry. ## Scope examined Fifty nine pull requests merged to `main` on 2026-08-29. Forty eight of them carried at least one entry, for eighty two entries in total. Thirty two of those were already on `main` and are skipped, leaving fifty appended here from thirty four pull requests. The largest block of skips comes from #1342, the equivalent batch for the 2026-08-28 merges, which merged earlier the same day and already landed thirty six entries covering #1257, #1268, #1276, #1277, #1287, #1292, #1293, #1294, #1296, #1301, #1303, #1305, #1313, #1335 and #1337. ## What landed Fifty entries appended, one JSON object per line, append only. The 232 pre-existing lines are byte identical to `origin/main` (verified by hashing the first 232 lines of the result against the base file). Every line in the resulting file parses as JSON and carries `error_message`, `root_cause`, `fix` and `tags`. | Source | Entries | |---|---| | #1083 | 2 | | #1277 | 1 | | #1278 | 1 | | #1298 | 1 | | #1334 | 1 | | #1336 | 3 | | #1343 | 1 | | #1346 | 1 | | #1351 | 1 | | #1365 | 2 | | #1368 | 1 | | #1369 | 1 | | #1371 | 3 | | #1375 | 3 | | #1376 | 1 | | #1378 | 1 | | #1379 | 2 | | #1388 | 5 | | #1389 | 3 | | #1390 | 2 | | #1393 | 1 | | #1394 | 1 | | #1410 | 1 | | #1417 | 1 | | #1421 | 1 | | #1423 | 1 | | #1424 | 1 | | #1426 | 1 | | #1429 | 1 | | #1431 | 1 | | #1433 | 1 | | #1434 | 1 | | #1436 | 1 | | #1439 | 1 | Entries are copied verbatim from their source pull request bodies. Nothing was rewritten, no field was invented, and no field was added. No JSON needed repair: all eighty two extracted entries parsed on the first attempt and all four required fields were present on every one. ## Merged pull requests that carried no entry Eleven of the fifty nine. Recorded here because the gap is itself the useful signal. | Pull request | Title | Assessment | |---|---|---| | #1013 | chore(deps): bump the go-minor-patch group across 1 directory with 4 updates | Dependabot bump, no defect fixed, no entry expected | | #1015 | chore(deps): bump the go-minor-patch group across 1 directory with 6 updates | Dependabot bump, no entry expected | | #1016 | chore(deps): bump golang from 1.26-alpine to 1.27-alpine in /deploy/docker | Dependabot bump, no entry expected | | #1218 | chore(deps): bump postcss from 8.5.19 to 8.5.26 in /apps/desktop | Dependabot bump, no entry expected | | #1219 | chore(deps): bump golang.org/x/crypto from 0.41.0 to 0.52.0 in /apps/control-plane | Dependabot bump, no entry expected | | #1342 | chore: batch buglog entries for the 2026-08-28 merges | The previous batch pull request itself, correctly carries no entry of its own | | #1364 | chore: remove four dead skills and record the patterns that cost time | Protocol gap. The body records patterns that cost time, which is the shape of a buglog entry, but none was written as one | | #1383 | test: retire stale expected-failure markers, restore the ones that are true (#1381, #1382, #1324) | Protocol gap. Stale `it.fails` markers reading as red is a real defect that was fixed here and should have carried an entry | | #1384 | docs: correct D-047, hive-auto reverted to variable pricing (D-059) | Decision ledger correction, arguably a documentation defect, no entry written | | #1387 | chore(deps): bump next from 15.5.23 to 16.3.3 in /apps/agent-console | Dependabot bump, no entry expected | | #1398 | docs: rescue the 2026-08-25 parity captures and add the 2026-08-29 QA matrix evidence | Documentation and evidence rescue, no entry written | Six of the eleven are Dependabot bumps and one is the previous batch, so the genuine protocol gaps are #1364, #1383, #1384 and #1398. Of those, #1383 is the one worth a follow-up: it fixed a real defect class (a stale expected-failure marker reads as a red "Expect test to fail" and gets dismissed as pre-existing) and left no record. ## Entries skipped as already present Thirty two. Thirty of them matched an entry already on `main` on `error_message`, `id` or `fix`. Two more from #1278 are semantic duplicates that an exact match would have missed, and were skipped after reading the landed entries they duplicate: - #1278's `streaming content_block_start omits text field` entry is covered by the consolidated `bug-2026-08-28-anthropic-sdk-wire-conformance` entry landed from #1296, whose root cause names the same `omitempty` on `StreamContentBlock.Text`. - #1278's `GET /v1/models leaked an upstream provider name` entry is covered by `BUG-1284`, landed from #1300, which names the same `public.model_aliases.summary` publication path. #1278's third entry, on `top_k` forwarding producing a 400, is not covered anywhere on `main` and is appended here. #1342 recorded #1278 as fully "merged into #1296", which was accurate for two of its three entries. ## Note on entry quality One appended entry is thin: #1277's parity re-score record carries `error_message` of `n/a` and a root cause of "console had no privacy/data-policy surface at all". It is a parity gap record rather than a defect record. It is included exactly as written rather than embellished, per the protocol's preference for the author's own words. ## Test plan - [x] Branch cut fresh from `origin/main`, diff is `.wolf/buglog.jsonl` and nothing else - [x] First 232 lines byte identical to the base file (md5 match) - [x] All 282 resulting lines parse as JSON and carry `error_message`, `root_cause`, `fix` and `tags` - [x] No `.wolf/` telemetry (`anatomy.md`, `memory.md`, `token-ledger.json`, `hooks/_session.json`, `buglog.json`) in the commit - [ ] The six required checks report green via the inert path allowlist in `.github/workflows/ci.yml` --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ers (issue #1416) (#1468) Fixes #1416 ## What the evidence says Issue #1416 was filed by run [33246772783](https://github.com/sakibsadmanshajib/hive/actions/runs/33246772783). The failed step was not a migration. It was the migrate job's very first step, `Refuse to migrate without disk headroom`, and its annotation reads: > demo box has 14G free on /var/lib/docker, below the 15G floor. Refusing to proceed. Three consecutive runs refused for that reason between 10:00 and 10:04 UTC on 2026-08-29 (33246772783, 33246777571, and attempt 1 of 33246956723, whose attempt 2 passed after someone pruned by hand). So the trigger was intermittent in the sense that it appears only when the box crosses the floor, and consistent while it is across it: once below 15G, every run refuses until space is reclaimed. That cause is **already fixed on main**. PR #1424 (issue #1419) moved a build cache reclaim inside the disk gate and merged at 14:04 UTC the same day. Twenty one consecutive deploy runs have been green since, the most recent at the time of writing being 33274654247. Sampling the disk annotation on the latest green run: 18G free before the reclaim, 23G after. ## What is still broken, and what this PR changes The tracking issue never closed. `deploy-demo-box.yml` files one issue per outage and dedupes every later red run onto it as a comment. That is deliberate, and it carries a hard requirement: the issue has to close when the workflow recovers. Nothing closed it. The filed body says "close it once a run goes green", which is addressed to a human with no reason to be watching, and no workflow in this repository has ever closed an issue it filed. The consequence is visible on #1416 itself. It stayed open through twenty one green runs, still saying "The MIGRATION failed, so main is running against a stale schema", and was still being read that evening as the top demo blocker on a box that had deployed every merge that day. The second consequence is worse than the misdirection: while it is open, a genuinely new failure with a completely different cause is downgraded to a one line comment on a stale body, with no guidance and no new issue notification. The workflow's own comments already name that trap twice, on `agent-workspace-coverage` and in `post-deploy-verify.yml`'s reason for not sharing the label. ### 1. `report-recovered` job Runs on `success()` with the same `needs` list as `report-failure`, comments the green run on every open issue carrying `ci-failure:deploy-demo-box`, and closes it. `continue-on-error: true` at job and step level, matching `post-deploy-verify.yml`'s reporter, so a rate limited or broken notifier can never turn a green deploy red. Its worst case is the issue staying open, which is exactly today's behaviour. ### 2. The guard: `.github/ci/lint-deploy-failure-reporter.mjs` Wired into `ci.yml`'s `repo-policy-lints`, which is a required check, so a workflow only change cannot remove the close path without CI noticing. It asserts: * both `report-failure` and `report-recovered` exist; * their `if:` polarity is `failure()` and `success()` respectively; * both scripts declare the same label, read out of the YAML rather than assumed; * `report-recovered` still calls `issues.update` with `state: 'closed'`, and `report-failure` still calls `issues.create`; * the two `needs` lists are identical. The `needs` equality is the load bearing assertion. A narrower recovery list would close the issue that an untracked job's failure had just filed; a wider one would let a job the filer ignores hold the issue open forever. Either direction reintroduces the swallowing behaviour. ## Proof the guard bites The lint takes an optional workflow path so it can be pointed at a deliberately broken copy. Six negative controls were run before commit, each against a mutated copy of the real file: | mutation | exit | message | | --- | --- | --- | | `report-recovered` deleted | 1 | has no `report-recovered` job ... That is issue #1416 exactly | | recovery `needs` narrowed to `[migrate, deploy]` | 1 | must watch the same jobs | | recovery `needs` widened with `agent-workspace-coverage` | 1 | must watch the same jobs | | `state: 'closed'` removed | 1 | no longer closes anything | | label changed to `ci-failure:other` | 1 | nothing it files is ever closed | | recovery `if:` inverted to `failure()` | 1 | no longer tests success() | Unmutated, it exits 0. A guard nobody has watched go red is a guard that might not be able to. ## Also run locally, all green * `node .github/ci/lint-deploy-failure-reporter.mjs` * `node .github/ci/lint-deploy-paths-filter.mjs` * `node .github/ci/lint-workflow-check-names.mjs` * `python3 scripts/test_selfhost_supabase_seam.py` (28 checks, it fails if any step in this workflow spells its own compose flags) * YAML parse of both edited workflows `report-recovered` cannot execute on a pull request, since this workflow only triggers on push to main and dispatch. It will run for the first time on the merge commit, and that run closes #1416 if the "Fixes" line above has not already. ## Residual risk, not fixed here The box is still riding on the reclaim. The latest green run read 18G free before the reclaim and 23G after, which is below the 25G warn line even after everything reclaimable is gone, and the reclaim's yield has already fallen from 12.42G on 2026-08-29 to about 5G. One more image set growth puts it back under the 15G floor with nothing left to reclaim. That is a capacity problem on the box rather than a workflow defect, and the gate refusing is the correct behaviour when it happens, so it is deliberately out of scope for this change. ## Review round: over-closing and a silent notifier Two medium findings on the reporter job, both fixed in 45697e3. Over-closing. `report-recovered` closed every open issue carrying the label, so an issue a human opened or hand-labelled with the same string, or one opened while this deploy was still in flight, was closed silently with no review. It now closes an issue only when the author is `github-actions[bot]`, the identity `report-failure` files under, and only when the issue was created before this run started, compared against the run's own `run_started_at`. Reading that timestamp needs `actions: read`, added next to the existing `issues: write`. An issue failing either test is left open and gets one comment saying the deploy has since gone green and that it was left open for human review, with the reason. The note carries a hidden marker and existing comments are read before writing, so it lands once per issue rather than once per green run. Silent notifier failure. `continue-on-error` stays, since a notifier must never change the deploy verdict, but it also suppresses GitHub's own failure notification. The script now catches its own failure, emits a `core.error` annotation and a `core.summary` line naming what broke and what a reader has to do by hand, then rethrows. Neither workflow command changes a step's exit status, so the alarm is loud on the run page without touching the verdict. Three more negative controls, run the same way as the six above: | Mutation | Exit | Message | | --- | --- | --- | | attribution check removed | 1 | no longer checks who filed the issue it is about to close | | created-before-run comparison removed | 1 | no longer refuses to close issues opened after this run started | | `core.error` emission removed | 1 | no longer reports its own failure | | `actions: read` dropped, comparison left in place | 1 | same check, since the comparison cannot work without the permission | Unmutated, it still exits 0. The recovery script's branch logic was also exercised against a stubbed `github` client covering all four cases: bot-filed and older (closed), human-filed (left open, commented), bot-filed but newer than the run start (left open, commented), and already carrying the marker (left open, silent). ## Buglog entry ```json {"id":"bug-2026-08-29-deploy-demo-box-tracking-issue-never-closes","date":"2026-08-29","title":"deploy-demo-box files a tracking issue on failure and never closes it on recovery","error_message":"Issue #1416 'deploy-demo-box is failing on main' stayed open through 21 consecutive green deploy runs, still reading 'The MIGRATION failed, so main is running against a stale schema'. Its actual trigger was run 33246772783 refusing at the disk gate: 'demo box has 14G free on /var/lib/docker, below the 15G floor. Refusing to proceed.'","root_cause":"Two layers. The run failure was a disk floor refusal, not a migration fault, and was already fixed on main by PR #1424 (issue #1419) four hours later. The lasting defect is that deploy-demo-box.yml's report-failure job dedupes every red run onto one open issue but nothing ever closes that issue when the workflow recovers; the filed body delegates closing to a human who has no reason to be watching, and no workflow in the repository closes an issue it files. A stale open issue then misreports current state and downgrades the next unrelated failure to a comment with no guidance and no notification.","fix":"Added a report-recovered job to deploy-demo-box.yml that runs on success() with the same needs list as report-failure, comments the green run on every open issue carrying ci-failure:deploy-demo-box, and closes it with state_reason completed. It is continue-on-error at job and step level so the notifier can never change the verdict. Added .github/ci/lint-deploy-failure-reporter.mjs, wired into ci.yml's repo-policy-lints required check, asserting both jobs exist, that their if polarity is correct, that they share one label, that the close call is present, and that their needs lists are identical. Review then added two safeguards on the close path, since closing is destructive and the label is not evidence of who filed anything: only an issue authored by the workflow's own bot identity and created before this run started is closed, and one skipped for either reason is left open with a single comment saying the deploy has since gone green and that a human should look. The job also catches its own failure and emits a core.error annotation plus a job summary line, because continue-on-error suppresses GitHub's failure notification and a closer that breaks quietly recreates this same bug with no alarm. Verified with nine negative controls against mutated copies of the workflow, each exiting 1.","tags":["ci","deploy-demo-box","github-actions","observability","tracking-issue","disk","quiet-absence"],"files":[".github/workflows/deploy-demo-box.yml",".github/workflows/ci.yml",".github/ci/lint-deploy-failure-reporter.mjs"],"issue":1416} ```
Closes #1419.
What was happening
The disk gate added in PR #1369 refused three consecutive
deploy-demo-boxruns on 2026-08-29 at 14G free against its 15G floor. It was right to refuse: a deploy that dies mid migration is how this box broke at 05:55Z the same day, when the runner process was killed writing its own_diaglog withNo space left on device.What is not sustainable is that a human then has to reclaim by hand before anything ships. Nothing on this box prunes build cache in a way that reaches it, every merge to main deploys, and every deploy builds. The reclaim was run by hand three times in one day.
The cause is build cache, not images
docker system dfat the point of refusal:docker builder prune -frecovered the full 12.42GB and took free space from 14G to 23G, touching no image, no volume and no rollback path.The deploy job already ends with
docker builder prune -f --filter until=24h, and the filter is precisely why that step reclaims nothing on the days that matter. After roughly 43 merges in one day every cache record is younger than 24 hours, sountil=24hexcludes exactly the records consuming the disk. That step is kept, with its comment corrected, because it is the only cleanup that runs on a box healthy enough for the guard to exit silently, and because a build that failed halfway leaves cache no later deploy will reuse.Why option 1, weighed against the other three
Issue #1419 lists four options.
One refinement on the issue's wording: the prune runs only when free space is already below the warn line, not on every deploy. Unconditional pruning would discard fresh cache on healthy days for no reason and would hide the trend the warn line exists to show.
Why the prune lives inside the guard rather than in a step before it
Because the requirement is that a prune failure can never skip the disk check, and inside the script that is structural rather than a promise. There is no second step whose failure, timeout or cancellation could stop the comparison from running, and no
if:expression to get wrong.scripts/check-deploy-disk.shis already the first step of both jobs and already on this workflow'spush.paths, so nothing else needed wiring.How this cannot mask a genuine disk problem
reclaimed build cache: 14G -> 23G free. A box whose problem is not build cache shows a small delta and is still refused by the floor. Theprune-not-enoughtest pins exactly this.::warning::on every deploy, so quiet dependence on it is not possible.What this does on failure
docker builder prunefails or outlives its 300 secondtimeout: a::warning::naming the failure, then the check runs against whateverdfactually reports. A box below the floor is still refused. A failed reclaim can only ever leave a refusal in place, never turn one into a pass.prune-failsis the test for this and it asserts exit 1.Constraints honoured
docker system prune -aand nodocker image prune -a. Neither appears in this diff; the guard's own error text still names both as forbidden and the test still asserts that text.docker builder prunewithout-areleases only records BuildKit itself reports as reclaimable, which by definition excludes anything backing an image that currently exists, and it touches no volume at all.Tests
scripts/test-deploy-disk-gate.sh, run withdfanddockerstubbed on PATH, so no daemon and no real filesystem. Five new cases, all verified red before the implementation existed (the run before the fix reported5 check(s) failed, and every pre-existing case stayed green):healthy-box-is-not-pruned— 40G free, the docker stub log contains nobuilder prune.prune-rescues— 14G then 23G, exit 0, output names the reclaim.prune-partial— 14G then 20G, exit 0 with a warning, no error.prune-not-enough— 14G then 14G, exit 1 with an error. The proof that pruning first cannot launder a real problem.prune-fails— 14G then 14G with the prune stub failing, exit 1 with an error. The proof that a failed prune cannot skip the check.Plus an assertion that both the pre and post numbers reach the log. The
dfstub gained a sequence mode for this: a single fixed value cannot express "the prune freed nothing" and "the prune freed 9G" as different runs, and a test that cannot tell those apart cannot fail when the second read is dropped (issue #797).bash scripts/test-deploy-disk-gate.shreportsall checks passed, 29 checks. It is wired into the requiredci.ymljob already.Not verified end to end
This changes the only deploy path to the live box and there is no way to exercise a self-hosted-runner job anywhere but on that box, so the real proof is the first merge to main after this lands. The stubs cover the branch logic; they do not prove
docker builder prune -fbehaves on the box the way it did when it was run by hand three times today. That measurement is the evidence for the command, and it is recorded in #1419.No UI surface is touched, so the visual proof rule does not apply.
Buglog entry
{"date":"2026-08-29","title":"Demo box build cache grew unbounded, so the deploy disk gate refused three consecutive deploys","error_message":"demo box has 14G free on /var/lib/docker, below the 15G floor. Refusing to proceed.","root_cause":"Nothing reclaimed build cache in a way that reached the box. The deploy job's only cache prune carried --filter until=24h, and on a day of roughly 43 merges every cache record is younger than 24 hours, so the filter excluded exactly the records consuming the disk. Build cache reached 37.68GB with 12.42GB reclaimable while images were only 5 percent reclaimable.","fix":"Reclaim unused build cache inside scripts/check-deploy-disk.sh, below the warn line only, bounded by timeout 300, before the thresholds are compared. Inside the guard rather than as a preceding step so a failed reclaim cannot skip the check. Both the pre-reclaim and post-reclaim readings are reported so a non-cache disk problem still fails loudly.","tags":["deploy","disk","docker","build-cache","ci","issue-1419"]}Summary by CodeRabbit
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Tests