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fix: refuse a demo box deploy that starts without disk headroom (issue #1098) - #1369
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…#1098) The deploy job's two prune steps both carry `if: always()`, which covers a failed step but not the runner being killed. When the job trips its own `timeout-minutes` mid build, every remaining step including both prunes reports no conclusion and never runs. Run 33237021243 did exactly that on 2026-08-29: it timed out inside "Rebuild + recreate changed services" with the box at 11 GB free, so the deploy that consumed the disk was also the deploy whose cleanup never fired. Add a disk precondition as the first step of the deploy job, which is the only position a job timeout cannot skip. Below 20 GB free it warns and proceeds; below 10 GB it fails before anything builds. Both paths print `docker system df` and name the reclaim moves that are safe, plus the two that are not: `docker system prune -a` and `docker image prune -a` both delete the previous stack images that are this box's only rollback path, and volume pruning would take the database, the storage buckets and the chat data, which still have no off box backup (issue #1000). Failing before the build is deliberately preferable to failing halfway. This box holds the Postgres data directory, so a filesystem that fills during a recreate does not merely abort a deploy, it stops the database accepting writes with containers already half torn down. A deploy that never starts leaves the previous stack running and serving. scripts/test-deploy-disk-gate.sh exercises the three branches plus the unreadable mount case by stubbing `df` and `docker` on PATH, reading the step body out of the workflow rather than copying it so the test cannot drift. It is wired into the same required CI lane that already guards set-compose-project-name.sh, and it was confirmed to go red when the floor comparison is inverted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WyEwUxZCArdn1ZUDkTvuQ1
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe deploy workflow adds a configurable Docker disk-space guard before migration and deployment. The guard reports warnings, blocks low-space operations, and handles command failures. CI adds regression tests with stubbed ChangesDeploy disk headroom guard
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The PR adds disk-space checks to prevent unsafe demo-box deployments, but invalid manual thresholds can bypass the protection and the regression test may miss a removed workflow call; migrations can also advance before a later disk check refuses deployment. These concrete merge-readiness risks should be fixed or explicitly accepted before merging. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant DeployWorkflow
participant check-deploy-disk.sh
participant df
participant docker
DeployWorkflow->>check-deploy-disk.sh: Run before migration or deployment
check-deploy-disk.sh->>df: Read available Docker storage
df-->>check-deploy-disk.sh: Return free gigabytes
check-deploy-disk.sh->>docker: Show Docker usage below warning threshold
check-deploy-disk.sh-->>DeployWorkflow: Proceed or exit with error
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 3 | ❌ 2❌ Failed checks (2 warnings)
✅ Passed checks (3 passed)
Full details: Linked Issues checkExplanation The PR partially addresses issue Resolution Implement unattended cache pruning with a stated ceiling that survives reboot, and add disk-usage alerting through the existing alerting path. Alternatively, update the linked issue or acceptance criteria if deployment-time protection is the intended scope. Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 0.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 3 functions across 2 files. (2 skipped: 2 unsupported.)
✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Two ways the gate could fail with no annotation, both found by rereading it rather than by it misbehaving. The step runs under `set -euo pipefail`, so a `df` that exits non-zero inside `free_gb=$(df ... | tail -1 | tr -dc '0-9')` aborted the step before the emptiness check below it ever ran. The job went red with no `::error::` line saying anything about disk, which is the least useful way for a disk guard to fail. Read df in its own command and report its stderr. Separately, `set -u` turned an unset `GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY` into a bare abort. Actions always sets it, so this was latent, but a guard whose job is to fail loudly should not have a silent abort path at all. Default it. Both are now covered: `df-fails` stubs a df that exits 1, `no-summary-var` runs with the variable unset. Confirmed `df-fails` goes red against the previous pipeline form.
… failure Adversarial review found two real holes and new evidence from the incident made a third one urgent. The gate only protected `deploy`. `migrate` runs first, on the same box, and opens a database connection. Postgres answers ENOSPC by panicking and shutting the engine down to protect data integrity, so a migration that runs out of disk mid transaction takes down the stack that is currently serving, which is worse than the refused deploy this was written to prevent. Gating only the build also let the schema advance while the code matching it never shipped. The floor was 10 GB. Run 33237021243 timed out mid recreate with 11 GB free, and the runner then died outright with `No space left on device` writing its own diagnostic log, so a 10 GB floor would have waved through the exact deploy this exists to stop. A floor has to sit above the known failure point. It is now 15 GB, and the warn line moves to 25 GB. A hard floor with no override can also wedge the box: below it nothing deploys, including a change meant to reduce what the box builds. The floor is now overridable through `HIVE_DEPLOY_DISK_FLOOR_GB`, fed by a new `workflow_dispatch` input, so the escape hatch is a manual audited action. It is deliberately not readable from a commit message, so no ordinary push can bypass the floor. The step body moved into scripts/check-deploy-disk.sh so both jobs call one line instead of carrying two copies of it. That also lets the test exercise the script directly rather than extracting YAML, removing the PyYAML dependency the review flagged, and it puts the guard on deploy-demo-box.yml's push.paths alongside every other script the deploy invokes, so a fix to the guard cannot merge and never reach the box. New coverage: `incident-11g` pins the motivating failure and fails if the floor ever drops to or below it, `floor-overridable` and `empty-override-uses-default` cover the escape hatch and the empty value a push-triggered run passes, and `wired-into-both-jobs` fails if either call site is deleted. Confirmed `incident-11g` goes red with the floor back at 10.
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Adversarial review: Antigravity (gemini-3.1-pro-high, effort high)One stream. CodeRabbit reported Eight findings. Four fixed, one already fixed before the review ran, two rebutted on evidence, one accepted as a known compromise. Fixed1. Rather than duplicating the step body, it moved to 2. Hard floor with no override can wedge the box (BLOCKER). Accepted, fixed differently. 5. 10 GB floor is a false negative (MAJOR). Accepted, fixed. 4. 7. Step summary clutter (MINOR). Accepted. Already fixed before the review ran3. Rebutted6. The CI lane might be silently skipped (MAJOR). Not reproducible. 8. A rename slips past the position assertion (NIT). Now moot. Overall approachThe reviewer's framing, that a static free-space threshold is a brittle proxy because it cannot tell a cache-hit rebuild from a full 26 GB one, is fair. It is accepted deliberately: the alternative is predicting build size before the build, and the failure this prevents is not a slightly-too-tight estimate, it is a runner dying with ENOSPC partway through a recreate on the box that holds the database. |
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Inline comments:
In `@scripts/check-deploy-disk.sh`:
- Around line 44-45: Validate fail_gb and warn_gb in check-deploy-disk before
reading disk space, requiring both to be nonnegative decimal integers and
warn_gb to be greater than or equal to fail_gb; reject invalid or inverted
values rather than continuing with comparisons. Add regression coverage for
HIVE_DEPLOY_DISK_FLOOR_GB=bad and HIVE_DEPLOY_DISK_WARN_GB=0.
In `@scripts/test-deploy-disk-gate.sh`:
- Around line 143-146: Update the wired-into-both-jobs check in the deployment
workflow validation to count exactly two executable run entries for
scripts/check-deploy-disk.sh, excluding comments and path configuration. Add a
separate assertion that the script appears exactly once in the push.paths entry,
preserving coverage of both job guards and the merge-protection path.
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…l sites Both findings are real and both are self-inflicted holes in the guard. The thresholds are reachable from a human-typed workflow_dispatch input, and a bad value there did not fail, it silently stopped gating. `[ 22 -lt bad ]` exits 2, which an `if` reads as false, so the floor check was skipped and the deploy proceeded on a stderr line nobody reads. A warn line below the floor was the same hole by another route, since the `>= warn` early exit returns 0 before the floor is ever compared. Both are now refused with an annotation. The wiring assertion counted every text match of the guard's path and required three or more. The workflow mentions that path six times, four of them comments and the push-paths entry, so deleting BOTH `run:` lines still left four matches and the test passed with zero jobs protected. It now counts exactly two `run:` lines and separately exactly one push-paths entry. Five new cases cover the threshold validation and one covers the push-paths entry. Confirmed red: removing the validation block fails all five, and replacing either `run:` line fails wired-into-both-jobs. Also records why the reclaim used `docker rmi` without --force rather than any prune. A rebuild that moves a tag leaves the previous image pinned only by the running container's snapshot, absent from `docker images` entirely; four were live on the box on 2026-08-29. Nothing a human inventories before pruning shows them, so refusing to remove a referenced image is the only real backstop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WyEwUxZCArdn1ZUDkTvuQ1
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…1424) Closes #1419. ## What was happening The disk gate added in PR #1369 refused three consecutive `deploy-demo-box` runs on 2026-08-29 at 14G free against its 15G floor. It was right to refuse: a deploy that dies mid migration is how this box broke at 05:55Z the same day, when the runner process was killed writing its own `_diag` log with `No space left on device`. What is not sustainable is that a human then has to reclaim by hand before anything ships. Nothing on this box prunes build cache in a way that reaches it, every merge to main deploys, and every deploy builds. The reclaim was run by hand three times in one day. ## The cause is build cache, not images `docker system df` at the point of refusal: | Type | Size | Reclaimable | | --- | --- | --- | | Images | 26.72GB | 1.391GB (5%) | | Build Cache | 37.68GB | 12.42GB | `docker builder prune -f` recovered the full 12.42GB and took free space from 14G to 23G, touching no image, no volume and no rollback path. The deploy job already ends with `docker builder prune -f --filter until=24h`, and the filter is precisely why that step reclaims nothing on the days that matter. After roughly 43 merges in one day every cache record is younger than 24 hours, so `until=24h` excludes exactly the records consuming the disk. That step is kept, with its comment corrected, because it is the only cleanup that runs on a box healthy enough for the guard to exit silently, and because a build that failed halfway leaves cache no later deploy will reuse. ## Why option 1, weighed against the other three Issue #1419 lists four options. - **Option 2, a schedule independent of deploys.** The box has no passwordless sudo, so a systemd timer cannot be installed from CI and would not be repo tracked. It also fires when nothing has changed and does not fire at the one moment that matters, which is immediately before a build. - **Option 3, a BuildKit cache ceiling.** The most correct long term answer, and the one to reach for if this recurs. It is daemon configuration on a box CI cannot reconfigure, it needs a daemon restart to apply, and a ceiling set too low silently evicts cache the next build needs, which trades a loud refusal for a slow build nobody attributes. - **Option 4, raise the floor and add disk.** Defers. The floor is already set above the observed failure point deliberately, and lowering the guard to fit the garbage is backwards. - **Option 1** costs one bounded command, is repo tracked, is the exact reclaim already measured as safe and effective on this box, and keeps the gate a backstop rather than a routine blocker. One refinement on the issue's wording: the prune runs **only when free space is already below the warn line**, not on every deploy. Unconditional pruning would discard fresh cache on healthy days for no reason and would hide the trend the warn line exists to show. ## Why the prune lives inside the guard rather than in a step before it Because the requirement is that a prune failure can never skip the disk check, and inside the script that is structural rather than a promise. There is no second step whose failure, timeout or cancellation could stop the comparison from running, and no `if:` expression to get wrong. `scripts/check-deploy-disk.sh` is already the first step of both jobs and already on this workflow's `push.paths`, so nothing else needed wiring. ## How this cannot mask a genuine disk problem 1. **It only runs below the warn line.** A healthy box is never pruned and its numbers are never massaged. 2. **Both readings are printed**, in the log and in the step summary: `reclaimed build cache: 14G -> 23G free`. A box whose problem is not build cache shows a small delta and is still refused by the floor. The `prune-not-enough` test pins exactly this. 3. **Any run that needed a reclaim is annotated.** A box that only deploys because of this step emits `::warning::` on every deploy, so quiet dependence on it is not possible. ## What this does on failure - **`docker builder prune` fails or outlives its 300 second `timeout`:** a `::warning::` naming the failure, then the check runs against whatever `df` actually reports. A box below the floor is still refused. A failed reclaim can only ever leave a refusal in place, never turn one into a pass. `prune-fails` is the test for this and it asserts exit 1. - **Still below the 15G floor after the reclaim:** exit 1 exactly as today, before anything builds or connects to the database. The previous stack keeps running and serving, which is the entire point of failing before rather than halfway. - **Above the 25G warn line on entry:** nothing is pruned, nothing is printed, and behaviour is byte for byte what it is today. - **Recovered above the warn line by the reclaim:** proceed, with a warning naming both numbers. ## Constraints honoured - No `docker system prune -a` and no `docker image prune -a`. Neither appears in this diff; the guard's own error text still names both as forbidden and the test still asserts that text. - No volume pruning. `docker builder prune` without `-a` releases only records BuildKit itself reports as reclaimable, which by definition excludes anything backing an image that currently exists, and it touches no volume at all. - The rollback path is untouched: no image is removed by anything in this diff. ## Tests `scripts/test-deploy-disk-gate.sh`, run with `df` and `docker` stubbed on PATH, so no daemon and no real filesystem. Five new cases, all verified red before the implementation existed (the run before the fix reported `5 check(s) failed`, and every pre-existing case stayed green): - `healthy-box-is-not-pruned` — 40G free, the docker stub log contains no `builder prune`. - `prune-rescues` — 14G then 23G, exit 0, output names the reclaim. - `prune-partial` — 14G then 20G, exit 0 with a warning, no error. - `prune-not-enough` — 14G then 14G, exit 1 with an error. The proof that pruning first cannot launder a real problem. - `prune-fails` — 14G then 14G with the prune stub failing, exit 1 with an error. The proof that a failed prune cannot skip the check. Plus an assertion that both the pre and post numbers reach the log. The `df` stub gained a sequence mode for this: a single fixed value cannot express "the prune freed nothing" and "the prune freed 9G" as different runs, and a test that cannot tell those apart cannot fail when the second read is dropped (issue #797). `bash scripts/test-deploy-disk-gate.sh` reports `all checks passed`, 29 checks. It is wired into the required `ci.yml` job already. ## Not verified end to end This changes the only deploy path to the live box and there is no way to exercise a self-hosted-runner job anywhere but on that box, so the real proof is the first merge to main after this lands. The stubs cover the branch logic; they do not prove `docker builder prune -f` behaves on the box the way it did when it was run by hand three times today. That measurement is the evidence for the command, and it is recorded in #1419. No UI surface is touched, so the visual proof rule does not apply. ## Buglog entry ```json {"date":"2026-08-29","title":"Demo box build cache grew unbounded, so the deploy disk gate refused three consecutive deploys","error_message":"demo box has 14G free on /var/lib/docker, below the 15G floor. Refusing to proceed.","root_cause":"Nothing reclaimed build cache in a way that reached the box. The deploy job's only cache prune carried --filter until=24h, and on a day of roughly 43 merges every cache record is younger than 24 hours, so the filter excluded exactly the records consuming the disk. Build cache reached 37.68GB with 12.42GB reclaimable while images were only 5 percent reclaimable.","fix":"Reclaim unused build cache inside scripts/check-deploy-disk.sh, below the warn line only, bounded by timeout 300, before the thresholds are compared. Inside the guard rather than as a preceding step so a failed reclaim cannot skip the check. Both the pre-reclaim and post-reclaim readings are reported so a non-cache disk problem still fails loudly.","tags":["deploy","disk","docker","build-cache","ci","issue-1419"]} ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit - **New Features** - Deployment disk checks now reclaim unused build cache when disk space is low before evaluating whether deployment can proceed. - Successful cleanup reports the recovered disk space and allows deployment to continue when sufficient space is restored. - Low-space warnings and errors now include before-and-after disk readings. - **Bug Fixes** - Deployment remains blocked when cleanup fails or available disk space is still insufficient. - **Tests** - Added coverage for successful, partial, failed, and insufficient cache-reclaim scenarios. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
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## Summary This is the batched buglog follow-up for the pull requests merged to `main` on 2026-08-29. Its diff is `.wolf/buglog.jsonl` and nothing else. Per `.claude/rules/openwolf.md`, every fixed bug, error, failed test or failed build must be logged, but the line may never be appended on a fix branch. `merge=union` in `.gitattributes` resolves concurrent appends locally and is ignored by GitHub's server side merge, so two branches that both appended land in hard conflict there. An unmergeable pull request gets no `refs/pull/N/merge`, no `pull_request` run and therefore zero checks, and the required status gate then blocks the merge for a reason the page never states (issue #873). Each fix accordingly carried its entry in its own pull request body, and this pull request copies them onto `main` in one batch, which the protocol explicitly prefers over one pull request per entry. ## Scope examined Fifty nine pull requests merged to `main` on 2026-08-29. Forty eight of them carried at least one entry, for eighty two entries in total. Thirty two of those were already on `main` and are skipped, leaving fifty appended here from thirty four pull requests. The largest block of skips comes from #1342, the equivalent batch for the 2026-08-28 merges, which merged earlier the same day and already landed thirty six entries covering #1257, #1268, #1276, #1277, #1287, #1292, #1293, #1294, #1296, #1301, #1303, #1305, #1313, #1335 and #1337. ## What landed Fifty entries appended, one JSON object per line, append only. The 232 pre-existing lines are byte identical to `origin/main` (verified by hashing the first 232 lines of the result against the base file). Every line in the resulting file parses as JSON and carries `error_message`, `root_cause`, `fix` and `tags`. | Source | Entries | |---|---| | #1083 | 2 | | #1277 | 1 | | #1278 | 1 | | #1298 | 1 | | #1334 | 1 | | #1336 | 3 | | #1343 | 1 | | #1346 | 1 | | #1351 | 1 | | #1365 | 2 | | #1368 | 1 | | #1369 | 1 | | #1371 | 3 | | #1375 | 3 | | #1376 | 1 | | #1378 | 1 | | #1379 | 2 | | #1388 | 5 | | #1389 | 3 | | #1390 | 2 | | #1393 | 1 | | #1394 | 1 | | #1410 | 1 | | #1417 | 1 | | #1421 | 1 | | #1423 | 1 | | #1424 | 1 | | #1426 | 1 | | #1429 | 1 | | #1431 | 1 | | #1433 | 1 | | #1434 | 1 | | #1436 | 1 | | #1439 | 1 | Entries are copied verbatim from their source pull request bodies. Nothing was rewritten, no field was invented, and no field was added. No JSON needed repair: all eighty two extracted entries parsed on the first attempt and all four required fields were present on every one. ## Merged pull requests that carried no entry Eleven of the fifty nine. Recorded here because the gap is itself the useful signal. | Pull request | Title | Assessment | |---|---|---| | #1013 | chore(deps): bump the go-minor-patch group across 1 directory with 4 updates | Dependabot bump, no defect fixed, no entry expected | | #1015 | chore(deps): bump the go-minor-patch group across 1 directory with 6 updates | Dependabot bump, no entry expected | | #1016 | chore(deps): bump golang from 1.26-alpine to 1.27-alpine in /deploy/docker | Dependabot bump, no entry expected | | #1218 | chore(deps): bump postcss from 8.5.19 to 8.5.26 in /apps/desktop | Dependabot bump, no entry expected | | #1219 | chore(deps): bump golang.org/x/crypto from 0.41.0 to 0.52.0 in /apps/control-plane | Dependabot bump, no entry expected | | #1342 | chore: batch buglog entries for the 2026-08-28 merges | The previous batch pull request itself, correctly carries no entry of its own | | #1364 | chore: remove four dead skills and record the patterns that cost time | Protocol gap. The body records patterns that cost time, which is the shape of a buglog entry, but none was written as one | | #1383 | test: retire stale expected-failure markers, restore the ones that are true (#1381, #1382, #1324) | Protocol gap. Stale `it.fails` markers reading as red is a real defect that was fixed here and should have carried an entry | | #1384 | docs: correct D-047, hive-auto reverted to variable pricing (D-059) | Decision ledger correction, arguably a documentation defect, no entry written | | #1387 | chore(deps): bump next from 15.5.23 to 16.3.3 in /apps/agent-console | Dependabot bump, no entry expected | | #1398 | docs: rescue the 2026-08-25 parity captures and add the 2026-08-29 QA matrix evidence | Documentation and evidence rescue, no entry written | Six of the eleven are Dependabot bumps and one is the previous batch, so the genuine protocol gaps are #1364, #1383, #1384 and #1398. Of those, #1383 is the one worth a follow-up: it fixed a real defect class (a stale expected-failure marker reads as a red "Expect test to fail" and gets dismissed as pre-existing) and left no record. ## Entries skipped as already present Thirty two. Thirty of them matched an entry already on `main` on `error_message`, `id` or `fix`. Two more from #1278 are semantic duplicates that an exact match would have missed, and were skipped after reading the landed entries they duplicate: - #1278's `streaming content_block_start omits text field` entry is covered by the consolidated `bug-2026-08-28-anthropic-sdk-wire-conformance` entry landed from #1296, whose root cause names the same `omitempty` on `StreamContentBlock.Text`. - #1278's `GET /v1/models leaked an upstream provider name` entry is covered by `BUG-1284`, landed from #1300, which names the same `public.model_aliases.summary` publication path. #1278's third entry, on `top_k` forwarding producing a 400, is not covered anywhere on `main` and is appended here. #1342 recorded #1278 as fully "merged into #1296", which was accurate for two of its three entries. ## Note on entry quality One appended entry is thin: #1277's parity re-score record carries `error_message` of `n/a` and a root cause of "console had no privacy/data-policy surface at all". It is a parity gap record rather than a defect record. It is included exactly as written rather than embellished, per the protocol's preference for the author's own words. ## Test plan - [x] Branch cut fresh from `origin/main`, diff is `.wolf/buglog.jsonl` and nothing else - [x] First 232 lines byte identical to the base file (md5 match) - [x] All 282 resulting lines parse as JSON and carry `error_message`, `root_cause`, `fix` and `tags` - [x] No `.wolf/` telemetry (`anatomy.md`, `memory.md`, `token-ledger.json`, `hooks/_session.json`, `buglog.json`) in the commit - [ ] The six required checks report green via the inert path allowlist in `.github/workflows/ci.yml` --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Refs #1098.
What happened on the box
The demo box was at 90 percent of a 98 GB root filesystem with 11 GB free, hours before a demo, with
deploy-demo-box.ymlfree to fire at any moment and build into what was left.I reclaimed 15 GB by hand first, then wrote this so it is less likely to recur. The reclaim is recorded below rather than in a script, because the safe move depends on what is on the box at the time and I do not want an unattended job making that judgment.
Why the existing prunes were not enough
The deploy job already prunes. Both steps carry
if: always():Prune dangling imagesrunsdocker image prune -fPrune build cache older than 24hrunsdocker builder prune -f --filter until=24hMeasured on the box on 2026-08-29, both were doing approximately nothing, for two separate reasons.
Dangling images were zero. Compose retags on rebuild, and the previous image stays referenced by the still-running container until the recreate, after which it does become dangling and is pruned. That path works. It just does not reclaim much.
Build cache showed 20.57 GB total and 0 B reclaimable, confirmed independently by
docker buildx du(Reclaimable: 0B, every record listed as not reclaimable). Those records back layers of images that currently exist, so BuildKit holds them in use and nountil=filter can release them.docker builder prune -awould not have freed the space either, and would have cost a full rebuild on the next deploy. I did not run it.What had actually accumulated was a third thing neither step targets: tagged images that no container references and nothing in this repo names. Three separate Playwright base images (10.2 GB across
v1.51.1-noble,v1.51.1-jammy,v1.62.0-jammy, none of which is the one tag the tree does mention), the supersededlitellm:v1.77.7-stablefrom before thev1.98.0pin, and stalenode:20andgolang:1.24-alpinebases.docker image prune -awould collect these, and would also delete every previous stack image, which is this box's only rollback path. #1098 rules that out and I agree with it.Why the guard goes before the build, not after
Deploy run 33237021243 (job 99059755081, 2026-08-29 05:49:50Z to 05:55:11Z) did not merely fail. The runner process itself died:
The Actions runner could not write its own diagnostic log. That is the box at effectively zero free space, not at 90 percent, and it is why the job reported
failurewith an empty failed-steps array: no step failed, the process was gone. Every step after the point of death, both prune steps included, reports an empty conclusion and never ran.if: always()covers a failed step. It does not cover the runner being killed. So the deploy that consumed the disk was also the deploy whose cleanup never fired, and no post-build step can ever fix that. A precondition as the first step is the only disk guard a timeout or an ENOSPC death cannot skip.Failing before the build is also deliberately preferable to failing halfway. This box holds the Postgres data directory, the storage buckets and the chat data volume. A filesystem that fills during a recreate does not merely abort a deploy, it stops the database accepting writes with containers already half torn down, which is the 2026-08-01 shape. A deploy that never starts leaves the previous stack running and serving.
The change
scripts/check-deploy-disk.sh, called as the first step of both jobs, the only position a job timeout or an ENOSPC death cannot skip.::warning::, printsdocker system df, proceeds.::error::, printsdocker system df, exits 1 before anything builds or connects to the database.migrateis gated as well asdeploy, and the migrate case is the worse one. Postgres answers ENOSPC by panicking and shutting the engine down to protect data integrity, so a migration that runs out of disk mid transaction takes down the stack that is currently serving, where a refused deploy merely leaves the previous stack running. Gating only the build would also let the schema advance while the code matching it never ships.Both non-silent paths name the safe reclaim move and, more importantly, the two unsafe ones:
docker system prune -aanddocker image prune -adelete the rollback images, and volume pruning would take the database, the buckets and the chat data, which still have no off box backup (#1000). A full disk failure is exactly when someone reaches for the biggest hammer available, so the message that surfaces at that moment is the right place to say which hammers are wrong.The floor sits above the observed failure point, not below it. The box had 11 GB free when run 33237021243 died, so a 10 GB floor would have permitted exactly the deploy this exists to stop.
incident-11gis a test case pinning that. For scale, the built images total about 26 GB, of which open-webui alone is 7.4 GB.The floor is overridable through
HIVE_DEPLOY_DISK_FLOOR_GB, fed by a newworkflow_dispatchinput, because a hard floor with no escape hatch can wedge the box: below it nothing deploys, including a change meant to reduce what the box builds. It is deliberately an input rather than anything readable from a commit message, so an ordinary push cannot bypass it.dftargets/var/lib/dockerrather than/, so the check stays correct if the image store is ever moved. The guard sits on this workflow's ownpush.pathsalongside every other script the deploy invokes, so a fix to the guard cannot merge and never reach the box.Test
scripts/test-deploy-disk-gate.shruns the guard script directly withdfanddockerstubbed on PATH, the same trickscripts/test-set-compose-project-name.shuses, so it needs no docker daemon and no real filesystem.Sixteen assertions: both sides of both thresholds, the motivating incident, a
dfthat exits non-zero, adfthat exits 0 with nothing usable, an unsetGITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY, the floor override and the empty override a push-triggered run passes, the three warnings in the failure message, and that both jobs still call the guard.Confirmed it can go red, three ways: inverting the floor comparison
-ltto-gtfails three threshold cases; reverting thedfread to an inline pipeline failsdf-fails; and putting the floor back to 10 failsincident-11g, which is the case that exists because a 10 GB floor would have permitted the deploy that killed the box.wired-into-both-jobsis the assertion that matters for drift: deleting a call site is a one-line diff nothing else would notice, andmigrateis the job where running out of disk is worst.Wired into
Repo policy lints (tenant + audit), a required check, next to the existingtest-set-compose-project-name.shguard. Verified running green and not vacuously passing in an earlier revision (gh api .../jobs/99063678491/logs).What I did to the box, exactly
Before: 83 GB used, 11 GB free, 90 percent. Re-measured at the start of the run: 82 GB used, 12 GB free, 88 percent (a deploy had landed in between).
I removed 13 images by explicit name, never a prune, never
--force. Every one had zero container references and zero references anywhere in the repo tree.That choice is what makes this operation reviewable, and it is not a style preference. Four images on this box are referenced only by a running container's snapshot and do not appear in
docker imagesat all, because a rebuild moved their tag and no image record points at them any more. On 2026-08-29 those were8c48f00a4af0(markitdown),51cfa87934bc(agent-console),b5458df9af29(supabase-db) and60b92cbaffa3(proof-db): four live services, invisible to any inventory a human or a script takes before pruning. No amount of care readingdocker imageswould have protected them.The only thing that reliably does is
docker rmiwithout--force, which refuses to remove an image any container references, running or stopped. Docker itself was the last-line guard behind my analysis, not the analysis alone. A prune, or anrmi --force, has no such backstop, and those four are precisely what it would have cost. That is also whydocker system prune -aanddocker image prune -aare named as forbidden in the guard's own failure message, and why the guard repeats this reasoning in a comment.mcr.microsoft.com/playwright:v1.51.1-noblemcr.microsoft.com/playwright:v1.51.1-jammymcr.microsoft.com/playwright:v1.62.0-jammyghcr.io/berriai/litellm:v1.77.7-stablenode:20golang:1.24-alpinenode:24-alpinenode:22-alpinepython:3.12-alpineredis:7-alpinecurlimages/curl:latestbusybox:1.36alpine/socat:latestAfter the image removals: 67 GB used, 27 GB free, 72 percent.
Later the same day, once the day's deploys had superseded some layers and the box was quiet (no self-hosted job in flight), build cache went from 0 B reclaimable to 5.757 GB reclaimable. I took it with
docker builder prune -f, no-a, so in-use records were never eligible: 22 GB to 25 GB free, cache 29.2 GB to 23.44 GB, reclaimable back to 0 B, images and volumes untouched, all 22 containers still up. Net for the day: 11 GB free to 25 GB free.The deploy that ran after the image reclaim (06:33 UTC) succeeded, against the one before it that died on ENOSPC at 11 GB free. Image store 42.03 GB to 26.01 GB. All 22 running containers still up, same 22 as before, none restarted or recreated.
chat-hive.scubed.co200,console-hive.scubed.co307,api-hive.scubed.co/health{"status":"ok"}.Left alone deliberately:
-awould force a full rebuild for the same nothing.postgres:16-alpine, despite zero container references, becausescripts/stack-psql.shdefaults to it and agents use that on the box.curlimages/curl:8.10.1, referenced by twodocs/proof/*/run.shscripts.hive-toolchain:latest, which backsdocker compose --profile tools run toolchain.hive-web-console-prod:proof683(2.6 GB), a stale one-off proof artifact whose container exited two weeks ago. Removing it needs a container removal first, and the target was already met without it. Worth revisiting as a separate cleanup.What this does not do
It does not close #1098. Two of that issue's acceptance criteria are not met here, and one of its premises no longer holds:
until=24hstep, and today's measurement (0 B reclaimable) shows cache is no longer the growth driver the issue diagnosed on 2026-08-23. That part of the issue can be closed on evidence.control-plane,edge-api,alertmanagerand itself. There is no node-exporter anywhere indeploy/, so host filesystem metrics are not available to alert on. That needs a new container, a new scrape job and deploy wiring, on a box that was at 90 percent an hour ago. It deserves its own change.Buglog entry
{"id":"2026-08-29-demo-box-disk-90pct","date":"2026-08-29","area":"ops/deploy","error_message":"Demo box root filesystem at 90 percent (11 GB free of 98 GB) with deploy-demo-box.yml free to build into the remainder; run 33237021243 (job 99059755081) died at 05:55:11Z with 'Unhandled exception. System.IO.IOException: No space left on device' while the Actions runner was writing its own _diag worker log, reporting failure with an EMPTY failed-steps array because the runner process died rather than a step failing","root_cause":"The deploy job's two cleanup steps (docker image prune -f, docker builder prune -f --filter until=24h) both run only at the END of the job. `if: always()` covers a failed step but not the runner being killed, so a job that dies on ENOSPC or trips timeout-minutes mid build skips both. Separately, neither step targets what actually accumulated: tagged images that no container references and nothing in the repo names (three Playwright versions, superseded litellm, stale node and golang bases, 15 GB total). Dangling images were 0 and build cache was 0 B reclaimable, so both existing prunes were reclaiming approximately nothing.","fix":"Reclaimed 15 GB by removing 13 explicitly named unreferenced images with `docker rmi` (no prune, no --force, so docker refuses anything a container holds), taking the box from 12 GB to 27 GB free with all 22 running containers untouched, then a further 5.757 GB later that day with `docker builder prune -f` (no -a) once deploys had superseded those layers, ending at 25 GB free. Added scripts/check-deploy-disk.sh as the FIRST step of BOTH the migrate and deploy jobs, the only position a job timeout or ENOSPC death cannot skip: warn below 25 GB, hard fail below 15 GB (above the 11 GB at which the incident happened), printing docker system df and naming the unsafe reclaim moves. Floor overridable only via a workflow_dispatch input, never from a commit message. Guarded by scripts/test-deploy-disk-gate.sh in a required CI lane.","tags":["disk","docker","deploy-demo-box","prune","demo-box","timeout","ops"]}🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01WyEwUxZCArdn1ZUDkTvuQ1