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fix: log account_not_provisioned at its single choke point - #1240
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change adds account and API key identifiers to audio and image routing inputs. Shared tenant parsing now logs these identifiers when it returns ChangesTenant parsing diagnostics
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The PR adds diagnostics without changing authorization outcomes, but its tests temporarily replace the process-wide logger, which could interfere with other concurrent tests. The change is mergeable with explicit follow-up to isolate logging in tests. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant AudioOrImageHandler
participant RoutingAdapter
participant ParseTenantID
participant Logger
AudioOrImageHandler->>RoutingAdapter: RouteInput with tenant, account, and key IDs
RoutingAdapter->>ParseTenantID: Validate tenant identifiers
ParseTenantID->>Logger: Log account_not_provisioned on invalid tenant
ParseTenantID-->>RoutingAdapter: ErrAccountNotProvisioned
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Independent security review (rolegate)Verdict: merge-safe, 0 BLOCKING. No behavior change, no leak, tests are load-bearing (verified live, see below). One SHOULD-FIX on the PR's own "single choke point" claim. 1. Log content — safe, no leak, no flood risk worth blocking on
Volume: only reachable after 2. "Single choke point" claim — SHOULD-FIX, claim is not fully accurateConfirmed 3 real callers of But two more fail-closed paths exist that never call it and so never log:
Both are fed by Practical effect: an unprovisioned key hitting 3. Tests — verified live, not just readBuilt the PR's actual worktree branch (
Both tests are genuinely load-bearing, not vacuous. 4. No behavior change — confirmedDiff is additive only: one 5. Root cause — correctly scoped as open, PR is honest about itThe underlying short-circuit (both live provisioning entry points skip re-provisioning once a user already holds an ACTIVE membership) is unchanged by this PR and remains a real gap for any future shared-tenant-with-stale-membership case, not just |
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Response to the independent security review (SHOULD-FIX #2)Both bypass paths are closed as of What changed:
Enumeration of every fail-closed On volume/flood risk (point 1): agreed, not blocking, noted as a real follow-up rather than folded into this PR's scope, same as you flagged it. On root cause (point 5): left untouched per the reviewer's explicit instruction that it's tracked separately. No GitHub review threads exist on this PR to resolve (this review landed as a top-level issue comment rather than a diff-anchored review, so there's nothing for the thread-resolution API to act on); replying here is the equivalent close-out. |
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Actionable comments posted: 1
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Inline comments:
In `@apps/edge-api/internal/audio/routing_adapter_test.go`:
- Around line 163-165: Replace the process-wide log.SetOutput mutation in the
tests around audio.RoutingAdapter.SelectRoute and
images.RoutingAdapter.SelectRoute with a test-local logger or injectable hook at
the authz.ParseTenantID boundary. Apply the same change in
apps/edge-api/internal/audio/routing_adapter_test.go lines 163-165 and
apps/edge-api/internal/images/routing_adapter_test.go lines 163-165, preserving
the assertions that depend on captured logging without affecting concurrent
tests.
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Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
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📒 Files selected for processing (8)
apps/edge-api/internal/audio/handler.goapps/edge-api/internal/audio/routing_adapter.goapps/edge-api/internal/audio/routing_adapter_test.goapps/edge-api/internal/authz/authz.goapps/edge-api/internal/authz/authz_test.goapps/edge-api/internal/images/handler.goapps/edge-api/internal/images/routing_adapter.goapps/edge-api/internal/images/routing_adapter_test.go
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Ran the full adversarial review pipeline on this (CodeRabbit CLI fresh against head e8a89e1c1: 0 findings; a security-focused pass; a Go-idiom pass; an independent ticket-first pass that re-verified the enumeration from scratch; and a general code-quality pass). Also built the actual worktree and mutation-tested the two load-bearing claims directly rather than taking them on faith: commenting out the log.Printf call breaks go build ./apps/edge-api/... (unused log import in authz, which images and audio both depend on), and mutating just the log message text fails all three new tests while leaving everything else green. Both hold exactly as described.
Also re-derived the "5 covered / 3 out of scope" table myself: grepped every uuid.Parse and every TenantUUID()/ParseTenantID call site in apps/edge-api, confirmed nothing else silently duplicates this check, and confirmed internal/batches/internal/files genuinely have zero TenantID references because they scope by AccountID directly instead, not because they lack a check that should exist. No fourth silent path found.
No BLOCKING findings. Two pre-existing unresolved threads addressed by reply: the CodeQL clear-text-logging alert is a false positive (traced AccountID/KeyID to apps/control-plane/internal/apikeys/types.go, they're DB surrogate UUIDs resolved from the token hash, never the raw key), and CodeRabbit's global-logger-mutation-in-tests flag is a real observation but not an active race today since none of the three log-capturing tests use t.Parallel().
One new NIT below on ParseTenantID's signature. Everything else is fine as-is.
A security reviewer's freshly minted API key answered 403
account_not_provisioned on every /v1/* call with nothing anywhere,
not a log line, not a metric, telling an operator it happened. The
403 itself is loud to the caller; nothing was loud to us.
AuthSnapshot.TenantUUID is the single definition every fail-closed
caller already routes through (handleModels, selectRoute,
checkOWUIShimKey), so the log line goes there once rather than at
each of the four call sites that construct the same error inline.
Logs account_id and key_id only, both internal identifiers already
treated as loggable elsewhere in this package; the raw key secret is
never present on this snapshot.
Root cause for the reviewer's specific account (not a code
regression): qa-tester@hive.test was a MEMBER, not the OWNER, of an
old shared E2E fixture tenant whose tenant_billing_accounts row was
already claimed by a different member's account, and predates
EnsureTenantBillingAccount's existence besides. Both live entry
points short-circuit once a user already holds an ACTIVE tenant
membership, so nothing running today could ever revisit it. Fixed
live by clearing that stale membership and letting the existing
self-serve provisioning path run once more (no code change needed
for that half); verified end to end with a freshly minted key
against api-hive.scubed.co returning 200 with the real catalog.
New-signup provisioning itself was traced and confirmed working
correctly on current main; this is not a P0 provisioning regression.
Buglog entry (to be appended to main separately, per repo convention):
{"date":"2026-08-28","tags":["auth","billing","provisioning","observability"],"error_message":"403 account_not_provisioned on every /v1/* call for a freshly minted API key with no operator-visible signal anywhere but the HTTP response","root_cause":"AuthSnapshot.TenantUUID (apps/edge-api/internal/authz/authz.go) returned ErrAccountNotProvisioned silently; qa-tester@hive.test specifically was a non-owner MEMBER of an old shared E2E fixture tenant (created 2026-04-25, before the tenant_billing_accounts table existed) whose billing mapping was already claimed by a different member's account, and both live provisioning entry points (signup.Provisioner.Reconcile, accounts.Service.EnsureViewerContext) short-circuit on any existing ACTIVE tenant_users row so neither could ever revisit it","fix":"added a log.Printf at TenantUUID's single choke point so every occurrence is operator-visible; live-repaired qa-tester by setting its stale tenant_users row to SUSPENDED and re-running the existing self-serve tenant-provision endpoint, which mapped its own account cleanly; verified with a freshly minted key against api-hive.scubed.co (200, real catalog)","verified_new_signups_unaffected":"traced signup.Provisioner.Reconcile + accounts.Service.provisionDefaultWorkspace on current main (c177972) and confirmed via the live control-plane boot log that both provisioning entry points are wired and running; no commit merged 2026-08-28 touched internal/signup, internal/accounts, or their main.go wiring"}
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security review of this PR found two more fail-closed paths that never routed through TenantUUID() and stayed silent: images and audio each ran their own uuid.Parse plus a package-local ErrAccountNotProvisioned, fed by their authz_adapter.go copying the raw AuthSnapshot.TenantID string across the package boundary without ever calling TenantUUID(). An unprovisioned key hitting /v1/images or /v1/audio still failed invisibly, which is exactly the condition this PR exists to eliminate. Extracted authz.TenantUUID's check into an exported authz.ParseTenantID(tenantID, accountID, keyID string), since the two adapters hold only the raw string form (not a full AuthSnapshot) by the time they reach their own check. Both routing_adapter.go files now call it instead of re-implementing uuid.Parse. Behaviour is unchanged: same rejection point, same local ErrAccountNotProvisioned error type and message returned to callers; only the check's internals and its visibility are now shared. RouteInput on both packages gained AccountID/APIKeyID fields (already available on the handler's AuthResult at every call site, just not threaded through) purely so the log carries the same account_id/key_id context every other occurrence does. Nothing about who is authorised changed. Verified the same way the reviewer verified the original log line: gutted the log call at authz.ParseTenantID's one definition and confirmed it takes go build down (unused log import) for authz, images and audio together, since images/audio now depend on the shared function transitively; restored it; then mutated only the log message text and confirmed all three new/updated tests (authz, images, audio) go red on that instead, then green again after restoring. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review NIT on the shared choke point: three bare string params in a
row (tenantID, accountID, keyID) invite a transposition footgun on
an auth path. A swapped pair at a call site compiles cleanly and
logs (or, if this function ever grows a second predicate, checks)
the wrong-but-plausible identifier. A struct literal forces every
call site to name each field, so a transposed pair becomes a visible
diff instead of a silent one.
ParseTenantID(tenantID, accountID, keyID string) is now
ParseTenantID(TenantLookup{TenantID, AccountID, KeyID}). TenantUUID()
and both routing_adapter.go call sites updated to the named form.
No behaviour change: same parse, same log format, same returned
error.
Re-ran both mutation checks the reviewer used, against the new
signature: deleting the log.Printf still takes go build down across
authz/images/audio together (unused import, transitively); mutating
only the log message text still fails all three
TestTenantUUIDLogsOnAccountNotProvisioned /
TestRoutingAdapterLogsAccountNotProvisioned tests while the rest of
the suite stays green. Full go build/go vet/go test
./apps/edge-api/... (25 packages) green after restoring.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CodeQL flagged clear-text logging of sensitive information: an access to APIKeyID flows to a logging call in authz.ParseTenantID. Traced APIKeyID to its population site (apps/control-plane/internal/apikeys/service.go:428, key.ID) and the api_keys table definition: it is api_keys.id, a gen_random_uuid() surrogate primary key stored in a column independent of token_hash, never derived from the bearer secret. AccountID is the same shape. The alert is a name-pattern false positive (CodeQL flags any field whose name contains "Key" flowing into a log call, regardless of what it actually holds), confirmed by reading the code rather than inferred from the field name. True as that is, it buys little: an operator identifying an unprovisioned ACCOUNT already has what they need from AccountID, and a permanent CodeQL alert on an auth path that every future reviewer has to re-litigate costs more than the field is worth. Dropped APIKeyID from the log line entirely rather than dismissing the alert; logged the offending TenantID string instead (also non-secret, and now the log distinguishes an empty tenant_id from a malformed one, which the previous line could not). TenantLookup keeps its KeyID field for callers that need it for something other than this log line; ParseTenantID simply never reads it. Re-ran both mutation checks against this change: deleting the log.Printf still takes go build down across authz/images/audio together; mutating only the log message text still fails all three tests. Added a negative assertion to all three tests (TestTenantUUIDLogsOnAccountNotProvisioned, TestRoutingAdapterLogsAccountNotProvisioned x2) that the log output never contains the KeyID value, so the field cannot silently reappear in the log. Full go build/go vet/go test ./apps/edge-api/... (25 packages) green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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#1335) Closes #1330. ## What was wrong An account with no row in `public.tenant_billing_accounts` could still mint an API key. The console answered 201, rendered the secret in its copy-it-now panel, and listed the key as active. `edge-api` then refused every request made with that key, `403 account_not_provisioned`, naming no cause and offering no remedy. That is a trap on the exact path a new user walks: create a key, try it, receive an opaque refusal. Confirmed live on the demo box before touching anything: ``` account slug type tenant_billing_accounts links e2e-verified-owner-s-workspace business 0 hive-demo-owner business 1 hive-owner-demo business 1 ``` ## Which of the two directions, and why The issue offered two fixes and asked for one. This is the refuse-at-creation one. Provisioning the link as part of account creation was considered and rejected on evidence, not on diff size: - `public.tenant_billing_accounts` is one to one in both directions (`tenant_id` and `account_id` are both UNIQUE). A user with several workspaces can only ever have one of them carry the tenant. The other workspaces are permanently unbillable by construction, so "the unprovisioned state cannot exist" is not reachable. The owner of the broken account above holds one active tenant and three active account memberships, which is exactly that shape. - `signup.EnsureTenantBillingAccount` deliberately refuses to guess a mapping, and both its call sites and the two backfill migrations use the same conservative predicate. A wrong mapping bills one tenant's usage to another account and is unreachable afterwards, since `alreadyMapped` short-circuits every future call on both sides. Making the link mandatory at account creation would mean inventing the rule this code refuses to invent, on the money path. - The mapping also converges legitimately *after* account creation (the documented `tenant_users` and `account_memberships` race, observed live at 28 to 60 seconds). Forcing it at creation would break that handling. Refusing at the moment a credential is issued closes every route into the bad state rather than one, and is the last point at which the customer can still be told something useful. ## The change `apikeys.Service.requireBillingTenant` resolves the account's billing tenant before any secret is generated, using the `GetTenantIDByAccountID` lookup that already existed for `ResolveSnapshot`. It is called from both mints: - `CreateKey`. - `RotateKey`, checked before the source key is even read, so a refused rotation leaves that key exactly as it was. Rotation hands out a fresh secret, so without this a customer whose key is being refused clicks Rotate and walks away with a second key refused identically. `ResolveSnapshot` is deliberately unchanged and still tolerates `uuid.Nil`: every key issued before this gate existed is sitting on an account that may never have had a mapping, and those must keep failing closed at the boundary rather than erroring differently. The refusal is 409 with a message naming the missing link and the two remedies that actually exist, plus the machine code `account_not_provisioned`, which is the same string `edge-api` answers with and the same one PR #1240 now logs. A customer report, this refusal and the operator log line all name one thing. Console side, two links in the chain were dropping the message: - `app/api/v1/accounts/current/[...path]/route.ts` deliberately never forwards upstream error text to the browser, so the refusal arrived as the word "Conflict". It now maps this one machine code to its own wording, exactly the way `app/api/console/members/role/route.ts` already does for `last_owner_required`. No upstream text reaches the browser. - `ApiKeyCreateForm` replaced every non-ok response with "Failed to create key. Please try again." It now renders a 409 body verbatim and keeps the generic text for every other status, because the other bodies this endpoint produces are deliberately opaque. ## Also in scope Live key `0ed1fa97-447a-4154-958a-7ee998022f2a` on the zero-link `e2e-verified` workspace was unusable and has been revoked through the API, not by direct SQL. The other live key on the demo workspace was not touched. ## Test plan - [x] `go test ./apps/control-plane/... -count=1 -short` green. Four new tests in `apps/control-plane/internal/apikeys/provisioning_gate_test.go`: create refuses and writes neither key row nor event, create still succeeds on a mapped account, rotate refuses and leaves the source key active with no replacement row, and both HTTP surfaces answer 409 with the code and no secret in the body. - [x] Mutation check, not just a green run: with the guard's condition forced false, all four go red (create returns nil, rotate returns nil, both HTTP cases return 201 and 200 with a secret in the body). Restored, all four go green. - [x] `npm run test:unit` in the console: 801 pass, including two new create-form cases (a 409 message is rendered verbatim; an unreadable 409 body still produces a message). The one failing suite in the container, `ci-web-e2e-secret-free.test.ts`, fails on `ENOENT .github/workflows/ci.yml` because that image does not copy the workflow in; it is pre-existing and unrelated. - [x] `npm run build` for the console passes. - [x] Visual proof against a stack built from this branch: branch control-plane, branch console, throwaway Supabase with all 112 migrations. Refusal capture plus a positive control showing a mapped workspace still issues a key. Log committed under `docs/proof/api-key-provisioning-gate-2026-08-29/`. ## Buglog entry ```json {"date":"2026-08-29","tags":["auth","billing","provisioning","api-keys","console"],"error_message":"The console minted an API key (201, secret shown in the copy-it-now panel, key listed active) for an account with zero public.tenant_billing_accounts rows, and edge-api then rejected that key with 403 account_not_provisioned and an unactionable contact-support message","root_cause":"apikeys.Service.CreateKey and RotateKey generated and persisted a secret without ever resolving the account's billing tenant, even though the exact lookup (Repository.GetTenantIDByAccountID) already existed in the same package for ResolveSnapshot; the unprovisioned state is permanent for any user whose tenant is already billed by a different workspace, since tenant_billing_accounts is UNIQUE on both columns and signup.EnsureTenantBillingAccount refuses to guess a mapping","fix":"added Service.requireBillingTenant as a precondition on both mints, returning a new ErrAccountNotProvisioned sentinel mapped to 409 with an actionable message and the machine code account_not_provisioned; the console proxy route now maps that code to its own customer-facing wording (it never forwards upstream error text) and ApiKeyCreateForm renders a 409 body verbatim instead of replacing it with generic retry text; ResolveSnapshot deliberately still tolerates uuid.Nil so pre-existing keys keep failing closed at the boundary","verification":"four new Go tests plus a mutation check that forces the guard false and confirms all four go red; two new console unit tests; visual proof captured against a branch-built control-plane and console over a throwaway Supabase with all 112 migrations, showing the refusal, zero api_keys rows written, and a positive control where a mapped workspace still issues a key"} ```
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## Summary This is the batched buglog follow-up for the 21 pull requests merged during the 2026-08-28 session. Its diff is `.wolf/buglog.jsonl` and nothing else. Per `.claude/rules/openwolf.md`, every fixed bug, error, failed test or failed build must be logged, but the line may never be appended on a fix branch: `merge=union` in `.gitattributes` resolves concurrent appends locally and is ignored by GitHub's server side merge, so two branches that both appended land in hard conflict there. An unmergeable pull request gets no `refs/pull/N/merge`, no `pull_request` run and therefore zero checks, and the required status gate then blocks the merge for a reason the page never states (issue #873). Each fix accordingly carried its entry in its own pull request body, and this pull request copies them onto `main` in one batch, which the protocol explicitly prefers over one pull request per entry. ## Source pull requests 1240, 1251, 1253, 1257, 1268, 1276, 1277, 1278, 1281, 1287, 1292, 1293, 1294, 1296, 1300, 1301, 1303, 1305, 1313, 1335, 1337. All merged. Every entry came from a "Buglog entry" heading in one of those bodies. Nothing was invented for a pull request that carried none. ## What landed 36 entries appended, one JSON object per line, append only. The 196 pre-existing lines are byte identical to `origin/main`. | Source | Entries | |---|---| | #1240 | 1 | | #1251 | 1 | | #1253 | 1 | | #1257 | 4 | | #1268 | 5 | | #1276 | 2 | | #1277 | 1 (of 2 in the body) | | #1278 | 0 (merged into #1296) | | #1281 | 2 | | #1287 | 2 | | #1292 | 3 | | #1293 | 1 | | #1294 | 3 | | #1296 | 1 | | #1300 | 1 | | #1301 | 1 | | #1303 | 1 | | #1305 | 3 | | #1313 | 1 | | #1335 | 1 | | #1337 | 1 | Note on #1268: its first "Buglog entry" heading says "None yet" in prose and carries no JSON. Its two later headings, from the CI live lane and from the intermittent tool call failure, carry the five entries taken here. ## Deduplication - **#1278 dropped, folded into #1296.** Both describe the same defect: `omitempty` on `StreamContentBlock.Text` dropped the required `"text":""` from every text `content_block_start`, crashing the real Anthropic SDK's stream accumulator (issue #1274). #1278 is the conformance suite that found it and shipped it marked xfail; #1296 is the fix, and its entry carries the fuller root cause and the actual remedy. One bug, one entry. #1296's entry gains a `discovered_by` field naming #1278 so the discovery is not lost. - **#1277's first entry dropped.** The same body carries a later "Buglog entry (revised)" heading written after the review round found the page's claims did not match what the code enforces. The revised entry is the one taken. - Checked and kept as distinct: #1313 and #1337 are two different hooks (`decision-citation-check.js` and `secrets-scanner.js`) blind to the same MultiEdit payload shape, fixed in two different pull requests, so two entries. #1240 and #1335 are two different `account_not_provisioned` defects, one an observability gap at the edge boundary and one a console mint that should have refused, so two entries. #1305's three entries are three separate rounds of defects in the same money path change, each with its own root cause. ## Corrections against what actually merged Each entry was checked against the merged tree at `origin/main`, not against its own claim. - **#1240.** The entry said the log line went in at `AuthSnapshot.TenantUUID`. On `main` the check is the exported `authz.ParseTenantID(TenantLookup)` that `TenantUUID` delegates to, which the images and audio routing adapters (two further silent call sites found in the same review) also call, and `key_id` is deliberately not logged because CodeQL's clear text logging check flags any field named `*Key*` (alert #31). The `fix` field now says so. - **#1276, first entry.** The entry named `app/console/analytics/page.tsx` as the home of the five fetch helpers and their `Promise.all`. On `main` they live in `apps/web-console/lib/analytics/overview-fetch.ts`, extracted during review. Path corrected. - **#1277.** Its `error_message` was the placeholder `n/a`. Reconstructed from the pull request's own correction narrative: the page as first written published a blanket no content stored claim false for `/v1/batches`, `/v1/files` and `/v1/rag`, a product wide provider blindness claim disproved by catalogue summaries that name vendors (#1284), a metering claim anchored to the console side `UsageEventRow` projection rather than the `usage_events` table, and a 1:1 alias to route claim that is a property of seed data rather than of `SelectRoute`. **#1303 needed no correction.** Its original root cause asserted a live mid stream provider leak on the session chat relay that measurement disproved, and the author had already corrected the body before merge. The corrected version is what was taken, including the sentence recording that the session chat relay did not leak an error frame but silently truncated instead. Every other entry's central claim was verified present in the merged tree, among them `metering.SupportsIncludeUsage`, `sanitize.VariablePriceFrame` in the batch dispatcher, the revoke and regrant in `20260828_01_service_role_public_schema_grant.sql` with the `anon` assertions in `ci-throwaway-db.sh`, `normalizeReasoningUsage` now called from `normalizeChatCompletion`, `signup.SyncTenantMembershipRole`, `TestKeyViewHidesALimitThatIsNotEnforced`, `TestListEventsLatencyCrossesTheWire`, `mask-api-keys.mjs` and `md-table.mjs`, `StreamContentBlock.Text` as `*string`, `redactSnapshot`, `httpx.ReadBody`, `sanitize.ReplaceErrorFrame` with the default deny tail in `provider_blind.go`, `pinCompletionCeiling` and `captureInputTokens` with `applyReasoningHeadroom` gone, `requireBillingTenant`, and `hooks.selfcheck.js` wired into the Repo policy lints check. ## Verification - `node .wolf/hooks/bugstore.selfcheck.js` reports `bugstore selfcheck OK`. - All 232 lines parse as a single JSON object each. - Every appended entry carries `error_message`, `root_cause`, `fix` and `tags`. - Scanned for credentials: no API key, bearer token, JWT, password, AWS key or Postgres DSN with a password appears in any entry. The `hk_` occurrences are prefix descriptions in prose, not keys. - `git diff origin/main...HEAD --name-only` prints `.wolf/buglog.jsonl` and nothing else. No `.wolf/` telemetry was staged. ## Review No adversarial review streams were run, deliberately. This change is records only: it adds no code, no test, no configuration and no behavior, and `.wolf/buglog.jsonl` is on the inert path allowlist in `.github/workflows/ci.yml`, so the six required checks report green without running their heavy steps. If a check does fail here, that is a real signal about the file rather than about the pipeline. https://claude.ai/code/session_01WyEwUxZCArdn1ZUDkTvuQ1 Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
The security reviewer's freshly minted API key for
qa-tester@hive.testanswered403 account_not_provisionedon every/v1/*call, and nothing (no log line, no metric) told an operator it happened. This PR adds one log line atAuthSnapshot.TenantUUID, the single choke point every fail-closed caller already routes through, so the next occurrence is operator-visible instead of silently opaque.Diagnosis (Phase 1, no mutation)
hive-supabase-db-1on the demo box; the checked-in.envSUPABASE_DB_URLpoints at a deleted Supabase Cloud project and is stale).tenant_usersrows have notenant_billing_accountsrow for their tenant. All 39 are E2E/test fixtures (*@hive-e2e.invalid,*@hive-proof.test,e2e-verified/e2e-inviter/e2e-unverified+...@scubed.com.bd), dated 2026-07-28 through 2026-08-23. None are from today; no20260826_*migration exists onmain; nothing merged today (259c1430e..c177972f4) touchedinternal/signup,internal/accounts, or their wiring inmain.go.app/console/layout.tsx→/console/provision→signup.Provisioner.Reconcile→accounts.Service.EnsureViewerContext/provisionDefaultWorkspaceracing to close the billing-mapping gap) and confirmed live in the control-plane boot log that both entry points are wired and running (signup provisioning ready (console route plus reconciler sweep)). This is not a P0 signup regression.qa-tester@hive.testitself is a distinct case from the other 38: it already had atenant_usersrow (April 2026, predates thetenant_billing_accountstable by 3 months) as a non-owner MEMBER of a shared E2E fixture tenant whose billing mapping was already claimed by a different member's account. Both live provisioning entry points short-circuit the instant a user already holds an ACTIVE membership, so nothing running today could ever revisit it, andcmd/backfill-tenantscorrectly refused to touch it (tenant_already_billed_by_another_account, working as designed, no wrong mapping written).Fix
tenant_usersrow toSUSPENDED, then re-ran the existing/api/v1/viewer/tenant-provisionself-serve path using qa-tester's own (unrotated, unchanged) password. It created a fresh personal tenant and mapped it to qa-tester's own existing account in one call, exactly like a first-time signup would. Verified end to end: minted a real key and got200with the full catalog fromapi-hive.scubed.co/v1/models; the verification key has since been revoked.AuthSnapshot.TenantUUID()now logsaccount_id+key_id(both already-loggable internal identifiers, never the raw key secret) whenever it returnsErrAccountNotProvisioned. Every fail-closed caller (handleModels,inference.Orchestrator.selectRoute,checkOWUIShimKey) routes through this one function, so the fix lives once rather than duplicated at each of the ~4 call sites that build the same error inline.Test plan
go build ./apps/edge-api/...(toolchain image)go vet ./apps/edge-api/internal/authz/...go test ./apps/edge-api/internal/authz/... -count=1— includes two new tests:TestTenantUUIDLogsOnAccountNotProvisioned(log fires with account_id/key_id on failure) andTestTenantUUIDSilentOnSuccess(no log spam on the ordinary success path)qa-tester@hive.test's newly minted key returns200from/v1/modelswith the real DeepSeek/Groq catalogBuglog entry
{"date":"2026-08-28","tags":["auth","billing","provisioning","observability"],"error_message":"403 account_not_provisioned on every /v1/* call for a freshly minted API key with no operator-visible signal anywhere but the HTTP response","root_cause":"AuthSnapshot.TenantUUID (apps/edge-api/internal/authz/authz.go) returned ErrAccountNotProvisioned silently; qa-tester@hive.test specifically was a non-owner MEMBER of an old shared E2E fixture tenant (created 2026-04-25, before the tenant_billing_accounts table existed) whose billing mapping was already claimed by a different member's account, and both live provisioning entry points (signup.Provisioner.Reconcile, accounts.Service.EnsureViewerContext) short-circuit on any existing ACTIVE tenant_users row so neither could ever revisit it","fix":"added a log.Printf at TenantUUID's single choke point so every occurrence is operator-visible; live-repaired qa-tester by setting its stale tenant_users row to SUSPENDED and re-running the existing self-serve tenant-provision endpoint, which mapped its own account cleanly; verified with a freshly minted key against api-hive.scubed.co (200, real catalog)","verified_new_signups_unaffected":"traced signup.Provisioner.Reconcile + accounts.Service.provisionDefaultWorkspace on current main (c177972f4) and confirmed via the live control-plane boot log that both provisioning entry points are wired and running; no commit merged 2026-08-28 touched internal/signup, internal/accounts, or their main.go wiring"}https://claude.ai/code/session_019XuWtAxdxYutskzpH7FFQ8
Update: two more silent paths found and closed
Security review of this PR found
apps/edge-api/internal/images/routing_adapter.go:46andapps/edge-api/internal/audio/routing_adapter.go:46bypassedTenantUUID()entirely: each ran its ownuuid.Parseplus a package-localErrAccountNotProvisioned, fed byauthz_adapter.gocopying the rawAuthSnapshot.TenantIDstring across the package boundary without ever callingTenantUUID(). Both now call the shared check (extracted asauthz.ParseTenantID(tenantID, accountID, keyID), since these two only ever hold the raw string, not a fullAuthSnapshot). Behaviour is unchanged: same rejection point, same local error type/message returned; only the check's internals and its visibility are shared.Verified the same way the reviewer verified the original: gutted the log call and confirmed it takes
go builddown acrossauthz,imagesandaudiotogether (unused import), since the latter two now depend on it transitively; restored it; then mutated only the log message text and confirmed all three new/updated tests go red on that, then green again.Every fail-closed
account_not_provisioned-family path, enumeratedAPI-key principal,
AuthSnapshot-derived (public.tenant_billing_accountsunmapped account):/v1/models(API-key branch)cmd/server/main.go:893(handleModels)authSnap.TenantUUID()directly/v1/chat/completions(sync), streaming,/v1/responsesstreaminginternal/inference/orchestrator.go:70(Orchestrator.selectRoute, the one functionexecuteSync/executeStreaming/executeResponsesStreamingall route through)snapshot.TenantUUID()cmd/server/main.go:1230(checkOWUIShimKey, periodic)snapshot.TenantUUID()/v1/images/generations,/v1/images/editsinternal/images/routing_adapter.go:46(RoutingAdapter.SelectRoute)authz.ParseTenantID/v1/audio/speech,/v1/audio/transcriptions(both realtime and batch call sites)internal/audio/routing_adapter.go:46(RoutingAdapter.SelectRoute)authz.ParseTenantIDChecked and confirmed out of scope (different failure family, not silent):
internal/chat/dispatch.go:100(user.TenantID == uuid.Nil)auth.UserFrom), not an API-keyAuthSnapshot. This is the tenant-claim gap (notenant_idin the token at all), a different failure family the console's/console/provisionflow already exists to close. Already returns a distinctly namedapierr.CodeNoTenant, not a generic opaque 403 — never silent to begin with.internal/anthropic/handler.go:71,167(sameuser.TenantID == uuid.Nilguard)internal/batches,internal/filesTenantID: zero hits) — nothing to route through, not a silent duplicate of anything.Root-cause item (provisioning short-circuits once a user already holds an ACTIVE
tenant_usersrow, which is whyqa-tester@hive.testspecifically could never self-heal) stays explicitly out of scope for this PR, per the reviewer's instruction; tracked separately.Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
Tests