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PR for vgpu-dev #10
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PR for vgpu-dev #10
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Due to a reason that dom0 device tree is a part of system specific configuration they are moved to a meta-demo layer. Signed-off-by: Andrii Anisov <[email protected]>
Retrieve gsx clock (3dge in our case) and enable it to make gsx happy. Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <[email protected]>
The patch clarifies the protocol that is used by the PV keyboard drivers. Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Multi-touch fields re-use the page that is used by the other features which means that you can interleave multi-touch, motion, and key events. Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
This is the ABI for the two halves of a para-virtualized display driver. This protocol aims to provide a unified protocol which fits more sophisticated use-cases than a framebuffer device can handle. At the moment basic functionality is supported with the intention to extend: o multiple dynamically allocated/destroyed framebuffers o buffers of arbitrary sizes o better configuration options including multiple display support Note: existing fbif can be used together with displif running at the same time, e.g. on Linux one provides framebuffer and another DRM/KMS Future extensions to the existing protocol may include: o allow display/connector cloning o allow allocating objects other than display buffers o add planes/overlays support o support scaling o support rotation Note, that this protocol doesn't use ring macros for bi-directional exchange (PV calls/9pfs) bacause: o it statically defines the use of a single page for the ring buffer o it uses direct memory access to ring's contents w/o memory copying o re-uses the same idea that kbdif/fbif use which for this use-case seems to be appropriate ================================================== Rationale for introducing this protocol instead of using the existing fbif: ================================================== 1. In/out event sizes o fbif - 40 octets o displif - 40 octets This is only the initial version of the displif protocol which means that there could be requests which will not fit (WRT introducing some GPU related functionality later on). In that case we cannot alter fbif sizes as we need to be backward compatible an will be forced to handle those apart of fbif. 2. Shared page Displif doesn't use anything like struct xenfb_page, but DEFINE_RING_TYPES(xen_displif, struct xendispl_req, struct xendispl_resp) which is a better and more common way. Output events use a shared page which only has in_cons and in_prod and all the rest is used for incoming events. Here struct xenfb_page could probably be used as is despite the fact that it only has a half of a page for incoming events which is only 50 events. (consider something like 60Hz display) 3. Amount of changes. fbif only provides XENFB_TYPE_UPDATE and XENFB_TYPE_RESIZE events, so it looks like it is easier to get fb support into displif than vice versa. displif at the moment has 6 requests and 1 event, multiple connector support, etc. Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Grytsov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
There are multiple instances of code reading an optional unsigned parameter from Xenstore via xenbus_scanf(). Instead of repeating the same code over and over add a service function doing the job. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <[email protected]>
Use xenbus_read_unsigned() instead of xenbus_scanf() when possible. This requires to change the type of the reads from int to unsigned, but these cases have been wrong before: negative values are not allowed for the modified cases. Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Vrabel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <[email protected]>
Add a parameter for setting the resolution of xen-kbdfront in order to be able to cope with a (virtual) frame buffer of arbitrary resolution. While at it remove the pointless second reading of parameters from Xenstore in the device connection phase: all parameters are available during device probing already and that is where they should be read. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Xen input para-virtual protocol defines string constants used by both back and frontend. Use those instead of explicit strings in the frontend driver. Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <[email protected]>
Extend xen_kbdfront to provide multi-touch support to unprivileged domains. Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <[email protected]>
andr2000
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Dec 22, 2017
Thomas reported that 'perf buildid-list' gets a SEGFAULT due to NULL pointer deref when he ran it on a data with namespace events. It was because the buildid_id__mark_dso_hit_ops lacks the namespace event handler and perf_too__fill_default() didn't set it. Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () Missing separate debuginfos, use: dnf debuginfo-install audit-libs-2.7.7-1.fc25.s390x bzip2-libs-1.0.6-21.fc25.s390x elfutils-libelf-0.169-1.fc25.s390x +elfutils-libs-0.169-1.fc25.s390x libcap-ng-0.7.8-1.fc25.s390x numactl-libs-2.0.11-2.ibm.fc25.s390x openssl-libs-1.1.0e-1.1.ibm.fc25.s390x perl-libs-5.24.1-386.fc25.s390x +python-libs-2.7.13-2.fc25.s390x slang-2.3.0-7.fc25.s390x xz-libs-5.2.3-2.fc25.s390x zlib-1.2.8-10.fc25.s390x (gdb) where #0 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () #1 0x00000000010fad6a in machines__deliver_event (machines=<optimized out>, machines@entry=0x2c6fd18, evlist=<optimized out>, event=event@entry=0x3fffdf00470, sample=0x3ffffffe880, sample@entry=0x3ffffffe888, tool=tool@entry=0x1312968 <build_id.mark_dso_hit_ops>, file_offset=1136) at util/session.c:1287 #2 0x00000000010fbf4e in perf_session__deliver_event (file_offset=1136, tool=0x1312968 <build_id.mark_dso_hit_ops>, sample=0x3ffffffe888, event=0x3fffdf00470, session=0x2c6fc30) at util/session.c:1340 #3 perf_session__process_event (session=0x2c6fc30, session@entry=0x0, event=event@entry=0x3fffdf00470, file_offset=file_offset@entry=1136) at util/session.c:1522 xen-troops#4 0x00000000010fddde in __perf_session__process_events (file_size=11880, data_size=<optimized out>, data_offset=<optimized out>, session=0x0) at util/session.c:1899 xen-troops#5 perf_session__process_events (session=0x0, session@entry=0x2c6fc30) at util/session.c:1953 xen-troops#6 0x000000000103b2ac in perf_session__list_build_ids (with_hits=<optimized out>, force=<optimized out>) at builtin-buildid-list.c:83 xen-troops#7 cmd_buildid_list (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at builtin-buildid-list.c:115 xen-troops#8 0x00000000010a026c in run_builtin (p=0x1311f78 <commands+24>, argc=argc@entry=2, argv=argv@entry=0x3fffffff3c0) at perf.c:296 xen-troops#9 0x000000000102bc00 in handle_internal_command (argv=<optimized out>, argc=2) at perf.c:348 xen-troops#10 run_argv (argcp=<synthetic pointer>, argv=<synthetic pointer>) at perf.c:392 xen-troops#11 main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x3fffffff3c0) at perf.c:536 (gdb) Fix it by adding a stub event handler for namespace event. Committer testing: Further clarifying, plain using 'perf buildid-list' will not end up in a SEGFAULT when processing a perf.data file with namespace info: # perf record -a --namespaces sleep 1 [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 2.024 MB perf.data (1058 samples) ] # perf buildid-list | wc -l 38 # perf buildid-list | head -5 e2a171c7b905826fc8494f0711ba76ab6abbd604 /lib/modules/4.14.0-rc3+/build/vmlinux 874840a02d8f8a31cedd605d0b8653145472ced3 /lib/modules/4.14.0-rc3+/kernel/arch/x86/kvm/kvm-intel.ko ea7223776730cd8a22f320040aae4d54312984bc /lib/modules/4.14.0-rc3+/kernel/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915.ko 5961535e6732a8edb7f22b3f148bb2fa2e0be4b9 /lib/modules/4.14.0-rc3+/kernel/drivers/gpu/drm/drm.ko f045f54aa78cf1931cc893f78b6cbc52c72a8cb1 /usr/lib64/libc-2.25.so # It is only when one asks for checking what of those entries actually had samples, i.e. when we use either -H or --with-hits, that we will process all the PERF_RECORD_ events, and since tools/perf/builtin-buildid-list.c neither explicitely set a perf_tool.namespaces() callback nor the default stub was set that we end up, when processing a PERF_RECORD_NAMESPACE record, causing a SEGFAULT: # perf buildid-list -H Segmentation fault (core dumped) ^C # Reported-and-Tested-by: Thomas-Mich Richter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Hari Bathini <[email protected]> Cc: Hendrik Brueckner <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas-Mich Richter <[email protected]> Fixes: f3b3614 ("perf tools: Add PERF_RECORD_NAMESPACES to include namespaces related info") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
andr2000
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Mar 1, 2018
It was reported by Sergey Senozhatsky that if THP (Transparent Huge Page) and frontswap (via zswap) are both enabled, when memory goes low so that swap is triggered, segfault and memory corruption will occur in random user space applications as follow, kernel: urxvt[338]: segfault at 20 ip 00007fc08889ae0d sp 00007ffc73a7fc40 error 6 in libc-2.26.so[7fc08881a000+1ae000] #0 0x00007fc08889ae0d _int_malloc (libc.so.6) #1 0x00007fc08889c2f3 malloc (libc.so.6) #2 0x0000560e6004bff7 _Z14rxvt_wcstoutf8PKwi (urxvt) #3 0x0000560e6005e75c n/a (urxvt) xen-troops#4 0x0000560e6007d9f1 _ZN16rxvt_perl_interp6invokeEP9rxvt_term9hook_typez (urxvt) xen-troops#5 0x0000560e6003d988 _ZN9rxvt_term9cmd_parseEv (urxvt) xen-troops#6 0x0000560e60042804 _ZN9rxvt_term6pty_cbERN2ev2ioEi (urxvt) xen-troops#7 0x0000560e6005c10f _Z17ev_invoke_pendingv (urxvt) xen-troops#8 0x0000560e6005cb55 ev_run (urxvt) xen-troops#9 0x0000560e6003b9b9 main (urxvt) xen-troops#10 0x00007fc08883af4a __libc_start_main (libc.so.6) xen-troops#11 0x0000560e6003f9da _start (urxvt) After bisection, it was found the first bad commit is bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out"). The root cause is as follows: When the pages are written to swap device during swapping out in swap_writepage(), zswap (fontswap) is tried to compress the pages to improve performance. But zswap (frontswap) will treat THP as a normal page, so only the head page is saved. After swapping in, tail pages will not be restored to their original contents, causing memory corruption in the applications. This is fixed by refusing to save page in the frontswap store functions if the page is a THP. So that the THP will be swapped out to swap device. Another choice is to split THP if frontswap is enabled. But it is found that the frontswap enabling isn't flexible. For example, if CONFIG_ZSWAP=y (cannot be module), frontswap will be enabled even if zswap itself isn't enabled. Frontswap has multiple backends, to make it easy for one backend to enable THP support, the THP checking is put in backend frontswap store functions instead of the general interfaces. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out") Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <[email protected]> Reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Minchan Kim <[email protected]> [put THP checking in backend] Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Streetman <[email protected]> Cc: Seth Jennings <[email protected]> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Cc: Shaohua Li <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]> Cc: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> [4.14] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
andr2000
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Mar 13, 2018
Since commit afcc90f ("usercopy: WARN() on slab cache usercopy region violations"), MIPS systems booting with a compat root filesystem emit a warning when copying compat siginfo to userspace: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 953 at mm/usercopy.c:81 usercopy_warn+0x98/0xe8 Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLAB object 'task_struct' (offset 1432, size 16)! Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 953 Comm: S01logging Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2 xen-troops#10 Stack : ffffffff808c0000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 65ac85163f3bdc4a 65ac85163f3bdc4a 0000000000000000 90000000ff667ab8 ffffffff808c0000 00000000000003f8 ffffffff808d0000 00000000000000d1 0000000000000000 000000000000003c 0000000000000000 ffffffff808c8ca8 ffffffff808d0000 ffffffff808d0000 ffffffff80810000 fffffc0000000000 ffffffff80785c30 0000000000000009 0000000000000051 90000000ff667eb0 90000000ff667db0 000000007fe0d938 0000000000000018 ffffffff80449958 0000000020052798 ffffffff808c0000 90000000ff664000 90000000ff667ab0 00000000100c0000 ffffffff80698810 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff8010d02c 65ac85163f3bdc4a ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff8010d02c>] show_stack+0x9c/0x130 [<ffffffff80698810>] dump_stack+0x90/0xd0 [<ffffffff80137b78>] __warn+0x100/0x118 [<ffffffff80137bdc>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x4c/0x70 [<ffffffff8021e4a8>] usercopy_warn+0x98/0xe8 [<ffffffff8021e68c>] __check_object_size+0xfc/0x250 [<ffffffff801bbfb8>] put_compat_sigset+0x30/0x88 [<ffffffff8011af24>] setup_rt_frame_n32+0xc4/0x160 [<ffffffff8010b8b4>] do_signal+0x19c/0x230 [<ffffffff8010c408>] do_notify_resume+0x60/0x78 [<ffffffff80106f50>] work_notifysig+0x10/0x18 ---[ end trace 88fffbf69147f48a ]--- Commit 5905429 ("fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct") noted that: "While the blocked and saved_sigmask fields of task_struct are copied to userspace (via sigmask_to_save() and setup_rt_frame()), it is always copied with a static length (i.e. sizeof(sigset_t))." However, this is not true in the case of compat signals, whose sigset is copied by put_compat_sigset and receives size as an argument. At most call sites, put_compat_sigset is copying a sigset from the current task_struct. This triggers a warning when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is active. However, by marking this function as static inline, the warning can be avoided because in all of these cases the size is constant at compile time, which is allowed. The only site where this is not the case is handling the rt_sigpending syscall, but there the copy is being made from a stack local variable so does not trigger the warning. Move put_compat_sigset to compat.h, and mark it static inline. This fixes the WARN on MIPS. Fixes: afcc90f ("usercopy: WARN() on slab cache usercopy region violations") Signed-off-by: Matt Redfearn <[email protected]> Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Cc: "Dmitry V . Levin" <[email protected]> Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/18639/ Signed-off-by: James Hogan <[email protected]>
andr2000
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May 23, 2018
syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread xen-troops#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 xen-troops#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] xen-troops#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ xen-troops#26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
andr2000
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to andr2000/linux
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this pull request
Nov 22, 2018
info->nr_rings isn't adjusted in case of ENOMEM error from negotiate_mq(). This leads to kernel panic in error path. Typical call stack involving panic - xen-troops#8 page_fault at ffffffff8175936f [exception RIP: blkif_free_ring+33] RIP: ffffffffa0149491 RSP: ffff8804f7673c08 RFLAGS: 00010292 ... xen-troops#9 blkif_free at ffffffffa0149aaa [xen_blkfront] xen-troops#10 talk_to_blkback at ffffffffa014c8cd [xen_blkfront] xen-troops#11 blkback_changed at ffffffffa014ea8b [xen_blkfront] xen-troops#12 xenbus_otherend_changed at ffffffff81424670 xen-troops#13 backend_changed at ffffffff81426dc3 xen-troops#14 xenwatch_thread at ffffffff81422f29 xen-troops#15 kthread at ffffffff810abe6a xen-troops#16 ret_from_fork at ffffffff81754078 Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 7ed8ce1 ("xen-blkfront: move negotiate_mq to cover all cases of new VBDs") Signed-off-by: Manjunath Patil <[email protected]> Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
andr2000
pushed a commit
to andr2000/linux
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this pull request
Nov 27, 2018
Increase kasan instrumented kernel stack size from 32k to 64k. Other architectures seems to get away with just doubling kernel stack size under kasan, but on s390 this appears to be not enough due to bigger frame size. The particular pain point is kasan inlined checks (CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE vs CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE). With inlined checks one particular case hitting stack overflow is fs sync on xfs filesystem: #0 [9a0681e8] 704 bytes check_usage at 34b1fc #1 [9a0684a8] 432 bytes check_usage at 34c710 #2 [9a068658] 1048 bytes validate_chain at 35044a #3 [9a068a70] 312 bytes __lock_acquire at 3559fe xen-troops#4 [9a068ba8] 440 bytes lock_acquire at 3576ee xen-troops#5 [9a068d60] 104 bytes _raw_spin_lock at 21b44e0 xen-troops#6 [9a068dc8] 1992 bytes enqueue_entity at 2dbf72 xen-troops#7 [9a069590] 1496 bytes enqueue_task_fair at 2df5f0 xen-troops#8 [9a069b68] 64 bytes ttwu_do_activate at 28f438 xen-troops#9 [9a069ba8] 552 bytes try_to_wake_up at 298c4c xen-troops#10 [9a069dd0] 168 bytes wake_up_worker at 23f97c xen-troops#11 [9a069e78] 200 bytes insert_work at 23fc2e xen-troops#12 [9a069f40] 648 bytes __queue_work at 2487c0 xen-troops#13 [9a06a1c8] 200 bytes __queue_delayed_work at 24db28 xen-troops#14 [9a06a290] 248 bytes mod_delayed_work_on at 24de84 xen-troops#15 [9a06a388] 24 bytes kblockd_mod_delayed_work_on at 153e2a0 xen-troops#16 [9a06a3a0] 288 bytes __blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue at 158168c xen-troops#17 [9a06a4c0] 192 bytes blk_mq_run_hw_queue at 1581a3c xen-troops#18 [9a06a580] 184 bytes blk_mq_sched_insert_requests at 15a2192 xen-troops#19 [9a06a638] 1024 bytes blk_mq_flush_plug_list at 1590f3a xen-troops#20 [9a06aa38] 704 bytes blk_flush_plug_list at 1555028 xen-troops#21 [9a06acf8] 320 bytes schedule at 219e476 xen-troops#22 [9a06ae38] 760 bytes schedule_timeout at 21b0aac xen-troops#23 [9a06b130] 408 bytes wait_for_common at 21a1706 xen-troops#24 [9a06b2c8] 360 bytes xfs_buf_iowait at fa1540 xen-troops#25 [9a06b430] 256 bytes __xfs_buf_submit at fadae6 xen-troops#26 [9a06b530] 264 bytes xfs_buf_read_map at fae3f6 xen-troops#27 [9a06b638] 656 bytes xfs_trans_read_buf_map at 10ac9a8 xen-troops#28 [9a06b8c8] 304 bytes xfs_btree_kill_root at e72426 xen-troops#29 [9a06b9f8] 288 bytes xfs_btree_lookup_get_block at e7bc5e xen-troops#30 [9a06bb18] 624 bytes xfs_btree_lookup at e7e1a6 xen-troops#31 [9a06bd88] 2664 bytes xfs_alloc_ag_vextent_near at dfa070 xen-troops#32 [9a06c7f0] 144 bytes xfs_alloc_ag_vextent at dff3ca xen-troops#33 [9a06c880] 1128 bytes xfs_alloc_vextent at e05fce xen-troops#34 [9a06cce8] 584 bytes xfs_bmap_btalloc at e58342 xen-troops#35 [9a06cf30] 1336 bytes xfs_bmapi_write at e618de xen-troops#36 [9a06d468] 776 bytes xfs_iomap_write_allocate at ff678e xen-troops#37 [9a06d770] 720 bytes xfs_map_blocks at f82af8 xen-troops#38 [9a06da40] 928 bytes xfs_writepage_map at f83cd6 xen-troops#39 [9a06dde0] 320 bytes xfs_do_writepage at f85872 xen-troops#40 [9a06df20] 1320 bytes write_cache_pages at 73dfe8 xen-troops#41 [9a06e448] 208 bytes xfs_vm_writepages at f7f892 xen-troops#42 [9a06e518] 88 bytes do_writepages at 73fe6a xen-troops#43 [9a06e570] 872 bytes __writeback_single_inode at a20cb6 xen-troops#44 [9a06e8d8] 664 bytes writeback_sb_inodes at a23be2 xen-troops#45 [9a06eb70] 296 bytes __writeback_inodes_wb at a242e0 xen-troops#46 [9a06ec98] 928 bytes wb_writeback at a2500e xen-troops#47 [9a06f038] 848 bytes wb_do_writeback at a260ae xen-troops#48 [9a06f388] 536 bytes wb_workfn at a28228 xen-troops#49 [9a06f5a0] 1088 bytes process_one_work at 24a234 xen-troops#50 [9a06f9e0] 1120 bytes worker_thread at 24ba26 xen-troops#51 [9a06fe40] 104 bytes kthread at 26545a xen-troops#52 [9a06fea8] kernel_thread_starter at 21b6b62 To be able to increase the stack size to 64k reuse LLILL instruction in __switch_to function to load 64k - STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD - __PT_SIZE (65192) value as unsigned. Reported-by: Benjamin Block <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
andr2000
pushed a commit
to andr2000/linux
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this pull request
Jan 29, 2019
syzbot found that ax25 routes where not properly protected against concurrent use [1]. In this particular report the bug happened while copying ax25->digipeat. Fix this problem by making sure we call ax25_get_route() while ax25_route_lock is held, so that no modification could happen while using the route. The current two ax25_get_route() callers do not sleep, so this change should be fine. Once we do that, ax25_get_route() no longer needs to grab a reference on the found route. [1] ax25_connect(): syz-executor0 uses autobind, please contact [email protected] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kmemdup+0x42/0x60 mm/util.c:113 Read of size 66 at addr ffff888066641a80 by task syz-executor2/531 ax25_connect(): syz-executor0 uses autobind, please contact [email protected] CPU: 1 PID: 531 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ xen-troops#10 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1db/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x24/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130 memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline] kmemdup+0x42/0x60 mm/util.c:113 kmemdup include/linux/string.h:425 [inline] ax25_rt_autobind+0x25d/0x750 net/ax25/ax25_route.c:424 ax25_connect.cold+0x30/0xa4 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:1224 __sys_connect+0x357/0x490 net/socket.c:1664 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1675 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1672 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1672 do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458099 Code: 6d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f870ee22c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458099 RDX: 0000000000000048 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 ax25_connect(): syz-executor4 uses autobind, please contact [email protected] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f870ee236d4 R13: 00000000004be48e R14: 00000000004ce9a8 R15: 00000000ffffffff Allocated by task 526: save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:73 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:496 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:469 kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:504 ax25_connect(): syz-executor5 uses autobind, please contact [email protected] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x151/0x760 mm/slab.c:3609 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline] ax25_rt_add net/ax25/ax25_route.c:95 [inline] ax25_rt_ioctl+0x3b9/0x1270 net/ax25/ax25_route.c:233 ax25_ioctl+0x322/0x10b0 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:1763 sock_do_ioctl+0xe2/0x400 net/socket.c:950 sock_ioctl+0x32f/0x6c0 net/socket.c:1074 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x107b/0x17d0 fs/ioctl.c:696 ksys_ioctl+0xab/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:713 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718 do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe ax25_connect(): syz-executor5 uses autobind, please contact [email protected] Freed by task 550: save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:73 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:458 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:466 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3487 [inline] kfree+0xcf/0x230 mm/slab.c:3806 ax25_rt_add net/ax25/ax25_route.c:92 [inline] ax25_rt_ioctl+0x304/0x1270 net/ax25/ax25_route.c:233 ax25_ioctl+0x322/0x10b0 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:1763 sock_do_ioctl+0xe2/0x400 net/socket.c:950 sock_ioctl+0x32f/0x6c0 net/socket.c:1074 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x107b/0x17d0 fs/ioctl.c:696 ksys_ioctl+0xab/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:713 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718 do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888066641a80 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of 96-byte region [ffff888066641a80, ffff888066641ae0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0001999040 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88812c3f04c0 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000200(slab) ax25_connect(): syz-executor4 uses autobind, please contact [email protected] raw: 01fffc0000000200 ffffea0001817948 ffffea0002341dc8 ffff88812c3f04c0 raw: 0000000000000000 ffff888066641000 0000000100000020 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888066641980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff888066641a00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff888066641a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888066641b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff888066641b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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We see the following NULL pointer dereference while running xfstests generic/475: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 PGD 8000000c84bad067 P4D 8000000c84bad067 PUD c84e62067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 7 PID: 9886 Comm: fsstress Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8 xen-troops#10 RIP: 0010:ext4_do_update_inode+0x4ec/0x760 ... Call Trace: ? jbd2_journal_get_write_access+0x42/0x50 ? __ext4_journal_get_write_access+0x2c/0x70 ? ext4_truncate+0x186/0x3f0 ext4_mark_iloc_dirty+0x61/0x80 ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x62/0x1b0 ext4_truncate+0x186/0x3f0 ? unmap_mapping_pages+0x56/0x100 ext4_setattr+0x817/0x8b0 notify_change+0x1df/0x430 do_truncate+0x5e/0x90 ? generic_permission+0x12b/0x1a0 This is triggered because the NULL pointer handle->h_transaction was dereferenced in function ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(). I found that the h_transaction was set to NULL in jbd2__journal_restart but failed to attached to a new transaction while the journal is aborted. Fix this by checking the handle before updating the inode. Fixes: b436b9b ("ext4: Wait for proper transaction commit on fsync") Signed-off-by: Jiufei Xue <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected]
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…_map Detected via gcc's ASan: Direct leak of 2048 byte(s) in 64 object(s) allocated from: 6 #0 0x7f606512e370 in __interceptor_realloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee370) 7 #1 0x556b0f1d7ddd in thread_map__realloc util/thread_map.c:43 8 #2 0x556b0f1d84c7 in thread_map__new_by_tid util/thread_map.c:85 9 #3 0x556b0f0e045e in is_event_supported util/parse-events.c:2250 10 xen-troops#4 0x556b0f0e1aa1 in print_hwcache_events util/parse-events.c:2382 11 xen-troops#5 0x556b0f0e3231 in print_events util/parse-events.c:2514 12 xen-troops#6 0x556b0ee0a66e in cmd_list /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-list.c:58 13 xen-troops#7 0x556b0f01e0ae in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 14 xen-troops#8 0x556b0f01e859 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 15 xen-troops#9 0x556b0f01edc8 in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 16 xen-troops#10 0x556b0f01f71f in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 17 xen-troops#11 0x7f6062ccf09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Fixes: 8989605 ("perf tools: Do not put a variable sized type not at the end of a struct") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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Detected with gcc's ASan: Direct leak of 66 byte(s) in 5 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7ff3b1f32070 in __interceptor_strdup (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x3b070) #1 0x560c8761034d in collect_config util/config.c:597 #2 0x560c8760d9cb in get_value util/config.c:169 #3 0x560c8760dfd7 in perf_parse_file util/config.c:285 xen-troops#4 0x560c8760e0d2 in perf_config_from_file util/config.c:476 xen-troops#5 0x560c876108fd in perf_config_set__init util/config.c:661 xen-troops#6 0x560c87610c72 in perf_config_set__new util/config.c:709 xen-troops#7 0x560c87610d2f in perf_config__init util/config.c:718 xen-troops#8 0x560c87610e5d in perf_config util/config.c:730 xen-troops#9 0x560c875ddea0 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:442 xen-troops#10 0x7ff3afb8609a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Cc: Taeung Song <[email protected]> Fixes: 20105ca ("perf config: Introduce perf_config_set class") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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…r-free issue The evlist should be destroyed before the perf session. Detected with gcc's ASan: ================================================================= ==27350==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x62b000002e38 at pc 0x5611da276999 bp 0x7ffce8f1d1a0 sp 0x7ffce8f1d190 WRITE of size 8 at 0x62b000002e38 thread T0 #0 0x5611da276998 in __list_del /home/work/linux/tools/include/linux/list.h:89 #1 0x5611da276d4a in __list_del_entry /home/work/linux/tools/include/linux/list.h:102 #2 0x5611da276e77 in list_del_init /home/work/linux/tools/include/linux/list.h:145 #3 0x5611da2781cd in thread__put util/thread.c:130 xen-troops#4 0x5611da2cc0a8 in __thread__zput util/thread.h:68 xen-troops#5 0x5611da2d2dcb in hist_entry__delete util/hist.c:1148 xen-troops#6 0x5611da2cdf91 in hists__delete_entry util/hist.c:337 xen-troops#7 0x5611da2ce19e in hists__delete_entries util/hist.c:365 xen-troops#8 0x5611da2db2ab in hists__delete_all_entries util/hist.c:2639 xen-troops#9 0x5611da2db325 in hists_evsel__exit util/hist.c:2651 xen-troops#10 0x5611da1c5352 in perf_evsel__exit util/evsel.c:1304 xen-troops#11 0x5611da1c5390 in perf_evsel__delete util/evsel.c:1309 xen-troops#12 0x5611da1b35f0 in perf_evlist__purge util/evlist.c:124 xen-troops#13 0x5611da1b38e2 in perf_evlist__delete util/evlist.c:148 xen-troops#14 0x5611da069781 in cmd_top /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1645 xen-troops#15 0x5611da17d038 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 xen-troops#16 0x5611da17d577 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 xen-troops#17 0x5611da17d97b in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 xen-troops#18 0x5611da17e0e9 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 xen-troops#19 0x7fdcc970f09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) xen-troops#20 0x5611d9ff35c9 in _start (/home/work/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x3e95c9) 0x62b000002e38 is located 11320 bytes inside of 27448-byte region [0x62b000000200,0x62b000006d38) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdccb04ab70 in free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xedb70) #1 0x5611da260df4 in perf_session__delete util/session.c:201 #2 0x5611da063de5 in __cmd_top /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1300 #3 0x5611da06973c in cmd_top /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1642 xen-troops#4 0x5611da17d038 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 xen-troops#5 0x5611da17d577 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 xen-troops#6 0x5611da17d97b in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 xen-troops#7 0x5611da17e0e9 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 xen-troops#8 0x7fdcc970f09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdccb04b138 in calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee138) #1 0x5611da26010c in zalloc util/util.h:23 #2 0x5611da260824 in perf_session__new util/session.c:118 #3 0x5611da0633a6 in __cmd_top /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1192 xen-troops#4 0x5611da06973c in cmd_top /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1642 xen-troops#5 0x5611da17d038 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 xen-troops#6 0x5611da17d577 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 xen-troops#7 0x5611da17d97b in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 xen-troops#8 0x5611da17e0e9 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 xen-troops#9 0x7fdcc970f09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /home/work/linux/tools/include/linux/list.h:89 in __list_del Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c567fff8570: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff8580: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff8590: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff85a0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff85b0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd =>0x0c567fff85c0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd[fd]fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff85d0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff85e0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff85f0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff8600: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c567fff8610: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==27350==ABORTING Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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Using gcc's ASan, Changbin reports: ================================================================= ==7494==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 48 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f0333a89138 in calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee138) #1 0x5625e5330a5e in zalloc util/util.h:23 #2 0x5625e5330a9b in perf_counts__new util/counts.c:10 #3 0x5625e5330ca0 in perf_evsel__alloc_counts util/counts.c:47 xen-troops#4 0x5625e520d8e5 in __perf_evsel__read_on_cpu util/evsel.c:1505 xen-troops#5 0x5625e517a985 in perf_evsel__read_on_cpu /home/work/linux/tools/perf/util/evsel.h:347 xen-troops#6 0x5625e517ad1a in test__openat_syscall_event tests/openat-syscall.c:47 xen-troops#7 0x5625e51528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358 xen-troops#8 0x5625e5152baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388 xen-troops#9 0x5625e51543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583 xen-troops#10 0x5625e515572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722 xen-troops#11 0x5625e51c3fb8 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 xen-troops#12 0x5625e51c44f7 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 xen-troops#13 0x5625e51c48fb in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 xen-troops#14 0x5625e51c5069 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 xen-troops#15 0x7f033214d09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) Indirect leak of 72 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f0333a89138 in calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee138) #1 0x5625e532560d in zalloc util/util.h:23 #2 0x5625e532566b in xyarray__new util/xyarray.c:10 #3 0x5625e5330aba in perf_counts__new util/counts.c:15 xen-troops#4 0x5625e5330ca0 in perf_evsel__alloc_counts util/counts.c:47 xen-troops#5 0x5625e520d8e5 in __perf_evsel__read_on_cpu util/evsel.c:1505 xen-troops#6 0x5625e517a985 in perf_evsel__read_on_cpu /home/work/linux/tools/perf/util/evsel.h:347 xen-troops#7 0x5625e517ad1a in test__openat_syscall_event tests/openat-syscall.c:47 xen-troops#8 0x5625e51528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358 xen-troops#9 0x5625e5152baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388 xen-troops#10 0x5625e51543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583 xen-troops#11 0x5625e515572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722 xen-troops#12 0x5625e51c3fb8 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 xen-troops#13 0x5625e51c44f7 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 xen-troops#14 0x5625e51c48fb in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 xen-troops#15 0x5625e51c5069 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 xen-troops#16 0x7f033214d09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) His patch took care of evsel->prev_raw_counts, but the above backtraces are about evsel->counts, so fix that instead. Reported-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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Apr 4, 2019
…_event_on_all_cpus test ================================================================= ==7497==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f0333a88f30 in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xedf30) #1 0x5625e5326213 in cpu_map__trim_new util/cpumap.c:45 #2 0x5625e5326703 in cpu_map__read util/cpumap.c:103 #3 0x5625e53267ef in cpu_map__read_all_cpu_map util/cpumap.c:120 xen-troops#4 0x5625e5326915 in cpu_map__new util/cpumap.c:135 xen-troops#5 0x5625e517b355 in test__openat_syscall_event_on_all_cpus tests/openat-syscall-all-cpus.c:36 xen-troops#6 0x5625e51528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358 xen-troops#7 0x5625e5152baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388 xen-troops#8 0x5625e51543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583 xen-troops#9 0x5625e515572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722 xen-troops#10 0x5625e51c3fb8 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 xen-troops#11 0x5625e51c44f7 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 xen-troops#12 0x5625e51c48fb in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 xen-troops#13 0x5625e51c5069 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 xen-troops#14 0x7f033214d09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Fixes: f30a79b ("perf tools: Add reference counting for cpu_map object") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
andr2000
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Apr 4, 2019
================================================================= ==7506==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 13 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f03339d6070 in __interceptor_strdup (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x3b070) #1 0x5625e53aaef0 in expr__find_other util/expr.y:221 #2 0x5625e51bcd3f in test__expr tests/expr.c:52 #3 0x5625e51528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358 xen-troops#4 0x5625e5152baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388 xen-troops#5 0x5625e51543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583 xen-troops#6 0x5625e515572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722 xen-troops#7 0x5625e51c3fb8 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 xen-troops#8 0x5625e51c44f7 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 xen-troops#9 0x5625e51c48fb in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 xen-troops#10 0x5625e51c5069 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 xen-troops#11 0x7f033214d09a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Fixes: 0751673 ("perf tools: Add a simple expression parser for JSON") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
andr2000
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Apr 4, 2019
================================================================= ==20875==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 1160 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f1b6fc84138 in calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xee138) #1 0x55bd50005599 in zalloc util/util.h:23 #2 0x55bd500068f5 in perf_evsel__newtp_idx util/evsel.c:327 #3 0x55bd4ff810fc in perf_evsel__newtp /home/work/linux/tools/perf/util/evsel.h:216 xen-troops#4 0x55bd4ff81608 in test__perf_evsel__tp_sched_test tests/evsel-tp-sched.c:69 xen-troops#5 0x55bd4ff528e6 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:358 xen-troops#6 0x55bd4ff52baf in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:388 xen-troops#7 0x55bd4ff543fe in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:583 xen-troops#8 0x55bd4ff5572f in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:722 xen-troops#9 0x55bd4ffc4087 in run_builtin /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:302 xen-troops#10 0x55bd4ffc45c6 in handle_internal_command /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:354 xen-troops#11 0x55bd4ffc49ca in run_argv /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:398 xen-troops#12 0x55bd4ffc5138 in main /home/changbin/work/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:520 xen-troops#13 0x7f1b6e34809a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2409a) Indirect leak of 19 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f1b6fc83f30 in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xedf30) #1 0x7f1b6e3ac30f in vasprintf (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x8830f) Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Fixes: 6a6cd11 ("perf test: Add test for the sched tracepoint format fields") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
arminn
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Nov 28, 2019
syzbot hit the following crash on upstream commit 83beed7 (Fri Apr 20 17:56:32 2018 +0000) Merge branch 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/evalenti/linux-soc-thermal syzbot dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d154ec99402c6f628887 C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?id=5414336294027264 syzkaller reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?id=5471683234234368 Raw console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?id=5436660795834368 Kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?id=1808800213120130118 compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental) IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit: Reported-by: [email protected] It will help syzbot understand when the bug is fixed. See footer for details. If you forward the report, please keep this part and the footer. F2FS-fs (loop0): Magic Mismatch, valid(0xf2f52010) - read(0x0) F2FS-fs (loop0): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 1th superblock F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/node.c:1185! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 4549 Comm: syzkaller704305 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc1+ #10 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:__get_node_page+0xb68/0x16e0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1185 RSP: 0018:ffff8801d960e820 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffff8801d88205c0 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: ffffffff82f6cc06 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff82f6d5e8 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: ffff8801d960ec30 R08: ffff8801d88205c0 R09: ffffed003b5e46c2 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8801a86e00c0 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8801a86e0530 R15: ffff8801d9745240 FS: 000000000072c880(0000) GS:ffff8801daf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f3d403209b8 CR3: 00000001d8f3f000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: get_node_page fs/f2fs/node.c:1237 [inline] truncate_xattr_node+0x152/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1014 remove_inode_page+0x200/0xaf0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1039 f2fs_evict_inode+0xe86/0x1710 fs/f2fs/inode.c:547 evict+0x4a6/0x960 fs/inode.c:557 iput_final fs/inode.c:1519 [inline] iput+0x62d/0xa80 fs/inode.c:1545 f2fs_fill_super+0x5f4e/0x7bf0 fs/f2fs/super.c:2849 mount_bdev+0x30c/0x3e0 fs/super.c:1164 f2fs_mount+0x34/0x40 fs/f2fs/super.c:3020 mount_fs+0xae/0x328 fs/super.c:1267 vfs_kern_mount.part.34+0xd4/0x4d0 fs/namespace.c:1037 vfs_kern_mount fs/namespace.c:1027 [inline] do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2518 [inline] do_mount+0x564/0x3070 fs/namespace.c:2848 ksys_mount+0x12d/0x140 fs/namespace.c:3064 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3078 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3075 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3075 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x443dea RSP: 002b:00007ffcc7882368 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000c00 RCX: 0000000000443dea RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007ffcc7882370 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000020016a00 R09: 000000000000000a R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 0000000000402ce0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 RIP: __get_node_page+0xb68/0x16e0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1185 RSP: ffff8801d960e820 ---[ end trace 4edbeb71f002bb76 ]--- Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
arminn
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Nov 28, 2019
This patch enhances sanity check for SIT entries. syzbot hit the following crash on upstream commit 83beed7 (Fri Apr 20 17:56:32 2018 +0000) Merge branch 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/evalenti/linux-soc-thermal syzbot dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=bf9253040425feb155ad syzkaller reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?id=5692130282438656 Raw console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?id=5095924598571008 Kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?id=1808800213120130118 compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental) IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit: Reported-by: [email protected] It will help syzbot understand when the bug is fixed. See footer for details. If you forward the report, please keep this part and the footer. F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value F2FS-fs (loop0): Try to recover 1th superblock, ret: 0 F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = d F2FS-fs (loop0): Bitmap was wrongly cleared, blk:9740 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:1884! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 4508 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc1+ #10 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:update_sit_entry+0x1215/0x1590 fs/f2fs/segment.c:1882 RSP: 0018:ffff8801af526708 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: ffffed0035ea4cc0 RBX: ffff8801ad454f90 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff82eeb87e RDI: ffffed0035ea4cb6 RBP: ffff8801af526760 R08: ffff8801ad4a2480 R09: ffffed003b5e4f90 R10: ffffed003b5e4f90 R11: ffff8801daf27c87 R12: ffff8801adb8d380 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: 00000000ffffffff FS: 00000000014af940(0000) GS:ffff8801daf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f06bc223000 CR3: 00000001adb02000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: allocate_data_block+0x66f/0x2050 fs/f2fs/segment.c:2663 do_write_page+0x105/0x1b0 fs/f2fs/segment.c:2727 write_node_page+0x129/0x350 fs/f2fs/segment.c:2770 __write_node_page+0x7da/0x1370 fs/f2fs/node.c:1398 sync_node_pages+0x18cf/0x1eb0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1652 block_operations+0x429/0xa60 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1088 write_checkpoint+0x3ba/0x5380 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1405 f2fs_sync_fs+0x2fb/0x6a0 fs/f2fs/super.c:1077 __sync_filesystem fs/sync.c:39 [inline] sync_filesystem+0x265/0x310 fs/sync.c:67 generic_shutdown_super+0xd7/0x520 fs/super.c:429 kill_block_super+0xa4/0x100 fs/super.c:1191 kill_f2fs_super+0x9f/0xd0 fs/f2fs/super.c:3030 deactivate_locked_super+0x97/0x100 fs/super.c:316 deactivate_super+0x188/0x1b0 fs/super.c:347 cleanup_mnt+0xbf/0x160 fs/namespace.c:1174 __cleanup_mnt+0x16/0x20 fs/namespace.c:1181 task_work_run+0x1e4/0x290 kernel/task_work.c:113 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:191 [inline] exit_to_usermode_loop+0x2bd/0x310 arch/x86/entry/common.c:166 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline] syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:265 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x6ac/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x457d97 RSP: 002b:00007ffd46f9c8e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000457d97 RDX: 00000000014b09a3 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 00007ffd46f9da50 RBP: 00007ffd46f9da50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000009 R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000014b0940 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 000000000000658e RIP: update_sit_entry+0x1215/0x1590 fs/f2fs/segment.c:1882 RSP: ffff8801af526708 ---[ end trace f498328bb02610a2 ]--- Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
andr2000
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Aug 13, 2020
I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I was using the tep_parse_format function: Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe) #1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985 #2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140 #3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206 xen-troops#4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291 xen-troops#5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299 xen-troops#6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849 xen-troops#7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161 xen-troops#8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207 xen-troops#9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786 xen-troops#10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285 xen-troops#11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369 xen-troops#12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335 xen-troops#13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389 xen-troops#14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431 xen-troops#15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251 xen-troops#16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284 xen-troops#17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593 xen-troops#18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727 xen-troops#19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048 xen-troops#20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127 xen-troops#21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152 xen-troops#22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252 xen-troops#23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347 xen-troops#24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461 xen-troops#25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673 xen-troops#26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before calling the read_token function. Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the leak. Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
varder
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Jun 8, 2021
We hit this issue in our internal test. When enabling generic kasan, a kfree()'d object is put into per-cpu quarantine first. If the cpu goes offline, object still remains in the per-cpu quarantine. If we call kmem_cache_destroy() now, slub will report "Objects remaining" error. ============================================================================= BUG test_module_slab (Not tainted): Objects remaining in test_module_slab on __kmem_cache_shutdown() ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=34 used=1 fp=0x(____ptrval____) flags=0x2ffff00000010200 CPU: 3 PID: 176 Comm: cat Tainted: G B 5.10.0-rc1-00007-g4525c8781ec0-dirty xen-troops#10 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2b0 show_stack+0x18/0x68 dump_stack+0xfc/0x168 slab_err+0xac/0xd4 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x1e4/0x3c8 kmem_cache_destroy+0x68/0x130 test_version_show+0x84/0xf0 module_attr_show+0x40/0x60 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x128/0x1c0 kernfs_seq_show+0xa0/0xb8 seq_read+0x1f0/0x7e8 kernfs_fop_read+0x70/0x338 vfs_read+0xe4/0x250 ksys_read+0xc8/0x180 __arm64_sys_read+0x44/0x58 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xac/0x228 do_el0_svc+0x38/0xa0 el0_sync_handler+0x170/0x178 el0_sync+0x174/0x180 INFO: Object 0x(____ptrval____) @offset=15848 INFO: Allocated in test_version_show+0x98/0xf0 age=8188 cpu=6 pid=172 stack_trace_save+0x9c/0xd0 set_track+0x64/0xf0 alloc_debug_processing+0x104/0x1a0 ___slab_alloc+0x628/0x648 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x2c/0x58 kmem_cache_alloc+0x560/0x588 test_version_show+0x98/0xf0 module_attr_show+0x40/0x60 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x128/0x1c0 kernfs_seq_show+0xa0/0xb8 seq_read+0x1f0/0x7e8 kernfs_fop_read+0x70/0x338 vfs_read+0xe4/0x250 ksys_read+0xc8/0x180 __arm64_sys_read+0x44/0x58 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xac/0x228 kmem_cache_destroy test_module_slab: Slab cache still has objects Register a cpu hotplug function to remove all objects in the offline per-cpu quarantine when cpu is going offline. Set a per-cpu variable to indicate this cpu is offline. [[email protected]: fix slab double free when cpu-hotplug] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ying Lee <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zqiang <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Reported-by: Guangye Yang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Matthias Brugger <[email protected]> Cc: Nicholas Tang <[email protected]> Cc: Miles Chen <[email protected]> Cc: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
arminn
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Aug 9, 2021
…tances commit cad83c9 upstream. As syzbot reported, there is an use-after-free issue during f2fs recovery: Use-after-free write at 0xffff88823bc16040 (in kfence-xen-troops#10): kmem_cache_destroy+0x1f/0x120 mm/slab_common.c:486 f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x75b0/0x8380 fs/f2fs/recovery.c:869 f2fs_fill_super+0x9393/0xa420 fs/f2fs/super.c:3945 mount_bdev+0x26c/0x3a0 fs/super.c:1367 legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592 vfs_get_tree+0x86/0x270 fs/super.c:1497 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2905 [inline] path_mount+0x196f/0x2be0 fs/namespace.c:3235 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3248 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3456 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x2f9/0x3b0 fs/namespace.c:3433 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The root cause is multi f2fs filesystem instances can race on accessing global fsync_entry_slab pointer, result in use-after-free issue of slab cache, fixes to init/destroy this slab cache only once during module init/destroy procedure to avoid this issue. Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Nov 22, 2021
The exit function fixes a memory leak with the src field as detected by leak sanitizer. An example of which is: Indirect leak of 25133184 byte(s) in 207 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f199ecfe987 in __interceptor_calloc libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x55defe638224 in annotated_source__alloc_histograms util/annotate.c:803 #2 0x55defe6397e4 in symbol__hists util/annotate.c:952 xen-troops#3 0x55defe639908 in symbol__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:968 xen-troops#4 0x55defe63aa29 in hist_entry__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:1119 xen-troops#5 0x55defe499a79 in hist_iter__report_callback tools/perf/builtin-report.c:182 xen-troops#6 0x55defe7a859d in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1236 xen-troops#7 0x55defe49aa63 in process_sample_event tools/perf/builtin-report.c:315 xen-troops#8 0x55defe731bc8 in evlist__deliver_sample util/session.c:1473 xen-troops#9 0x55defe731e38 in machines__deliver_event util/session.c:1510 xen-troops#10 0x55defe732a23 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1590 xen-troops#11 0x55defe72951e in ordered_events__deliver_event util/session.c:183 xen-troops#12 0x55defe740082 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:244 xen-troops#13 0x55defe7407cb in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:323 xen-troops#14 0x55defe740a61 in ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:341 xen-troops#15 0x55defe73837f in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2390 xen-troops#16 0x55defe7385ff in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2420 ... Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: James Clark <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Kajol Jain <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Martin Liška <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
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Mar 15, 2022
When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already removed. [ 755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called [ 756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called ... [ 757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 758.031397] IP: [<ffffffff8ee11acb>] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280 crash> bt ... PID: 12649 TASK: ffff8924108f2100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "amsd" ... xen-troops#9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778 [exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab] RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb RSP: ffff89240e1a3968 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff89243d874100 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff89243d874090 RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0 R8: 000000000001f080 R9: ffff8905ffc03c00 R10: ffffffffc04680d4 R11: ffffffff8edde9fd R12: 00000000000080d0 R13: ffff89243d874090 R14: ffff89243d874080 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 xen-troops#10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core] xen-troops#11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core] xen-troops#12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core] xen-troops#13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core] xen-troops#14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core] xen-troops#15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core] xen-troops#16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core] xen-troops#17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46 xen-troops#18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208 xen-troops#19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3 xen-troops#20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf xen-troops#21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596 xen-troops#22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10 xen-troops#23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5 xen-troops#24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff xen-troops#25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f xen-troops#26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92 crash> net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000 state = 0x5 (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER) To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present. Signed-off-by: suresh kumar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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May 5, 2022
Either mount(2) or automount might not have server->origin_fullpath set yet while refresh_cache_worker() is attempting to refresh DFS referrals. Add missing NULL check and locking around it. This fixes bellow crash: [ 1070.276835] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 1070.277676] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] [ 1070.278219] CPU: 1 PID: 8506 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc3 xen-troops#10 [ 1070.278701] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 1070.279495] Workqueue: cifs-dfscache refresh_cache_worker [cifs] [ 1070.280044] RIP: 0010:strcasecmp+0x34/0x150 [ 1070.280359] Code: 00 00 00 fc ff df 41 54 55 48 89 fd 53 48 83 ec 10 eb 03 4c 89 fe 48 89 ef 48 83 c5 01 48 89 f8 48 89 fa 48 c1 e8 03 83 e2 07 <42> 0f b6 04 28 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 bc 00 00 00 0f b6 45 ff 44 [ 1070.281729] RSP: 0018:ffffc90008367958 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 1070.282114] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1070.282691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 1070.283273] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff873eda27 [ 1070.283857] R10: ffffc900083679a0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88812624c000 [ 1070.284436] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88810e6e9a88 R15: ffff888119bb9000 [ 1070.284990] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888151200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1070.285625] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1070.286100] CR2: 0000561a4d922418 CR3: 000000010aecc000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 1070.286683] Call Trace: [ 1070.286890] <TASK> [ 1070.287070] refresh_cache_worker+0x895/0xd20 [cifs] [ 1070.287475] ? __refresh_tcon.isra.0+0xfb0/0xfb0 [cifs] [ 1070.287905] ? __lock_acquire+0xcd1/0x6960 [ 1070.288247] ? is_dynamic_key+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 1070.288591] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410 [ 1070.289012] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0 [ 1070.289318] process_one_work+0x7bd/0x12d0 [ 1070.289637] ? worker_thread+0x160/0xec0 [ 1070.289970] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x230/0x230 [ 1070.290318] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x5e/0x90 [ 1070.290619] worker_thread+0x5ac/0xec0 [ 1070.290891] ? process_one_work+0x12d0/0x12d0 [ 1070.291199] kthread+0x2a5/0x350 [ 1070.291430] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 1070.291770] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 1070.292050] </TASK> [ 1070.292223] Modules linked in: bpfilter cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 [ 1070.292765] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 1070.293108] RIP: 0010:strcasecmp+0x34/0x150 [ 1070.293471] Code: 00 00 00 fc ff df 41 54 55 48 89 fd 53 48 83 ec 10 eb 03 4c 89 fe 48 89 ef 48 83 c5 01 48 89 f8 48 89 fa 48 c1 e8 03 83 e2 07 <42> 0f b6 04 28 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 bc 00 00 00 0f b6 45 ff 44 [ 1070.297718] RSP: 0018:ffffc90008367958 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 1070.298622] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1070.299428] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 1070.300296] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff873eda27 [ 1070.301204] R10: ffffc900083679a0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88812624c000 [ 1070.301932] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88810e6e9a88 R15: ffff888119bb9000 [ 1070.302645] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888151200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1070.303462] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1070.304131] CR2: 0000561a4d922418 CR3: 000000010aecc000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 1070.305004] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 1070.305711] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 1070.305971] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
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Oct 5, 2022
A transaction of type BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_HANDLE can fail to increment the reference for a node. In this case, the target proc normally releases the failed reference upon close as expected. However, if the target is dying in parallel the call will race with binder_deferred_release(), so the target could have released all of its references by now leaving the cleanup of the new failed reference unhandled. The transaction then ends and the target proc gets released making the ref->proc now a dangling pointer. Later on, ref->node is closed and we attempt to take spin_lock(&ref->proc->inner_lock), which leads to the use-after-free bug reported below. Let's fix this by cleaning up the failed reference on the spot instead of relying on the target to do so. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xa8/0x150 Write of size 4 at addr ffff5ca207094238 by task kworker/1:0/590 CPU: 1 PID: 590 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8 xen-troops#10 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: events binder_deferred_func Call trace: dump_backtrace.part.0+0x1d0/0x1e0 show_stack+0x18/0x70 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 print_report+0x2e4/0x61c kasan_report+0xa4/0x110 kasan_check_range+0xfc/0x1a4 __kasan_check_write+0x3c/0x50 _raw_spin_lock+0xa8/0x150 binder_deferred_func+0x5e0/0x9b0 process_one_work+0x38c/0x5f0 worker_thread+0x9c/0x694 kthread+0x188/0x190 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Acked-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 4.14+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Oct 5, 2022
Fix the following scenario: 1. ethtool -L $IFACE rx 8 tx 96 2. xdpsock -q 10 -t -z Above refers to a case where user would like to attach XSK socket in txonly mode at a queue id that does not have a corresponding Rx queue. At this moment ice's XSK logic is tightly bound to act on a "queue pair", e.g. both Tx and Rx queues at a given queue id are disabled/enabled and both of them will get XSK pool assigned, which is broken for the presented queue configuration. This results in the splat included at the bottom, which is basically an OOB access to Rx ring array. To fix this, allow using the ids only in scope of "combined" queues reported by ethtool. However, logic should be rewritten to allow such configurations later on, which would end up as a complete rewrite of the control path, so let us go with this temporary fix. [420160.558008] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000082 [420160.566359] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [420160.572657] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [420160.579002] PGD 0 P4D 0 [420160.582756] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [420160.588396] CPU: 10 PID: 21232 Comm: xdpsock Tainted: G OE 5.19.0-rc7+ xen-troops#10 [420160.597893] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 [420160.609894] RIP: 0010:ice_xsk_pool_setup+0x44/0x7d0 [ice] [420160.616968] Code: f3 48 83 ec 40 48 8b 4f 20 48 8b 3f 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 38 31 c0 48 8d 04 ed 00 00 00 00 48 01 c1 48 8b 11 <0f> b7 92 82 00 00 00 48 85 d2 0f 84 2d 75 00 00 48 8d 72 ff 48 85 [420160.639421] RSP: 0018:ffffc9002d2afd48 EFLAGS: 00010282 [420160.646650] RAX: 0000000000000050 RBX: ffff88811d8bdd00 RCX: ffff888112c14ff8 [420160.655893] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88811d8bdd00 RDI: ffff888109861000 [420160.665166] RBP: 000000000000000a R08: 000000000000000a R09: 0000000000000000 [420160.674493] R10: 000000000000889f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000000a [420160.683833] R13: 000000000000000a R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888117611828 [420160.693211] FS: 00007fa869fc1f80(0000) GS:ffff8897e0880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [420160.703645] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [420160.711783] CR2: 0000000000000082 CR3: 00000001d076c001 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [420160.721399] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [420160.731045] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [420160.740707] PKRU: 55555554 [420160.745960] Call Trace: [420160.750962] <TASK> [420160.755597] ? kmalloc_large_node+0x79/0x90 [420160.762703] ? __kmalloc_node+0x3f5/0x4b0 [420160.769341] xp_assign_dev+0xfd/0x210 [420160.775661] ? shmem_file_read_iter+0x29a/0x420 [420160.782896] xsk_bind+0x152/0x490 [420160.788943] __sys_bind+0xd0/0x100 [420160.795097] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x20/0x120 [420160.802801] __x64_sys_bind+0x16/0x20 [420160.809298] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [420160.815741] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [420160.823731] RIP: 0033:0x7fa86a0dd2fb [420160.830264] Code: c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 15 69 8b 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bc 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 31 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 3d 8b 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [420160.855410] RSP: 002b:00007ffc1146f618 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031 [420160.866366] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fa86a0dd2fb [420160.876957] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00007ffc1146f680 RDI: 0000000000000003 [420160.887604] RBP: 000055d7113a0520 R08: 00007fa868fb8000 R09: 0000000080000000 [420160.898293] R10: 0000000000008001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055d7113a04e0 [420160.909038] R13: 000055d7113a0320 R14: 000000000000000a R15: 0000000000000000 [420160.919817] </TASK> [420160.925659] Modules linked in: ice(OE) af_packet binfmt_misc nls_iso8859_1 ipmi_ssif intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp mei_me coretemp ioatdma mei ipmi_si wmi ipmi_msghandler acpi_pad acpi_power_meter ip_tables x_tables autofs4 ixgbe i40e crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd ahci mdio dca libahci lpc_ich [last unloaded: ice] [420160.977576] CR2: 0000000000000082 [420160.985037] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [420161.097724] RIP: 0010:ice_xsk_pool_setup+0x44/0x7d0 [ice] [420161.107341] Code: f3 48 83 ec 40 48 8b 4f 20 48 8b 3f 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 38 31 c0 48 8d 04 ed 00 00 00 00 48 01 c1 48 8b 11 <0f> b7 92 82 00 00 00 48 85 d2 0f 84 2d 75 00 00 48 8d 72 ff 48 85 [420161.134741] RSP: 0018:ffffc9002d2afd48 EFLAGS: 00010282 [420161.144274] RAX: 0000000000000050 RBX: ffff88811d8bdd00 RCX: ffff888112c14ff8 [420161.155690] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88811d8bdd00 RDI: ffff888109861000 [420161.168088] RBP: 000000000000000a R08: 000000000000000a R09: 0000000000000000 [420161.179295] R10: 000000000000889f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000000a [420161.190420] R13: 000000000000000a R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888117611828 [420161.201505] FS: 00007fa869fc1f80(0000) GS:ffff8897e0880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [420161.213628] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [420161.223413] CR2: 0000000000000082 CR3: 00000001d076c001 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [420161.234653] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [420161.245893] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [420161.257052] PKRU: 55555554 Fixes: 2d4238f ("ice: Add support for AF_XDP") Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]> Tested-by: George Kuruvinakunnel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
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This must be #9 without device trees and config changes.