Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Add zero-copy driver #37

Merged
merged 8 commits into from
Apr 25, 2018
Merged

Conversation

andr2000
Copy link
Collaborator

This pull request adds Xen zero-copy driver: for that, backport of DRM xen-front driver is also required
(to keep consistency).

Oleksandr Andrushchenko and others added 8 commits April 23, 2018 16:38
With fixes for 4.14

It is possible that drm_simple_kms_plane_atomic_check called
with no CRTC set, e.g. when user-space application sets CRTC_ID/FB_ID
to 0 before doing any actual drawing. This leads to NULL pointer
dereference because in this case new CRTC state is NULL and must be
checked before accessing.

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Use srcu to protect drm_device.unplugged in a race free manner.
Drivers can use drm_dev_enter()/drm_dev_exit() to protect and mark
sections preventing access to device resources that are not available
after the device is gone.

Suggested-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Noralf Trønnes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
The PL111 needs to filter valid modes based on memory bandwidth.
I guess it is a pretty simple operation, so we can still claim
the DRM KMS helper pipeline is simple after adding this (optional)
vtable callback.

Reviewed-by: Eric Anholt <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
tinydrm enable hook wants to play around with the new fb in
.atomic_enable(), thus we'll need access to the plane state.

Performed with coccinelle:
@r1@
identifier F =~ ".*enable$";
identifier P, CS;
@@
F(
	struct drm_simple_display_pipe *P
	,struct drm_crtc_state *CS
+	,struct drm_plane_state *plane_state
	)
{
...
}

@@
struct drm_simple_display_pipe *P;
expression E;
@@
{
+ struct drm_plane *plane;
...
+ plane = &P->plane;
P->funcs->enable(P
		,E
+		,plane->state
	);
...
}

@@
identifier P, CS;
@@
struct drm_simple_display_pipe_funcs {
...
        void (*enable)(struct drm_simple_display_pipe *P
	     		,struct drm_crtc_state *CS
+			,struct drm_plane_state *plane_state
		);
...
};

v2: Pimp the commit message (David)

Cc: Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Anholt <[email protected]>
Cc: David Lechner <[email protected]>
Cc: "Noralf Trønnes" <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Noralf Trønnes <[email protected]>
We do not want the common dma_configure() pathway to apply
indiscriminately to all devices, since there are plenty of buses which
do not have DMA capability, and if their child devices were used for
DMA API calls it would only be indicative of a driver bug. However,
there are a number of buses for which DMA is implicitly expected even
when not described by firmware - those we whitelist with an automatic
opt-in to dma_configure(), assuming that the DMA address space and the
physical address space are equivalent if not otherwise specified.

Commit 7232888 ("of: restrict DMA configuration") introduced a
short-term fix by comparing explicit bus types, but this approach is far
from pretty, doesn't scale well, and fails to cope at all with bus
drivers which may be built as modules, like host1x. Let's refine things
by making that opt-in a property of the bus type, which neatly addresses
those problems and lets the decision of whether firmware description of
DMA capability should be optional or mandatory stay internal to the bus
drivers themselves.

Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Thierry Reding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Add support for Xen para-virtualized frontend display driver.
Accompanying backend [1] is implemented as a user-space application
and its helper library [2], capable of running as a Weston client
or DRM master.
Configuration of both backend and frontend is done via
Xen guest domain configuration options [3].

Driver limitations:
 1. Only primary plane without additional properties is supported.
 2. Only one video mode supported which resolution is configured
    via XenStore.
 3. All CRTCs operate at fixed frequency of 60Hz.

1. Implement Xen bus state machine for the frontend driver according to
the state diagram and recovery flow from display para-virtualized
protocol: xen/interface/io/displif.h.

2. Read configuration values from Xen store according
to xen/interface/io/displif.h protocol:
  - read connector(s) configuration
  - read buffer allocation mode (backend/frontend)

3. Handle Xen event channels:
  - create for all configured connectors and publish
    corresponding ring references and event channels in Xen store,
    so backend can connect
  - implement event channels interrupt handlers
  - create and destroy event channels with respect to Xen bus state

4. Implement shared buffer handling according to the
para-virtualized display device protocol at xen/interface/io/displif.h:
  - handle page directories according to displif protocol:
    - allocate and share page directories
    - grant references to the required set of pages for the
      page directory
  - allocate xen balllooned pages via Xen balloon driver
    with alloc_xenballooned_pages/free_xenballooned_pages
  - grant references to the required set of pages for the
    shared buffer itself
  - implement pages map/unmap for the buffers allocated by the
    backend (gnttab_map_refs/gnttab_unmap_refs)

5. Implement kernel modesetiing/connector handling using
DRM simple KMS helper pipeline:

- implement KMS part of the driver with the help of DRM
  simple pipepline helper which is possible due to the fact
  that the para-virtualized driver only supports a single
  (primary) plane:
  - initialize connectors according to XenStore configuration
  - handle frame done events from the backend
  - create and destroy frame buffers and propagate those
    to the backend
  - propagate set/reset mode configuration to the backend on display
    enable/disable callbacks
  - send page flip request to the backend and implement logic for
    reporting backend IO errors on prepare fb callback

- implement virtual connector handling:
  - support only pixel formats suitable for single plane modes
  - make sure the connector is always connected
  - support a single video mode as per para-virtualized driver
    configuration

6. Implement GEM handling depending on driver mode of operation:
depending on the requirements for the para-virtualized environment,
namely requirements dictated by the accompanying DRM/(v)GPU drivers
running in both host and guest environments, number of operating
modes of para-virtualized display driver are supported:
 - display buffers can be allocated by either
   frontend driver or backend
 - display buffers can be allocated to be contiguous
   in memory or not

Note! Frontend driver itself has no dependency on contiguous memory for
its operation.

6.1. Buffers allocated by the frontend driver.

The below modes of operation are configured at compile-time via
frontend driver's kernel configuration.

6.1.1. Front driver configured to use GEM CMA helpers
     This use-case is useful when used with accompanying DRM/vGPU driver
     in guest domain which was designed to only work with contiguous
     buffers, e.g. DRM driver based on GEM CMA helpers: such drivers can
     only import contiguous PRIME buffers, thus requiring frontend driver
     to provide such. In order to implement this mode of operation
     para-virtualized frontend driver can be configured to use
     GEM CMA helpers.

6.1.2. Front driver doesn't use GEM CMA
     If accompanying drivers can cope with non-contiguous memory then, to
     lower pressure on CMA subsystem of the kernel, driver can allocate
     buffers from system memory.

Note! If used with accompanying DRM/(v)GPU drivers this mode of operation
may require IOMMU support on the platform, so accompanying DRM/vGPU
hardware can still reach display buffer memory while importing PRIME
buffers from the frontend driver.

6.2. Buffers allocated by the backend

This mode of operation is run-time configured via guest domain
configuration through XenStore entries.

For systems which do not provide IOMMU support, but having specific
requirements for display buffers it is possible to allocate such buffers
at backend side and share those with the frontend.
For example, if host domain is 1:1 mapped and has DRM/GPU hardware
expecting physically contiguous memory, this allows implementing
zero-copying use-cases.

Note, while using this scenario the following should be considered:
  a) If guest domain dies then pages/grants received from the backend
     cannot be claimed back
  b) Misbehaving guest may send too many requests to the
     backend exhausting its grant references and memory
     (consider this from security POV).

Note! Configuration options 1.1 (contiguous display buffers) and 2
(backend allocated buffers) are not supported at the same time.

7. Handle communication with the backend:
 - send requests and wait for the responses according
   to the displif protocol
 - serialize access to the communication channel
 - time-out used for backend communication is set to 3000 ms
 - manage display buffers shared with the backend

[1] https://github.com/xen-troops/displ_be
[2] https://github.com/xen-troops/libxenbe
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=blob;f=docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5.in;h=a699367779e2ae1212ff8f638eff0206ec1a1cc9;hb=refs/heads/master#l1257

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
It turns out this was only needed to paper over a bug in the CMA
helpers, which was addressed in

commit 998fb1a
Author: Liviu Dudau <[email protected]>
Date:   Fri Nov 10 13:33:10 2017 +0000

    drm: gem_cma_helper.c: Allow importing of contiguous scatterlists with nents > 1

Without this the following pipeline didn't work:

domU:
1. xen-front allocates a non-contig buffer
2. creates grants out of it

dom0:
3. converts the grants into a dma-buf. Since they're non-contig, the
scatter-list is huge.
4. imports it into rcar-du, which requires dma-contig memory for
scanout.

-> On this given platform there's an IOMMU, so in theory this should
work. But in practice this failed, because of the huge number of sg
entries, even though the IOMMU driver mapped it all into a dma-contig
range.

With a guest-contig buffer allocated in step 1, this problem doesn't
exist. But there's technically no reason to require guest-contig
memory for xen buffer sharing using grants.

Given all that, the xen-front cma support is not needed and should be
removed.

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Introduce Xen zero-copy helper DRM driver, add user-space API
of the driver:
1. DRM_IOCTL_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_FROM_REFS
This will create a DRM dumb buffer from grant references provided
by the frontend. The intended usage is:
  - Frontend
    - creates a dumb/display buffer and allocates memory
    - grants foreign access to the buffer pages
    - passes granted references to the backend
  - Backend
    - issues DRM_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_FROM_REFS ioctl to map
      granted references and create a dumb buffer
    - requests handle to fd conversion via DRM_IOCTL_PRIME_HANDLE_TO_FD
    - requests real HW driver/consumer to import the PRIME buffer with
      DRM_IOCTL_PRIME_FD_TO_HANDLE
    - uses handle returned by the real HW driver
  - at the end:
    o closes real HW driver's handle with DRM_IOCTL_GEM_CLOSE
    o closes zero-copy driver's handle with DRM_IOCTL_GEM_CLOSE
    o closes file descriptor of the exported buffer

2. DRM_IOCTL_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_TO_REFS
This will grant references to a dumb/display buffer's memory provided
 by the backend. The intended usage is:
  - Frontend
    - requests backend to allocate dumb/display buffer and grant
      references to its pages
  - Backend
    - requests real HW driver to create a dumb with
      DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CREATE_DUMB
    - requests handle to fd conversion via
      DRM_IOCTL_PRIME_HANDLE_TO_FD
    - requests zero-copy driver to import the PRIME buffer with
      DRM_IOCTL_PRIME_FD_TO_HANDLE
    - issues DRM_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_TO_REFS ioctl to
      grant references to the buffer's memory.
    - passes grant references to the frontend
 - at the end:
    - closes zero-copy driver's handle with DRM_IOCTL_GEM_CLOSE
    - closes real HW driver's handle with DRM_IOCTL_GEM_CLOSE
    - closes file descriptor of the imported buffer

Implement GEM/IOCTL handling depending on driver mode of operation:
- if GEM is created from grant references, then prepare to create
  a dumb from mapped pages
- if GEM grant references are about to be provided for the
  imported PRIME buffer, then prepare for granting references
  and providing those to user-space

Implement handling of display buffers from backend to/from front
interaction point ov view:
- when importing a buffer from the frontend:
  - allocate/free xen ballooned pages via Xen balloon driver
    or by manually allocating a DMA buffer
  - if DMA buffer is used, then increase/decrease its pages
    reservation accordingly
  - map/unmap foreign pages to the ballooned pages
- when exporting a buffer to the frontend:
  - grant references for the pages of the imported PRIME buffer
  - pass the grants back to user-space, so those can be shared
    with the frontend

Add an option to allocate DMA buffers as backing storage while
importing a frontend's buffer into host's memory:
for those use-cases when exported PRIME buffer will be used by
a device expecting CMA buffers only, it is possible to map
frontend's pages onto contiguous buffer, e.g. allocated via
DMA API.

Implement synchronous buffer deletion: for buffers, created from front's
grant references, synchronization between backend and frontend is needed
on buffer deletion as front expects us to unmap these references after
XENDISPL_OP_DBUF_DESTROY response.
For that reason introduce DRM_IOCTL_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_WAIT_FREE IOCTL:
this will block until dumb buffer, with the wait handle provided,
be freed.

The rationale behind implementing own wait handle:
  - dumb buffer handle cannot be used as when the PRIME buffer
    gets exported there are at least 2 handles: one is for the
    backend and another one for the importing application,
    so when backend closes its handle and the other application still
    holds the buffer then there is no way for the backend to tell
    which buffer we want to wait for while calling xen_ioctl_wait_free
  - flink cannot be used as well as it is gone when DRM core
    calls .gem_free_object_unlocked

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <[email protected]>
@aanisov aanisov removed their request for review April 23, 2018 14:01
@andr2000 andr2000 changed the base branch from master to yocto-3.7-migration April 25, 2018 10:12
@iartemenko iartemenko merged commit 3df9604 into xen-troops:yocto-3.7-migration Apr 25, 2018
andr2000 pushed a commit to andr2000/linux that referenced this pull request May 23, 2018
syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment().

Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of
reasonable length.

BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
turning off the locking correctness validator.
depth: 48  max: 48!
48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189:
 #0:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517
 #1:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #1:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #2:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #2:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #3:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #3:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#4:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#4:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#5:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#5:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#6:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#6:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#7:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#7:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#8:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#8:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#9:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#9:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#10:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#10:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#11:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#11:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#12:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#12:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#13:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#13:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#14:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#14:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#15:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#15:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#16:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#16:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#17:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#17:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#18:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#18:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#19:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#19:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#20:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#20:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#21:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#21:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#22:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#22:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#23:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#23:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#24:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#24:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#25:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#25:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#26:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#26:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#27:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#27:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#28:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#28:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#29:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#29:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#30:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#30:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#31:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#31:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
 xen-troops#32:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#32:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#33:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#33:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#34:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#34:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#35:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#35:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#36:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#36:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#37:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#37:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#38:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#38:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#39:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#39:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#40:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#40:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#41:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#41:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#42:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#42:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#43:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#43:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#44:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#44:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#45:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#45:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#46:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#46:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 xen-troops#47:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 xen-troops#47:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ xen-troops#26
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449
 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline]
 rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline]
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865
 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline]
 validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118
 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168
 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312
 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline]
 __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410
 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551
 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639
 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797
 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
andr2000 pushed a commit to andr2000/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 27, 2018
Increase kasan instrumented kernel stack size from 32k to 64k. Other
architectures seems to get away with just doubling kernel stack size under
kasan, but on s390 this appears to be not enough due to bigger frame size.
The particular pain point is kasan inlined checks (CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE
vs CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE). With inlined checks one particular case hitting
stack overflow is fs sync on xfs filesystem:

 #0 [9a0681e8]  704 bytes  check_usage at 34b1fc
 #1 [9a0684a8]  432 bytes  check_usage at 34c710
 #2 [9a068658]  1048 bytes  validate_chain at 35044a
 #3 [9a068a70]  312 bytes  __lock_acquire at 3559fe
 xen-troops#4 [9a068ba8]  440 bytes  lock_acquire at 3576ee
 xen-troops#5 [9a068d60]  104 bytes  _raw_spin_lock at 21b44e0
 xen-troops#6 [9a068dc8]  1992 bytes  enqueue_entity at 2dbf72
 xen-troops#7 [9a069590]  1496 bytes  enqueue_task_fair at 2df5f0
 xen-troops#8 [9a069b68]  64 bytes  ttwu_do_activate at 28f438
 xen-troops#9 [9a069ba8]  552 bytes  try_to_wake_up at 298c4c
 xen-troops#10 [9a069dd0]  168 bytes  wake_up_worker at 23f97c
 xen-troops#11 [9a069e78]  200 bytes  insert_work at 23fc2e
 xen-troops#12 [9a069f40]  648 bytes  __queue_work at 2487c0
 xen-troops#13 [9a06a1c8]  200 bytes  __queue_delayed_work at 24db28
 xen-troops#14 [9a06a290]  248 bytes  mod_delayed_work_on at 24de84
 xen-troops#15 [9a06a388]  24 bytes  kblockd_mod_delayed_work_on at 153e2a0
 xen-troops#16 [9a06a3a0]  288 bytes  __blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue at 158168c
 xen-troops#17 [9a06a4c0]  192 bytes  blk_mq_run_hw_queue at 1581a3c
 xen-troops#18 [9a06a580]  184 bytes  blk_mq_sched_insert_requests at 15a2192
 xen-troops#19 [9a06a638]  1024 bytes  blk_mq_flush_plug_list at 1590f3a
 xen-troops#20 [9a06aa38]  704 bytes  blk_flush_plug_list at 1555028
 xen-troops#21 [9a06acf8]  320 bytes  schedule at 219e476
 xen-troops#22 [9a06ae38]  760 bytes  schedule_timeout at 21b0aac
 xen-troops#23 [9a06b130]  408 bytes  wait_for_common at 21a1706
 xen-troops#24 [9a06b2c8]  360 bytes  xfs_buf_iowait at fa1540
 xen-troops#25 [9a06b430]  256 bytes  __xfs_buf_submit at fadae6
 xen-troops#26 [9a06b530]  264 bytes  xfs_buf_read_map at fae3f6
 xen-troops#27 [9a06b638]  656 bytes  xfs_trans_read_buf_map at 10ac9a8
 xen-troops#28 [9a06b8c8]  304 bytes  xfs_btree_kill_root at e72426
 xen-troops#29 [9a06b9f8]  288 bytes  xfs_btree_lookup_get_block at e7bc5e
 xen-troops#30 [9a06bb18]  624 bytes  xfs_btree_lookup at e7e1a6
 xen-troops#31 [9a06bd88]  2664 bytes  xfs_alloc_ag_vextent_near at dfa070
 xen-troops#32 [9a06c7f0]  144 bytes  xfs_alloc_ag_vextent at dff3ca
 xen-troops#33 [9a06c880]  1128 bytes  xfs_alloc_vextent at e05fce
 xen-troops#34 [9a06cce8]  584 bytes  xfs_bmap_btalloc at e58342
 xen-troops#35 [9a06cf30]  1336 bytes  xfs_bmapi_write at e618de
 xen-troops#36 [9a06d468]  776 bytes  xfs_iomap_write_allocate at ff678e
 xen-troops#37 [9a06d770]  720 bytes  xfs_map_blocks at f82af8
 xen-troops#38 [9a06da40]  928 bytes  xfs_writepage_map at f83cd6
 xen-troops#39 [9a06dde0]  320 bytes  xfs_do_writepage at f85872
 xen-troops#40 [9a06df20]  1320 bytes  write_cache_pages at 73dfe8
 xen-troops#41 [9a06e448]  208 bytes  xfs_vm_writepages at f7f892
 xen-troops#42 [9a06e518]  88 bytes  do_writepages at 73fe6a
 xen-troops#43 [9a06e570]  872 bytes  __writeback_single_inode at a20cb6
 xen-troops#44 [9a06e8d8]  664 bytes  writeback_sb_inodes at a23be2
 xen-troops#45 [9a06eb70]  296 bytes  __writeback_inodes_wb at a242e0
 xen-troops#46 [9a06ec98]  928 bytes  wb_writeback at a2500e
 xen-troops#47 [9a06f038]  848 bytes  wb_do_writeback at a260ae
 xen-troops#48 [9a06f388]  536 bytes  wb_workfn at a28228
 xen-troops#49 [9a06f5a0]  1088 bytes  process_one_work at 24a234
 xen-troops#50 [9a06f9e0]  1120 bytes  worker_thread at 24ba26
 xen-troops#51 [9a06fe40]  104 bytes  kthread at 26545a
 xen-troops#52 [9a06fea8]             kernel_thread_starter at 21b6b62

To be able to increase the stack size to 64k reuse LLILL instruction
in __switch_to function to load 64k - STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD - __PT_SIZE
(65192) value as unsigned.

Reported-by: Benjamin Block <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
andr2000 pushed a commit to andr2000/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 27, 2018
We get the following warning:

[   47.926140] 32-bit node address hash set to 2010a0a
[   47.927202]
[   47.927433] ================================
[   47.928050] WARNING: inconsistent lock state
[   47.928661] 4.19.0+ xen-troops#37 Tainted: G            E
[   47.929346] --------------------------------
[   47.929954] inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage.
[   47.930116] swapper/3/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[3]:HE1:SE0] takes:
[   47.930116] 00000000af8bc31e (&(&ht->lock)->rlock){+.?.}, at: rhashtable_walk_enter+0x36/0xb0
[   47.930116] {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
[   47.930116]   _raw_spin_lock+0x29/0x60
[   47.930116]   rht_deferred_worker+0x556/0x810
[   47.930116]   process_one_work+0x1f5/0x540
[   47.930116]   worker_thread+0x64/0x3e0
[   47.930116]   kthread+0x112/0x150
[   47.930116]   ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[   47.930116] irq event stamp: 14044
[   47.930116] hardirqs last  enabled at (14044): [<ffffffff9a07fbba>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x7a/0xf0
[   47.938117] hardirqs last disabled at (14043): [<ffffffff9a07fb81>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x41/0xf0
[   47.938117] softirqs last  enabled at (14028): [<ffffffff9a0803ee>] irq_enter+0x5e/0x60
[   47.938117] softirqs last disabled at (14029): [<ffffffff9a0804a5>] irq_exit+0xb5/0xc0
[   47.938117]
[   47.938117] other info that might help us debug this:
[   47.938117]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   47.938117]
[   47.938117]        CPU0
[   47.938117]        ----
[   47.938117]   lock(&(&ht->lock)->rlock);
[   47.938117]   <Interrupt>
[   47.938117]     lock(&(&ht->lock)->rlock);
[   47.938117]
[   47.938117]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   47.938117]
[   47.938117] 2 locks held by swapper/3/0:
[   47.938117]  #0: 0000000062c64f90 ((&d->timer)){+.-.}, at: call_timer_fn+0x5/0x280
[   47.938117]  #1: 00000000ee39619c (&(&d->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: tipc_disc_timeout+0xc8/0x540 [tipc]
[   47.938117]
[   47.938117] stack backtrace:
[   47.938117] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Tainted: G            E     4.19.0+ xen-troops#37
[   47.938117] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[   47.938117] Call Trace:
[   47.938117]  <IRQ>
[   47.938117]  dump_stack+0x5e/0x8b
[   47.938117]  print_usage_bug+0x1ed/0x1ff
[   47.938117]  mark_lock+0x5b5/0x630
[   47.938117]  __lock_acquire+0x4c0/0x18f0
[   47.938117]  ? lock_acquire+0xa6/0x180
[   47.938117]  lock_acquire+0xa6/0x180
[   47.938117]  ? rhashtable_walk_enter+0x36/0xb0
[   47.938117]  _raw_spin_lock+0x29/0x60
[   47.938117]  ? rhashtable_walk_enter+0x36/0xb0
[   47.938117]  rhashtable_walk_enter+0x36/0xb0
[   47.938117]  tipc_sk_reinit+0xb0/0x410 [tipc]
[   47.938117]  ? mark_held_locks+0x6f/0x90
[   47.938117]  ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x7a/0xf0
[   47.938117]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x20/0x1a0
[   47.938117]  tipc_net_finalize+0xbf/0x180 [tipc]
[   47.938117]  tipc_disc_timeout+0x509/0x540 [tipc]
[   47.938117]  ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x280
[   47.938117]  ? tipc_disc_msg_xmit.isra.19+0xa0/0xa0 [tipc]
[   47.938117]  ? tipc_disc_msg_xmit.isra.19+0xa0/0xa0 [tipc]
[   47.938117]  call_timer_fn+0xa1/0x280
[   47.938117]  ? tipc_disc_msg_xmit.isra.19+0xa0/0xa0 [tipc]
[   47.938117]  run_timer_softirq+0x1f2/0x4d0
[   47.938117]  __do_softirq+0xfc/0x413
[   47.938117]  irq_exit+0xb5/0xc0
[   47.938117]  smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0xac/0x210
[   47.938117]  apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
[   47.938117]  </IRQ>
[   47.938117] RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x1c/0x140
[   47.938117] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 53 65 8b 2d d8 2b 74 65 0f 1f 44 00 00 e8 c6 2c 8b ff fb f4 <65> 8b 2d c5 2b 74 65 0f 1f 44 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c c3 65 8b 05 b4 2b
[   47.938117] RSP: 0018:ffffaf6ac0207ec8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
[   47.938117] RAX: ffff8f5b3735e200 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000001
[   47.938117] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8f5b3735e200
[   47.938117] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[   47.938117] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[   47.938117] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8f5b3735e200 R15: ffff8f5b3735e200
[   47.938117]  ? default_idle+0x1a/0x140
[   47.938117]  do_idle+0x1bc/0x280
[   47.938117]  cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20
[   47.938117]  start_secondary+0x187/0x1c0
[   47.938117]  secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0

The reason seems to be that tipc_net_finalize()->tipc_sk_reinit() is
calling the function rhashtable_walk_enter() within a timer interrupt.
We fix this by executing tipc_net_finalize() in work queue context.

Acked-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
andr2000 pushed a commit to andr2000/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2019
Similarly to commit 276bdb8 ("dccp: check ccid before dereferencing")
it is wise to test for a NULL ccid.

kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc3+ xen-troops#37
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:ccid_hc_tx_parse_options net/dccp/ccid.h:205 [inline]
RIP: 0010:dccp_parse_options+0x8d9/0x12b0 net/dccp/options.c:233
Code: c5 0f b6 75 b3 80 38 00 0f 85 d6 08 00 00 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b b8 f8 07 00 00 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 08 00 0f 85 95 08 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b
kobject: 'loop5' (0000000080f78fc1): kobject_uevent_env
RSP: 0018:ffff8880a94df0b8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880858ac723 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000007 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff8880a94df140 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888061b83a80
R10: ffffed100c370752 R11: ffff888061b83a97 R12: 0000000000000026
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880ae700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0defa33518 CR3: 000000008db5e000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
kobject: 'loop5' (0000000080f78fc1): fill_kobj_path: path = '/devices/virtual/block/loop5'
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 dccp_rcv_state_process+0x2b6/0x1af6 net/dccp/input.c:654
 dccp_v4_do_rcv+0x100/0x190 net/dccp/ipv4.c:688
 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:936 [inline]
 __sk_receive_skb+0x3a9/0xea0 net/core/sock.c:473
 dccp_v4_rcv+0x10cb/0x1f80 net/dccp/ipv4.c:880
 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xb6/0xa20 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:208
 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x23b/0x390 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:283 [inline]
 ip_local_deliver+0x1f0/0x740 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:255
 dst_input include/net/dst.h:450 [inline]
 ip_rcv_finish+0x1f4/0x2f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:414
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:283 [inline]
 ip_rcv+0xed/0x620 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:524
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x160/0x210 net/core/dev.c:4973
 __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1c0 net/core/dev.c:5083
 process_backlog+0x206/0x750 net/core/dev.c:5923
 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6346 [inline]
 net_rx_action+0x76d/0x1930 net/core/dev.c:6412
 __do_softirq+0x30b/0xb11 kernel/softirq.c:292
 run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:654 [inline]
 run_ksoftirqd+0x8e/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:646
 smpboot_thread_fn+0x6ab/0xa10 kernel/smpboot.c:164
 kthread+0x357/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:246
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 58a0ba03bea2c376 ]---
RIP: 0010:ccid_hc_tx_parse_options net/dccp/ccid.h:205 [inline]
RIP: 0010:dccp_parse_options+0x8d9/0x12b0 net/dccp/options.c:233
Code: c5 0f b6 75 b3 80 38 00 0f 85 d6 08 00 00 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b b8 f8 07 00 00 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 08 00 0f 85 95 08 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b
RSP: 0018:ffff8880a94df0b8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880858ac723 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000007 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff8880a94df140 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888061b83a80
R10: ffffed100c370752 R11: ffff888061b83a97 R12: 0000000000000026
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880ae700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0defa33518 CR3: 0000000009871000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Cc: Gerrit Renker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
otyshchenko1 pushed a commit to otyshchenko1/linux that referenced this pull request May 10, 2022
We received a report[1] of kernel crashes when Cilium is used in XDP
mode with virtio_net after updating to newer kernels. After
investigating the reason it turned out that when using mergeable bufs
with an XDP program which adjusts xdp.data or xdp.data_meta page_to_buf()
calculates the build_skb address wrong because the offset can become less
than the headroom so it gets the address of the previous page (-X bytes
depending on how lower offset is):
 page_to_skb: page addr ffff9eb2923e2000 buf ffff9eb2923e1ffc offset 252 headroom 256

This is a pr_err() I added in the beginning of page_to_skb which clearly
shows offset that is less than headroom by adding 4 bytes of metadata
via an xdp prog. The calculations done are:
 receive_mergeable():
 headroom = VIRTIO_XDP_HEADROOM; // VIRTIO_XDP_HEADROOM == 256 bytes
 offset = xdp.data - page_address(xdp_page) -
          vi->hdr_len - metasize;

 page_to_skb():
 p = page_address(page) + offset;
 ...
 buf = p - headroom;

Now buf goes -4 bytes from the page's starting address as can be seen
above which is set as skb->head and skb->data by build_skb later. Depending
on what's done with the skb (when it's freed most often) we get all kinds
of corruptions and BUG_ON() triggers in mm[2]. We have to recalculate
the new headroom after the xdp program has run, similar to how offset
and len are recalculated. Headroom is directly related to
data_hard_start, data and data_meta, so we use them to get the new size.
The result is correct (similar pr_err() in page_to_skb, one case of
xdp_page and one case of virtnet buf):
 a) Case with 4 bytes of metadata
 [  115.949641] page_to_skb: page addr ffff8b4dcfad2000 offset 252 headroom 252
 [  121.084105] page_to_skb: page addr ffff8b4dcf018000 offset 20732 headroom 252
 b) Case of pushing data +32 bytes
 [  153.181401] page_to_skb: page addr ffff8b4dd0c4d000 offset 288 headroom 288
 [  158.480421] page_to_skb: page addr ffff8b4dd00b0000 offset 24864 headroom 288
 c) Case of pushing data -33 bytes
 [  835.906830] page_to_skb: page addr ffff8b4dd3270000 offset 223 headroom 223
 [  840.839910] page_to_skb: page addr ffff8b4dcdd68000 offset 12511 headroom 223

Offset and headroom are equal because offset points to the start of
reserved bytes for the virtio_net header which are at buf start +
headroom, while data points at buf start + vnet hdr size + headroom so
when data or data_meta are adjusted by the xdp prog both the headroom size
and the offset change equally. We can use data_hard_start to compute the
new headroom after the xdp prog (linearized / page start case, the
virtnet buf case is similar just with bigger base offset):
 xdp.data_hard_start = page_address + vnet_hdr
 xdp.data = page_address + vnet_hdr + headroom
 new headroom after xdp prog = xdp.data - xdp.data_hard_start - metasize

An example reproducer xdp prog[3] is below.

[1] cilium/cilium#19453

[2] Two of the many traces:
 [   40.437400] BUG: Bad page state in process swapper/0  pfn:14940
 [   40.916726] BUG: Bad page state in process systemd-resolve  pfn:053b7
 [   41.300891] kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:720!
 [   41.301801] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
 [   41.302784] CPU: 1 PID: 1181 Comm: kubelet Kdump: loaded Tainted: G    B   W         5.18.0-rc1+ xen-troops#37
 [   41.304458] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014
 [   41.306018] RIP: 0010:page_frag_free+0x79/0xe0
 [   41.306836] Code: 00 00 75 ea 48 8b 07 a9 00 00 01 00 74 e0 48 8b 47 48 48 8d 50 ff a8 01 48 0f 45 fa eb d0 48 c7 c6 18 b8 30 a6 e8 d7 f8 fc ff <0f> 0b 48 8d 78 ff eb bc 48 8b 07 a9 00 00 01 00 74 3a 66 90 0f b6
 [   41.310235] RSP: 0018:ffffac05c2a6bc78 EFLAGS: 00010292
 [   41.311201] RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
 [   41.312502] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffa6423004 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
 [   41.313794] RBP: ffff993c98823600 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffdfff
 [   41.315089] R10: ffffac05c2a6ba68 R11: ffffffffa698ca28 R12: ffff993c98823600
 [   41.316398] R13: ffff993c86311ebc R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000000005c
 [   41.317700] FS:  00007fe13fc56740(0000) GS:ffff993cdd900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 [   41.319150] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 [   41.320152] CR2: 000000c00008a000 CR3: 0000000014908000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
 [   41.321387] Call Trace:
 [   41.321819]  <TASK>
 [   41.322193]  skb_release_data+0x13f/0x1c0
 [   41.322902]  __kfree_skb+0x20/0x30
 [   41.343870]  tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x671/0x880
 [   41.363764]  tcp_recvmsg+0x5e/0x1c0
 [   41.384102]  inet_recvmsg+0x42/0x100
 [   41.406783]  ? sock_recvmsg+0x1d/0x70
 [   41.428201]  sock_read_iter+0x84/0xd0
 [   41.445592]  ? 0xffffffffa3000000
 [   41.462442]  new_sync_read+0x148/0x160
 [   41.479314]  ? 0xffffffffa3000000
 [   41.496937]  vfs_read+0x138/0x190
 [   41.517198]  ksys_read+0x87/0xc0
 [   41.535336]  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
 [   41.551637]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 [   41.568050] RIP: 0033:0x48765b
 [   41.583955] Code: e8 4a 35 fe ff eb 88 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc e8 fb 7a fe ff 48 8b 7c 24 10 48 8b 74 24 18 48 8b 54 24 20 48 8b 44 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 76 20 48 c7 44 24 28 ff ff ff ff 48 c7 44 24 30
 [   41.632818] RSP: 002b:000000c000a2f5b8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
 [   41.664588] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000c000062000 RCX: 000000000048765b
 [   41.681205] RDX: 0000000000005e54 RSI: 000000c000e66000 RDI: 0000000000000016
 [   41.697164] RBP: 000000c000a2f608 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00000000000001b4
 [   41.713034] R10: 00000000000000b6 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 00000000000000e9
 [   41.728755] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000000c000a92000 R15: ffffffffffffffff
 [   41.744254]  </TASK>
 [   41.758585] Modules linked in: br_netfilter bridge veth netconsole virtio_net

 and

 [   33.524802] BUG: Bad page state in process systemd-network  pfn:11e60
 [   33.528617] page ffffe05dc0147b00 ffffe05dc04e7a00 ffff8ae9851ec000 (1) len 82 offset 252 metasize 4 hroom 0 hdr_len 12 data ffff8ae9851ec10c data_meta ffff8ae9851ec108 data_end ffff8ae9851ec14e
 [   33.529764] page:000000003792b5ba refcount:0 mapcount:-512 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x11e60
 [   33.532463] flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
 [   33.532468] raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 [   33.532470] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000fffffdff 0000000000000000
 [   33.532471] page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
 [   33.532472] Modules linked in: br_netfilter bridge veth netconsole virtio_net
 [   33.532479] CPU: 0 PID: 791 Comm: systemd-network Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1+ xen-troops#37
 [   33.532482] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014
 [   33.532484] Call Trace:
 [   33.532496]  <TASK>
 [   33.532500]  dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x5a
 [   33.532506]  bad_page.cold+0x63/0x94
 [   33.532510]  free_pcp_prepare+0x290/0x420
 [   33.532515]  free_unref_page+0x1b/0x100
 [   33.532518]  skb_release_data+0x13f/0x1c0
 [   33.532524]  kfree_skb_reason+0x3e/0xc0
 [   33.532527]  ip6_mc_input+0x23c/0x2b0
 [   33.532531]  ip6_sublist_rcv_finish+0x83/0x90
 [   33.532534]  ip6_sublist_rcv+0x22b/0x2b0

[3] XDP program to reproduce(xdp_pass.c):
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
 #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>

 SEC("xdp_pass")
 int xdp_pkt_pass(struct xdp_md *ctx)
 {
          bpf_xdp_adjust_head(ctx, -(int)32);
          return XDP_PASS;
 }

 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";

 compile: clang -O2 -g -Wall -target bpf -c xdp_pass.c -o xdp_pass.o
 load on virtio_net: ip link set enp1s0 xdpdrv obj xdp_pass.o sec xdp_pass

CC: [email protected]
CC: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
CC: Xuan Zhuo <[email protected]>
CC: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
CC: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Fixes: 8fb7da9 ("virtio_net: get build_skb() buf by data ptr")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xuan Zhuo <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
otyshchenko1 pushed a commit to otyshchenko1/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 5, 2022
This change fixes the following kernel NULL pointer dereference
which is reproduced by blktests srp/007 occasionally.

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000170
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1H Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.0.0-rc1+ xen-troops#37
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-29-g6a62e0cb0dfe-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue:  0x0 (kblockd)
RIP: 0010:srp_recv_done+0x176/0x500 [ib_srp]
Code: 00 4d 85 ff 0f 84 52 02 00 00 48 c7 82 80 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 89 df 4c 89 14 24 e8 53 d3 4a f6 4c 8b 14 24 41 0f b6 42 13 <41> 89 87 70 01 00 00 41 0f b6 52 12 f6 c2 02 74 44 41 8b 42 1c b9
RSP: 0018:ffffaef7c0003e28 EFLAGS: 00000282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9bc9486dea60 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000102 RSI: ffffffffb76bbd0e RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffff9bc980099a00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffff9bca53ef0000 R11: ffff9bc980099a10 R12: ffff9bc956e14000
R13: ffff9bc9836b9cb0 R14: ffff9bc9557b4480 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9bc97ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000170 CR3: 0000000007e04000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 __ib_process_cq+0xb7/0x280 [ib_core]
 ib_poll_handler+0x2b/0x130 [ib_core]
 irq_poll_softirq+0x93/0x150
 __do_softirq+0xee/0x4b8
 irq_exit_rcu+0xf7/0x130
 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8e/0xc0
 </IRQ>

Fixes: ad215aa ("RDMA/srp: Make struct scsi_cmnd and struct srp_request adjacent")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Xiao Yang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
Labels
None yet
Projects
None yet
Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

6 participants