Increase CMA reserved for MFC #25

tygraen · 2013-07-22T02:48:38Z

Hi Mdrjr, here is the change that lets us use MFC to decode 1080p video files...

Increase CMA reserved for MFC

Check for the presence of the '/cpus' OF node before dereferencing it blindly: [ 4.181793] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000001c [ 4.181793] pgd = c0004000 [ 4.181823] [0000001c] *pgd=00000000 [ 4.181823] Internal error: Oops: 5 [hardkernel#1] SMP ARM [ 4.181823] Modules linked in: [ 4.181823] CPU: 1 Tainted: G W (3.8.0-15-generic hardkernel#25~hbankD) [ 4.181854] PC is at of_get_next_child+0x64/0x70 [ 4.181854] LR is at of_get_next_child+0x24/0x70 [ 4.181854] pc : [<c04fda18>] lr : [<c04fd9d8>] psr: 60000113 [ 4.181854] sp : ed891ec0 ip : ed891ec0 fp : ed891ed4 [ 4.181884] r10: c04dafd0 r9 : c098690c r8 : c0936208 [ 4.181884] r7 : ed890000 r6 : c0a63d00 r5 : 00000000 r4 : 00000000 [ 4.181884] r3 : 00000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 00000000 r0 : c0b2acc8 [ 4.181884] Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment kernel [ 4.181884] Control: 10c5387d Table: adcb804a DAC: 00000015 [ 4.181915] Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, stack limit = 0xed890238) [ 4.181915] Stack: (0xed891ec0 to 0xed892000) [ 4.181915] 1ec0: c09b7b70 00000007 ed891efc ed891ed8 c04daff4 c04fd9c0 00000000 c09b7b70 [ 4.181915] 1ee0: 00000007 c0a63d00 ed890000 c0936208 ed891f54 ed891f00 c00088e0 c04dafdc [ 4.181945] 1f00: ed891f54 ed891f10 c006e940 00000000 00000000 00000007 00000007 c08a4914 [ 4.181945] 1f20: 00000000 c07dbd30 c0a63d00 c09b7b70 00000007 c0a63d00 000000bc c0936208 [ 4.181945] 1f40: c098690c c0986914 ed891f94 ed891f58 c0936a40 c00087bc 00000007 00000007 [ 4.181976] 1f60: c0936208 be8bda20 b6eea010 c0a63d00 c064547c 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 4.181976] 1f80: 00000000 00000000 ed891fac ed891f98 c0645498 c09368c8 00000000 00000000 [ 4.181976] 1fa0: 00000000 ed891fb0 c0014658 c0645488 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 4.182006] 1fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 4.182006] 1fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 4.182037] [<c04fda18>] (of_get_next_child+0x64/0x70) from [<c04daff4>] (cpu0_cpufreq_driver_init+0x24/0x284) [ 4.182067] [<c04daff4>] (cpu0_cpufreq_driver_init+0x24/0x284) from [<c00088e0>] (do_one_initcall+0x130/0x1b0) [ 4.182067] [<c00088e0>] (do_one_initcall+0x130/0x1b0) from [<c0936a40>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x184/0x24c) [ 4.182098] [<c0936a40>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x184/0x24c) from [<c0645498>] (kernel_init+0x1c/0xf4) [ 4.182128] [<c0645498>] (kernel_init+0x1c/0xf4) from [<c0014658>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x20) [ 4.182128] Code: f57ff04f e320f004 e89da830 e89da830 (e595001c) [ 4.182128] ---[ end trace 634903a22e8609cb ]--- [ 4.182189] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b [ 4.182189] [ 4.642395] CPU0: stopping [rjw: Changelog] Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]> Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> (cherry picked from git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git commit f5c3ef2) Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <[email protected]>

Check for the presence of the '/cpus' OF node before dereferencing it blindly: [ 4.181793] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000001c [ 4.181793] pgd = c0004000 [ 4.181823] [0000001c] *pgd=00000000 [ 4.181823] Internal error: Oops: 5 [hardkernel#1] SMP ARM [ 4.181823] Modules linked in: [ 4.181823] CPU: 1 Tainted: G W (3.8.0-15-generic hardkernel#25~hbankD) [ 4.181854] PC is at of_get_next_child+0x64/0x70 [ 4.181854] LR is at of_get_next_child+0x24/0x70 [ 4.181854] pc : [<c04fda18>] lr : [<c04fd9d8>] psr: 60000113 [ 4.181854] sp : ed891ec0 ip : ed891ec0 fp : ed891ed4 [ 4.181884] r10: c04dafd0 r9 : c098690c r8 : c0936208 [ 4.181884] r7 : ed890000 r6 : c0a63d00 r5 : 00000000 r4 : 00000000 [ 4.181884] r3 : 00000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 00000000 r0 : c0b2acc8 [ 4.181884] Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment kernel [ 4.181884] Control: 10c5387d Table: adcb804a DAC: 00000015 [ 4.181915] Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, stack limit = 0xed890238) [ 4.181915] Stack: (0xed891ec0 to 0xed892000) [ 4.181915] 1ec0: c09b7b70 00000007 ed891efc ed891ed8 c04daff4 c04fd9c0 00000000 c09b7b70 [ 4.181915] 1ee0: 00000007 c0a63d00 ed890000 c0936208 ed891f54 ed891f00 c00088e0 c04dafdc [ 4.181945] 1f00: ed891f54 ed891f10 c006e940 00000000 00000000 00000007 00000007 c08a4914 [ 4.181945] 1f20: 00000000 c07dbd30 c0a63d00 c09b7b70 00000007 c0a63d00 000000bc c0936208 [ 4.181945] 1f40: c098690c c0986914 ed891f94 ed891f58 c0936a40 c00087bc 00000007 00000007 [ 4.181976] 1f60: c0936208 be8bda20 b6eea010 c0a63d00 c064547c 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 4.181976] 1f80: 00000000 00000000 ed891fac ed891f98 c0645498 c09368c8 00000000 00000000 [ 4.181976] 1fa0: 00000000 ed891fb0 c0014658 c0645488 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 4.182006] 1fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 4.182006] 1fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 4.182037] [<c04fda18>] (of_get_next_child+0x64/0x70) from [<c04daff4>] (cpu0_cpufreq_driver_init+0x24/0x284) [ 4.182067] [<c04daff4>] (cpu0_cpufreq_driver_init+0x24/0x284) from [<c00088e0>] (do_one_initcall+0x130/0x1b0) [ 4.182067] [<c00088e0>] (do_one_initcall+0x130/0x1b0) from [<c0936a40>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x184/0x24c) [ 4.182098] [<c0936a40>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x184/0x24c) from [<c0645498>] (kernel_init+0x1c/0xf4) [ 4.182128] [<c0645498>] (kernel_init+0x1c/0xf4) from [<c0014658>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x20) [ 4.182128] Code: f57ff04f e320f004 e89da830 e89da830 (e595001c) [ 4.182128] ---[ end trace 634903a22e8609cb ]--- [ 4.182189] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b [ 4.182189] [ 4.642395] CPU0: stopping [rjw: Changelog] Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]> Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>

As the new x86 CPU bootup printout format code maintainer, I am taking immediate action to improve and clean (and thus indulge my OCD) the reporting of the cores when coming up online. Fix padding to a right-hand alignment, cleanup code and bind reporting width to the max number of supported CPUs on the system, like this: [ 0.074509] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 OK [ 0.644008] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors: #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 OK [ 1.245006] smpboot: Booting Node 2, Processors: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 OK [ 1.864005] smpboot: Booting Node 3, Processors: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 OK [ 2.489005] smpboot: Booting Node 4, Processors: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 OK [ 3.093005] smpboot: Booting Node 5, Processors: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 OK [ 3.698005] smpboot: Booting Node 6, Processors: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 OK [ 4.304005] smpboot: Booting Node 7, Processors: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 OK [ 4.961413] Brought up 64 CPUs and this: [ 0.072367] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 OK [ 0.686329] Brought up 8 CPUs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Libin <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

Turn it into (for example): [ 0.073380] x86: Booting SMP configuration: [ 0.074005] .... node #0, CPUs: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 [ 0.603005] .... node #1, CPUs: #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 [ 1.200005] .... node #2, CPUs: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 [ 1.796005] .... node #3, CPUs: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 [ 2.393005] .... node #4, CPUs: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 [ 2.996005] .... node #5, CPUs: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 [ 3.600005] .... node #6, CPUs: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 [ 4.202005] .... node #7, CPUs: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 [ 4.811005] .... node #8, CPUs: #64 #65 #66 #67 #68 #69 #70 #71 [ 5.421006] .... node #9, CPUs: #72 #73 #74 #75 #76 #77 #78 #79 [ 6.032005] .... node #10, CPUs: #80 #81 #82 #83 #84 #85 #86 #87 [ 6.648006] .... node #11, CPUs: #88 #89 #90 #91 #92 #93 #94 #95 [ 7.262005] .... node #12, CPUs: #96 #97 #98 #99 #100 #101 #102 #103 [ 7.865005] .... node #13, CPUs: #104 #105 #106 #107 #108 #109 #110 #111 [ 8.466005] .... node #14, CPUs: #112 #113 #114 #115 #116 #117 #118 #119 [ 9.073006] .... node #15, CPUs: #120 #121 #122 #123 #124 #125 #126 #127 [ 9.679901] x86: Booted up 16 nodes, 128 CPUs and drop useless elements. Change num_digits() to hpa's division-avoiding, cell-phone-typed version which he went at great lengths and pains to submit on a Saturday evening. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

Commit 7cb2ef5 ("mm: fix aio performance regression for database caused by THP") can cause dereference of a dangling pointer if split_huge_page runs during PageHuge() if there are updates to the tail_page->private field. Also it is repeating compound_head twice for hugetlbfs and it is running compound_head+compound_trans_head for THP when a single one is needed in both cases. The new code within the PageSlab() check doesn't need to verify that the THP page size is never bigger than the smallest hugetlbfs page size, to avoid memory corruption. A longstanding theoretical race condition was found while fixing the above (see the change right after the skip_unlock label, that is relevant for the compound_lock path too). By re-establishing the _mapcount tail refcounting for all compound pages, this also fixes the below problem: echo 0 >/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages BUG: Bad page state in process bash pfn:59a01 page:ffffea000139b038 count:0 mapcount:10 mapping: (null) index:0x0 page flags: 0x1c00000000008000(tail) Modules linked in: CPU: 6 PID: 2018 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.12.0+ #25 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x55/0x76 bad_page+0xd5/0x130 free_pages_prepare+0x213/0x280 __free_pages+0x36/0x80 update_and_free_page+0xc1/0xd0 free_pool_huge_page+0xc2/0xe0 set_max_huge_pages.part.58+0x14c/0x220 nr_hugepages_store_common.isra.60+0xd0/0xf0 nr_hugepages_store+0x13/0x20 kobj_attr_store+0xf/0x20 sysfs_write_file+0x189/0x1e0 vfs_write+0xc5/0x1f0 SyS_write+0x55/0xb0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Khalid Aziz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]> Tested-by: Khalid Aziz <[email protected]> Cc: Pravin Shelar <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

…ce_activate power_supply_register() calls device_init_wakeup() to register a wakeup source before initializing dev_name. As a result, device_wakeup_enable() end up registering wakeup source with a null name when wakeup_source_register() gets called with dev_name(dev) which is null at the time. When kernel is booted with wakeup_source_activate enabled, it will panic when the trace point code tries to dereference ws->name. Fixed the problem by moving up the kobject_set_name() call prior to accesses to dev_name(). Replaced kobject_set_name() with dev_set_name() which is the right interface to be called from drivers. Fixed the call to device_del() prior to device_add() in for wakeup_init_failed error handling code. Trace after the change: bash-2143 [003] d... 132.280697: wakeup_source_activate: BAT1 state=0x20001 kworker/3:2-1169 [003] d... 132.281305: wakeup_source_deactivate: BAT1 state=0x30000 Oops message: [ 819.769934] device: 'BAT1': device_add [ 819.770078] PM: Adding info for No Bus:BAT1 [ 819.770235] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 819.770435] IP: [<ffffffff813381c0>] skip_spaces+0x30/0x30 [ 819.770572] PGD 3efd90067 PUD 3eff61067 PMD 0 [ 819.770716] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 819.770829] Modules linked in: arc4 iwldvm mac80211 x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp kvm_intel joydev i915 kvm uvcvideo ghash_clmulni_intel videobuf2_vmalloc aesni_intel videobuf2_memops videobuf2_core aes_x86_64 ablk_helper cryptd videodev iwlwifi lrw rfcomm gf128mul glue_helper bnep btusb media bluetooth parport_pc hid_generic ppdev snd_hda_codec_hdmi drm_kms_helper snd_hda_codec_realtek cfg80211 drm tpm_infineon samsung_laptop snd_hda_intel usbhid snd_hda_codec hid snd_hwdep snd_pcm microcode snd_page_alloc snd_timer psmouse i2c_algo_bit lpc_ich tpm_tis video wmi mac_hid serio_raw ext2 lp parport r8169 mii [ 819.771802] CPU: 0 PID: 2167 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.12.0+ #25 [ 819.771876] Hardware name: SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 900X3C/900X3D/900X4C/900X4D/SAMSUNG_NP1234567890, BIOS P03AAC 07/12/2012 [ 819.772022] task: ffff88002e6ddcc0 ti: ffff8804015ca000 task.ti: ffff8804015ca000 [ 819.772119] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff813381c0>] [<ffffffff813381c0>] skip_spaces+0x30/0x30 [ 819.772242] RSP: 0018:ffff8804015cbc70 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 819.772310] RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: ffff88040cfd6d40 RCX: 0000000000000018 [ 819.772397] RDX: 0000000000020001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 819.772484] RBP: ffff8804015cbcc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8803f0768d40 [ 819.772570] R10: ffffea001033b800 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff81c519c0 [ 819.772656] R13: 0000000000020001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000020001 [ 819.772744] FS: 00007ff98309b740(0000) GS:ffff88041f200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 819.772845] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 819.772917] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000003f59dc000 CR4: 00000000001407f0 [ 819.773001] Stack: [ 819.773030] ffffffff81114003 ffff8804015cbcb0 0000000000000000 0000000000000046 [ 819.773146] ffff880409757a18 ffff8803f065a160 0000000000000000 0000000000020001 [ 819.773273] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8804015cbce8 ffffffff8143e388 [ 819.773387] Call Trace: [ 819.773434] [<ffffffff81114003>] ? ftrace_raw_event_wakeup_source+0x43/0xe0 [ 819.773520] [<ffffffff8143e388>] wakeup_source_report_event+0xb8/0xd0 [ 819.773595] [<ffffffff8143e3cd>] __pm_stay_awake+0x2d/0x50 [ 819.773724] [<ffffffff8153395c>] power_supply_changed+0x3c/0x90 [ 819.773795] [<ffffffff8153407c>] power_supply_register+0x18c/0x250 [ 819.773869] [<ffffffff813d8d18>] sysfs_add_battery+0x61/0x7b [ 819.773935] [<ffffffff813d8d69>] battery_notify+0x37/0x3f [ 819.774001] [<ffffffff816ccb7c>] notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x70 [ 819.774071] [<ffffffff81073ded>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x4d/0x70 [ 819.774149] [<ffffffff81073e26>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [ 819.774227] [<ffffffff8109397a>] pm_notifier_call_chain+0x1a/0x40 [ 819.774316] [<ffffffff81095b66>] hibernate+0x66/0x1c0 [ 819.774407] [<ffffffff81093931>] state_store+0x71/0xa0 [ 819.774507] [<ffffffff81331d8f>] kobj_attr_store+0xf/0x20 [ 819.774613] [<ffffffff811f8618>] sysfs_write_file+0x128/0x1c0 [ 819.774735] [<ffffffff8118579d>] vfs_write+0xbd/0x1e0 [ 819.774841] [<ffffffff811861d9>] SyS_write+0x49/0xa0 [ 819.774939] [<ffffffff816d1052>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 819.775055] Code: 89 f8 48 89 e5 f6 82 c0 a6 84 81 20 74 15 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 c0 01 0f b6 10 f6 82 c0 a6 84 81 20 75 f0 5d c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 <80> 3f 00 55 48 89 e5 74 15 48 89 f8 0f 1f 40 00 48 83 c0 01 80 [ 819.775760] RIP [<ffffffff813381c0>] skip_spaces+0x30/0x30 [ 819.775881] RSP <ffff8804015cbc70> [ 819.775949] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 819.794175] ---[ end trace c4ef25127039952e ]--- Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]> Acked-by: Anton Vorontsov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Anton Vorontsov <[email protected]>

…after split thp Memory failures on thp tail pages cause kernel panic like below: mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged MCE exception done on CPU 7 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000058 IP: [<ffffffff811b7cd1>] dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page+0x131/0x1e0 PGD bae42067 PUD ba47d067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP ... CPU: 7 PID: 128 Comm: kworker/7:2 Tainted: G M O 3.13.0-rc4-131217-1558-00003-g83b7df08e462 #25 ... Call Trace: me_huge_page+0x3e/0x50 memory_failure+0x4bb/0xc20 mce_process_work+0x3e/0x70 process_one_work+0x171/0x420 worker_thread+0x11b/0x3a0 ? manage_workers.isra.25+0x2b0/0x2b0 kthread+0xe4/0x100 ? kthread_create_on_node+0x190/0x190 ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 ? kthread_create_on_node+0x190/0x190 ... RIP dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page+0x131/0x1e0 CR2: 0000000000000058 The reasoning of this problem is shown below: - when we have a memory error on a thp tail page, the memory error handler grabs a refcount of the head page to keep the thp under us. - Before unmapping the error page from processes, we split the thp, where page refcounts of both of head/tail pages don't change. - Then we call try_to_unmap() over the error page (which was a tail page before). We didn't pin the error page to handle the memory error, this error page is freed and removed from LRU list. - We never have the error page on LRU list, so the first page state check returns "unknown page," then we move to the second check with the saved page flag. - The saved page flag have PG_tail set, so the second page state check returns "hugepage." - We call me_huge_page() for freed error page, then we hit the above panic. The root cause is that we didn't move refcount from the head page to the tail page after split thp. So this patch suggests to do this. This panic was introduced by commit 524fca1 ("HWPOISON: fix misjudgement of page_action() for errors on mlocked pages"). Note that we did have the same refcount problem before this commit, but it was just ignored because we had only first page state check which returned "unknown page." The commit changed the refcount problem from "doesn't work" to "kernel panic." Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> [3.9+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

…ce_activate commit 80c6463 upstream. power_supply_register() calls device_init_wakeup() to register a wakeup source before initializing dev_name. As a result, device_wakeup_enable() end up registering wakeup source with a null name when wakeup_source_register() gets called with dev_name(dev) which is null at the time. When kernel is booted with wakeup_source_activate enabled, it will panic when the trace point code tries to dereference ws->name. Fixed the problem by moving up the kobject_set_name() call prior to accesses to dev_name(). Replaced kobject_set_name() with dev_set_name() which is the right interface to be called from drivers. Fixed the call to device_del() prior to device_add() in for wakeup_init_failed error handling code. Trace after the change: bash-2143 [003] d... 132.280697: wakeup_source_activate: BAT1 state=0x20001 kworker/3:2-1169 [003] d... 132.281305: wakeup_source_deactivate: BAT1 state=0x30000 Oops message: [ 819.769934] device: 'BAT1': device_add [ 819.770078] PM: Adding info for No Bus:BAT1 [ 819.770235] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 819.770435] IP: [<ffffffff813381c0>] skip_spaces+0x30/0x30 [ 819.770572] PGD 3efd90067 PUD 3eff61067 PMD 0 [ 819.770716] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 819.770829] Modules linked in: arc4 iwldvm mac80211 x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp kvm_intel joydev i915 kvm uvcvideo ghash_clmulni_intel videobuf2_vmalloc aesni_intel videobuf2_memops videobuf2_core aes_x86_64 ablk_helper cryptd videodev iwlwifi lrw rfcomm gf128mul glue_helper bnep btusb media bluetooth parport_pc hid_generic ppdev snd_hda_codec_hdmi drm_kms_helper snd_hda_codec_realtek cfg80211 drm tpm_infineon samsung_laptop snd_hda_intel usbhid snd_hda_codec hid snd_hwdep snd_pcm microcode snd_page_alloc snd_timer psmouse i2c_algo_bit lpc_ich tpm_tis video wmi mac_hid serio_raw ext2 lp parport r8169 mii [ 819.771802] CPU: 0 PID: 2167 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.12.0+ #25 [ 819.771876] Hardware name: SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 900X3C/900X3D/900X4C/900X4D/SAMSUNG_NP1234567890, BIOS P03AAC 07/12/2012 [ 819.772022] task: ffff88002e6ddcc0 ti: ffff8804015ca000 task.ti: ffff8804015ca000 [ 819.772119] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff813381c0>] [<ffffffff813381c0>] skip_spaces+0x30/0x30 [ 819.772242] RSP: 0018:ffff8804015cbc70 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 819.772310] RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: ffff88040cfd6d40 RCX: 0000000000000018 [ 819.772397] RDX: 0000000000020001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 819.772484] RBP: ffff8804015cbcc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8803f0768d40 [ 819.772570] R10: ffffea001033b800 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff81c519c0 [ 819.772656] R13: 0000000000020001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000020001 [ 819.772744] FS: 00007ff98309b740(0000) GS:ffff88041f200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 819.772845] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 819.772917] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000003f59dc000 CR4: 00000000001407f0 [ 819.773001] Stack: [ 819.773030] ffffffff81114003 ffff8804015cbcb0 0000000000000000 0000000000000046 [ 819.773146] ffff880409757a18 ffff8803f065a160 0000000000000000 0000000000020001 [ 819.773273] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8804015cbce8 ffffffff8143e388 [ 819.773387] Call Trace: [ 819.773434] [<ffffffff81114003>] ? ftrace_raw_event_wakeup_source+0x43/0xe0 [ 819.773520] [<ffffffff8143e388>] wakeup_source_report_event+0xb8/0xd0 [ 819.773595] [<ffffffff8143e3cd>] __pm_stay_awake+0x2d/0x50 [ 819.773724] [<ffffffff8153395c>] power_supply_changed+0x3c/0x90 [ 819.773795] [<ffffffff8153407c>] power_supply_register+0x18c/0x250 [ 819.773869] [<ffffffff813d8d18>] sysfs_add_battery+0x61/0x7b [ 819.773935] [<ffffffff813d8d69>] battery_notify+0x37/0x3f [ 819.774001] [<ffffffff816ccb7c>] notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x70 [ 819.774071] [<ffffffff81073ded>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x4d/0x70 [ 819.774149] [<ffffffff81073e26>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [ 819.774227] [<ffffffff8109397a>] pm_notifier_call_chain+0x1a/0x40 [ 819.774316] [<ffffffff81095b66>] hibernate+0x66/0x1c0 [ 819.774407] [<ffffffff81093931>] state_store+0x71/0xa0 [ 819.774507] [<ffffffff81331d8f>] kobj_attr_store+0xf/0x20 [ 819.774613] [<ffffffff811f8618>] sysfs_write_file+0x128/0x1c0 [ 819.774735] [<ffffffff8118579d>] vfs_write+0xbd/0x1e0 [ 819.774841] [<ffffffff811861d9>] SyS_write+0x49/0xa0 [ 819.774939] [<ffffffff816d1052>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 819.775055] Code: 89 f8 48 89 e5 f6 82 c0 a6 84 81 20 74 15 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 c0 01 0f b6 10 f6 82 c0 a6 84 81 20 75 f0 5d c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 <80> 3f 00 55 48 89 e5 74 15 48 89 f8 0f 1f 40 00 48 83 c0 01 80 [ 819.775760] RIP [<ffffffff813381c0>] skip_spaces+0x30/0x30 [ 819.775881] RSP <ffff8804015cbc70> [ 819.775949] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 819.794175] ---[ end trace c4ef25127039952e ]--- Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]> Acked-by: Anton Vorontsov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anton Vorontsov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…after split thp commit a3e0f9e upstream. Memory failures on thp tail pages cause kernel panic like below: mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged MCE exception done on CPU 7 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000058 IP: [<ffffffff811b7cd1>] dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page+0x131/0x1e0 PGD bae42067 PUD ba47d067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP ... CPU: 7 PID: 128 Comm: kworker/7:2 Tainted: G M O 3.13.0-rc4-131217-1558-00003-g83b7df08e462 #25 ... Call Trace: me_huge_page+0x3e/0x50 memory_failure+0x4bb/0xc20 mce_process_work+0x3e/0x70 process_one_work+0x171/0x420 worker_thread+0x11b/0x3a0 ? manage_workers.isra.25+0x2b0/0x2b0 kthread+0xe4/0x100 ? kthread_create_on_node+0x190/0x190 ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 ? kthread_create_on_node+0x190/0x190 ... RIP dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page+0x131/0x1e0 CR2: 0000000000000058 The reasoning of this problem is shown below: - when we have a memory error on a thp tail page, the memory error handler grabs a refcount of the head page to keep the thp under us. - Before unmapping the error page from processes, we split the thp, where page refcounts of both of head/tail pages don't change. - Then we call try_to_unmap() over the error page (which was a tail page before). We didn't pin the error page to handle the memory error, this error page is freed and removed from LRU list. - We never have the error page on LRU list, so the first page state check returns "unknown page," then we move to the second check with the saved page flag. - The saved page flag have PG_tail set, so the second page state check returns "hugepage." - We call me_huge_page() for freed error page, then we hit the above panic. The root cause is that we didn't move refcount from the head page to the tail page after split thp. So this patch suggests to do this. This panic was introduced by commit 524fca1 ("HWPOISON: fix misjudgement of page_action() for errors on mlocked pages"). Note that we did have the same refcount problem before this commit, but it was just ignored because we had only first page state check which returned "unknown page." The commit changed the refcount problem from "doesn't work" to "kernel panic." Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 27c73ae upstream. Commit 7cb2ef5 ("mm: fix aio performance regression for database caused by THP") can cause dereference of a dangling pointer if split_huge_page runs during PageHuge() if there are updates to the tail_page->private field. Also it is repeating compound_head twice for hugetlbfs and it is running compound_head+compound_trans_head for THP when a single one is needed in both cases. The new code within the PageSlab() check doesn't need to verify that the THP page size is never bigger than the smallest hugetlbfs page size, to avoid memory corruption. A longstanding theoretical race condition was found while fixing the above (see the change right after the skip_unlock label, that is relevant for the compound_lock path too). By re-establishing the _mapcount tail refcounting for all compound pages, this also fixes the below problem: echo 0 >/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages BUG: Bad page state in process bash pfn:59a01 page:ffffea000139b038 count:0 mapcount:10 mapping: (null) index:0x0 page flags: 0x1c00000000008000(tail) Modules linked in: CPU: 6 PID: 2018 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.12.0+ #25 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x55/0x76 bad_page+0xd5/0x130 free_pages_prepare+0x213/0x280 __free_pages+0x36/0x80 update_and_free_page+0xc1/0xd0 free_pool_huge_page+0xc2/0xe0 set_max_huge_pages.part.58+0x14c/0x220 nr_hugepages_store_common.isra.60+0xd0/0xf0 nr_hugepages_store+0x13/0x20 kobj_attr_store+0xf/0x20 sysfs_write_file+0x189/0x1e0 vfs_write+0xc5/0x1f0 SyS_write+0x55/0xb0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Khalid Aziz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]> Tested-by: Khalid Aziz <[email protected]> Cc: Pravin Shelar <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Guillaume Morin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…after split thp commit a3e0f9e upstream. Memory failures on thp tail pages cause kernel panic like below: mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged MCE exception done on CPU 7 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000058 IP: [<ffffffff811b7cd1>] dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page+0x131/0x1e0 PGD bae42067 PUD ba47d067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [hardkernel#1] SMP ... CPU: 7 PID: 128 Comm: kworker/7:2 Tainted: G M O 3.13.0-rc4-131217-1558-00003-g83b7df08e462 hardkernel#25 ... Call Trace: me_huge_page+0x3e/0x50 memory_failure+0x4bb/0xc20 mce_process_work+0x3e/0x70 process_one_work+0x171/0x420 worker_thread+0x11b/0x3a0 ? manage_workers.isra.25+0x2b0/0x2b0 kthread+0xe4/0x100 ? kthread_create_on_node+0x190/0x190 ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 ? kthread_create_on_node+0x190/0x190 ... RIP dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page+0x131/0x1e0 CR2: 0000000000000058 The reasoning of this problem is shown below: - when we have a memory error on a thp tail page, the memory error handler grabs a refcount of the head page to keep the thp under us. - Before unmapping the error page from processes, we split the thp, where page refcounts of both of head/tail pages don't change. - Then we call try_to_unmap() over the error page (which was a tail page before). We didn't pin the error page to handle the memory error, this error page is freed and removed from LRU list. - We never have the error page on LRU list, so the first page state check returns "unknown page," then we move to the second check with the saved page flag. - The saved page flag have PG_tail set, so the second page state check returns "hugepage." - We call me_huge_page() for freed error page, then we hit the above panic. The root cause is that we didn't move refcount from the head page to the tail page after split thp. So this patch suggests to do this. This panic was introduced by commit 524fca1 ("HWPOISON: fix misjudgement of page_action() for errors on mlocked pages"). Note that we did have the same refcount problem before this commit, but it was just ignored because we had only first page state check which returned "unknown page." The commit changed the refcount problem from "doesn't work" to "kernel panic." Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 27c73ae upstream. Commit 7cb2ef5 ("mm: fix aio performance regression for database caused by THP") can cause dereference of a dangling pointer if split_huge_page runs during PageHuge() if there are updates to the tail_page->private field. Also it is repeating compound_head twice for hugetlbfs and it is running compound_head+compound_trans_head for THP when a single one is needed in both cases. The new code within the PageSlab() check doesn't need to verify that the THP page size is never bigger than the smallest hugetlbfs page size, to avoid memory corruption. A longstanding theoretical race condition was found while fixing the above (see the change right after the skip_unlock label, that is relevant for the compound_lock path too). By re-establishing the _mapcount tail refcounting for all compound pages, this also fixes the below problem: echo 0 >/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages BUG: Bad page state in process bash pfn:59a01 page:ffffea000139b038 count:0 mapcount:10 mapping: (null) index:0x0 page flags: 0x1c00000000008000(tail) Modules linked in: CPU: 6 PID: 2018 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.12.0+ hardkernel#25 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x55/0x76 bad_page+0xd5/0x130 free_pages_prepare+0x213/0x280 __free_pages+0x36/0x80 update_and_free_page+0xc1/0xd0 free_pool_huge_page+0xc2/0xe0 set_max_huge_pages.part.58+0x14c/0x220 nr_hugepages_store_common.isra.60+0xd0/0xf0 nr_hugepages_store+0x13/0x20 kobj_attr_store+0xf/0x20 sysfs_write_file+0x189/0x1e0 vfs_write+0xc5/0x1f0 SyS_write+0x55/0xb0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Khalid Aziz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]> Tested-by: Khalid Aziz <[email protected]> Cc: Pravin Shelar <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Guillaume Morin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

airq_iv_(alloc|free) is called by some users with interrupts enabled and by some with interrupts disabled which leads to the following lockdep warning: [ INFO: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected ] 3.14.0-15249-gbf29b7b-dirty hardkernel#25 Not tainted --------------------------------------------------------- insmod/2108 just changed the state of lock: (&(&iv->lock)->rlock){+.....}, at: [<000000000046ee3e>] airq_iv_alloc+0x62/0x228 but this lock was taken by another, HARDIRQ-READ-safe lock in the past: (&info->lock){.-.-..} and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&(&iv->lock)->rlock); local_irq_disable(); lock(&info->lock); lock(&(&iv->lock)->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&info->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** Although this is a false alarm (since each airq user consistently calls these functions from the same context) fix this by ensuring that interrupts are disabled when the airq lock is held. Reported-by: Frank Blaschka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Ott <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>

mm could be removed from current task struct, using previous vma->vm_mm It will crash on blackfin after updated to Linux 3.15. The commit "mm: per-thread vma caching" caused the crash. mm could be removed from current task struct before mmput()-> exit_mmap()-> delete_vma_from_mm() the detailed fault information: NULL pointer access Kernel OOPS in progress Deferred Exception context CURRENT PROCESS: COMM=modprobe PID=278 CPU=0 invalid mm return address: [0x000531de]; contents of: 0x000531b0: c727 acea 0c42 181d 0000 0000 0000 a0a8 0x000531c0: b090 acaa 0c42 1806 0000 0000 0000 a0e8 0x000531d0: b0d0 e801 0000 05b3 0010 e522 0046 [a090] 0x000531e0: 6408 b090 0c00 17cc 3042 e3ff f37b 2fc8 CPU: 0 PID: 278 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 3.15.0-ADI-2014R1-pre-00345-gea9f446 hardkernel#25 task: 0572b720 ti: 0569e000 task.ti: 0569e000 Compiled for cpu family 0x27fe (Rev 0), but running on:0x0000 (Rev 0) ADSP-BF609-0.0 500(MHz CCLK) 125(MHz SCLK) (mpu off) Linux version 3.15.0-ADI-2014R1-pre-00345-gea9f446 (steven@steven-OptiPlex-390) (gcc version 4.3.5 (ADI-trunk/svn-5962) ) hardkernel#25 Tue Jun 10 17:47:46 CST 2014 SEQUENCER STATUS: Not tainted SEQSTAT: 00000027 IPEND: 8008 IMASK: ffff SYSCFG: 2806 EXCAUSE : 0x27 physical IVG3 asserted : <0xffa00744> { _trap + 0x0 } physical IVG15 asserted : <0xffa00d68> { _evt_system_call + 0x0 } logical irq 6 mapped : <0xffa003bc> { _bfin_coretmr_interrupt + 0x0 } logical irq 7 mapped : <0x00008828> { _bfin_fault_routine + 0x0 } logical irq 11 mapped : <0x00007724> { _l2_ecc_err + 0x0 } logical irq 13 mapped : <0x00008828> { _bfin_fault_routine + 0x0 } logical irq 39 mapped : <0x00150788> { _bfin_twi_interrupt_entry + 0x0 } logical irq 40 mapped : <0x00150788> { _bfin_twi_interrupt_entry + 0x0 } RETE: <0x00000000> /* Maybe null pointer? */ RETN: <0x0569fe50> /* kernel dynamic memory (maybe user-space) */ RETX: <0x00000480> /* Maybe fixed code section */ RETS: <0x00053384> { _exit_mmap + 0x28 } PC : <0x000531de> { _delete_vma_from_mm + 0x92 } DCPLB_FAULT_ADDR: <0x00000008> /* Maybe null pointer? */ ICPLB_FAULT_ADDR: <0x000531de> { _delete_vma_from_mm + 0x92 } PROCESSOR STATE: R0 : 00000004 R1 : 0569e000 R2 : 00bf3db4 R3 : 00000000 R4 : 057f9800 R5 : 00000001 R6 : 0569ddd0 R7 : 0572b720 P0 : 0572b854 P1 : 00000004 P2 : 00000000 P3 : 0569dda0 P4 : 0572b720 P5 : 0566c368 FP : 0569fe5c SP : 0569fd74 LB0: 057f523f LT0: 057f523e LC0: 00000000 LB1: 0005317c LT1: 00053172 LC1: 00000002 B0 : 00000000 L0 : 00000000 M0 : 0566f5bc I0 : 00000000 B1 : 00000000 L1 : 00000000 M1 : 00000000 I1 : ffffffff B2 : 00000001 L2 : 00000000 M2 : 00000000 I2 : 00000000 B3 : 00000000 L3 : 00000000 M3 : 00000000 I3 : 057f8000 A0.w: 00000000 A0.x: 00000000 A1.w: 00000000 A1.x: 00000000 USP : 056ffcf8 ASTAT: 02003024 Hardware Trace: 0 Target : <0x00003fb8> { _trap_c + 0x0 } Source : <0xffa006d8> { _exception_to_level5 + 0xa0 } JUMP.L 1 Target : <0xffa00638> { _exception_to_level5 + 0x0 } Source : <0xffa004f2> { _bfin_return_from_exception + 0x6 } RTX 2 Target : <0xffa004ec> { _bfin_return_from_exception + 0x0 } Source : <0xffa00590> { _ex_trap_c + 0x70 } JUMP.S 3 Target : <0xffa00520> { _ex_trap_c + 0x0 } Source : <0xffa0076e> { _trap + 0x2a } JUMP (P4) 4 Target : <0xffa00744> { _trap + 0x0 } FAULT : <0x000531de> { _delete_vma_from_mm + 0x92 } P0 = W[P2 + 2] Source : <0x000531da> { _delete_vma_from_mm + 0x8e } P2 = [P4 + 0x18] 5 Target : <0x000531da> { _delete_vma_from_mm + 0x8e } Source : <0x00053176> { _delete_vma_from_mm + 0x2a } IF CC JUMP pcrel 6 Target : <0x0005314c> { _delete_vma_from_mm + 0x0 } Source : <0x00053380> { _exit_mmap + 0x24 } JUMP.L 7 Target : <0x00053378> { _exit_mmap + 0x1c } Source : <0x00053394> { _exit_mmap + 0x38 } IF !CC JUMP pcrel (BP) 8 Target : <0x00053390> { _exit_mmap + 0x34 } Source : <0xffa020e0> { __cond_resched + 0x20 } RTS 9 Target : <0xffa020c0> { __cond_resched + 0x0 } Source : <0x0005338c> { _exit_mmap + 0x30 } JUMP.L 10 Target : <0x0005338c> { _exit_mmap + 0x30 } Source : <0x0005333a> { _delete_vma + 0xb2 } RTS 11 Target : <0x00053334> { _delete_vma + 0xac } Source : <0x0005507a> { _kmem_cache_free + 0xba } RTS 12 Target : <0x00055068> { _kmem_cache_free + 0xa8 } Source : <0x0005505e> { _kmem_cache_free + 0x9e } IF !CC JUMP pcrel (BP) 13 Target : <0x00055052> { _kmem_cache_free + 0x92 } Source : <0x0005501a> { _kmem_cache_free + 0x5a } IF CC JUMP pcrel 14 Target : <0x00054ff4> { _kmem_cache_free + 0x34 } Source : <0x00054fce> { _kmem_cache_free + 0xe } IF CC JUMP pcrel (BP) 15 Target : <0x00054fc0> { _kmem_cache_free + 0x0 } Source : <0x00053330> { _delete_vma + 0xa8 } JUMP.L Kernel Stack Stack info: SP: [0x0569ff24] <0x0569ff24> /* kernel dynamic memory (maybe user-space) */ Memory from 0x0569ff20 to 056a0000 0569ff20: 00000001 [04e8da5a] 00008000 00000000 00000000 056a0000 04e8da5a 04e8da5a 0569ff40: 04eb9eea ffa00dce 02003025 04ea09c5 057f523f 04ea09c4 057f523e 00000000 0569ff60: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001 00000000 0569ff80: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 0569ffa0: 0566f5bc 057f8000 057f8000 00000001 04ec0170 056ffcf8 056ffd04 057f9800 0569ffc0: 04d1d498 057f9800 057f8fe4 057f8ef0 00000001 057f928c 00000001 00000001 0569ffe0: 057f9800 00000000 00000008 00000007 00000001 00000001 00000001 <00002806> Return addresses in stack: address : <0x00002806> { _show_cpuinfo + 0x2d2 } Modules linked in: Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel exception [ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel exception Signed-off-by: Steven Miao <[email protected]> Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> [3.15.x] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

commit 27c73ae upstream. Commit 7cb2ef5 ("mm: fix aio performance regression for database caused by THP") can cause dereference of a dangling pointer if split_huge_page runs during PageHuge() if there are updates to the tail_page->private field. Also it is repeating compound_head twice for hugetlbfs and it is running compound_head+compound_trans_head for THP when a single one is needed in both cases. The new code within the PageSlab() check doesn't need to verify that the THP page size is never bigger than the smallest hugetlbfs page size, to avoid memory corruption. A longstanding theoretical race condition was found while fixing the above (see the change right after the skip_unlock label, that is relevant for the compound_lock path too). By re-establishing the _mapcount tail refcounting for all compound pages, this also fixes the below problem: echo 0 >/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages BUG: Bad page state in process bash pfn:59a01 page:ffffea000139b038 count:0 mapcount:10 mapping: (null) index:0x0 page flags: 0x1c00000000008000(tail) Modules linked in: CPU: 6 PID: 2018 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.12.0+ #25 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x55/0x76 bad_page+0xd5/0x130 free_pages_prepare+0x213/0x280 __free_pages+0x36/0x80 update_and_free_page+0xc1/0xd0 free_pool_huge_page+0xc2/0xe0 set_max_huge_pages.part.58+0x14c/0x220 nr_hugepages_store_common.isra.60+0xd0/0xf0 nr_hugepages_store+0x13/0x20 kobj_attr_store+0xf/0x20 sysfs_write_file+0x189/0x1e0 vfs_write+0xc5/0x1f0 SyS_write+0x55/0xb0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Khalid Aziz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]> Tested-by: Khalid Aziz <[email protected]> Cc: Pravin Shelar <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Guillaume Morin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 6ffa30d upstream. Bruce reported seeing this warning pop when mounting using v4.1: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1121 at kernel/sched/core.c:7300 __might_sleep+0xbd/0xd0() do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<ffffffff810ff58f>] prepare_to_wait+0x2f/0x90 Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace sunrpc fscache ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 xt_conntrack ebtable_nat ebtable_broute bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_nat nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_nat_ipv6 ip6table_mangle ip6table_security ip6table_raw ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_mangle iptable_security iptable_raw snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_controller snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer ppdev joydev snd virtio_console virtio_balloon pcspkr serio_raw parport_pc parport pvpanic floppy soundcore i2c_piix4 virtio_blk virtio_net qxl drm_kms_helper ttm drm virtio_pci virtio_ring ata_generic virtio pata_acpi CPU: 1 PID: 1121 Comm: nfsv4.1-svc Not tainted 3.19.0-rc4+ #25 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140709_153950- 04/01/2014 0000000000000000 000000004e5e3f73 ffff8800b998fb48 ffffffff8186ac78 0000000000000000 ffff8800b998fba0 ffff8800b998fb88 ffffffff810ac9da ffff8800b998fb68 ffffffff81c923e7 00000000000004d9 0000000000000000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8186ac78>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x65 [<ffffffff810ac9da>] warn_slowpath_common+0x8a/0xc0 [<ffffffff810aca65>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x55/0x70 [<ffffffff810ff58f>] ? prepare_to_wait+0x2f/0x90 [<ffffffff810ff58f>] ? prepare_to_wait+0x2f/0x90 [<ffffffff810dd2ad>] __might_sleep+0xbd/0xd0 [<ffffffff8124c973>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x243/0x430 [<ffffffff810d941e>] ? groups_alloc+0x3e/0x130 [<ffffffff810d941e>] groups_alloc+0x3e/0x130 [<ffffffffa0301b1e>] svcauth_unix_accept+0x16e/0x290 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa0300571>] svc_authenticate+0xe1/0xf0 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa02fc564>] svc_process_common+0x244/0x6a0 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa02fd044>] bc_svc_process+0x1c4/0x260 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa03d5478>] nfs41_callback_svc+0x128/0x1f0 [nfsv4] [<ffffffff810ff970>] ? wait_woken+0xc0/0xc0 [<ffffffffa03d5350>] ? nfs4_callback_svc+0x60/0x60 [nfsv4] [<ffffffff810d45bf>] kthread+0x11f/0x140 [<ffffffff810ea815>] ? local_clock+0x15/0x30 [<ffffffff810d44a0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x250/0x250 [<ffffffff81874bfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [<ffffffff810d44a0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x250/0x250 ---[ end trace 675220a11e30f4f2 ]--- nfs41_callback_svc does most of its work while in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, which is just wrong. Fix that by finishing the wait immediately if we've found that the list has something on it. Also, we don't expect this kthread to accept signals, so we should be using a TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE sleep instead. That however, opens us up hung task warnings from the watchdog, so have the schedule_timeout wake up every 60s if there's no callback activity. Reported-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

The ehci_init_driver is used to initialize hcd APIs for each ehci controller driver, it is designed to be called only one time and before driver register is called. The current design will cause ehci_init_driver is called multiple times at probe process, it will cause hc_driver's initialization affect current running hcd. We run out NULL pointer dereference problem when one hcd is started by module_init, and the other is started by otg thread at SMP platform. The reason for this problem is ehci_init_driver will do memory copy for current uniform hc_driver, and this memory copy will do memset (as 0) first, so when the first hcd is running usb_add_hcd, and the second hcd may clear the uniform hc_driver's space (at ehci_init_driver), then the first hcd will meet NULL pointer at the same time. See below two logs: LOG_1: ci_hdrc ci_hdrc.0: EHCI Host Controller ci_hdrc ci_hdrc.0: new USB bus registered, assigned bus number 1 ci_hdrc ci_hdrc.1: doesn't support gadget Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000014 pgd = 80004000 [00000014] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 805 [hardkernel#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 108 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 3.14.38-222193-g24b2734-dirty hardkernel#25 Workqueue: ci_otg ci_otg_work task: d839ec00 ti: d8400000 task.ti: d8400000 PC is at ehci_run+0x4c/0x284 LR is at _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x28/0x54 pc : [<8041f9a0>] lr : [<8070ea84>] psr: 60000113 sp : d8401e30 ip : 00000000 fp : d8004400 r10: 00000001 r9 : 00000001 r8 : 00000000 r7 : 00000000 r6 : d8419940 r5 : 80dd24c0 r4 : d8419800 r3 : 8001d060 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 00000001 r0 : 00000000 Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment kernel Control: 10c53c7d Table: 1000404a DAC: 00000015 Process kworker/u8:2 (pid: 108, stack limit = 0xd8400238) Stack: (0xd8401e30 to 0xd8402000) 1e20: d87523c0 d8401e48 66667562 d8419800 1e40: 00000000 00000000 d8419800 00000000 00000000 00000000 d84198b0 8040fcdc 1e60: 00000000 80dd320c d8477610 d8419c00 d803d010 d8419800 00000000 00000000 1e80: d8004400 00000000 d8400008 80431494 80431374 d803d100 d803d010 d803d1ac 1ea0: 00000000 80432428 804323d4 d803d100 00000001 80435eb8 80e0d0bc d803d100 1ec0: 00000006 80436458 00000000 d803d100 80e92ec8 80436f44 d803d010 d803d100 1ee0: d83fde00 8043292c d8752710 d803d1f4 d803d010 8042ddfc 8042ddb8 d83f3b00 1f00: d803d1f4 80042b60 00000000 00000003 00000001 00000001 80054598 d83f3b00 1f20: d8004400 d83f3b18 d8004414 d8400000 80e3957b 00000089 d8004400 80043814 1f40: d839ec00 00000000 d83fcd80 d83f3b00 800436e4 00000000 00000000 00000000 1f60: 00000000 80048f34 00000000 00000000 00000000 d83f3b00 00000000 00000000 1f80: d8401f80 d8401f80 00000000 00000000 d8401f90 d8401f90 d8401fac d83fcd80 1fa0: 80048e68 00000000 00000000 8000e538 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 1fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 1fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 00000000 00000000 [<8041f9a0>] (ehci_run) from [<8040fcdc>] (usb_add_hcd+0x248/0x6e8) [<8040fcdc>] (usb_add_hcd) from [<80431494>] (host_start+0x120/0x2e4) [<80431494>] (host_start) from [<80432428>] (ci_otg_start_host+0x54/0xbc) [<80432428>] (ci_otg_start_host) from [<80435eb8>] (otg_set_protocol+0xa4/0xd0) [<80435eb8>] (otg_set_protocol) from [<80436458>] (otg_set_state+0x574/0xc58) [<80436458>] (otg_set_state) from [<80436f44>] (otg_statemachine+0x408/0x46c) [<80436f44>] (otg_statemachine) from [<8043292c>] (ci_otg_fsm_work+0x3c/0x190) [<8043292c>] (ci_otg_fsm_work) from [<8042ddfc>] (ci_otg_work+0x44/0x1c4) [<8042ddfc>] (ci_otg_work) from [<80042b60>] (process_one_work+0xf4/0x35c) [<80042b60>] (process_one_work) from [<80043814>] (worker_thread+0x130/0x3bc) [<80043814>] (worker_thread) from [<80048f34>] (kthread+0xcc/0xe4) [<80048f34>] (kthread) from [<8000e538>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c) Code: e5953018 e3530000 0a000000 e12fff33 (e5878014) LOG_2: ci_hdrc ci_hdrc.0: EHCI Host Controller ci_hdrc ci_hdrc.0: new USB bus registered, assigned bus number 1 ci_hdrc ci_hdrc.1: doesn't support gadget Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 pgd = 80004000 [00000000] *pgd=00000000 In Online 00:00ternal e Offline rror: Oops: 80000005 [hardkernel#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 108 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 3.14.38-02007-g24b2734-dirty hardkernel#127 Workque Online 00:00ue: ci_o Offline tg ci_otg_work Online 00:00task: d8 Offline 39ec00 ti: d83ea000 task.ti: d83ea000 PC is at 0x0 LR is at usb_add_hcd+0x248/0x6e8 pc : [<00000000>] lr : [<8040f644>] psr: 60000113 sp : d83ebe60 ip : 00000000 fp : d8004400 r10: 00000001 r9 : 00000001 r8 : d85fd4b0 r7 : 00000000 r6 : 00000000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : d85fd400 r3 : 00000000 r2 : d85fd4f4 r1 : 80410178 r0 : d85fd400 Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment kernel Control: 10c53c7d Table: 1000404a DAC: 00000015 Process kworker/u8:2 (pid: 108, stack limit = 0xd83ea238) Stack: (0xd83ebe60 to 0xd83ec000) be60: 00000000 80dd920c d8654e10 d85fd800 d803e010 d85fd400 00000000 00000000 be80: d8004400 00000000 d83ea008 80430e34 80430d14 d803e100 d803e010 d803e1ac bea0: 00000000 80431dc8 80431d74 d803e100 00000001 80435858 80e130bc d803e100 bec0: 00000006 80435df8 00000000 d803e100 80e98ec8 804368e4 d803e010 d803e100 bee0: d86e8100 804322cc d86cf050 d803e1f4 d803e010 8042d79c 8042d758 d83cf900 bf00: d803e1f4 80042b78 00000000 00000003 00000001 00000001 800545e8 d83cf900 bf20: d8004400 d83cf918 d8004414 d83ea000 80e3f57b 00000089 d8004400 8004382c bf40: d839ec00 00000000 d8393780 d83cf900 800436fc 00000000 00000000 00000000 bf60: 00000000 80048f50 80e019f4 00000000 0000264c d83cf900 00000000 00000000 bf80: d83ebf80 d83ebf80 00000000 00000000 d83ebf90 d83ebf90 d83ebfac d8393780 bfa0: 80048e84 00000000 00000000 8000e538 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 bfc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 bfe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 ee66e85d 133ebd03 [<804 Online 00:000f644>] Offline (usb_add_hcd) from [<80430e34>] (host_start+0x120/0x2e4) [<80430e34>] (host_start) from [<80431dc8>] (ci_otg_start_host+0x54/0xbc) [<80431dc8>] (ci_otg_start_host) from [<80435858>] (otg_set_protocol+0xa4/0xd0) [<80435858>] (otg_set_protocol) from [<80435df8>] (otg_set_state+0x574/0xc58) [<80435df8>] (otg_set_state) from [<804368e4>] (otg_statemachine+0x408/0x46c) [<804368e4>] (otg_statemachine) from [<804322cc>] (ci_otg_fsm_work+0x3c/0x190) [<804322cc>] (ci_otg_fsm_work) from [<8042d79c>] (ci_otg_work+0x44/0x1c4) [<8042d79c>] (ci_otg_work) from [<80042b78>] (process_one_work+0xf4/0x35c) [<80042b78>] (process_one_work) from [<8004382c>] (worker_thread+0x130/0x3bc) [<8004382c>] (worker_thread) from [<80048f50>] (kthread+0xcc/0xe4) [<80048f50>] (kthread) from [<8000e538>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c) Code: bad PC value Cc: Jun Li <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Alan Stern <[email protected]> Acked-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Chen <[email protected]>

Nikolay has reported a hang when a memcg reclaim got stuck with the following backtrace: PID: 18308 TASK: ffff883d7c9b0a30 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "rsync" #0 __schedule at ffffffff815ab152 hardkernel#1 schedule at ffffffff815ab76e hardkernel#2 schedule_timeout at ffffffff815ae5e5 hardkernel#3 io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff815aad6a hardkernel#4 bit_wait_io at ffffffff815abfc6 hardkernel#5 __wait_on_bit at ffffffff815abda5 hardkernel#6 wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff8111fd4f hardkernel#7 shrink_page_list at ffffffff81135445 hardkernel#8 shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81135845 hardkernel#9 shrink_lruvec at ffffffff81135ead hardkernel#10 shrink_zone at ffffffff811360c3 hardkernel#11 shrink_zones at ffffffff81136eff hardkernel#12 do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8113712f hardkernel#13 try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages at ffffffff811372be hardkernel#14 try_charge at ffffffff81189423 hardkernel#15 mem_cgroup_try_charge at ffffffff8118c6f5 hardkernel#16 __add_to_page_cache_locked at ffffffff8112137d hardkernel#17 add_to_page_cache_lru at ffffffff81121618 hardkernel#18 pagecache_get_page at ffffffff8112170b hardkernel#19 grow_dev_page at ffffffff811c8297 hardkernel#20 __getblk_slow at ffffffff811c91d6 hardkernel#21 __getblk_gfp at ffffffff811c92c1 hardkernel#22 ext4_ext_grow_indepth at ffffffff8124565c hardkernel#23 ext4_ext_create_new_leaf at ffffffff81246ca8 hardkernel#24 ext4_ext_insert_extent at ffffffff81246f09 hardkernel#25 ext4_ext_map_blocks at ffffffff8124a848 hardkernel#26 ext4_map_blocks at ffffffff8121a5b7 hardkernel#27 mpage_map_one_extent at ffffffff8121b1fa hardkernel#28 mpage_map_and_submit_extent at ffffffff8121f07b hardkernel#29 ext4_writepages at ffffffff8121f6d5 hardkernel#30 do_writepages at ffffffff8112c490 hardkernel#31 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffff81120199 hardkernel#32 filemap_flush at ffffffff8112041c hardkernel#33 ext4_alloc_da_blocks at ffffffff81219da1 hardkernel#34 ext4_rename at ffffffff81229b91 hardkernel#35 ext4_rename2 at ffffffff81229e32 hardkernel#36 vfs_rename at ffffffff811a08a5 hardkernel#37 SYSC_renameat2 at ffffffff811a3ffc hardkernel#38 sys_renameat2 at ffffffff811a408e hardkernel#39 sys_rename at ffffffff8119e51e hardkernel#40 system_call_fastpath at ffffffff815afa89 Dave Chinner has properly pointed out that this is a deadlock in the reclaim code because ext4 doesn't submit pages which are marked by PG_writeback right away. The heuristic was introduced by commit e62e384 ("memcg: prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") and it was applied only when may_enter_fs was specified. The code has been changed by c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") which has removed the __GFP_FS restriction with a reasoning that we do not get into the fs code. But this is not sufficient apparently because the fs doesn't necessarily submit pages marked PG_writeback for IO right away. ext4_bio_write_page calls io_submit_add_bh but that doesn't necessarily submit the bio. Instead it tries to map more pages into the bio and mpage_map_one_extent might trigger memcg charge which might end up waiting on a page which is marked PG_writeback but hasn't been submitted yet so we would end up waiting for something that never finishes. Fix this issue by replacing __GFP_IO by may_enter_fs check (for case 2) before we go to wait on the writeback. The page fault path, which is the only path that triggers memcg oom killer since 3.12, shouldn't require GFP_NOFS and so we shouldn't reintroduce the premature OOM killer issue which was originally addressed by the heuristic. As per David Chinner the xfs is doing similar thing since 2.6.15 already so ext4 is not the only affected filesystem. Moreover he notes: : For example: IO completion might require unwritten extent conversion : which executes filesystem transactions and GFP_NOFS allocations. The : writeback flag on the pages can not be cleared until unwritten : extent conversion completes. Hence memory reclaim cannot wait on : page writeback to complete in GFP_NOFS context because it is not : safe to do so, memcg reclaim or otherwise. Cc: [email protected] # 3.9+ [[email protected]: corrected the control flow] Fixes: c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

commit 1c7de2b upstream. There is at least one Chelsio 10Gb card which uses VPD area to store some non-standard blocks (example below). However pci_vpd_size() returns the length of the first block only assuming that there can be only one VPD "End Tag". Since 4e1a635 ("vfio/pci: Use kernel VPD access functions"), VFIO blocks access beyond that offset, which prevents the guest "cxgb3" driver from probing the device. The host system does not have this problem as its driver accesses the config space directly without pci_read_vpd(). Add a quirk to override the VPD size to a bigger value. The maximum size is taken from EEPROMSIZE in drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/common.h. We do not read the tag as the cxgb3 driver does as the driver supports writing to EEPROM/VPD and when it writes, it only checks for 8192 bytes boundary. The quirk is registered for all devices supported by the cxgb3 driver. This adds a quirk to the PCI layer (not to the cxgb3 driver) as the cxgb3 driver itself accesses VPD directly and the problem only exists with the vfio-pci driver (when cxgb3 is not running on the host and may not be even loaded) which blocks accesses beyond the first block of VPD data. However vfio-pci itself does not have quirks mechanism so we add it to PCI. This is the controller: Ethernet controller [0200]: Chelsio Communications Inc T310 10GbE Single Port Adapter [1425:0030] This is what I parsed from its VPD: === b'\x82*\x0010 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter\x90J\x00EC\x07D76809 FN\x0746K' 0000 Large item 42 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String b'10 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter' 002d Large item 74 bytes; name 0x10 #00 [EC] len=7: b'D76809 ' #0a [FN] len=7: b'46K7897' hardkernel#14 [PN] len=7: b'46K7897' #1e [MN] len=4: b'1037' hardkernel#25 [FC] len=4: b'5769' #2c [SN] len=12: b'YL102035603V' #3b [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1' 007a Small item 1 bytes; name 0xf End Tag 0c00 Large item 16 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String b'S310E-SR-X ' 0c13 Large item 234 bytes; name 0x10 #00 [PN] len=16: b'TBD ' hardkernel#13 [EC] len=16: b'110107730D2 ' hardkernel#26 [SN] len=16: b'97YL102035603V ' hardkernel#39 [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1' hardkernel#48 [V0] len=6: b'175000' hardkernel#51 [V1] len=6: b'266666' #5a [V2] len=6: b'266666' hardkernel#63 [V3] len=6: b'2000 ' #6c [V4] len=2: b'1 ' hardkernel#71 [V5] len=6: b'c2 ' #7a [V6] len=6: b'0 ' hardkernel#83 [V7] len=2: b'1 ' hardkernel#88 [V8] len=2: b'0 ' #8d [V9] len=2: b'0 ' hardkernel#92 [VA] len=2: b'0 ' hardkernel#97 [RV] len=80: b's\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'... 0d00 Large item 252 bytes; name 0x11 #00 [VC] len=16: b'122310_1222 dp ' hardkernel#13 [VD] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00' hardkernel#26 [VE] len=16: b'122310_1353 fp ' hardkernel#39 [VF] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00' #4c [RW] len=173: b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'... 0dff Small item 0 bytes; name 0xf End Tag 10f3 Large item 13315 bytes; name 0x62 !!! unknown item name 98: b'\xd0\x03\x00@`\x0c\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' === Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 45caeaa ] As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6. v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well. We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk->sk_dst_cache) pointing to that dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is: hardkernel#8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648 [exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74] . . hardkernel#9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64 hardkernel#10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a hardkernel#11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02 hardkernel#12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4 hardkernel#13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9 hardkernel#14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d hardkernel#15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06 hardkernel#16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2 hardkernel#17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608 hardkernel#18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690 hardkernel#19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3] hardkernel#20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3] hardkernel#21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2 hardkernel#22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f hardkernel#23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c hardkernel#24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5 hardkernel#25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5 hardkernel#26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8 Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well. It's found the freed dst_entry here: 224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)↩ 225 {↩ 226 ▹ const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);↩ 227 ▹ const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);↩ 228 ↩ 229 ▹ return (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||↩ 230 ▹ ▹ (icsk->icsk_ack.quick && !icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong);↩ 231 }↩ But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in netfilter code as well. All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues: - Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable. - All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g: LockDroppedIcmps 267 A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk->sk_dst_entry can be decremented twice for the same socket via: do_redirect()->__sk_dst_check()-> dst_release(). Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket pointing to it via sk->sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash. To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket locked. The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too. As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which can set the dst->obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and triggers the dst_release(). Fixes: ceb3320 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.") Cc: Eric Garver <[email protected]> Cc: Hannes Sowa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 45caeaa upstream. As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6. v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well. We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk->sk_dst_cache) pointing to that dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is: #8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648 [exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74] . . #9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64 #10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a #11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02 #12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4 #13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9 #14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d #15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06 #16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2 #17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608 #18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690 #19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3] #20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3] #21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2 #22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f #23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c #24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5 #25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5 #26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8 Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well. It's found the freed dst_entry here: 224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)â�© 225 {â�© 226 â�¹ const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);â�© 227 â�¹ const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);â�© 228 â�© 229 â�¹ return (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||â�© 230 â�¹ â�¹ (icsk->icsk_ack.quick && !icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong);â�© 231 }â�© But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in netfilter code as well. All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues: - Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable. - All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g: LockDroppedIcmps 267 A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk->sk_dst_entry can be decremented twice for the same socket via: do_redirect()->__sk_dst_check()-> dst_release(). Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket pointing to it via sk->sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash. To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket locked. The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too. As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which can set the dst->obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and triggers the dst_release(). Fixes: ceb3320 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.") Cc: Eric Garver <[email protected]> Cc: Hannes Sowa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>

commit b6b1b81 upstream. BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1268727 The task field in the lsm_audit struct needs to be initialized if a change_hat fails, otherwise the following oops will occur BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000002fbead7d08 IP: [<ffffffff8171153e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x50 PGD 1e3f35067 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: pppox crc_ccitt p8023 p8022 psnap llc ax25 btrfs raid6_pq xor xfs libcrc32c dm_multipath scsi_dh kvm_amd dcdbas kvm microcode amd64_edac_mod joydev edac_core psmouse edac_mce_amd serio_raw k10temp sp5100_tco i2c_piix4 ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter mac_hid lp parport hid_generic usbhid hid pata_acpi mpt2sas ahci raid_class pata_atiixp bnx2 libahci scsi_transport_sas [last unloaded: tipc] CPU: 2 PID: 699 Comm: changehat_twice Tainted: GF O 3.13.0-7-generic #25-Ubuntu Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R415/08WNM9, BIOS 1.8.6 12/06/2011 task: ffff8802135c6000 ti: ffff880212986000 task.ti: ffff880212986000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8171153e>] [<ffffffff8171153e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x50 RSP: 0018:ffff880212987b68 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000000020000 RBX: 0000002fbead7500 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000292 RSI: ffff880212987ba8 RDI: 0000002fbead7d08 RBP: ffff880212987b68 R08: 0000000000000246 R09: ffff880216e572a0 R10: ffffffff815fd677 R11: ffffea0008469580 R12: ffffffff8130966f R13: ffff880212987ba8 R14: 0000002fbead7d08 R15: ffff8800d8c6b830 FS: 00002b5e6c84e7c0(0000) GS:ffff880216e40000(0000) knlGS:0000000055731700 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000002fbead7d08 CR3: 000000021270f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffff880212987b98 ffffffff81075f17 ffffffff8130966f 0000000000000009 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880212987bd0 ffffffff81075f7c 0000000000000292 ffff880212987c08 ffff8800d8c6b800 0000000000000026 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81075f17>] __lock_task_sighand+0x47/0x80 [<ffffffff8130966f>] ? apparmor_cred_prepare+0x2f/0x50 [<ffffffff81075f7c>] do_send_sig_info+0x2c/0x80 [<ffffffff81075fee>] send_sig_info+0x1e/0x30 [<ffffffff8130242d>] aa_audit+0x13d/0x190 [<ffffffff8130c1dc>] aa_audit_file+0xbc/0x130 [<ffffffff8130966f>] ? apparmor_cred_prepare+0x2f/0x50 [<ffffffff81304cc2>] aa_change_hat+0x202/0x530 [<ffffffff81308fc6>] aa_setprocattr_changehat+0x116/0x1d0 [<ffffffff8130a11d>] apparmor_setprocattr+0x25d/0x300 [<ffffffff812cee56>] security_setprocattr+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff8121fc87>] proc_pid_attr_write+0x107/0x130 [<ffffffff811b7604>] vfs_write+0xb4/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811b8039>] SyS_write+0x49/0xa0 [<ffffffff8171a1bf>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>

commit af3ff80 upstream. Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))" through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow. This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3) because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer, and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that, but SHA-3 is not. However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything. Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed. Then update the HMAC template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed. Here is a reproducer: #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <sys/socket.h> int main() { int algfd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "hash", .salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))", }; char key[4096] = { 0 }; algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key)); } Here was the KASAN report from syzbot: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161 Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044 CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ hardkernel#25 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline] check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267 memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303 memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161 crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109 shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151 crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165 hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152 crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165 shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172 crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186 hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66 crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64 shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207 crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200 hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446 alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline] alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5af4157 ] Commit 4f350c6 (kvm: nVMX: Handle deferred early VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME failure properly) can result in L1(run kvm-unit-tests/run_tests.sh vmx_controls in L1) null pointer deference and also L0 calltrace when EPT=0 on both L0 and L1. In L1: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffc015bf8f IP: vmx_vcpu_run+0x202/0x510 [kvm_intel] PGD 146e13067 P4D 146e13067 PUD 146e15067 PMD 3d2686067 PTE 3d4af9161 Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 2 PID: 1798 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc4+ #6 RIP: 0010:vmx_vcpu_run+0x202/0x510 [kvm_intel] Call Trace: WARNING: kernel stack frame pointer at ffffb86f4988bc18 in qemu-system-x86:1798 has bad value 0000000000000002 In L0: -----------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 4460 at /home/kernel/linux/arch/x86/kvm//vmx.c:9845 vmx_inject_page_fault_nested+0x130/0x140 [kvm_intel] CPU: 6 PID: 4460 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G OE 4.14.0-rc7+ #25 RIP: 0010:vmx_inject_page_fault_nested+0x130/0x140 [kvm_intel] Call Trace: paging64_page_fault+0x500/0xde0 [kvm] ? paging32_gva_to_gpa_nested+0x120/0x120 [kvm] ? nonpaging_page_fault+0x3b0/0x3b0 [kvm] ? __asan_storeN+0x12/0x20 ? paging64_gva_to_gpa+0xb0/0x120 [kvm] ? paging64_walk_addr_generic+0x11a0/0x11a0 [kvm] ? lock_acquire+0x2c0/0x2c0 ? vmx_read_guest_seg_ar+0x97/0x100 [kvm_intel] ? vmx_get_segment+0x2a6/0x310 [kvm_intel] ? sched_clock+0x1f/0x30 ? check_chain_key+0x137/0x1e0 ? __lock_acquire+0x83c/0x2420 ? kvm_multiple_exception+0xf2/0x220 [kvm] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x240/0x240 ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20 ? __lock_is_held+0x9e/0x100 kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x90/0x180 [kvm] kvm_handle_page_fault+0x15c/0x310 [kvm] ? __lock_is_held+0x9e/0x100 handle_exception+0x3c7/0x4d0 [kvm_intel] vmx_handle_exit+0x103/0x1010 [kvm_intel] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1628/0x2e20 [kvm] The commit avoids to load host state of vmcs12 as vmcs01's guest state since vmcs12 is not modified (except for the VM-instruction error field) if the checking of vmcs control area fails. However, the mmu context is switched to nested mmu in prepare_vmcs02() and it will not be reloaded since load_vmcs12_host_state() is skipped when nested VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME fails. This patch fixes it by reloading mmu context when nested VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME fails. Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Cc: Jim Mattson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…s while handle_mm_fault commit 4d44745 upstream. do_page_fault() forgot to relinquish mmap_sem if a signal came while handling handle_mm_fault() - due to say a ctl+c or oom etc. This would later cause a deadlock by acquiring it twice. This came to light when running libc testsuite tst-tls3-malloc test but is likely also the cause for prior seen LTP failures. Using lockdep clearly showed what the issue was. | # while true; do ./tst-tls3-malloc ; done | Didn't expect signal from child: got `Segmentation fault' | ^C | ============================================ | WARNING: possible recursive locking detected | 4.17.0+ #25 Not tainted | -------------------------------------------- | tst-tls3-malloc/510 is trying to acquire lock: | 606c7728 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0x28/0x5c | |but task is already holding lock: |606c7728 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: do_page_fault+0x9c/0x2a0 | | other info that might help us debug this: | Possible unsafe locking scenario: | | CPU0 | ---- | lock(&mm->mmap_sem); | lock(&mm->mmap_sem); | | *** DEADLOCK *** | ------------------------------------------------------------ What the change does is not obvious (note to myself) prior code was | do_page_fault | | down_read() <-- lock taken | handle_mm_fault <-- signal pending as this runs | if fatal_signal_pending | if VM_FAULT_ERROR | up_read | if user_mode | return <-- lock still held, this was the BUG New code | do_page_fault | | down_read() <-- lock taken | handle_mm_fault <-- signal pending as this runs | if fatal_signal_pending | if VM_FAULT_RETRY | return <-- not same case as above, but still OK since | core mm already relinq lock for FAULT_RETRY | ... | | < Now falls through for bug case above > | | up_read() <-- lock relinquished Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <[email protected]> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>

commit d454854 upstream. KASAN report this: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffa0097000 PGD 3870067 P4D 3870067 PUD 3871063 PMD 2326e2067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1 CPU: 0 PID: 5340 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #25 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x10/0x70 Code: c3 48 8b 06 55 48 89 e5 5d 48 39 07 0f 94 c0 0f b6 c0 c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 d0 48 8b 52 08 48 89 e5 48 39 f2 75 19 <48> 8b 32 48 39 f0 75 3a RSP: 0018:ffffc90000e23c68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffffffa00ad000 RBX: ffffffffa009d000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffffffa0097000 RSI: ffffffffa0097000 RDI: ffffffffa009d000 RBP: ffffc90000e23c68 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffa0097000 R13: ffff888231797180 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc90000e23e78 FS: 00007fb215285540(0000) GS:ffff888237a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffa0097000 CR3: 000000022f144000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: v9fs_register_trans+0x2f/0x60 [9pnet ? 0xffffffffa0087000 p9_virtio_init+0x25/0x1000 [9pnet_virtio do_one_initcall+0x6c/0x3cc ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x248/0x3b0 do_init_module+0x5b/0x1f1 load_module+0x1db1/0x2690 ? m_show+0x1d0/0x1d0 __do_sys_finit_module+0xc5/0xd0 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x15/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x7fb214d8e839 Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 RSP: 002b:00007ffc96554278 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e67eed2aa0 RCX: 00007fb214d8e839 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055e67ce95c2e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000055e67ce95c2e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055e67eed2aa0 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000055e67eeda500 R14: 0000000000040000 R15: 000055e67eed2aa0 Modules linked in: 9pnet_virtio(+) 9pnet gre rfkill vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vsock [last unloaded: 9pnet_virtio CR2: ffffffffa0097000 ---[ end trace 4a52bb13ff07b761 If register_virtio_driver() fails in p9_virtio_init, we should call v9fs_unregister_trans() to do cleanup. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]> Fixes: b530cc7 ("9p: add virtio transport") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

The RCU lock is insufficient to protect the radix tree iteration as a deletion from the tree can occur before we take the spinlock to tag the entry. In 4.19, this has manifested as a bug with the following trace: kernel BUG at lib/radix-tree.c:1429! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 7 PID: 6935 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 4.19.36 #25 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:radix_tree_tag_set+0x200/0x2f0 lib/radix-tree.c:1429 Code: 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 89 44 24 10 e8 a3 29 7e fe 48 8b 44 24 10 48 0f ab 03 e9 d2 fe ff ff e8 90 29 7e fe <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 e0 5a 87 84 e8 f0 e7 08 ff 4c 89 ef e8 4a ff ac fe RSP: 0018:ffff88837b13fb60 EFLAGS: 00010016 RAX: 0000000000040000 RBX: ffff8883c5515d58 RCX: ffffffff82cb2ef0 RDX: 0000000000000b72 RSI: ffffc90004cf2000 RDI: ffff8883c5515d98 RBP: ffff88837b13fb98 R08: ffffed106f627f7e R09: ffffed106f627f7e R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed106f627f7d R12: 0000000000000004 R13: ffffea000d7fea80 R14: 1ffff1106f627f6f R15: 0000000000000002 FS: 00007fa1b8df2700(0000) GS:ffff8883e2fc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fa1b8df1db8 CR3: 000000037d4d2001 CR4: 0000000000160ee0 Call Trace: memfd_tag_pins mm/memfd.c:51 [inline] memfd_wait_for_pins+0x2c5/0x12d0 mm/memfd.c:81 memfd_add_seals mm/memfd.c:215 [inline] memfd_fcntl+0x33d/0x4a0 mm/memfd.c:247 do_fcntl+0x589/0xeb0 fs/fcntl.c:421 __do_sys_fcntl fs/fcntl.c:463 [inline] __se_sys_fcntl fs/fcntl.c:448 [inline] __x64_sys_fcntl+0x12d/0x180 fs/fcntl.c:448 do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:293 The problem does not occur in mainline due to the XArray rewrite which changed the locking to exclude modification of the tree during iteration. At the time, nobody realised this was a bugfix. Backport the locking changes to stable. Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: zhong jiang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit d454854 upstream. KASAN report this: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffa0097000 PGD 3870067 P4D 3870067 PUD 3871063 PMD 2326e2067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1 CPU: 0 PID: 5340 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #25 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x10/0x70 Code: c3 48 8b 06 55 48 89 e5 5d 48 39 07 0f 94 c0 0f b6 c0 c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 d0 48 8b 52 08 48 89 e5 48 39 f2 75 19 <48> 8b 32 48 39 f0 75 3a RSP: 0018:ffffc90000e23c68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffffffa00ad000 RBX: ffffffffa009d000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffffffa0097000 RSI: ffffffffa0097000 RDI: ffffffffa009d000 RBP: ffffc90000e23c68 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffa0097000 R13: ffff888231797180 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc90000e23e78 FS: 00007fb215285540(0000) GS:ffff888237a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffa0097000 CR3: 000000022f144000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: v9fs_register_trans+0x2f/0x60 [9pnet ? 0xffffffffa0087000 p9_virtio_init+0x25/0x1000 [9pnet_virtio do_one_initcall+0x6c/0x3cc ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x248/0x3b0 do_init_module+0x5b/0x1f1 load_module+0x1db1/0x2690 ? m_show+0x1d0/0x1d0 __do_sys_finit_module+0xc5/0xd0 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x15/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x7fb214d8e839 Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 RSP: 002b:00007ffc96554278 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e67eed2aa0 RCX: 00007fb214d8e839 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055e67ce95c2e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000055e67ce95c2e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055e67eed2aa0 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000055e67eeda500 R14: 0000000000040000 R15: 000055e67eed2aa0 Modules linked in: 9pnet_virtio(+) 9pnet gre rfkill vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vsock [last unloaded: 9pnet_virtio CR2: ffffffffa0097000 ---[ end trace 4a52bb13ff07b761 If register_virtio_driver() fails in p9_virtio_init, we should call v9fs_unregister_trans() to do cleanup. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]> Fixes: b530cc7 ("9p: add virtio transport") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a33121e ] In a case when a ptp chardev (like /dev/ptp0) is open but an underlying device is removed, closing this file leads to a race. This reproduces easily in a kvm virtual machine: ts# cat openptp0.c int main() { ... fp = fopen("/dev/ptp0", "r"); ... sleep(10); } ts# uname -r 5.5.0-rc3-46cf053e ts# cat /proc/cmdline ... slub_debug=FZP ts# modprobe ptp_kvm ts# ./openptp0 & [1] 670 opened /dev/ptp0, sleeping 10s... ts# rmmod ptp_kvm ts# ls /dev/ptp* ls: cannot access '/dev/ptp*': No such file or directory ts# ...woken up [ 48.010809] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 48.012502] CPU: 6 PID: 658 Comm: openptp0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc3-46cf053e #25 [ 48.014624] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), ... [ 48.016270] RIP: 0010:module_put.part.0+0x7/0x80 [ 48.017939] RSP: 0018:ffffb3850073be00 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 48.018339] RAX: 000000006b6b6b6b RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RCX: ffff89a476c00ad0 [ 48.018936] RDX: fffff65a08d3ea08 RSI: 0000000000000247 RDI: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b [ 48.019470] ... ^^^ a slub poison [ 48.023854] Call Trace: [ 48.024050] __fput+0x21f/0x240 [ 48.024288] task_work_run+0x79/0x90 [ 48.024555] do_exit+0x2af/0xab0 [ 48.024799] ? vfs_write+0x16a/0x190 [ 48.025082] do_group_exit+0x35/0x90 [ 48.025387] __x64_sys_exit_group+0xf/0x10 [ 48.025737] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x130 [ 48.026056] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 48.026479] RIP: 0033:0x7f53b12082f6 [ 48.026792] ... [ 48.030945] Modules linked in: ptp i6300esb watchdog [last unloaded: ptp_kvm] [ 48.045001] Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed! This happens in: static void __fput(struct file *file) { ... if (file->f_op->release) file->f_op->release(inode, file); <<< cdev is kfree'd here if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL && !(mode & FMODE_PATH))) { cdev_put(inode->i_cdev); <<< cdev fields are accessed here Namely: __fput() posix_clock_release() kref_put(&clk->kref, delete_clock) <<< the last reference delete_clock() delete_ptp_clock() kfree(ptp) <<< cdev is embedded in ptp cdev_put module_put(p->owner) <<< *p is kfree'd, bang! Here cdev is embedded in posix_clock which is embedded in ptp_clock. The race happens because ptp_clock's lifetime is controlled by two refcounts: kref and cdev.kobj in posix_clock. This is wrong. Make ptp_clock's sysfs device a parent of cdev with cdev_device_add() created especially for such cases. This way the parent device with its ptp_clock is not released until all references to the cdev are released. This adds a requirement that an initialized but not exposed struct device should be provided to posix_clock_register() by a caller instead of a simple dev_t. This approach was adopted from the commit 72139df ("watchdog: Fix the race between the release of watchdog_core_data and cdev"). See details of the implementation in the commit 233ed09 ("chardev: add helper function to register char devs with a struct device"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/[email protected]/T/#u Analyzed-by: Stephen Johnston <[email protected]> Analyzed-by: Vern Lovejoy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Richard Cochran <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a33121e ] In a case when a ptp chardev (like /dev/ptp0) is open but an underlying device is removed, closing this file leads to a race. This reproduces easily in a kvm virtual machine: ts# cat openptp0.c int main() { ... fp = fopen("/dev/ptp0", "r"); ... sleep(10); } ts# uname -r 5.5.0-rc3-46cf053e ts# cat /proc/cmdline ... slub_debug=FZP ts# modprobe ptp_kvm ts# ./openptp0 & [1] 670 opened /dev/ptp0, sleeping 10s... ts# rmmod ptp_kvm ts# ls /dev/ptp* ls: cannot access '/dev/ptp*': No such file or directory ts# ...woken up [ 48.010809] general protection fault: 0000 [hardkernel#1] SMP [ 48.012502] CPU: 6 PID: 658 Comm: openptp0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc3-46cf053e hardkernel#25 [ 48.014624] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), ... [ 48.016270] RIP: 0010:module_put.part.0+0x7/0x80 [ 48.017939] RSP: 0018:ffffb3850073be00 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 48.018339] RAX: 000000006b6b6b6b RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RCX: ffff89a476c00ad0 [ 48.018936] RDX: fffff65a08d3ea08 RSI: 0000000000000247 RDI: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b [ 48.019470] ... ^^^ a slub poison [ 48.023854] Call Trace: [ 48.024050] __fput+0x21f/0x240 [ 48.024288] task_work_run+0x79/0x90 [ 48.024555] do_exit+0x2af/0xab0 [ 48.024799] ? vfs_write+0x16a/0x190 [ 48.025082] do_group_exit+0x35/0x90 [ 48.025387] __x64_sys_exit_group+0xf/0x10 [ 48.025737] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x130 [ 48.026056] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 48.026479] RIP: 0033:0x7f53b12082f6 [ 48.026792] ... [ 48.030945] Modules linked in: ptp i6300esb watchdog [last unloaded: ptp_kvm] [ 48.045001] Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed! This happens in: static void __fput(struct file *file) { ... if (file->f_op->release) file->f_op->release(inode, file); <<< cdev is kfree'd here if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL && !(mode & FMODE_PATH))) { cdev_put(inode->i_cdev); <<< cdev fields are accessed here Namely: __fput() posix_clock_release() kref_put(&clk->kref, delete_clock) <<< the last reference delete_clock() delete_ptp_clock() kfree(ptp) <<< cdev is embedded in ptp cdev_put module_put(p->owner) <<< *p is kfree'd, bang! Here cdev is embedded in posix_clock which is embedded in ptp_clock. The race happens because ptp_clock's lifetime is controlled by two refcounts: kref and cdev.kobj in posix_clock. This is wrong. Make ptp_clock's sysfs device a parent of cdev with cdev_device_add() created especially for such cases. This way the parent device with its ptp_clock is not released until all references to the cdev are released. This adds a requirement that an initialized but not exposed struct device should be provided to posix_clock_register() by a caller instead of a simple dev_t. This approach was adopted from the commit 72139df ("watchdog: Fix the race between the release of watchdog_core_data and cdev"). See details of the implementation in the commit 233ed09 ("chardev: add helper function to register char devs with a struct device"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/[email protected]/T/#u Analyzed-by: Stephen Johnston <[email protected]> Analyzed-by: Vern Lovejoy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Richard Cochran <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit f5cdedd upstream. We can handle the special case of num_stripes == 0 directly inside btrfs_read_sys_array. The BUG_ON in btrfs_chunk_item_size is there to catch other unhandled cases where we fail to validate external data. A crafted or corrupted image crashes at mount time: BTRFS: device fsid 9006933e-2a9a-44f0-917f-514252aeec2c devid 1 transid 7 /dev/loop0 BTRFS info (device loop0): disk space caching is enabled BUG: failure at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:337/btrfs_chunk_item_size()! Kernel panic - not syncing: BUG! CPU: 0 PID: 313 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.2.5-00657-ge047887-dirty #25 Stack: 637af890 60062489 602aeb2e 604192ba 60387961 00000011 637af8a0 6038a835 637af9c0 6038776b 634ef32b 00000000 Call Trace: [<6001c86d>] show_stack+0xfe/0x15b [<6038a835>] dump_stack+0x2a/0x2c [<6038776b>] panic+0x13e/0x2b3 [<6020f099>] btrfs_read_sys_array+0x25d/0x2ff [<601cfbbe>] open_ctree+0x192d/0x27af [<6019c2c1>] btrfs_mount+0x8f5/0xb9a [<600bc9a7>] mount_fs+0x11/0xf3 [<600d5167>] vfs_kern_mount+0x75/0x11a [<6019bcb0>] btrfs_mount+0x2e4/0xb9a [<600bc9a7>] mount_fs+0x11/0xf3 [<600d5167>] vfs_kern_mount+0x75/0x11a [<600d710b>] do_mount+0xa35/0xbc9 [<600d7557>] SyS_mount+0x95/0xc8 [<6001e884>] handle_syscall+0x6b/0x8e Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]> Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>

commit a33121e upstream. In a case when a ptp chardev (like /dev/ptp0) is open but an underlying device is removed, closing this file leads to a race. This reproduces easily in a kvm virtual machine: ts# cat openptp0.c int main() { ... fp = fopen("/dev/ptp0", "r"); ... sleep(10); } ts# uname -r 5.5.0-rc3-46cf053e ts# cat /proc/cmdline ... slub_debug=FZP ts# modprobe ptp_kvm ts# ./openptp0 & [1] 670 opened /dev/ptp0, sleeping 10s... ts# rmmod ptp_kvm ts# ls /dev/ptp* ls: cannot access '/dev/ptp*': No such file or directory ts# ...woken up [ 48.010809] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 48.012502] CPU: 6 PID: 658 Comm: openptp0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc3-46cf053e #25 [ 48.014624] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), ... [ 48.016270] RIP: 0010:module_put.part.0+0x7/0x80 [ 48.017939] RSP: 0018:ffffb3850073be00 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 48.018339] RAX: 000000006b6b6b6b RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RCX: ffff89a476c00ad0 [ 48.018936] RDX: fffff65a08d3ea08 RSI: 0000000000000247 RDI: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b [ 48.019470] ... ^^^ a slub poison [ 48.023854] Call Trace: [ 48.024050] __fput+0x21f/0x240 [ 48.024288] task_work_run+0x79/0x90 [ 48.024555] do_exit+0x2af/0xab0 [ 48.024799] ? vfs_write+0x16a/0x190 [ 48.025082] do_group_exit+0x35/0x90 [ 48.025387] __x64_sys_exit_group+0xf/0x10 [ 48.025737] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x130 [ 48.026056] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 48.026479] RIP: 0033:0x7f53b12082f6 [ 48.026792] ... [ 48.030945] Modules linked in: ptp i6300esb watchdog [last unloaded: ptp_kvm] [ 48.045001] Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed! This happens in: static void __fput(struct file *file) { ... if (file->f_op->release) file->f_op->release(inode, file); <<< cdev is kfree'd here if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL && !(mode & FMODE_PATH))) { cdev_put(inode->i_cdev); <<< cdev fields are accessed here Namely: __fput() posix_clock_release() kref_put(&clk->kref, delete_clock) <<< the last reference delete_clock() delete_ptp_clock() kfree(ptp) <<< cdev is embedded in ptp cdev_put module_put(p->owner) <<< *p is kfree'd, bang! Here cdev is embedded in posix_clock which is embedded in ptp_clock. The race happens because ptp_clock's lifetime is controlled by two refcounts: kref and cdev.kobj in posix_clock. This is wrong. Make ptp_clock's sysfs device a parent of cdev with cdev_device_add() created especially for such cases. This way the parent device with its ptp_clock is not released until all references to the cdev are released. This adds a requirement that an initialized but not exposed struct device should be provided to posix_clock_register() by a caller instead of a simple dev_t. This approach was adopted from the commit 72139df ("watchdog: Fix the race between the release of watchdog_core_data and cdev"). See details of the implementation in the commit 233ed09 ("chardev: add helper function to register char devs with a struct device"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/[email protected]/T/#u Analyzed-by: Stephen Johnston <[email protected]> Analyzed-by: Vern Lovejoy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Richard Cochran <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>

commit a33121e upstream. In a case when a ptp chardev (like /dev/ptp0) is open but an underlying device is removed, closing this file leads to a race. This reproduces easily in a kvm virtual machine: ts# cat openptp0.c int main() { ... fp = fopen("/dev/ptp0", "r"); ... sleep(10); } ts# uname -r 5.5.0-rc3-46cf053e ts# cat /proc/cmdline ... slub_debug=FZP ts# modprobe ptp_kvm ts# ./openptp0 & [1] 670 opened /dev/ptp0, sleeping 10s... ts# rmmod ptp_kvm ts# ls /dev/ptp* ls: cannot access '/dev/ptp*': No such file or directory ts# ...woken up [ 48.010809] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 48.012502] CPU: 6 PID: 658 Comm: openptp0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc3-46cf053e #25 [ 48.014624] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), ... [ 48.016270] RIP: 0010:module_put.part.0+0x7/0x80 [ 48.017939] RSP: 0018:ffffb3850073be00 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 48.018339] RAX: 000000006b6b6b6b RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RCX: ffff89a476c00ad0 [ 48.018936] RDX: fffff65a08d3ea08 RSI: 0000000000000247 RDI: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b [ 48.019470] ... ^^^ a slub poison [ 48.023854] Call Trace: [ 48.024050] __fput+0x21f/0x240 [ 48.024288] task_work_run+0x79/0x90 [ 48.024555] do_exit+0x2af/0xab0 [ 48.024799] ? vfs_write+0x16a/0x190 [ 48.025082] do_group_exit+0x35/0x90 [ 48.025387] __x64_sys_exit_group+0xf/0x10 [ 48.025737] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x130 [ 48.026056] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 48.026479] RIP: 0033:0x7f53b12082f6 [ 48.026792] ... [ 48.030945] Modules linked in: ptp i6300esb watchdog [last unloaded: ptp_kvm] [ 48.045001] Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed! This happens in: static void __fput(struct file *file) { ... if (file->f_op->release) file->f_op->release(inode, file); <<< cdev is kfree'd here if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL && !(mode & FMODE_PATH))) { cdev_put(inode->i_cdev); <<< cdev fields are accessed here Namely: __fput() posix_clock_release() kref_put(&clk->kref, delete_clock) <<< the last reference delete_clock() delete_ptp_clock() kfree(ptp) <<< cdev is embedded in ptp cdev_put module_put(p->owner) <<< *p is kfree'd, bang! Here cdev is embedded in posix_clock which is embedded in ptp_clock. The race happens because ptp_clock's lifetime is controlled by two refcounts: kref and cdev.kobj in posix_clock. This is wrong. Make ptp_clock's sysfs device a parent of cdev with cdev_device_add() created especially for such cases. This way the parent device with its ptp_clock is not released until all references to the cdev are released. This adds a requirement that an initialized but not exposed struct device should be provided to posix_clock_register() by a caller instead of a simple dev_t. This approach was adopted from the commit 72139df ("watchdog: Fix the race between the release of watchdog_core_data and cdev"). See details of the implementation in the commit 233ed09 ("chardev: add helper function to register char devs with a struct device"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/[email protected]/T/#u Analyzed-by: Stephen Johnston <[email protected]> Analyzed-by: Vern Lovejoy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Richard Cochran <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f6766ff ] We need to check mddev->del_work before flush workqueu since the purpose of flush is to ensure the previous md is disappeared. Otherwise the similar deadlock appeared if LOCKDEP is enabled, it is due to md_open holds the bdev->bd_mutex before flush workqueue. kernel: [ 154.522645] ====================================================== kernel: [ 154.522647] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected kernel: [ 154.522650] 5.6.0-rc7-lp151.27-default #25 Tainted: G O kernel: [ 154.522651] ------------------------------------------------------ kernel: [ 154.522653] mdadm/2482 is trying to acquire lock: kernel: [ 154.522655] ffff888078529128 ((wq_completion)md_misc){+.+.}, at: flush_workqueue+0x84/0x4b0 kernel: [ 154.522673] kernel: [ 154.522673] but task is already holding lock: kernel: [ 154.522675] ffff88804efa9338 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}, at: __blkdev_get+0x79/0x590 kernel: [ 154.522691] kernel: [ 154.522691] which lock already depends on the new lock. kernel: [ 154.522691] kernel: [ 154.522694] kernel: [ 154.522694] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: kernel: [ 154.522696] kernel: [ 154.522696] -> #4 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}: kernel: [ 154.522704] __mutex_lock+0x87/0x950 kernel: [ 154.522706] __blkdev_get+0x79/0x590 kernel: [ 154.522708] blkdev_get+0x65/0x140 kernel: [ 154.522709] blkdev_get_by_dev+0x2f/0x40 kernel: [ 154.522716] lock_rdev+0x3d/0x90 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522719] md_import_device+0xd6/0x1b0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522723] new_dev_store+0x15e/0x210 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522728] md_attr_store+0x7a/0xc0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522732] kernfs_fop_write+0x117/0x1b0 kernel: [ 154.522735] vfs_write+0xad/0x1a0 kernel: [ 154.522737] ksys_write+0xa4/0xe0 kernel: [ 154.522745] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0 kernel: [ 154.522748] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe kernel: [ 154.522749] kernel: [ 154.522749] -> #3 (&mddev->reconfig_mutex){+.+.}: kernel: [ 154.522752] __mutex_lock+0x87/0x950 kernel: [ 154.522756] new_dev_store+0xc9/0x210 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522759] md_attr_store+0x7a/0xc0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522761] kernfs_fop_write+0x117/0x1b0 kernel: [ 154.522763] vfs_write+0xad/0x1a0 kernel: [ 154.522765] ksys_write+0xa4/0xe0 kernel: [ 154.522767] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0 kernel: [ 154.522769] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe kernel: [ 154.522770] kernel: [ 154.522770] -> #2 (kn->count#253){++++}: kernel: [ 154.522775] __kernfs_remove+0x253/0x2c0 kernel: [ 154.522778] kernfs_remove+0x1f/0x30 kernel: [ 154.522780] kobject_del+0x28/0x60 kernel: [ 154.522783] mddev_delayed_delete+0x24/0x30 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522786] process_one_work+0x2a7/0x5f0 kernel: [ 154.522788] worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0 kernel: [ 154.522793] kthread+0x117/0x130 kernel: [ 154.522795] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 kernel: [ 154.522796] kernel: [ 154.522796] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&mddev->del_work)){+.+.}: kernel: [ 154.522800] process_one_work+0x27e/0x5f0 kernel: [ 154.522802] worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0 kernel: [ 154.522804] kthread+0x117/0x130 kernel: [ 154.522806] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 kernel: [ 154.522807] kernel: [ 154.522807] -> #0 ((wq_completion)md_misc){+.+.}: kernel: [ 154.522813] __lock_acquire+0x1392/0x1690 kernel: [ 154.522816] lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1a0 kernel: [ 154.522818] flush_workqueue+0xab/0x4b0 kernel: [ 154.522821] md_open+0xb6/0xc0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522823] __blkdev_get+0xea/0x590 kernel: [ 154.522825] blkdev_get+0x65/0x140 kernel: [ 154.522828] do_dentry_open+0x1d1/0x380 kernel: [ 154.522831] path_openat+0x567/0xcc0 kernel: [ 154.522834] do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 kernel: [ 154.522836] do_sys_openat2+0x201/0x2a0 kernel: [ 154.522838] do_sys_open+0x57/0x80 kernel: [ 154.522840] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0 kernel: [ 154.522842] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe kernel: [ 154.522844] kernel: [ 154.522844] other info that might help us debug this: kernel: [ 154.522844] kernel: [ 154.522846] Chain exists of: kernel: [ 154.522846] (wq_completion)md_misc --> &mddev->reconfig_mutex --> &bdev->bd_mutex kernel: [ 154.522846] kernel: [ 154.522850] Possible unsafe locking scenario: kernel: [ 154.522850] kernel: [ 154.522852] CPU0 CPU1 kernel: [ 154.522853] ---- ---- kernel: [ 154.522854] lock(&bdev->bd_mutex); kernel: [ 154.522856] lock(&mddev->reconfig_mutex); kernel: [ 154.522858] lock(&bdev->bd_mutex); kernel: [ 154.522860] lock((wq_completion)md_misc); kernel: [ 154.522861] kernel: [ 154.522861] *** DEADLOCK *** kernel: [ 154.522861] kernel: [ 154.522864] 1 lock held by mdadm/2482: kernel: [ 154.522865] #0: ffff88804efa9338 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}, at: __blkdev_get+0x79/0x590 kernel: [ 154.522868] kernel: [ 154.522868] stack backtrace: kernel: [ 154.522873] CPU: 1 PID: 2482 Comm: mdadm Tainted: G O 5.6.0-rc7-lp151.27-default #25 kernel: [ 154.522875] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 kernel: [ 154.522878] Call Trace: kernel: [ 154.522881] dump_stack+0x8f/0xcb kernel: [ 154.522884] check_noncircular+0x194/0x1b0 kernel: [ 154.522888] ? __lock_acquire+0x1392/0x1690 kernel: [ 154.522890] __lock_acquire+0x1392/0x1690 kernel: [ 154.522893] lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1a0 kernel: [ 154.522895] ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x4b0 kernel: [ 154.522898] flush_workqueue+0xab/0x4b0 kernel: [ 154.522900] ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x4b0 kernel: [ 154.522905] ? md_open+0xb6/0xc0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522908] md_open+0xb6/0xc0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522910] __blkdev_get+0xea/0x590 kernel: [ 154.522912] ? bd_acquire+0xc0/0xc0 kernel: [ 154.522914] blkdev_get+0x65/0x140 kernel: [ 154.522916] ? bd_acquire+0xc0/0xc0 kernel: [ 154.522918] do_dentry_open+0x1d1/0x380 kernel: [ 154.522921] path_openat+0x567/0xcc0 kernel: [ 154.522923] ? __lock_acquire+0x380/0x1690 kernel: [ 154.522926] do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 kernel: [ 154.522929] ? __alloc_fd+0xe5/0x1f0 kernel: [ 154.522935] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x28c/0x630 kernel: [ 154.522939] ? do_sys_openat2+0x201/0x2a0 kernel: [ 154.522941] do_sys_openat2+0x201/0x2a0 kernel: [ 154.522944] do_sys_open+0x57/0x80 kernel: [ 154.522946] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0 kernel: [ 154.522948] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe kernel: [ 154.522951] RIP: 0033:0x7f98d279d9ae And md_alloc also flushed the same workqueue, but the thing is different here. Because all the paths call md_alloc don't hold bdev->bd_mutex, and the flush is necessary to avoid race condition, so leave it as it is. Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e24c644 ] I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I was using the tep_parse_format function: Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe) #1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985 #2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140 #3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206 #4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291 #5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299 #6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849 #7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161 #8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207 #9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786 #10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285 #11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369 #12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335 #13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389 #14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431 #15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251 #16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284 #17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593 #18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727 #19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048 #20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127 #21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152 #22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252 #23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347 #24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461 #25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673 #26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before calling the read_token function. Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the leak. Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit c1d0da8 upstream. Patch series "mm: fix memory to node bad links in sysfs", v3. Sometimes, firmware may expose interleaved memory layout like this: Early memory node ranges node 1: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000011fffffff] node 2: [mem 0x0000000120000000-0x000000014fffffff] node 1: [mem 0x0000000150000000-0x00000001ffffffff] node 0: [mem 0x0000000200000000-0x000000048fffffff] node 2: [mem 0x0000000490000000-0x00000007ffffffff] In that case, we can see memory blocks assigned to multiple nodes in sysfs: $ ls -l /sys/devices/system/memory/memory21 total 0 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Aug 24 05:27 node1 -> ../../node/node1 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Aug 24 05:27 node2 -> ../../node/node2 -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 online -r--r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 phys_device -r--r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 phys_index drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Aug 24 05:27 power -r--r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 removable -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 state lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Aug 24 05:25 subsystem -> ../../../../bus/memory -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:25 uevent -r--r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 valid_zones The same applies in the node's directory with a memory21 link in both the node1 and node2's directory. This is wrong but doesn't prevent the system to run. However when later, one of these memory blocks is hot-unplugged and then hot-plugged, the system is detecting an inconsistency in the sysfs layout and a BUG_ON() is raised: kernel BUG at /Users/laurent/src/linux-ppc/mm/memory_hotplug.c:1084! LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: rpadlpar_io rpaphp pseries_rng rng_core vmx_crypto gf128mul binfmt_misc ip_tables x_tables xfs libcrc32c crc32c_vpmsum autofs4 CPU: 8 PID: 10256 Comm: drmgr Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #25 Call Trace: add_memory_resource+0x23c/0x340 (unreliable) __add_memory+0x5c/0xf0 dlpar_add_lmb+0x1b4/0x500 dlpar_memory+0x1f8/0xb80 handle_dlpar_errorlog+0xc0/0x190 dlpar_store+0x198/0x4a0 kobj_attr_store+0x30/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x64/0x90 kernfs_fop_write+0x1b0/0x290 vfs_write+0xe8/0x290 ksys_write+0xdc/0x130 system_call_exception+0x160/0x270 system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c This has been seen on PowerPC LPAR. The root cause of this issue is that when node's memory is registered, the range used can overlap another node's range, thus the memory block is registered to multiple nodes in sysfs. There are two issues here: (a) The sysfs memory and node's layouts are broken due to these multiple links (b) The link errors in link_mem_sections() should not lead to a system panic. To address (a) register_mem_sect_under_node should not rely on the system state to detect whether the link operation is triggered by a hot plug operation or not. This is addressed by the patches 1 and 2 of this series. Issue (b) will be addressed separately. This patch (of 2): The memmap_context enum is used to detect whether a memory operation is due to a hot-add operation or happening at boot time. Make it general to the hotplug operation and rename it as meminit_context. There is no functional change introduced by this patch Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" <[email protected]> Cc: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]> Cc: Scott Cheloha <[email protected]> Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]> Cc: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit f85086f upstream. In register_mem_sect_under_node() the system_state's value is checked to detect whether the call is made during boot time or during an hot-plug operation. Unfortunately, that check against SYSTEM_BOOTING is wrong because regular memory is registered at SYSTEM_SCHEDULING state. In addition, memory hot-plug operation can be triggered at this system state by the ACPI [1]. So checking against the system state is not enough. The consequence is that on system with interleaved node's ranges like this: Early memory node ranges node 1: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000011fffffff] node 2: [mem 0x0000000120000000-0x000000014fffffff] node 1: [mem 0x0000000150000000-0x00000001ffffffff] node 0: [mem 0x0000000200000000-0x000000048fffffff] node 2: [mem 0x0000000490000000-0x00000007ffffffff] This can be seen on PowerPC LPAR after multiple memory hot-plug and hot-unplug operations are done. At the next reboot the node's memory ranges can be interleaved and since the call to link_mem_sections() is made in topology_init() while the system is in the SYSTEM_SCHEDULING state, the node's id is not checked, and the sections registered to multiple nodes: $ ls -l /sys/devices/system/memory/memory21/node* total 0 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Aug 24 05:27 node1 -> ../../node/node1 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Aug 24 05:27 node2 -> ../../node/node2 In that case, the system is able to boot but if later one of theses memory blocks is hot-unplugged and then hot-plugged, the sysfs inconsistency is detected and this is triggering a BUG_ON(): kernel BUG at /Users/laurent/src/linux-ppc/mm/memory_hotplug.c:1084! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: rpadlpar_io rpaphp pseries_rng rng_core vmx_crypto gf128mul binfmt_misc ip_tables x_tables xfs libcrc32c crc32c_vpmsum autofs4 CPU: 8 PID: 10256 Comm: drmgr Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #25 Call Trace: add_memory_resource+0x23c/0x340 (unreliable) __add_memory+0x5c/0xf0 dlpar_add_lmb+0x1b4/0x500 dlpar_memory+0x1f8/0xb80 handle_dlpar_errorlog+0xc0/0x190 dlpar_store+0x198/0x4a0 kobj_attr_store+0x30/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x64/0x90 kernfs_fop_write+0x1b0/0x290 vfs_write+0xe8/0x290 ksys_write+0xdc/0x130 system_call_exception+0x160/0x270 system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c This patch addresses the root cause by not relying on the system_state value to detect whether the call is due to a hot-plug operation. An extra parameter is added to link_mem_sections() detailing whether the operation is due to a hot-plug operation. [1] According to Oscar Salvador, using this qemu command line, ACPI memory hotplug operations are raised at SYSTEM_SCHEDULING state: $QEMU -enable-kvm -machine pc -smp 4,sockets=4,cores=1,threads=1 -cpu host -monitor pty \ -m size=$MEM,slots=255,maxmem=4294967296k \ -numa node,nodeid=0,cpus=0-3,mem=512 -numa node,nodeid=1,mem=512 \ -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm0,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=0,memdev=memdimm0,id=dimm0,slot=0 \ -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm1,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=0,memdev=memdimm1,id=dimm1,slot=1 \ -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm2,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=0,memdev=memdimm2,id=dimm2,slot=2 \ -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm3,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=0,memdev=memdimm3,id=dimm3,slot=3 \ -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm4,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=1,memdev=memdimm4,id=dimm4,slot=4 \ -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm5,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=1,memdev=memdimm5,id=dimm5,slot=5 \ -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm6,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=1,memdev=memdimm6,id=dimm6,slot=6 \ Fixes: 4fbce63 ("mm/memory_hotplug.c: make register_mem_sect_under_node() a callback of walk_memory_range()") Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <[email protected]> Cc: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]> Cc: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]> Cc: Scott Cheloha <[email protected]> Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit c1d0da8 upstream. Patch series "mm: fix memory to node bad links in sysfs", v3. Sometimes, firmware may expose interleaved memory layout like this: Early memory node ranges node 1: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000011fffffff] node 2: [mem 0x0000000120000000-0x000000014fffffff] node 1: [mem 0x0000000150000000-0x00000001ffffffff] node 0: [mem 0x0000000200000000-0x000000048fffffff] node 2: [mem 0x0000000490000000-0x00000007ffffffff] In that case, we can see memory blocks assigned to multiple nodes in sysfs: $ ls -l /sys/devices/system/memory/memory21 total 0 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Aug 24 05:27 node1 -> ../../node/node1 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Aug 24 05:27 node2 -> ../../node/node2 -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 online -r--r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 phys_device -r--r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 phys_index drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Aug 24 05:27 power -r--r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 removable -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 state lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Aug 24 05:25 subsystem -> ../../../../bus/memory -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:25 uevent -r--r--r-- 1 root root 65536 Aug 24 05:27 valid_zones The same applies in the node's directory with a memory21 link in both the node1 and node2's directory. This is wrong but doesn't prevent the system to run. However when later, one of these memory blocks is hot-unplugged and then hot-plugged, the system is detecting an inconsistency in the sysfs layout and a BUG_ON() is raised: kernel BUG at /Users/laurent/src/linux-ppc/mm/memory_hotplug.c:1084! LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: rpadlpar_io rpaphp pseries_rng rng_core vmx_crypto gf128mul binfmt_misc ip_tables x_tables xfs libcrc32c crc32c_vpmsum autofs4 CPU: 8 PID: 10256 Comm: drmgr Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ hardkernel#25 Call Trace: add_memory_resource+0x23c/0x340 (unreliable) __add_memory+0x5c/0xf0 dlpar_add_lmb+0x1b4/0x500 dlpar_memory+0x1f8/0xb80 handle_dlpar_errorlog+0xc0/0x190 dlpar_store+0x198/0x4a0 kobj_attr_store+0x30/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x64/0x90 kernfs_fop_write+0x1b0/0x290 vfs_write+0xe8/0x290 ksys_write+0xdc/0x130 system_call_exception+0x160/0x270 system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c This has been seen on PowerPC LPAR. The root cause of this issue is that when node's memory is registered, the range used can overlap another node's range, thus the memory block is registered to multiple nodes in sysfs. There are two issues here: (a) The sysfs memory and node's layouts are broken due to these multiple links (b) The link errors in link_mem_sections() should not lead to a system panic. To address (a) register_mem_sect_under_node should not rely on the system state to detect whether the link operation is triggered by a hot plug operation or not. This is addressed by the patches 1 and 2 of this series. Issue (b) will be addressed separately. This patch (of 2): The memmap_context enum is used to detect whether a memory operation is due to a hot-add operation or happening at boot time. Make it general to the hotplug operation and rename it as meminit_context. There is no functional change introduced by this patch Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" <[email protected]> Cc: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]> Cc: Scott Cheloha <[email protected]> Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]> Cc: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit f85086f upstream. In register_mem_sect_under_node() the system_state's value is checked to detect whether the call is made during boot time or during an hot-plug operation. Unfortunately, that check against SYSTEM_BOOTING is wrong because regular memory is registered at SYSTEM_SCHEDULING state. In addition, memory hot-plug operation can be triggered at this system state by the ACPI [1]. So checking against the system state is not enough. The consequence is that on system with interleaved node's ranges like this: Early memory node ranges node 1: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000011fffffff] node 2: [mem 0x0000000120000000-0x000000014fffffff] node 1: [mem 0x0000000150000000-0x00000001ffffffff] node 0: [mem 0x0000000200000000-0x000000048fffffff] node 2: [mem 0x0000000490000000-0x00000007ffffffff] This can be seen on PowerPC LPAR after multiple memory hot-plug and hot-unplug operations are done. At the next reboot the node's memory ranges can be interleaved and since the call to link_mem_sections() is made in topology_init() while the system is in the SYSTEM_SCHEDULING state, the node's id is not checked, and the sections registered to multiple nodes: $ ls -l /sys/devices/system/memory/memory21/node* total 0 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Aug 24 05:27 node1 -> ../../node/node1 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Aug 24 05:27 node2 -> ../../node/node2 In that case, the system is able to boot but if later one of theses memory blocks is hot-unplugged and then hot-plugged, the sysfs inconsistency is detected and this is triggering a BUG_ON(): kernel BUG at /Users/laurent/src/linux-ppc/mm/memory_hotplug.c:1084! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [hardkernel#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: rpadlpar_io rpaphp pseries_rng rng_core vmx_crypto gf128mul binfmt_misc ip_tables x_tables xfs libcrc32c crc32c_vpmsum autofs4 CPU: 8 PID: 10256 Comm: drmgr Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ hardkernel#25 Call Trace: add_memory_resource+0x23c/0x340 (unreliable) __add_memory+0x5c/0xf0 dlpar_add_lmb+0x1b4/0x500 dlpar_memory+0x1f8/0xb80 handle_dlpar_errorlog+0xc0/0x190 dlpar_store+0x198/0x4a0 kobj_attr_store+0x30/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x64/0x90 kernfs_fop_write+0x1b0/0x290 vfs_write+0xe8/0x290 ksys_write+0xdc/0x130 system_call_exception+0x160/0x270 system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c This patch addresses the root cause by not relying on the system_state value to detect whether the call is due to a hot-plug operation. An extra parameter is added to link_mem_sections() detailing whether the operation is due to a hot-plug operation. [1] According to Oscar Salvador, using this qemu command line, ACPI memory hotplug operations are raised at SYSTEM_SCHEDULING state: $QEMU -enable-kvm -machine pc -smp 4,sockets=4,cores=1,threads=1 -cpu host -monitor pty \ -m size=$MEM,slots=255,maxmem=4294967296k \ -numa node,nodeid=0,cpus=0-3,mem=512 -numa node,nodeid=1,mem=512 \ -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm0,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=0,memdev=memdimm0,id=dimm0,slot=0 \ -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm1,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=0,memdev=memdimm1,id=dimm1,slot=1 \ -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm2,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=0,memdev=memdimm2,id=dimm2,slot=2 \ -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm3,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=0,memdev=memdimm3,id=dimm3,slot=3 \ -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm4,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=1,memdev=memdimm4,id=dimm4,slot=4 \ -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm5,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=1,memdev=memdimm5,id=dimm5,slot=5 \ -object memory-backend-ram,id=memdimm6,size=134217728 -device pc-dimm,node=1,memdev=memdimm6,id=dimm6,slot=6 \ Fixes: 4fbce63 ("mm/memory_hotplug.c: make register_mem_sect_under_node() a callback of walk_memory_range()") Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <[email protected]> Cc: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]> Cc: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]> Cc: Scott Cheloha <[email protected]> Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 96298f6 ] According to Core Spec Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part A 6.1.5, the incoming L2CAP_ConfigReq should be handled during OPEN state. The section below shows the btmon trace when running L2CAP/COS/CFD/BV-12-C before and after this change. === Before === ... > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #22 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4 PSM: 1 (0x0001) Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16 #23 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #24 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #25 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #26 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #27 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 .. < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 #28 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #29 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14 #30 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6 Source CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20 #31 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 91 02 11 11 ...... < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 14 #32 L2CAP: Command Reject (0x01) ident 3 len 6 Reason: Invalid CID in request (0x0002) Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #33 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 ... === After === ... > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #22 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4 PSM: 1 (0x0001) Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16 #23 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #24 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #25 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #26 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #27 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 .. < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 #28 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #29 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14 #30 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6 Source CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20 #31 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 91 02 11 11 ..... < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 #32 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #33 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #34 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #35 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 ... Signed-off-by: Howard Chung <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 27af8e2 upstream. We have the following potential deadlock condition: ======================================================== WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected 5.10.0-rc2+ #25 Not tainted -------------------------------------------------------- swapper/3/0 just changed the state of lock: ffff8880063bd618 (&host->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: ata_bmdma_interrupt+0x27/0x200 but this lock took another, HARDIRQ-READ-unsafe lock in the past: (&trig->leddev_list_lock){.+.?}-{2:2} and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&trig->leddev_list_lock); local_irq_disable(); lock(&host->lock); lock(&trig->leddev_list_lock); <Interrupt> lock(&host->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** no locks held by swapper/3/0. the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock: -> (&trig->leddev_list_lock){.+.?}-{2:2} ops: 46 { HARDIRQ-ON-R at: lock_acquire+0x15f/0x420 _raw_read_lock+0x42/0x90 led_trigger_event+0x2b/0x70 rfkill_global_led_trigger_worker+0x94/0xb0 process_one_work+0x240/0x560 worker_thread+0x58/0x3d0 kthread+0x151/0x170 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 IN-SOFTIRQ-R at: lock_acquire+0x15f/0x420 _raw_read_lock+0x42/0x90 led_trigger_event+0x2b/0x70 kbd_bh+0x9e/0xc0 tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0xe9/0x100 tasklet_action+0x22/0x30 __do_softirq+0xcc/0x46d run_ksoftirqd+0x3f/0x70 smpboot_thread_fn+0x116/0x1f0 kthread+0x151/0x170 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 SOFTIRQ-ON-R at: lock_acquire+0x15f/0x420 _raw_read_lock+0x42/0x90 led_trigger_event+0x2b/0x70 rfkill_global_led_trigger_worker+0x94/0xb0 process_one_work+0x240/0x560 worker_thread+0x58/0x3d0 kthread+0x151/0x170 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 INITIAL READ USE at: lock_acquire+0x15f/0x420 _raw_read_lock+0x42/0x90 led_trigger_event+0x2b/0x70 rfkill_global_led_trigger_worker+0x94/0xb0 process_one_work+0x240/0x560 worker_thread+0x58/0x3d0 kthread+0x151/0x170 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 } ... key at: [<ffffffff83da4c00>] __key.0+0x0/0x10 ... acquired at: _raw_read_lock+0x42/0x90 led_trigger_blink_oneshot+0x3b/0x90 ledtrig_disk_activity+0x3c/0xa0 ata_qc_complete+0x26/0x450 ata_do_link_abort+0xa3/0xe0 ata_port_freeze+0x2e/0x40 ata_hsm_qc_complete+0x94/0xa0 ata_sff_hsm_move+0x177/0x7a0 ata_sff_pio_task+0xc7/0x1b0 process_one_work+0x240/0x560 worker_thread+0x58/0x3d0 kthread+0x151/0x170 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> (&host->lock){-...}-{2:2} ops: 69 { IN-HARDIRQ-W at: lock_acquire+0x15f/0x420 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x52/0xa0 ata_bmdma_interrupt+0x27/0x200 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0xd5/0x2b0 handle_irq_event+0x57/0xb0 handle_edge_irq+0x8c/0x230 asm_call_irq_on_stack+0xf/0x20 common_interrupt+0x100/0x1c0 asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40 native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10 arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20 default_idle_call+0x59/0x1c0 do_idle+0x22c/0x2c0 cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30 start_secondary+0x11d/0x150 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xa6/0xab INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x15f/0x420 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x52/0xa0 ata_dev_init+0x54/0xe0 ata_link_init+0x8b/0xd0 ata_port_alloc+0x1f1/0x210 ata_host_alloc+0xf1/0x130 ata_host_alloc_pinfo+0x14/0xb0 ata_pci_sff_prepare_host+0x41/0xa0 ata_pci_bmdma_prepare_host+0x14/0x30 piix_init_one+0x21f/0x600 local_pci_probe+0x48/0x80 pci_device_probe+0x105/0x1c0 really_probe+0x221/0x490 driver_probe_device+0xe9/0x160 device_driver_attach+0xb2/0xc0 __driver_attach+0x91/0x150 bus_for_each_dev+0x81/0xc0 driver_attach+0x1e/0x20 bus_add_driver+0x138/0x1f0 driver_register+0x91/0xf0 __pci_register_driver+0x73/0x80 piix_init+0x1e/0x2e do_one_initcall+0x5f/0x2d0 kernel_init_freeable+0x26f/0x2cf kernel_init+0xe/0x113 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 } ... key at: [<ffffffff83d9fdc0>] __key.6+0x0/0x10 ... acquired at: __lock_acquire+0x9da/0x2370 lock_acquire+0x15f/0x420 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x52/0xa0 ata_bmdma_interrupt+0x27/0x200 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0xd5/0x2b0 handle_irq_event+0x57/0xb0 handle_edge_irq+0x8c/0x230 asm_call_irq_on_stack+0xf/0x20 common_interrupt+0x100/0x1c0 asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40 native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10 arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20 default_idle_call+0x59/0x1c0 do_idle+0x22c/0x2c0 cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30 start_secondary+0x11d/0x150 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xa6/0xab This lockdep splat is reported after: commit e918188 ("locking: More accurate annotations for read_lock()") To clarify: - read-locks are recursive only in interrupt context (when in_interrupt() returns true) - after acquiring host->lock in CPU1, another cpu (i.e. CPU2) may call write_lock(&trig->leddev_list_lock) that would be blocked by CPU0 that holds trig->leddev_list_lock in read-mode - when CPU1 (ata_ac_complete()) tries to read-lock trig->leddev_list_lock, it would be blocked by the write-lock waiter on CPU2 (because we are not in interrupt context, so the read-lock is not recursive) - at this point if an interrupt happens on CPU0 and ata_bmdma_interrupt() is executed it will try to acquire host->lock, that is held by CPU1, that is currently blocked by CPU2, so: * CPU0 blocked by CPU1 * CPU1 blocked by CPU2 * CPU2 blocked by CPU0 *** DEADLOCK *** The deadlock scenario is better represented by the following schema (thanks to Boqun Feng <[email protected]> for the schema and the detailed explanation of the deadlock condition): CPU 0: CPU 1: CPU 2: ----- ----- ----- led_trigger_event(): read_lock(&trig->leddev_list_lock); <workqueue> ata_hsm_qc_complete(): spin_lock_irqsave(&host->lock); write_lock(&trig->leddev_list_lock); ata_port_freeze(): ata_do_link_abort(): ata_qc_complete(): ledtrig_disk_activity(): led_trigger_blink_oneshot(): read_lock(&trig->leddev_list_lock); // ^ not in in_interrupt() context, so could get blocked by CPU 2 <interrupt> ata_bmdma_interrupt(): spin_lock_irqsave(&host->lock); Fix by using read_lock_irqsave/irqrestore() in led_trigger_event(), so that no interrupt can happen in between, preventing the deadlock condition. Apply the same change to led_trigger_blink_setup() as well, since the same deadlock scenario can also happen in power_supply_update_bat_leds() -> led_trigger_blink() -> led_trigger_blink_setup() (workqueue context), and potentially prevent other similar usages. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201101092614.GB3989@xps-13-7390/ Fixes: eb25cb9 ("leds: convert IDE trigger to common disk trigger") Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b132030 ] A out-of-bounds bug can be triggered by an interrupt, the reason for this bug is the lack of checking of register values. In flexcop_pci_isr, the driver reads value from a register and uses it as a dma address. Finally, this address will be passed to the count parameter of find_next_packet. If this value is larger than the size of dma, the index of buffer will be out-of-bounds. Fix this by adding a check after reading the value of the register. The following KASAN report reveals it: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in find_next_packet drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c:528 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _dvb_dmx_swfilter drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c:572 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dvb_dmx_swfilter+0x3fa/0x420 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880608c00a0 by task swapper/2/0 CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 4.19.177-gdba4159c14ef hardkernel#25 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xec/0x156 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description+0x78/0x290 mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report+0x25b/0x380 mm/kasan/report.c:412 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430 find_next_packet drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c:528 [inline] _dvb_dmx_swfilter drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c:572 [inline] dvb_dmx_swfilter+0x3fa/0x420 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c:603 flexcop_pass_dmx_data+0x2e/0x40 drivers/media/common/b2c2/flexcop.c:167 flexcop_pci_isr+0x3d1/0x5d0 drivers/media/pci/b2c2/flexcop-pci.c:212 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0xfb/0x770 kernel/irq/handle.c:149 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x79/0x150 kernel/irq/handle.c:189 handle_irq_event+0xac/0x140 kernel/irq/handle.c:206 handle_fasteoi_irq+0x232/0x5c0 kernel/irq/chip.c:725 generic_handle_irq_desc include/linux/irqdesc.h:155 [inline] handle_irq+0x230/0x3a0 arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c:87 do_IRQ+0xa7/0x1e0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:247 common_interrupt+0xf/0xf arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:670 </IRQ> RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0x28/0x30 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:61 Code: 00 00 55 be 04 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 00 62 2f 8c 48 89 e5 e8 fb 31 e8 f8 8b 05 75 4f 8e 03 85 c0 7e 07 0f 00 2d 8a 61 66 00 fb f4 <5d> c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 RSP: 0018:ffff88806b71fcc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffde RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8bde44c8 RCX: ffffffff88a11285 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff8c2f6200 RBP: ffff88806b71fcc8 R08: fffffbfff185ec40 R09: fffffbfff185ec40 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff185ec40 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: ffffffff8be9d6e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:94 [inline] default_idle+0x6f/0x360 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:557 arch_cpu_idle+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:548 default_idle_call+0x3b/0x60 kernel/sched/idle.c:93 cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:153 [inline] do_idle+0x2ab/0x3c0 kernel/sched/idle.c:263 cpu_startup_entry+0xcb/0xe0 kernel/sched/idle.c:369 start_secondary+0x3b8/0x4e0 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:271 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:243 Allocated by task 1: save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553 kasan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:445 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2741 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2749 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0xeb/0x280 mm/slub.c:2754 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:699 [inline] __kernfs_new_node+0xe2/0x6f0 fs/kernfs/dir.c:633 kernfs_new_node+0x9a/0x120 fs/kernfs/dir.c:693 __kernfs_create_file+0x5f/0x340 fs/kernfs/file.c:992 sysfs_add_file_mode_ns+0x22a/0x4e0 fs/sysfs/file.c:306 create_files fs/sysfs/group.c:63 [inline] internal_create_group+0x34e/0xc30 fs/sysfs/group.c:147 sysfs_create_group fs/sysfs/group.c:173 [inline] sysfs_create_groups+0x9c/0x140 fs/sysfs/group.c:200 driver_add_groups+0x3e/0x50 drivers/base/driver.c:129 bus_add_driver+0x3a5/0x790 drivers/base/bus.c:684 driver_register+0x1cd/0x410 drivers/base/driver.c:170 __pci_register_driver+0x197/0x200 drivers/pci/pci-driver.c:1411 cx88_audio_pci_driver_init+0x23/0x25 drivers/media/pci/cx88/cx88-alsa.c: 1017 do_one_initcall+0xe0/0x610 init/main.c:884 do_initcall_level init/main.c:952 [inline] do_initcalls init/main.c:960 [inline] do_basic_setup init/main.c:978 [inline] kernel_init_freeable+0x4d0/0x592 init/main.c:1145 kernel_init+0x18/0x190 init/main.c:1062 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415 Freed by task 0: (stack is not available) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880608c0000 which belongs to the cache kernfs_node_cache of size 160 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of 160-byte region [ffff8880608c0000, ffff8880608c00a0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0001823000 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88806bed1e00 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head) raw: 0100000000008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88806bed1e00 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000240024 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880608bff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8880608c0000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff8880608c0080: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 ^ ffff8880608c0100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8880608c0180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/[email protected] Reported-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b132030 ] A out-of-bounds bug can be triggered by an interrupt, the reason for this bug is the lack of checking of register values. In flexcop_pci_isr, the driver reads value from a register and uses it as a dma address. Finally, this address will be passed to the count parameter of find_next_packet. If this value is larger than the size of dma, the index of buffer will be out-of-bounds. Fix this by adding a check after reading the value of the register. The following KASAN report reveals it: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in find_next_packet drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c:528 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _dvb_dmx_swfilter drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c:572 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dvb_dmx_swfilter+0x3fa/0x420 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c:603 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880608c00a0 by task swapper/2/0 CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 4.19.177-gdba4159c14ef #25 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xec/0x156 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description+0x78/0x290 mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report+0x25b/0x380 mm/kasan/report.c:412 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430 find_next_packet drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c:528 [inline] _dvb_dmx_swfilter drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c:572 [inline] dvb_dmx_swfilter+0x3fa/0x420 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c:603 flexcop_pass_dmx_data+0x2e/0x40 drivers/media/common/b2c2/flexcop.c:167 flexcop_pci_isr+0x3d1/0x5d0 drivers/media/pci/b2c2/flexcop-pci.c:212 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0xfb/0x770 kernel/irq/handle.c:149 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x79/0x150 kernel/irq/handle.c:189 handle_irq_event+0xac/0x140 kernel/irq/handle.c:206 handle_fasteoi_irq+0x232/0x5c0 kernel/irq/chip.c:725 generic_handle_irq_desc include/linux/irqdesc.h:155 [inline] handle_irq+0x230/0x3a0 arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c:87 do_IRQ+0xa7/0x1e0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:247 common_interrupt+0xf/0xf arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:670 </IRQ> RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0x28/0x30 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:61 Code: 00 00 55 be 04 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 00 62 2f 8c 48 89 e5 e8 fb 31 e8 f8 8b 05 75 4f 8e 03 85 c0 7e 07 0f 00 2d 8a 61 66 00 fb f4 <5d> c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 RSP: 0018:ffff88806b71fcc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffde RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8bde44c8 RCX: ffffffff88a11285 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff8c2f6200 RBP: ffff88806b71fcc8 R08: fffffbfff185ec40 R09: fffffbfff185ec40 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff185ec40 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: ffffffff8be9d6e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:94 [inline] default_idle+0x6f/0x360 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:557 arch_cpu_idle+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:548 default_idle_call+0x3b/0x60 kernel/sched/idle.c:93 cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:153 [inline] do_idle+0x2ab/0x3c0 kernel/sched/idle.c:263 cpu_startup_entry+0xcb/0xe0 kernel/sched/idle.c:369 start_secondary+0x3b8/0x4e0 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:271 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:243 Allocated by task 1: save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553 kasan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:445 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2741 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2749 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0xeb/0x280 mm/slub.c:2754 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:699 [inline] __kernfs_new_node+0xe2/0x6f0 fs/kernfs/dir.c:633 kernfs_new_node+0x9a/0x120 fs/kernfs/dir.c:693 __kernfs_create_file+0x5f/0x340 fs/kernfs/file.c:992 sysfs_add_file_mode_ns+0x22a/0x4e0 fs/sysfs/file.c:306 create_files fs/sysfs/group.c:63 [inline] internal_create_group+0x34e/0xc30 fs/sysfs/group.c:147 sysfs_create_group fs/sysfs/group.c:173 [inline] sysfs_create_groups+0x9c/0x140 fs/sysfs/group.c:200 driver_add_groups+0x3e/0x50 drivers/base/driver.c:129 bus_add_driver+0x3a5/0x790 drivers/base/bus.c:684 driver_register+0x1cd/0x410 drivers/base/driver.c:170 __pci_register_driver+0x197/0x200 drivers/pci/pci-driver.c:1411 cx88_audio_pci_driver_init+0x23/0x25 drivers/media/pci/cx88/cx88-alsa.c: 1017 do_one_initcall+0xe0/0x610 init/main.c:884 do_initcall_level init/main.c:952 [inline] do_initcalls init/main.c:960 [inline] do_basic_setup init/main.c:978 [inline] kernel_init_freeable+0x4d0/0x592 init/main.c:1145 kernel_init+0x18/0x190 init/main.c:1062 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415 Freed by task 0: (stack is not available) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880608c0000 which belongs to the cache kernfs_node_cache of size 160 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of 160-byte region [ffff8880608c0000, ffff8880608c00a0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0001823000 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88806bed1e00 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head) raw: 0100000000008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88806bed1e00 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000240024 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880608bff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8880608c0000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff8880608c0080: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 ^ ffff8880608c0100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8880608c0180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/[email protected] Reported-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4224cfd ] When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already removed. [ 755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called [ 756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called ... [ 757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 758.031397] IP: [<ffffffff8ee11acb>] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280 crash> bt ... PID: 12649 TASK: ffff8924108f2100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "amsd" ... #9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778 [exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab] RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb RSP: ffff89240e1a3968 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff89243d874100 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff89243d874090 RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0 R8: 000000000001f080 R9: ffff8905ffc03c00 R10: ffffffffc04680d4 R11: ffffffff8edde9fd R12: 00000000000080d0 R13: ffff89243d874090 R14: ffff89243d874080 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core] #11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core] #12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core] #13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core] #14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core] #15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core] #16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core] #17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46 #18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208 #19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3 #20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf #21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596 #22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10 #23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5 #24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff #25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f #26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92 crash> net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000 state = 0x5 (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER) To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present. Signed-off-by: suresh kumar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 1e41e69 upstream. UBSAN complains about array-index-out-of-bounds: [ 1.980703] kernel: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in /build/linux-9H675w/linux-5.15.0/drivers/ata/libahci.c:968:41 [ 1.980709] kernel: index 15 is out of range for type 'ahci_em_priv [8]' [ 1.980713] kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 209 Comm: scsi_eh_8 Not tainted 5.15.0-25-generic #25-Ubuntu [ 1.980716] kernel: Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/P5Q3, BIOS 1102 06/11/2010 [ 1.980718] kernel: Call Trace: [ 1.980721] kernel: <TASK> [ 1.980723] kernel: show_stack+0x52/0x58 [ 1.980729] kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x5f [ 1.980734] kernel: dump_stack+0x10/0x12 [ 1.980736] kernel: ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x45 [ 1.980739] kernel: __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49 [ 1.980742] kernel: ahci_qc_issue+0x166/0x170 [libahci] [ 1.980748] kernel: ata_qc_issue+0x135/0x240 [ 1.980752] kernel: ata_exec_internal_sg+0x2c4/0x580 [ 1.980754] kernel: ? vprintk_default+0x1d/0x20 [ 1.980759] kernel: ata_exec_internal+0x67/0xa0 [ 1.980762] kernel: sata_pmp_read+0x8d/0xc0 [ 1.980765] kernel: sata_pmp_read_gscr+0x3c/0x90 [ 1.980768] kernel: sata_pmp_attach+0x8b/0x310 [ 1.980771] kernel: ata_eh_revalidate_and_attach+0x28c/0x4b0 [ 1.980775] kernel: ata_eh_recover+0x6b6/0xb30 [ 1.980778] kernel: ? ahci_do_hardreset+0x180/0x180 [libahci] [ 1.980783] kernel: ? ahci_stop_engine+0xb0/0xb0 [libahci] [ 1.980787] kernel: ? ahci_do_softreset+0x290/0x290 [libahci] [ 1.980792] kernel: ? trace_event_raw_event_ata_eh_link_autopsy_qc+0xe0/0xe0 [ 1.980795] kernel: sata_pmp_eh_recover.isra.0+0x214/0x560 [ 1.980799] kernel: sata_pmp_error_handler+0x23/0x40 [ 1.980802] kernel: ahci_error_handler+0x43/0x80 [libahci] [ 1.980806] kernel: ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x2b1/0x600 [ 1.980810] kernel: ata_scsi_error+0x9c/0xd0 [ 1.980813] kernel: scsi_error_handler+0xa1/0x180 [ 1.980817] kernel: ? scsi_unjam_host+0x1c0/0x1c0 [ 1.980820] kernel: kthread+0x12a/0x150 [ 1.980823] kernel: ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 [ 1.980826] kernel: ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 1.980831] kernel: </TASK> This happens because sata_pmp_init_links() initialize link->pmp up to SATA_PMP_MAX_PORTS while em_priv is declared as 8 elements array. I can't find the maximum Enclosure Management ports specified in AHCI spec v1.3.1, but "12.2.1 LED message type" states that "Port Multiplier Information" can utilize 4 bits, which implies it can support up to 16 ports. Hence, use SATA_PMP_MAX_PORTS as EM_MAX_SLOTS to resolve the issue. BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1970074 Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 0b0747d upstream. The following processes run into a deadlock. CPU 41 was waiting for CPU 29 to handle a CSD request while holding spinlock "crashdump_lock", but CPU 29 was hung by that spinlock with IRQs disabled. PID: 17360 TASK: ffff95c1090c5c40 CPU: 41 COMMAND: "mrdiagd" !# 0 [ffffb80edbf37b58] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b871a40 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0 !# 1 [ffffb80edbf37b58] atomic_read at ffffffff9b871a40 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:27:0 !# 2 [ffffb80edbf37b58] dump_stack at ffffffff9b871a40 lib/dump_stack.c:54:0 # 3 [ffffb80edbf37b78] csd_lock_wait_toolong at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:364:0 # 4 [ffffb80edbf37b78] __csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:384:0 # 5 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:394:0 # 6 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] smp_call_function_many at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:843:0 # 7 [ffffb80edbf37c50] smp_call_function at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:867:0 # 8 [ffffb80edbf37c50] on_each_cpu at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:976:0 # 9 [ffffb80edbf37c78] flush_tlb_kernel_range at ffffffff9b085c4b arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:742:0 #10 [ffffb80edbf37cb8] __purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a1e0 mm/vmalloc.c:701:0 #11 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] try_purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:722:0 #12 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] free_vmap_area_noflush at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:754:0 #13 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] free_unmap_vmap_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:764:0 #14 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] remove_vm_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:1509:0 #15 [ffffb80edbf37d18] __vunmap at ffffffff9b23bb8a mm/vmalloc.c:1537:0 #16 [ffffb80edbf37d40] vfree at ffffffff9b23bc85 mm/vmalloc.c:1612:0 #17 [ffffb80edbf37d58] megasas_free_host_crash_buffer [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc020b7f2 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c:3932:0 #18 [ffffb80edbf37d80] fw_crash_state_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f804d drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3291:0 #19 [ffffb80edbf37dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0 #20 [ffffb80edbf37dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0 #21 [ffffb80edbf37de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0 #22 [ffffb80edbf37e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0 #23 [ffffb80edbf37ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0 #24 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0 #25 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0 #26 [ffffb80edbf37f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0 #27 [ffffb80edbf37f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0 PID: 17355 TASK: ffff95c1090c3d80 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "mrdiagd" !# 0 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0 !# 1 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 kernel/locking/qspinlock.c:368:0 # 2 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:674:0 # 3 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/qspinlock.h:53:0 # 4 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] queued_spin_lock at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:90:0 # 5 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] do_raw_spin_lock_flags at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock.h:173:0 # 6 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:122:0 # 7 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:160:0 # 8 [ffffb80f2d3c7d88] fw_crash_buffer_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f8129 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3205:0 # 9 [ffffb80f2d3c7dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0 #10 [ffffb80f2d3c7dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0 #11 [ffffb80f2d3c7de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0 #12 [ffffb80f2d3c7e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0 #13 [ffffb80f2d3c7ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0 #14 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0 #15 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0 #16 [ffffb80f2d3c7f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0 #17 [ffffb80f2d3c7f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0 The lock is used to synchronize different sysfs operations, it doesn't protect any resource that will be touched by an interrupt. Consequently it's not required to disable IRQs. Replace the spinlock with a mutex to fix the deadlock. Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fc1092f ] KMSAN reported uninit-value access in __ip_make_skb() [1]. __ip_make_skb() tests HDRINCL to know if the skb has icmphdr. However, HDRINCL can cause a race condition. If calling setsockopt(2) with IP_HDRINCL changes HDRINCL while __ip_make_skb() is running, the function will access icmphdr in the skb even if it is not included. This causes the issue reported by KMSAN. Check FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH on fl4->flowi4_flags instead of testing HDRINCL on the socket. Also, fl4->fl4_icmp_type and fl4->fl4_icmp_code are not initialized. These are union in struct flowi4 and are implicitly initialized by flowi4_init_output(), but we should not rely on specific union layout. Initialize these explicitly in raw_sendmsg(). [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __ip_make_skb+0x2b74/0x2d20 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1481 __ip_make_skb+0x2b74/0x2d20 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1481 ip_finish_skb include/net/ip.h:243 [inline] ip_push_pending_frames+0x4c/0x5c0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1508 raw_sendmsg+0x2381/0x2690 net/ipv4/raw.c:654 inet_sendmsg+0x27b/0x2a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x274/0x3c0 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x62c/0x7b0 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x130/0x200 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1f0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3804 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3845 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5f6/0xc50 mm/slub.c:3888 kmalloc_reserve+0x13c/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:577 __alloc_skb+0x35a/0x7c0 net/core/skbuff.c:668 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1318 [inline] __ip_append_data+0x49ab/0x68c0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1128 ip_append_data+0x1e7/0x260 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1365 raw_sendmsg+0x22b1/0x2690 net/ipv4/raw.c:648 inet_sendmsg+0x27b/0x2a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x274/0x3c0 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x62c/0x7b0 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x130/0x200 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1f0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 CPU: 1 PID: 15709 Comm: syz-executor.7 Not tainted 6.8.0-11567-gb3603fcb79b1 #25 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39 04/01/2014 Fixes: 99e5aca ("ipv4: Fix potential uninit variable access bug in __ip_make_skb()") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 431315a ] When the rcutorture tests start to exit, the rcu_torture_cleanup() is invoked to stop kthreads and release resources, if the stall-task kthreads exist, cpu-stall has started and the rcutorture.stall_cpu is set to a larger value, the rcu_torture_cleanup() will be blocked for a long time and the hung-task may occur, this commit therefore add kthread_should_stop() to the loop of cpu-stall operation, when rcutorture tests ends, no need to wait for cpu-stall to end, exit directly. Use the following command to test: insmod rcutorture.ko torture_type=srcu fwd_progress=0 stat_interval=4 stall_cpu_block=1 stall_cpu=200 stall_cpu_holdoff=10 read_exit_burst=0 object_debug=1 rmmod rcutorture [15361.918610] INFO: task rmmod:878 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [15361.918613] Tainted: G W 6.8.0-rc2-yoctodev-standard+ #25 [15361.918615] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [15361.918616] task:rmmod state:D stack:0 pid:878 tgid:878 ppid:773 flags:0x00004002 [15361.918621] Call Trace: [15361.918623] <TASK> [15361.918626] __schedule+0xc0d/0x28f0 [15361.918631] ? __pfx___schedule+0x10/0x10 [15361.918635] ? rcu_is_watching+0x19/0xb0 [15361.918638] ? schedule+0x1f6/0x290 [15361.918642] ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 [15361.918645] ? schedule+0xc9/0x290 [15361.918648] ? schedule+0xc9/0x290 [15361.918653] ? trace_preempt_off+0x54/0x100 [15361.918657] ? schedule+0xc9/0x290 [15361.918661] schedule+0xd0/0x290 [15361.918665] schedule_timeout+0x56d/0x7d0 [15361.918669] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30 [15361.918672] ? rcu_is_watching+0x19/0xb0 [15361.918676] ? __pfx_schedule_timeout+0x10/0x10 [15361.918679] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30 [15361.918683] ? rcu_is_watching+0x19/0xb0 [15361.918686] ? wait_for_completion+0x179/0x4c0 [15361.918690] ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 [15361.918693] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 [15361.918696] ? wait_for_completion+0x9d/0x4c0 [15361.918700] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x36/0x50 [15361.918703] ? wait_for_completion+0x179/0x4c0 [15361.918707] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x36/0x50 [15361.918710] ? wait_for_completion+0x179/0x4c0 [15361.918714] ? trace_preempt_on+0x54/0x100 [15361.918718] ? wait_for_completion+0x179/0x4c0 [15361.918723] wait_for_completion+0x181/0x4c0 [15361.918728] ? __pfx_wait_for_completion+0x10/0x10 [15361.918738] kthread_stop+0x152/0x470 [15361.918742] _torture_stop_kthread+0x44/0xc0 [torture 7af7f9cbba28271a10503b653f9e05d518fbc8c3] [15361.918752] rcu_torture_cleanup+0x2ac/0xe90 [rcutorture f2cb1f556ee7956270927183c4c2c7749a336529] [15361.918766] ? __pfx_rcu_torture_cleanup+0x10/0x10 [rcutorture f2cb1f556ee7956270927183c4c2c7749a336529] [15361.918777] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 [15361.918781] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x17c/0x670 [15361.918789] ? __might_fault+0xcd/0x180 [15361.918793] ? find_module_all+0x104/0x1d0 [15361.918799] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x2a4/0x3f0 [15361.918803] ? __pfx___x64_sys_delete_module+0x10/0x10 [15361.918807] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x149/0x280 Signed-off-by: Zqiang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

Increase CMA reserved for MFC

eed7a1c

mdrjr added a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 22, 2013

Merge pull request #25 from tygraen/odroid-3.8.y

b02465b

Increase CMA reserved for MFC

mdrjr merged commit b02465b into hardkernel:odroid-3.8.y Jul 22, 2013

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Increase CMA reserved for MFC #25

Increase CMA reserved for MFC #25

tygraen commented Jul 22, 2013

Increase CMA reserved for MFC #25

Increase CMA reserved for MFC #25

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tygraen commented Jul 22, 2013