Refactor Drone Pipelines to use AWS role assumption#17201
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Backports #17201 Contributes to gravitational/SecOps#213
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* Flip the order of the quay and ecr pipelines These are reversed in master/v11 (ecr first, and then quay) and having the order consistent across branches will make future ports easier. * Add AWS roles to Drone pipelines Backports #17201 Contributes to gravitational/SecOps#213
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This is follow up to #17201, that fixes the buildbox pipeline error seen here: An error occurred (AccessDeniedException) when calling the GetAuthorizationToken operation: User: arn:aws:iam::146628656107:user/teleport_build_user_read_only is not authorized to perform: ecr-public:GetAuthorizationToken on resource: * because no identity-based policy allows the ecr-public:GetAuthorizationToken action Contributes to gravitational/SecOps#213.
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This is follow up to #17201, that fixes the buildbox pipeline error seen here: An error occurred (AccessDeniedException) when calling the GetAuthorizationToken operation: User: arn:aws:iam::146628656107:user/teleport_build_user_read_only is not authorized to perform: ecr-public:GetAuthorizationToken on resource: * because no identity-based policy allows the ecr-public:GetAuthorizationToken action
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This is follow up to #17201, that fixes the buildbox pipeline error seen here: An error occurred (AccessDeniedException) when calling the GetAuthorizationToken operation: User: arn:aws:iam::146628656107:user/teleport_build_user_read_only is not authorized to perform: ecr-public:GetAuthorizationToken on resource: * because no identity-based policy allows the ecr-public:GetAuthorizationToken action
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This is follow up to #17201, that fixes the buildbox pipeline error seen here: An error occurred (AccessDeniedException) when calling the GetAuthorizationToken operation: User: arn:aws:iam::146628656107:user/teleport_build_user_read_only is not authorized to perform: ecr-public:GetAuthorizationToken on resource: * because no identity-based policy allows the ecr-public:GetAuthorizationToken action
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This PR updates our various Drone pipelines to use AWS roles for publishing.
Our AWS FTR requires that we do not use any long lived credentials in our AWS accounts and instead use roles. This means we need to move from attaching policies directly to users to attaching policies to roles and having policyless users assume those roles.
Related Issues & PRs
We created the roles needed in:
And added them to Drone in:
This PR updates the automation to use the new roles, such that we can remove the policies from the users:
Backports:
The corresponding
teleport-pluginsPR is:Contributes to https://github.com/gravitational/SecOps/issues/213
Reviewing
This is a large PR, however the changes are divided into small chunks for easier review.
Because this is a cross cutting change that touches on the past work of many different contributors, I've added your name after a commit if it touches code related to your work -- I'd appreciate it if you'd review at least these parts. Though you're welcome to review more.
Part One - This section includes all drongen changes. The important thing to review here is the drongen go code.
Part Two - This section includes all pipelines that aren't managed by dronegen, and were hand edited. The .drone.yml itself should be reviewed here.
Testing
All tag build changes were tested via
v12.0.0-dev.walt.3here:https://drone.platform.teleport.sh/gravitational/teleport/16273
Most promotion changes were tested off that same tag here:
https://drone.platform.teleport.sh/gravitational/teleport/16277
What wasn't tested from the promote?
All the testing above was performed with all the changes in this branch plus:
make versionupdate commitsSee the following for the diff between what was tested and what is in this branch: walt/role-assumption...walt/role-assumption-test
Notes
I chose to perform role assumption in a different step than the role is used in. This is a bit more verbose, but it is a reasonable simulacra of how we'll handle creds eventually in GitHub actions. Furthermore, it prevents the code using AWS credentials from ever having access to the long lived creds -- it'll only ever see the short lived role sessions. So if someone were to exfiltrate creds with anything short of
drone signed code, they'll only get a short lived session.plugins/s3has been entirely removed, as it didn't seem compatible with pre-assumed roles.