Kernel fails to build #26

declanmalone · 2013-08-14T00:35:29Z

$ git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/hardkernel/linux.git -b odroid-3.0.y odroid-3.0.y
$ make odroidu2_ubuntu_mali_defconfig
$ make menuconfig (leave everything as is)
$ make zImage
fs/block_dev.c: In function ‘bdev_inode_switch_bdi’:
fs/block_dev.c:67:4: error: ‘wakeup_bdi’ undeclared (first use in this function)
fs/block_dev.c:67:4: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
make[1]: *** [fs/block_dev.o] Error 1
make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....

Result: No kernel built into arch/arm/boot/zImage

mdrjr · 2013-08-14T01:00:27Z

Fixed with commit 38098b1

This avoids: Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: imon:send_packet: task interrupted Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------ Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: WARNING: at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:327 usb_submit_urb+0x353/0x370() Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: Hardware name: Unknow Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: URB f64b6f00 submitted while active Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: Modules linked in: Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: Pid: 3154, comm: LCDd Not tainted 3.8.6-htpc-00005-g9e6fc5e hardkernel#26 Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: Call Trace: Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: [<c012d778>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x78/0xb0 Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: [<c04136c3>] ? usb_submit_urb+0x353/0x370 Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: [<c04136c3>] ? usb_submit_urb+0x353/0x370 Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: [<c0447010>] ? imon_ir_change_protocol+0x150/0x150 Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: [<c012d843>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x33/0x40 Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: [<c04136c3>] ? usb_submit_urb+0x353/0x370 Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: [<c0446c67>] ? send_packet+0x97/0x270 Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: [<c0446cfe>] ? send_packet+0x12e/0x270 Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: [<c05c5743>] ? do_nanosleep+0xa3/0xd0 Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: [<c044760e>] ? vfd_write+0xae/0x250 Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: [<c0447560>] ? lcd_write+0x180/0x180 Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: [<c01b2b19>] ? vfs_write+0x89/0x140 Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: [<c01b2dda>] ? sys_write+0x4a/0x90 Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: [<c05c7c45>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x26 Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: ---[ end trace a0b6f0fcfd2f9a1d ]--- Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: imon:send_packet: error submitting urb(-16) Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: imon:vfd_write: send packet hardkernel#3 failed Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: imon:send_packet: error submitting urb(-16) Apr 12 23:52:16 homeserver kernel: imon:vfd_write: send packet #0 failed Signed-off-by: Kevin Baradon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>

em28xx is oopsing with some DVB devices: [10856.061884] general protection fault: 0000 [hardkernel#1] SMP [10856.067041] Modules linked in: rc_hauppauge em28xx_rc xc5000 drxk em28xx_dvb dvb_core em28xx videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_core rc_pixelview_new tuner_xc2028 tuner cx8800 cx88xx tveeprom btcx_risc videobuf_dma_sg videobuf_core rc_core v4l2_common videodev ebtable_nat ebtables nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_CHECKSUM be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs iptable_mangle bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 tun bridge cxgb3i cxgb3 stp ip6t_REJECT mdio libcxgbi nf_conntrack_ipv6 llc nf_defrag_ipv6 ib_iser rdma_cm ib_addr xt_conntrack iw_cm ib_cm ib_sa nf_conntrack ib_mad ib_core bnep bluetooth iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp ip6table_filter libiscsi ip6_tables scsi_transport_iscsi xfs libcrc32c snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm tg3 snd_page_alloc snd_timer [10856.139176] snd ptp iTCO_wdt soundcore pps_core iTCO_vendor_support lpc_ich mfd_core coretemp nfsd hp_wmi crc32c_intel microcode serio_raw rfkill sparse_keymap nfs_acl lockd sunrpc kvm_intel kvm uinput binfmt_misc firewire_ohci nouveau mxm_wmi i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper firewire_core crc_itu_t ttm drm i2c_core wmi [last unloaded: dib0070] [10856.168969] CPU 1 [10856.170799] Pid: 13606, comm: dvbv5-zap Not tainted 3.9.0-rc5+ hardkernel#26 Hewlett-Packard HP Z400 Workstation/0AE4h [10856.181187] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0459e47>] [<ffffffffa0459e47>] em28xx_write_regs_req+0x37/0x1c0 [em28xx] [10856.191028] RSP: 0018:ffff880118401a58 EFLAGS: 00010282 [10856.196533] RAX: 00020000012d0000 RBX: ffff88010804aec8 RCX: ffff880118401b14 [10856.203852] RDX: 0000000000000048 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88010804aec8 [10856.211174] RBP: ffff880118401ac8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [10856.218496] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: 0000000000000048 [10856.226026] R13: ffff880118401b14 R14: ffff88011752b258 R15: ffff88011752b258 [10856.233352] FS: 00007f26636d2740(0000) GS:ffff88011fc20000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [10856.241626] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [10856.247565] CR2: 00007f2663716e20 CR3: 00000000c7eb1000 CR4: 00000000000007e0 [10856.254889] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [10856.262215] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [10856.269542] Process dvbv5-zap (pid: 13606, threadinfo ffff880118400000, task ffff8800cd625d40) [10856.278340] Stack: [10856.280564] ffff88011ffe8de8 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 ffff88011ffe9b00 [10856.288191] ffff880118401b14 00ff88011ffe9b08 ffff880100000048 ffffffff8112a52a [10856.295893] 0000000000000001 ffff88010804aec8 0000000000000048 ffff880118401b14 [10856.303521] Call Trace: [10856.306182] [<ffffffff8112a52a>] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x15a/0x960 [10856.312912] [<ffffffffa045a002>] em28xx_write_regs+0x32/0xa0 [em28xx] [10856.319638] [<ffffffffa045a221>] em28xx_write_reg+0x21/0x30 [em28xx] [10856.326279] [<ffffffffa045a2cc>] em28xx_gpio_set+0x9c/0x100 [em28xx] [10856.332919] [<ffffffffa045a3ac>] em28xx_set_mode+0x7c/0x80 [em28xx] [10856.339472] [<ffffffffa03ef032>] em28xx_dvb_bus_ctrl+0x32/0x40 [em28xx_dvb] This is caused by commit c7a45e5, that added support for two I2C buses. A partial fix was applied at 3de09fb, but it doesn't cover all cases, as the DVB core fills fe->dvb->priv with adapter->priv. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>

With DT-based boot, the GPMC OneNAND sync mode setup does not work correctly. During the async mode setup, sync flags gets incorrectly set in the onenand_async data and the system crashes during the async setup. Also, the sync mode never gets set in gpmc_onenand_data->flags, so even without the crash, the actual sync mode setup would never be called. The patch fixes this by adjusting the gpmc_onenand_data->flags when the data is read from the DT. Also while doing this we force the onenand_async to be always async. The patch enables to use the following DTS chunk (that should correspond the arch/arm/mach-omap2/board-rm680.c board file setup) with Nokia N950, which currently crashes with 3.12-rc1. The crash output can be also found below. &gpmc { ranges = <0 0 0x04000000 0x20000000>; onenand@0,0 { #address-cells = <1>; #size-cells = <1>; reg = <0 0 0x20000000>; gpmc,sync-read; gpmc,sync-write; gpmc,burst-length = <16>; gpmc,burst-read; gpmc,burst-wrap; gpmc,burst-write; gpmc,device-width = <2>; gpmc,mux-add-data = <2>; gpmc,cs-on-ns = <0>; gpmc,cs-rd-off-ns = <87>; gpmc,cs-wr-off-ns = <87>; gpmc,adv-on-ns = <0>; gpmc,adv-rd-off-ns = <10>; gpmc,adv-wr-off-ns = <10>; gpmc,oe-on-ns = <15>; gpmc,oe-off-ns = <87>; gpmc,we-on-ns = <0>; gpmc,we-off-ns = <87>; gpmc,rd-cycle-ns = <112>; gpmc,wr-cycle-ns = <112>; gpmc,access-ns = <81>; gpmc,page-burst-access-ns = <15>; gpmc,bus-turnaround-ns = <0>; gpmc,cycle2cycle-delay-ns = <0>; gpmc,wait-monitoring-ns = <0>; gpmc,clk-activation-ns = <5>; gpmc,wr-data-mux-bus-ns = <30>; gpmc,wr-access-ns = <81>; gpmc,sync-clk-ps = <15000>; }; }; [ 1.467559] GPMC CS0: cs_on : 0 ticks, 0 ns (was 0 ticks) 0 ns [ 1.474822] GPMC CS0: cs_rd_off : 1 ticks, 5 ns (was 24 ticks) 5 ns [ 1.482116] GPMC CS0: cs_wr_off : 14 ticks, 71 ns (was 24 ticks) 71 ns [ 1.489349] GPMC CS0: adv_on : 0 ticks, 0 ns (was 0 ticks) 0 ns [ 1.496582] GPMC CS0: adv_rd_off: 3 ticks, 15 ns (was 3 ticks) 15 ns [ 1.503845] GPMC CS0: adv_wr_off: 3 ticks, 15 ns (was 3 ticks) 15 ns [ 1.511077] GPMC CS0: oe_on : 3 ticks, 15 ns (was 4 ticks) 15 ns [ 1.518310] GPMC CS0: oe_off : 1 ticks, 5 ns (was 24 ticks) 5 ns [ 1.525543] GPMC CS0: we_on : 0 ticks, 0 ns (was 0 ticks) 0 ns [ 1.532806] GPMC CS0: we_off : 8 ticks, 40 ns (was 24 ticks) 40 ns [ 1.540039] GPMC CS0: rd_cycle : 4 ticks, 20 ns (was 29 ticks) 20 ns [ 1.547302] GPMC CS0: wr_cycle : 4 ticks, 20 ns (was 29 ticks) 20 ns [ 1.554504] GPMC CS0: access : 0 ticks, 0 ns (was 23 ticks) 0 ns [ 1.561767] GPMC CS0: page_burst_access: 0 ticks, 0 ns (was 3 ticks) 0 ns [ 1.569641] GPMC CS0: bus_turnaround: 0 ticks, 0 ns (was 0 ticks) 0 ns [ 1.577270] GPMC CS0: cycle2cycle_delay: 0 ticks, 0 ns (was 0 ticks) 0 ns [ 1.585144] GPMC CS0: wait_monitoring: 0 ticks, 0 ns (was 0 ticks) 0 ns [ 1.592834] GPMC CS0: clk_activation: 0 ticks, 0 ns (was 0 ticks) 0 ns [ 1.600463] GPMC CS0: wr_data_mux_bus: 5 ticks, 25 ns (was 8 ticks) 25 ns [ 1.608154] GPMC CS0: wr_access : 0 ticks, 0 ns (was 23 ticks) 0 ns [ 1.615386] GPMC CS0 CLK period is 5 ns (div 1) [ 1.625122] Unhandled fault: external abort on non-linefetch (0x1008) at 0xf009e442 [ 1.633178] Internal error: : 1008 [#1] ARM [ 1.637573] Modules linked in: [ 1.640777] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.12.0-rc1-n9xx-los.git-5318619-00006-g4baa700-dirty #26 [ 1.651123] task: ef04c000 ti: ef050000 task.ti: ef050000 [ 1.656799] PC is at gpmc_onenand_setup+0x98/0x1e0 [ 1.661865] LR is at gpmc_cs_set_timings+0x494/0x5a4 [ 1.667083] pc : [<c002e040>] lr : [<c001f384>] psr: 60000113 [ 1.667083] sp : ef051d10 ip : ef051ce0 fp : ef051d94 [ 1.679138] r10: c0caaf60 r9 : ef050000 r8 : ef18b32c [ 1.684631] r7 : f0080000 r6 : c0caaf60 r5 : 00000000 r4 : f009e400 [ 1.691497] r3 : f009e442 r2 : 80050000 r1 : 00000014 r0 : 00000000 [ 1.698333] Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment kernel [ 1.706024] Control: 10c5387d Table: af290019 DAC: 00000015 [ 1.712066] Process swapper (pid: 1, stack limit = 0xef050240) [ 1.718200] Stack: (0xef051d10 to 0xef052000) [ 1.722778] 1d00: 00004000 00001402 00000000 00000005 [ 1.731384] 1d20: 00000047 00000000 0000000f 0000000f 00000000 00000028 0000000f 00000005 [ 1.739990] 1d40: 00000000 00000000 00000014 00000014 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 1.748596] 1d60: 00000000 00000019 00000000 00000000 ef18b000 ef099c50 c0c8cb30 00000000 [ 1.757171] 1d80: c0488074 c048f868 ef051dcc ef051d98 c024447c c002dfb4 00000000 c048f868 [ 1.765777] 1da0: 00000000 00000000 c010e4a4 c0dbbb7c c0c8cb40 00000000 c0ca2500 c0488074 [ 1.774383] 1dc0: ef051ddc ef051dd0 c01fd508 c0244370 ef051dfc ef051de0 c01fc204 c01fd4f4 [ 1.782989] 1de0: c0c8cb40 c0ca2500 c0c8cb74 00000000 ef051e1c ef051e00 c01fc3b0 c01fc104 [ 1.791595] 1e00: ef0983bc 00000000 c0ca2500 c01fc31c ef051e44 ef051e20 c01fa794 c01fc328 [ 1.800201] 1e20: ef03634c ef0983b0 ef27d534 c0ca2500 ef27d500 c0c9a2f8 ef051e54 ef051e48 [ 1.808807] 1e40: c01fbcfc c01fa744 ef051e84 ef051e58 c01fb838 c01fbce4 c0411df8 c0caa040 [ 1.817413] 1e60: ef051e84 c0ca2500 00000006 c0caa040 00000066 c0488074 ef051e9c ef051e88 [ 1.825988] 1e80: c01fca30 c01fb768 c04975b8 00000006 ef051eac ef051ea0 c01fd728 c01fc9bc [ 1.834594] 1ea0: ef051ebc ef051eb0 c048808c c01fd6e4 ef051f4c ef051ec0 c0008888 c0488080 [ 1.843200] 1ec0: 0000006f c046bae8 00000000 00000000 ef051efc ef051ee0 ef051f04 ef051ee8 [ 1.851806] 1ee0: c046d400 c0181218 c046d410 c18da8d5 c036a8e4 00000066 ef051f4c ef051f08 [ 1.860412] 1f00: c004b9a8 c046d41c c048f840 00000006 00000006 c046b488 00000000 c043ec08 [ 1.869018] 1f20: ef051f4c c04975b8 00000006 c0caa040 00000066 c046d410 c048f85c c048f868 [ 1.877593] 1f40: ef051f94 ef051f50 c046db8c c00087a0 00000006 00000006 c046d410 ffffffff [ 1.886199] 1f60: ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff 00000000 c0348fd0 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 1.894805] 1f80: 00000000 00000000 ef051fac ef051f98 c0348fe0 c046daa8 00000000 00000000 [ 1.903411] 1fa0: 00000000 ef051fb0 c000e7f8 c0348fdc 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 1.912017] 1fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 1.920623] 1fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 ffffffff ffffffff [ 1.929199] Backtrace: [ 1.931793] [<c002dfa8>] (gpmc_onenand_setup+0x0/0x1e0) from [<c024447c>] (omap2_onenand_probe+0x118/0x49c) [ 1.942047] [<c0244364>] (omap2_onenand_probe+0x0/0x49c) from [<c01fd508>] (platform_drv_probe+0x20/0x24) [ 1.952117] r8:c0488074 r7:c0ca2500 r6:00000000 r5:c0c8cb40 r4:c0dbbb7c [ 1.959197] [<c01fd4e8>] (platform_drv_probe+0x0/0x24) from [<c01fc204>] (driver_probe_device+0x10c/0x224) [ 1.969360] [<c01fc0f8>] (driver_probe_device+0x0/0x224) from [<c01fc3b0>] (__driver_attach+0x94/0x98) [ 1.979125] r7:00000000 r6:c0c8cb74 r5:c0ca2500 r4:c0c8cb40 [ 1.985107] [<c01fc31c>] (__driver_attach+0x0/0x98) from [<c01fa794>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x5c/0x90) [ 1.994506] r6:c01fc31c r5:c0ca2500 r4:00000000 r3:ef0983bc [ 2.000488] [<c01fa738>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x0/0x90) from [<c01fbcfc>] (driver_attach+0x24/0x28) [ 2.009735] r6:c0c9a2f8 r5:ef27d500 r4:c0ca2500 [ 2.014587] [<c01fbcd8>] (driver_attach+0x0/0x28) from [<c01fb838>] (bus_add_driver+0xdc/0x260) [ 2.023742] [<c01fb75c>] (bus_add_driver+0x0/0x260) from [<c01fca30>] (driver_register+0x80/0xfc) [ 2.033081] r8:c0488074 r7:00000066 r6:c0caa040 r5:00000006 r4:c0ca2500 [ 2.040161] [<c01fc9b0>] (driver_register+0x0/0xfc) from [<c01fd728>] (__platform_driver_register+0x50/0x64) [ 2.050476] r5:00000006 r4:c04975b8 [ 2.054260] [<c01fd6d8>] (__platform_driver_register+0x0/0x64) from [<c048808c>] (omap2_onenand_driver_init+0x18/0x20) [ 2.065490] [<c0488074>] (omap2_onenand_driver_init+0x0/0x20) from [<c0008888>] (do_one_initcall+0xf4/0x150) [ 2.075836] [<c0008794>] (do_one_initcall+0x0/0x150) from [<c046db8c>] (kernel_init_freeable+0xf0/0x1b4) [ 2.085815] [<c046da9c>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x0/0x1b4) from [<c0348fe0>] (kernel_init+0x10/0xec) [ 2.095336] [<c0348fd0>] (kernel_init+0x0/0xec) from [<c000e7f8>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c) [ 2.104125] r4:00000000 r3:00000000 [ 2.107879] Code: ebffc3ae e2505000 ba00002e e2843042 (e1d320b0) [ 2.114318] ---[ end trace b8ee3e3e5e002451 ]--- Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>

As the new x86 CPU bootup printout format code maintainer, I am taking immediate action to improve and clean (and thus indulge my OCD) the reporting of the cores when coming up online. Fix padding to a right-hand alignment, cleanup code and bind reporting width to the max number of supported CPUs on the system, like this: [ 0.074509] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 OK [ 0.644008] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors: #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 OK [ 1.245006] smpboot: Booting Node 2, Processors: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 OK [ 1.864005] smpboot: Booting Node 3, Processors: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 OK [ 2.489005] smpboot: Booting Node 4, Processors: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 OK [ 3.093005] smpboot: Booting Node 5, Processors: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 OK [ 3.698005] smpboot: Booting Node 6, Processors: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 OK [ 4.304005] smpboot: Booting Node 7, Processors: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 OK [ 4.961413] Brought up 64 CPUs and this: [ 0.072367] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 OK [ 0.686329] Brought up 8 CPUs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Libin <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

Turn it into (for example): [ 0.073380] x86: Booting SMP configuration: [ 0.074005] .... node #0, CPUs: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 [ 0.603005] .... node #1, CPUs: #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 [ 1.200005] .... node #2, CPUs: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 [ 1.796005] .... node #3, CPUs: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 [ 2.393005] .... node #4, CPUs: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 [ 2.996005] .... node #5, CPUs: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 [ 3.600005] .... node #6, CPUs: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 [ 4.202005] .... node #7, CPUs: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 [ 4.811005] .... node #8, CPUs: #64 #65 #66 #67 #68 #69 #70 #71 [ 5.421006] .... node #9, CPUs: #72 #73 #74 #75 #76 #77 #78 #79 [ 6.032005] .... node #10, CPUs: #80 #81 #82 #83 #84 #85 #86 #87 [ 6.648006] .... node #11, CPUs: #88 #89 #90 #91 #92 #93 #94 #95 [ 7.262005] .... node #12, CPUs: #96 #97 #98 #99 #100 #101 #102 #103 [ 7.865005] .... node #13, CPUs: #104 #105 #106 #107 #108 #109 #110 #111 [ 8.466005] .... node #14, CPUs: #112 #113 #114 #115 #116 #117 #118 #119 [ 9.073006] .... node #15, CPUs: #120 #121 #122 #123 #124 #125 #126 #127 [ 9.679901] x86: Booted up 16 nodes, 128 CPUs and drop useless elements. Change num_digits() to hpa's division-avoiding, cell-phone-typed version which he went at great lengths and pains to submit on a Saturday evening. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

…culation Currently mx53 (CortexA8) running at 1GHz reports: Calibrating delay loop... 663.55 BogoMIPS (lpj=3317760) Tom Evans verified that alignments of 0x0 and 0x8 run the two instructions of __loop_delay in one clock cycle (1 clock/loop), while alignments of 0x4 and 0xc take 3 clocks to run the loop twice. (1.5 clock/loop) The original object code looks like this: 00000010 <__loop_const_udelay>: 10: e3e01000 mvn r1, #0 14: e51f201c ldr r2, [pc, #-28] ; 0 <__loop_udelay-0x8> 18: e5922000 ldr r2, [r2] 1c: e0800921 add r0, r0, r1, lsr #18 20: e1a00720 lsr r0, r0, #14 24: e0822b21 add r2, r2, r1, lsr #22 28: e1a02522 lsr r2, r2, #10 2c: e0000092 mul r0, r2, r0 30: e0800d21 add r0, r0, r1, lsr #26 34: e1b00320 lsrs r0, r0, #6 38: 01a0f00e moveq pc, lr 0000003c <__loop_delay>: 3c: e2500001 subs r0, r0, #1 40: 8afffffe bhi 3c <__loop_delay> 44: e1a0f00e mov pc, lr After adding the 'align 3' directive to __loop_delay (align to 8 bytes): 00000010 <__loop_const_udelay>: 10: e3e01000 mvn r1, #0 14: e51f201c ldr r2, [pc, #-28] ; 0 <__loop_udelay-0x8> 18: e5922000 ldr r2, [r2] 1c: e0800921 add r0, r0, r1, lsr #18 20: e1a00720 lsr r0, r0, #14 24: e0822b21 add r2, r2, r1, lsr #22 28: e1a02522 lsr r2, r2, #10 2c: e0000092 mul r0, r2, r0 30: e0800d21 add r0, r0, r1, lsr #26 34: e1b00320 lsrs r0, r0, #6 38: 01a0f00e moveq pc, lr 3c: e320f000 nop {0} 00000040 <__loop_delay>: 40: e2500001 subs r0, r0, #1 44: 8afffffe bhi 40 <__loop_delay> 48: e1a0f00e mov pc, lr 4c: e320f000 nop {0} , which now reports: Calibrating delay loop... 996.14 BogoMIPS (lpj=4980736) Some more test results: On mx31 (ARM1136) running at 532 MHz, before the patch: Calibrating delay loop... 351.43 BogoMIPS (lpj=1757184) On mx31 (ARM1136) running at 532 MHz after the patch: Calibrating delay loop... 528.79 BogoMIPS (lpj=2643968) Also tested on mx6 (CortexA9) and on mx27 (ARM926), which shows the same BogoMIPS value before and after this patch. Reported-by: Tom Evans <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Tom Evans <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>

…d problems with booting Without that change booting leads to crash with more warnings like below: [ 0.284454] omap_hwmod: uart4: cannot clk_get main_clk uart4_fck [ 0.284484] omap_hwmod: uart4: cannot _init_clocks [ 0.284484] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 0.284545] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at arch/arm/mach-omap2/omap_hwmod.c:2543 _init+0x300/0x3e4() [ 0.284545] omap_hwmod: uart4: couldn't init clocks [ 0.284576] Modules linked in: [ 0.284606] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.13.0-next-20140124-00020-gd2aefec-dirty hardkernel#26 [ 0.284637] [<c00151c0>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0011e20>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 0.284667] [<c0011e20>] (show_stack) from [<c0568544>] (dump_stack+0x7c/0x94) [ 0.284729] [<c0568544>] (dump_stack) from [<c003ff94>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x6c/0x90) [ 0.284729] [<c003ff94>] (warn_slowpath_common) from [<c003ffe8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x30/0x40) [ 0.284759] [<c003ffe8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c07d1be8>] (_init+0x300/0x3e4) [ 0.284790] [<c07d1be8>] (_init) from [<c07d217c>] (__omap_hwmod_setup_all+0x40/0x8c) [ 0.284820] [<c07d217c>] (__omap_hwmod_setup_all) from [<c0008918>] (do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x14c) [ 0.284851] [<c0008918>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c07c5c18>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x104/0x1c8) [ 0.284881] [<c07c5c18>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<c0563524>] (kernel_init+0x8/0x118) [ 0.284912] [<c0563524>] (kernel_init) from [<c000e368>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c) [ 0.285064] ---[ end trace 63de210ad43b627d ]--- Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/10/8/553 Signed-off-by: Marek Belisko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>

======================================================= [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.0.0-rc3+ hardkernel#26 ------------------------------------------------------- ip/1104 is trying to acquire lock: (local_softirq_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81056d12>] __local_lock+0x25/0x68 but task is already holding lock: (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81433308>] lock_sock+0x10/0x12 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> hardkernel#1 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+...}: [<ffffffff810836e5>] lock_acquire+0x103/0x12e [<ffffffff813e2781>] lock_sock_nested+0x82/0x92 [<ffffffff81433308>] lock_sock+0x10/0x12 [<ffffffff81433afa>] tcp_close+0x1b/0x355 [<ffffffff81453c99>] inet_release+0xc3/0xcd [<ffffffff813dff3f>] sock_release+0x1f/0x74 [<ffffffff813dffbb>] sock_close+0x27/0x2b [<ffffffff81129c63>] fput+0x11d/0x1e3 [<ffffffff81126577>] filp_close+0x70/0x7b [<ffffffff8112667a>] sys_close+0xf8/0x13d [<ffffffff814ae882>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (local_softirq_lock){+.+...}: [<ffffffff81082ecc>] __lock_acquire+0xacc/0xdc8 [<ffffffff810836e5>] lock_acquire+0x103/0x12e [<ffffffff814a7e40>] _raw_spin_lock+0x3b/0x4a [<ffffffff81056d12>] __local_lock+0x25/0x68 [<ffffffff81056d8b>] local_bh_disable+0x36/0x3b [<ffffffff814a7fc4>] _raw_write_lock_bh+0x16/0x4f [<ffffffff81433c38>] tcp_close+0x159/0x355 [<ffffffff81453c99>] inet_release+0xc3/0xcd [<ffffffff813dff3f>] sock_release+0x1f/0x74 [<ffffffff813dffbb>] sock_close+0x27/0x2b [<ffffffff81129c63>] fput+0x11d/0x1e3 [<ffffffff81126577>] filp_close+0x70/0x7b [<ffffffff8112667a>] sys_close+0xf8/0x13d [<ffffffff814ae882>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sk_lock-AF_INET); lock(local_softirq_lock); lock(sk_lock-AF_INET); lock(local_softirq_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by ip/1104: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81433308>] lock_sock+0x10/0x12 stack backtrace: Pid: 1104, comm: ip Not tainted 3.0.0-rc3+ hardkernel#26 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81081649>] print_circular_bug+0x1f8/0x209 [<ffffffff81082ecc>] __lock_acquire+0xacc/0xdc8 [<ffffffff81056d12>] ? __local_lock+0x25/0x68 [<ffffffff810836e5>] lock_acquire+0x103/0x12e [<ffffffff81056d12>] ? __local_lock+0x25/0x68 [<ffffffff81046c75>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x41 [<ffffffff814a7e40>] _raw_spin_lock+0x3b/0x4a [<ffffffff81056d12>] ? __local_lock+0x25/0x68 [<ffffffff81046c8c>] ? get_parent_ip+0x28/0x41 [<ffffffff81056d12>] __local_lock+0x25/0x68 [<ffffffff81056d8b>] local_bh_disable+0x36/0x3b [<ffffffff81433308>] ? lock_sock+0x10/0x12 [<ffffffff814a7fc4>] _raw_write_lock_bh+0x16/0x4f [<ffffffff81433c38>] tcp_close+0x159/0x355 [<ffffffff81453c99>] inet_release+0xc3/0xcd [<ffffffff813dff3f>] sock_release+0x1f/0x74 [<ffffffff813dffbb>] sock_close+0x27/0x2b [<ffffffff81129c63>] fput+0x11d/0x1e3 [<ffffffff81126577>] filp_close+0x70/0x7b [<ffffffff8112667a>] sys_close+0xf8/0x13d [<ffffffff814ae882>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>

Nikolay has reported a hang when a memcg reclaim got stuck with the following backtrace: PID: 18308 TASK: ffff883d7c9b0a30 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "rsync" #0 __schedule at ffffffff815ab152 hardkernel#1 schedule at ffffffff815ab76e hardkernel#2 schedule_timeout at ffffffff815ae5e5 hardkernel#3 io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff815aad6a hardkernel#4 bit_wait_io at ffffffff815abfc6 hardkernel#5 __wait_on_bit at ffffffff815abda5 hardkernel#6 wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff8111fd4f hardkernel#7 shrink_page_list at ffffffff81135445 hardkernel#8 shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81135845 hardkernel#9 shrink_lruvec at ffffffff81135ead hardkernel#10 shrink_zone at ffffffff811360c3 hardkernel#11 shrink_zones at ffffffff81136eff hardkernel#12 do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8113712f hardkernel#13 try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages at ffffffff811372be hardkernel#14 try_charge at ffffffff81189423 hardkernel#15 mem_cgroup_try_charge at ffffffff8118c6f5 hardkernel#16 __add_to_page_cache_locked at ffffffff8112137d hardkernel#17 add_to_page_cache_lru at ffffffff81121618 hardkernel#18 pagecache_get_page at ffffffff8112170b hardkernel#19 grow_dev_page at ffffffff811c8297 hardkernel#20 __getblk_slow at ffffffff811c91d6 hardkernel#21 __getblk_gfp at ffffffff811c92c1 hardkernel#22 ext4_ext_grow_indepth at ffffffff8124565c hardkernel#23 ext4_ext_create_new_leaf at ffffffff81246ca8 hardkernel#24 ext4_ext_insert_extent at ffffffff81246f09 hardkernel#25 ext4_ext_map_blocks at ffffffff8124a848 hardkernel#26 ext4_map_blocks at ffffffff8121a5b7 hardkernel#27 mpage_map_one_extent at ffffffff8121b1fa hardkernel#28 mpage_map_and_submit_extent at ffffffff8121f07b hardkernel#29 ext4_writepages at ffffffff8121f6d5 hardkernel#30 do_writepages at ffffffff8112c490 hardkernel#31 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffff81120199 hardkernel#32 filemap_flush at ffffffff8112041c hardkernel#33 ext4_alloc_da_blocks at ffffffff81219da1 hardkernel#34 ext4_rename at ffffffff81229b91 hardkernel#35 ext4_rename2 at ffffffff81229e32 hardkernel#36 vfs_rename at ffffffff811a08a5 hardkernel#37 SYSC_renameat2 at ffffffff811a3ffc hardkernel#38 sys_renameat2 at ffffffff811a408e hardkernel#39 sys_rename at ffffffff8119e51e hardkernel#40 system_call_fastpath at ffffffff815afa89 Dave Chinner has properly pointed out that this is a deadlock in the reclaim code because ext4 doesn't submit pages which are marked by PG_writeback right away. The heuristic was introduced by commit e62e384 ("memcg: prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") and it was applied only when may_enter_fs was specified. The code has been changed by c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") which has removed the __GFP_FS restriction with a reasoning that we do not get into the fs code. But this is not sufficient apparently because the fs doesn't necessarily submit pages marked PG_writeback for IO right away. ext4_bio_write_page calls io_submit_add_bh but that doesn't necessarily submit the bio. Instead it tries to map more pages into the bio and mpage_map_one_extent might trigger memcg charge which might end up waiting on a page which is marked PG_writeback but hasn't been submitted yet so we would end up waiting for something that never finishes. Fix this issue by replacing __GFP_IO by may_enter_fs check (for case 2) before we go to wait on the writeback. The page fault path, which is the only path that triggers memcg oom killer since 3.12, shouldn't require GFP_NOFS and so we shouldn't reintroduce the premature OOM killer issue which was originally addressed by the heuristic. As per David Chinner the xfs is doing similar thing since 2.6.15 already so ext4 is not the only affected filesystem. Moreover he notes: : For example: IO completion might require unwritten extent conversion : which executes filesystem transactions and GFP_NOFS allocations. The : writeback flag on the pages can not be cleared until unwritten : extent conversion completes. Hence memory reclaim cannot wait on : page writeback to complete in GFP_NOFS context because it is not : safe to do so, memcg reclaim or otherwise. Cc: [email protected] # 3.9+ [[email protected]: corrected the control flow] Fixes: c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

commit 1c7de2b upstream. There is at least one Chelsio 10Gb card which uses VPD area to store some non-standard blocks (example below). However pci_vpd_size() returns the length of the first block only assuming that there can be only one VPD "End Tag". Since 4e1a635 ("vfio/pci: Use kernel VPD access functions"), VFIO blocks access beyond that offset, which prevents the guest "cxgb3" driver from probing the device. The host system does not have this problem as its driver accesses the config space directly without pci_read_vpd(). Add a quirk to override the VPD size to a bigger value. The maximum size is taken from EEPROMSIZE in drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/common.h. We do not read the tag as the cxgb3 driver does as the driver supports writing to EEPROM/VPD and when it writes, it only checks for 8192 bytes boundary. The quirk is registered for all devices supported by the cxgb3 driver. This adds a quirk to the PCI layer (not to the cxgb3 driver) as the cxgb3 driver itself accesses VPD directly and the problem only exists with the vfio-pci driver (when cxgb3 is not running on the host and may not be even loaded) which blocks accesses beyond the first block of VPD data. However vfio-pci itself does not have quirks mechanism so we add it to PCI. This is the controller: Ethernet controller [0200]: Chelsio Communications Inc T310 10GbE Single Port Adapter [1425:0030] This is what I parsed from its VPD: === b'\x82*\x0010 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter\x90J\x00EC\x07D76809 FN\x0746K' 0000 Large item 42 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String b'10 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter' 002d Large item 74 bytes; name 0x10 #00 [EC] len=7: b'D76809 ' #0a [FN] len=7: b'46K7897' hardkernel#14 [PN] len=7: b'46K7897' #1e [MN] len=4: b'1037' hardkernel#25 [FC] len=4: b'5769' #2c [SN] len=12: b'YL102035603V' #3b [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1' 007a Small item 1 bytes; name 0xf End Tag 0c00 Large item 16 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String b'S310E-SR-X ' 0c13 Large item 234 bytes; name 0x10 #00 [PN] len=16: b'TBD ' hardkernel#13 [EC] len=16: b'110107730D2 ' hardkernel#26 [SN] len=16: b'97YL102035603V ' hardkernel#39 [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1' hardkernel#48 [V0] len=6: b'175000' hardkernel#51 [V1] len=6: b'266666' #5a [V2] len=6: b'266666' hardkernel#63 [V3] len=6: b'2000 ' #6c [V4] len=2: b'1 ' hardkernel#71 [V5] len=6: b'c2 ' #7a [V6] len=6: b'0 ' hardkernel#83 [V7] len=2: b'1 ' hardkernel#88 [V8] len=2: b'0 ' #8d [V9] len=2: b'0 ' hardkernel#92 [VA] len=2: b'0 ' hardkernel#97 [RV] len=80: b's\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'... 0d00 Large item 252 bytes; name 0x11 #00 [VC] len=16: b'122310_1222 dp ' hardkernel#13 [VD] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00' hardkernel#26 [VE] len=16: b'122310_1353 fp ' hardkernel#39 [VF] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00' #4c [RW] len=173: b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'... 0dff Small item 0 bytes; name 0xf End Tag 10f3 Large item 13315 bytes; name 0x62 !!! unknown item name 98: b'\xd0\x03\x00@`\x0c\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' === Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 45caeaa ] As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6. v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well. We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk->sk_dst_cache) pointing to that dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is: hardkernel#8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648 [exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74] . . hardkernel#9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64 hardkernel#10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a hardkernel#11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02 hardkernel#12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4 hardkernel#13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9 hardkernel#14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d hardkernel#15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06 hardkernel#16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2 hardkernel#17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608 hardkernel#18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690 hardkernel#19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3] hardkernel#20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3] hardkernel#21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2 hardkernel#22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f hardkernel#23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c hardkernel#24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5 hardkernel#25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5 hardkernel#26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8 Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well. It's found the freed dst_entry here: 224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)↩ 225 {↩ 226 ▹ const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);↩ 227 ▹ const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);↩ 228 ↩ 229 ▹ return (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||↩ 230 ▹ ▹ (icsk->icsk_ack.quick && !icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong);↩ 231 }↩ But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in netfilter code as well. All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues: - Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable. - All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g: LockDroppedIcmps 267 A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk->sk_dst_entry can be decremented twice for the same socket via: do_redirect()->__sk_dst_check()-> dst_release(). Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket pointing to it via sk->sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash. To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket locked. The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too. As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which can set the dst->obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and triggers the dst_release(). Fixes: ceb3320 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.") Cc: Eric Garver <[email protected]> Cc: Hannes Sowa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 45caeaa upstream. As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6. v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well. We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk->sk_dst_cache) pointing to that dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is: #8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648 [exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74] . . #9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64 #10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a #11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02 #12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4 #13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9 #14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d #15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06 #16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2 #17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608 #18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690 #19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3] #20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3] #21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2 #22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f #23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c #24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5 #25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5 #26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8 Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well. It's found the freed dst_entry here: 224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)â�© 225 {â�© 226 â�¹ const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);â�© 227 â�¹ const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);â�© 228 â�© 229 â�¹ return (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||â�© 230 â�¹ â�¹ (icsk->icsk_ack.quick && !icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong);â�© 231 }â�© But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in netfilter code as well. All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues: - Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable. - All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g: LockDroppedIcmps 267 A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk->sk_dst_entry can be decremented twice for the same socket via: do_redirect()->__sk_dst_check()-> dst_release(). Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket pointing to it via sk->sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash. To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket locked. The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too. As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which can set the dst->obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and triggers the dst_release(). Fixes: ceb3320 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.") Cc: Eric Garver <[email protected]> Cc: Hannes Sowa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>

Fengguang reported a KASAN warning: Kprobe smoke test: started ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in deref_stack_reg+0xb5/0x11a Read of size 8 at addr ffff8800001c7cd8 by task swapper/1 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8 #26 Call Trace: <#DB> ... save_trace+0xd9/0x1d3 mark_lock+0x5f7/0xdc3 __lock_acquire+0x6b4/0x38ef lock_acquire+0x1a1/0x2aa _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x46/0x55 kretprobe_table_lock+0x1a/0x42 pre_handler_kretprobe+0x3f5/0x521 kprobe_int3_handler+0x19c/0x25f do_int3+0x61/0x142 int3+0x30/0x60 [...] The ORC unwinder got confused by some kprobes changes, which isn't surprising since the runtime code no longer matches vmlinux and the stack was modified for kretprobes. Until we have a way for generated code to register changes with the unwinder, these types of warnings are inevitable. So just disable KASAN checks for stack accesses in the ORC unwinder. Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171108021934.zbl6unh5hpugybc5@treble Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

commit e0058f3 upstream. In asn1_ber_decoder(), indefinitely-sized ASN.1 items were being passed to the action functions before their lengths had been computed, using the bogus length of 0x80 (ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH). This resulted in reading data past the end of the input buffer, when given a specially crafted message. Fix it by rearranging the code so that the indefinite length is resolved before the action is called. This bug was originally found by fuzzing the X.509 parser in userspace using libFuzzer from the LLVM project. KASAN report (cleaned up slightly): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy ./include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in x509_fabricate_name.constprop.1+0x1a4/0x940 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:366 Read of size 128 at addr ffff880035dd9eaf by task keyctl/195 CPU: 1 PID: 195 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 hardkernel#26 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0xd1/0x175 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x78/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x23f/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409 memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:302 memcpy ./include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] x509_fabricate_name.constprop.1+0x1a4/0x940 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:366 asn1_ber_decoder+0xb4a/0x1fd0 lib/asn1_decoder.c:447 x509_cert_parse+0x1c7/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:89 x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Allocated by task 195: __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab.c:3675 [inline] __kmalloc_node+0x47/0x60 mm/slab.c:3682 kvmalloc ./include/linux/mm.h:540 [inline] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:104 [inline] SyS_add_key+0x19e/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Fixes: 42d5ec2 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder") Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 0f30cbe upstream. Adding a specially crafted X.509 certificate whose subjectPublicKey ASN.1 value is zero-length caused x509_extract_key_data() to set the public key size to SIZE_MAX, as it subtracted the nonexistent BIT STRING metadata byte. Then, x509_cert_parse() called kmemdup() with that bogus size, triggering the WARN_ON_ONCE() in kmalloc_slab(). This appears to be harmless, but it still must be fixed since WARNs are never supposed to be user-triggerable. Fix it by updating x509_cert_parse() to validate that the value has a BIT STRING metadata byte, and that the byte is 0 which indicates that the number of bits in the bitstring is a multiple of 8. It would be nice to handle the metadata byte in asn1_ber_decoder() instead. But that would be tricky because in the general case a BIT STRING could be implicitly tagged, and/or could legitimately have a length that is not a whole number of bytes. Here was the WARN (cleaned up slightly): WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 202 at mm/slab_common.c:971 kmalloc_slab+0x5d/0x70 mm/slab_common.c:971 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 202 Comm: keyctl Tainted: G B 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 hardkernel#26 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 task: ffff880033014180 task.stack: ffff8800305c8000 Call Trace: __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3706 [inline] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x22/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3726 kmemdup+0x17/0x40 mm/util.c:118 kmemdup include/linux/string.h:414 [inline] x509_cert_parse+0x2cb/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:106 x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Fixes: 42d5ec2 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: James Morris <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit e0058f3 upstream. In asn1_ber_decoder(), indefinitely-sized ASN.1 items were being passed to the action functions before their lengths had been computed, using the bogus length of 0x80 (ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH). This resulted in reading data past the end of the input buffer, when given a specially crafted message. Fix it by rearranging the code so that the indefinite length is resolved before the action is called. This bug was originally found by fuzzing the X.509 parser in userspace using libFuzzer from the LLVM project. KASAN report (cleaned up slightly): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy ./include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in x509_fabricate_name.constprop.1+0x1a4/0x940 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:366 Read of size 128 at addr ffff880035dd9eaf by task keyctl/195 CPU: 1 PID: 195 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 hardkernel#26 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0xd1/0x175 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x78/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x23f/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409 memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:302 memcpy ./include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] x509_fabricate_name.constprop.1+0x1a4/0x940 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:366 asn1_ber_decoder+0xb4a/0x1fd0 lib/asn1_decoder.c:447 x509_cert_parse+0x1c7/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:89 x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Allocated by task 195: __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab.c:3675 [inline] __kmalloc_node+0x47/0x60 mm/slab.c:3682 kvmalloc ./include/linux/mm.h:540 [inline] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:104 [inline] SyS_add_key+0x19e/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Fixes: 42d5ec2 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder") Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 0f30cbe upstream. Adding a specially crafted X.509 certificate whose subjectPublicKey ASN.1 value is zero-length caused x509_extract_key_data() to set the public key size to SIZE_MAX, as it subtracted the nonexistent BIT STRING metadata byte. Then, x509_cert_parse() called kmemdup() with that bogus size, triggering the WARN_ON_ONCE() in kmalloc_slab(). This appears to be harmless, but it still must be fixed since WARNs are never supposed to be user-triggerable. Fix it by updating x509_cert_parse() to validate that the value has a BIT STRING metadata byte, and that the byte is 0 which indicates that the number of bits in the bitstring is a multiple of 8. It would be nice to handle the metadata byte in asn1_ber_decoder() instead. But that would be tricky because in the general case a BIT STRING could be implicitly tagged, and/or could legitimately have a length that is not a whole number of bytes. Here was the WARN (cleaned up slightly): WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 202 at mm/slab_common.c:971 kmalloc_slab+0x5d/0x70 mm/slab_common.c:971 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 202 Comm: keyctl Tainted: G B 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 hardkernel#26 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 task: ffff880033014180 task.stack: ffff8800305c8000 Call Trace: __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3706 [inline] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x22/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3726 kmemdup+0x17/0x40 mm/util.c:118 kmemdup include/linux/string.h:414 [inline] x509_cert_parse+0x2cb/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:106 x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Fixes: 42d5ec2 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: James Morris <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit d2890c3 upstream. In rsa_get_n(), if the buffer contained all 0's and "FIPS mode" is enabled, we would read one byte past the end of the buffer while scanning the leading zeroes. Fix it by checking 'n_sz' before '!*ptr'. This bug was reachable by adding a specially crafted key of type "asymmetric" (requires CONFIG_RSA and CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER). KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rsa_get_n+0x19e/0x1d0 crypto/rsa_helper.c:33 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88003501a708 by task keyctl/196 CPU: 1 PID: 196 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 hardkernel#26 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 Call Trace: rsa_get_n+0x19e/0x1d0 crypto/rsa_helper.c:33 asn1_ber_decoder+0x82a/0x1fd0 lib/asn1_decoder.c:328 rsa_set_pub_key+0xd3/0x320 crypto/rsa.c:278 crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key ./include/crypto/akcipher.h:364 [inline] pkcs1pad_set_pub_key+0xae/0x200 crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:117 crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key ./include/crypto/akcipher.h:364 [inline] public_key_verify_signature+0x270/0x9d0 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c:106 x509_check_for_self_signed+0x2ea/0x480 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:141 x509_cert_parse+0x46a/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:129 x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Allocated by task 196: __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3711 [inline] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x118/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3726 kmemdup+0x17/0x40 mm/util.c:118 kmemdup ./include/linux/string.h:414 [inline] x509_cert_parse+0x2cb/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:106 x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Fixes: 5a7de97 ("crypto: rsa - return raw integers for the ASN.1 parser") Cc: Tudor Ambarus <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: James Morris <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c37c287 ] Reported by syzkaller: *** Guest State *** CR0: actual=0x0000000080010031, shadow=0x0000000060000010, gh_mask=fffffffffffffff7 CR4: actual=0x0000000000002061, shadow=0x0000000000000000, gh_mask=ffffffffffffe8f1 CR3 = 0x000000002081e000 RSP = 0x000000000000fffa RIP = 0x0000000000000000 RFLAGS=0x00023000 DR7 = 0x00000000000000 ^^^^^^^^^^ ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 24431 at /home/kernel/linux/arch/x86/kvm//x86.c:7302 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x651/0x2ea0 [kvm] CPU: 6 PID: 24431 Comm: reprotest Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0+ #26 RIP: 0010:kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x651/0x2ea0 [kvm] RSP: 0018:ffff880291d179e0 EFLAGS: 00010202 Call Trace: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x479/0x880 [kvm] do_vfs_ioctl+0x142/0x9a0 SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0x9a The failed vmentry is triggered by the following beautified testcase: #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <linux/kvm.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> long r[5]; int main() { struct kvm_debugregs dr = { 0 }; r[2] = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDONLY); r[3] = ioctl(r[2], KVM_CREATE_VM, 0); r[4] = ioctl(r[3], KVM_CREATE_VCPU, 7); struct kvm_guest_debug debug = { .control = 0xf0403, .arch = { .debugreg[6] = 0x2, .debugreg[7] = 0x2 } }; ioctl(r[4], KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG, &debug); ioctl(r[4], KVM_RUN, 0); } which testcase tries to setup the processor specific debug registers and configure vCPU for handling guest debug events through KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG. The KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG ioctl will get and set rflags in order to set TF bit if single step is needed. All regs' caches are reset to avail and GUEST_RFLAGS vmcs field is reset to 0x2 during vCPU reset. However, the cache of rflags is not reset during vCPU reset. The function vmx_get_rflags() returns an unreset rflags cache value since the cache is marked avail, it is 0 after boot. Vmentry fails if the rflags reserved bit 1 is 0. This patch fixes it by resetting both the GUEST_RFLAGS vmcs field and its cache to 0x2 during vCPU reset. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Cc: Nadav Amit <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e2d5915 ] The hotplug code uses its own workqueue to handle IRQ requests (pseries_hp_wq), however that workqueue is initialized after init_ras_IRQ(). That can lead to a kernel panic if any hotplug interrupts fire after init_ras_IRQ() but before pseries_hp_wq is initialised. eg: UDP-Lite hash table entries: 2048 (order: 0, 65536 bytes) NET: Registered protocol family 1 Unpacking initramfs... (qemu) object_add memory-backend-ram,id=mem1,size=10G (qemu) device_add pc-dimm,id=dimm1,memdev=mem1 Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0xf94d03007c421378 Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000012d744 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc2-ziviani+ #26 task: (ptrval) task.stack: (ptrval) NIP: c00000000012d744 LR: c00000000012d744 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: (ptrval) TRAP: 0380 Not tainted (4.15.0-rc2-ziviani+) MSR: 8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28088042 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c00000000012d3c4 SOFTE: 0 ... NIP [c00000000012d744] __queue_work+0xd4/0x5c0 LR [c00000000012d744] __queue_work+0xd4/0x5c0 Call Trace: [c0000000fffefb90] [c00000000012d744] __queue_work+0xd4/0x5c0 (unreliable) [c0000000fffefc70] [c00000000012dce4] queue_work_on+0xb4/0xf0 This commit makes the RAS IRQ registration explicitly dependent on the creation of the pseries_hp_wq. Reported-by: Min Deng <[email protected]> Reported-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jose Ricardo Ziviani <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Gibson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ebe2f87 ] The ACPI specification says OS shouldn't attempt to use GICC configuration parameters if the flag ACPI_MADT_ENABLED is cleared. The ARM64-SMP code skips the disabled GICC entries but not causing any issue. However the current GICv3 driver probe bails out causing kernel panic() instead of skipping the disabled GICC interfaces. This issue happens on systems where redistributor regions are not in the always-on power domain and one of GICC interface marked with ACPI_MADT_ENABLED=0. This patch does the two things to fix the panic. - Don't return an error in gic_acpi_match_gicc() for disabled GICC entry. - No need to keep GICR region information for disabled GICC entry. Observed kernel crash on QDF2400 platform GICC entry is disabled. Kernel crash traces: Kernel panic - not syncing: No interrupt controller found. CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.13.5 hardkernel#26 [<ffff000008087770>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x218 [<ffff0000080879dc>] show_stack+0x14/0x20 [<ffff00000883b078>] dump_stack+0x98/0xb8 [<ffff0000080c5c14>] panic+0x118/0x26c [<ffff000008b62348>] init_IRQ+0x24/0x2c [<ffff000008b609fc>] start_kernel+0x230/0x394 [<ffff000008b601e4>] __primary_switched+0x64/0x6c ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: No interrupt controller found. Disabled GICC subtable example: Subtable Type : 0B [Generic Interrupt Controller] Length : 50 Reserved : 0000 CPU Interface Number : 0000003D Processor UID : 0000003D Flags (decoded below) : 00000000 Processor Enabled : 0 Performance Interrupt Trig Mode : 0 Virtual GIC Interrupt Trig Mode : 0 Parking Protocol Version : 00000000 Performance Interrupt : 00000017 Parked Address : 0000000000000000 Base Address : 0000000000000000 Virtual GIC Base Address : 0000000000000000 Hypervisor GIC Base Address : 0000000000000000 Virtual GIC Interrupt : 00000019 Redistributor Base Address : 0000FFFF88F40000 ARM MPIDR : 000000000000000D Efficiency Class : 00 Reserved : 000000 Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 97f3c0a ] I found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early termination and boot continuing case. When early termination occurs due to malicious ACPI table, Linux kernel terminates ACPI function and continues to boot process. While kernel terminates ACPI function, kmem_cache_destroy() reports Acpi-Operand cache leak. Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows: >[ 0.464168] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device) >[ 0.467022] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device) >[ 0.469376] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions) >[ 0.471647] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device) >[ 0.477997] ACPI Error: Null stack entry at ffff880215c0aad8 (20170303/exresop-174) >[ 0.482706] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, While resolving operands for [opcode_name unavailable] (20170303/dswexec-461) >[ 0.487503] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\DBG] (Node ffff88021710ab40), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543) >[ 0.492136] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_SB._INI] (Node ffff88021710a618), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543) >[ 0.497683] ACPI: Interpreter enabled >[ 0.499385] ACPI: (supports S0) >[ 0.501151] ACPI: Using IOAPIC for interrupt routing >[ 0.503342] ACPI Error: Null stack entry at ffff880215c0aad8 (20170303/exresop-174) >[ 0.506522] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, While resolving operands for [opcode_name unavailable] (20170303/dswexec-461) >[ 0.510463] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\DBG] (Node ffff88021710ab40), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543) >[ 0.514477] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_PIC] (Node ffff88021710ab18), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543) >[ 0.518867] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, Evaluating _PIC (20170303/bus-991) >[ 0.522384] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has objects >[ 0.524597] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5 hardkernel#26 >[ 0.526795] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS virtual_box 12/01/2006 >[ 0.529668] Call Trace: >[ 0.530811] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81 >[ 0.532240] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0 >[ 0.533905] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10 >[ 0.535497] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b >[ 0.537237] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14 >[ 0.538701] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f >[ 0.540008] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 >[ 0.541593] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0 >[ 0.543008] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x19e/0x21f >[ 0.546202] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80 >[ 0.547513] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100 >[ 0.548817] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 >[ 0.550587] vgaarb: loaded >[ 0.551716] EDAC MC: Ver: 3.0.0 >[ 0.553744] PCI: Probing PCI hardware >[ 0.555038] PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00 > ... Continue to boot and log is omitted ... I analyzed this memory leak in detail and found acpi_ns_evaluate() function only removes Info->return_object in AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE case. But, when errors occur, the status value is not AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE, and Info->return_object is also not null. Therefore, this causes acpi operand memory leak. This cache leak causes a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR. I made a patch to fix ACPI operand cache leak. Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Erik Schmauss <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 10d255c ] If segment type in SSA and SIT is inconsistent, we will encounter below BUG_ON during GC, to avoid this panic, let's just skip doing GC on such segment. The bug is triggered with image reported in below link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200223 [ 388.060262] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 388.060268] kernel BUG at /home/y00370721/git/devf2fs/gc.c:989! [ 388.061172] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 388.061773] Modules linked in: f2fs(O) bluetooth ecdh_generic xt_tcpudp iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables lp ttm drm_kms_helper drm intel_rapl sb_edac crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel fb_sys_fops ppdev aes_x86_64 syscopyarea crypto_simd sysfillrect parport_pc joydev sysimgblt glue_helper parport cryptd i2c_piix4 serio_raw mac_hid btrfs hid_generic usbhid hid raid6_pq psmouse pata_acpi floppy [ 388.064247] CPU: 7 PID: 4151 Comm: f2fs_gc-7:0 Tainted: G O 4.13.0-rc1+ #26 [ 388.065306] Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.1.2_115-900.260_ 11/06/2015 [ 388.066058] task: ffff880201583b80 task.stack: ffffc90004d7c000 [ 388.069948] RIP: 0010:do_garbage_collect+0xcc8/0xcd0 [f2fs] [ 388.070766] RSP: 0018:ffffc90004d7fc68 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 388.071783] RAX: ffff8801ed227000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffea0007b489c0 [ 388.072700] RDX: ffff880000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffea0007b489c0 [ 388.073607] RBP: ffffc90004d7fd58 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: ffffea0007b489dc [ 388.074619] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0052782ab317138d R12: 0000000000000018 [ 388.075625] R13: 0000000000000018 R14: ffff880211ceb000 R15: ffff880211ceb000 [ 388.076687] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880214fc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 388.083277] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 388.084536] CR2: 0000000000e18c60 CR3: 00000001ecf2e000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 [ 388.085748] Call Trace: [ 388.086690] ? find_next_bit+0xb/0x10 [ 388.088091] f2fs_gc+0x1a8/0x9d0 [f2fs] [ 388.088888] ? lock_timer_base+0x7d/0xa0 [ 388.090213] ? try_to_del_timer_sync+0x44/0x60 [ 388.091698] gc_thread_func+0x342/0x4b0 [f2fs] [ 388.092892] ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80 [ 388.094098] kthread+0x109/0x140 [ 388.095010] ? f2fs_gc+0x9d0/0x9d0 [f2fs] [ 388.096043] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60 [ 388.097281] ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 [ 388.098401] Code: ff ff 48 83 e8 01 48 89 44 24 58 e9 27 f8 ff ff 48 83 e8 01 e9 78 fc ff ff 48 8d 78 ff e9 17 fb ff ff 48 83 ef 01 e9 4d f4 ff ff <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 [ 388.100864] RIP: do_garbage_collect+0xcc8/0xcd0 [f2fs] RSP: ffffc90004d7fc68 [ 388.101810] ---[ end trace 81c73d6e6b7da61d ]--- Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…not disabled In kdump kernel, memcg usually is disabled with 'cgroup_disable=memory' for saving memory. Now kdump kernel will always panic when dump vmcore to local disk: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000ab8 Oops: 0000 [hardkernel#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 598 Comm: makedumpfile Not tainted 5.3.0+ hardkernel#26 Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 10/02/2018 RIP: 0010:mem_cgroup_track_foreign_dirty_slowpath+0x38/0x140 Call Trace: __set_page_dirty+0x52/0xc0 iomap_set_page_dirty+0x50/0x90 iomap_write_end+0x6e/0x270 iomap_write_actor+0xce/0x170 iomap_apply+0xba/0x11e iomap_file_buffered_write+0x62/0x90 xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0xca/0x320 [xfs] new_sync_write+0x12d/0x1d0 vfs_write+0xa5/0x1a0 ksys_write+0x59/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x59/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 And this will corrupt the 1st kernel too with 'cgroup_disable=memory'. Via the trace and with debugging, it is pointing to commit 97b2782 ("writeback, memcg: Implement foreign dirty flushing") which introduced this regression. Disabling memcg causes the null pointer dereference at uninitialized data in function mem_cgroup_track_foreign_dirty_slowpath(). Fix it by returning directly if memcg is disabled, but not trying to record the foreign writebacks with dirty pages. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190924141928.GD31919@MiWiFi-R3L-srv Fixes: 97b2782 ("writeback, memcg: Implement foreign dirty flushing") Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e24c644 ] I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I was using the tep_parse_format function: Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe) #1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985 #2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140 #3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206 #4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291 #5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299 #6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849 #7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161 #8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207 #9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786 #10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285 #11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369 #12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335 #13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389 #14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431 #15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251 #16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284 #17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593 #18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727 #19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048 #20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127 #21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152 #22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252 #23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347 #24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461 #25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673 #26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before calling the read_token function. Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the leak. Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 96ecdcc upstream. Netpoll can try to poll napi as soon as napi_enable() is called. It crashes trying to access a doorbell which is still NULL: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 CPU: 59 PID: 6039 Comm: ethtool Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S 5.9.0-rc1-00469-g5fd99b5d9950-dirty #26 RIP: 0010:bnxt_poll+0x121/0x1c0 Code: c4 20 44 89 e0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 41 8b 86 a0 01 00 00 41 23 85 18 01 00 00 49 8b 96 a8 01 00 00 0d 00 00 00 24 <89> 02 41 f6 45 77 02 74 cb 49 8b ae d8 01 00 00 31 c0 c7 44 24 1a netpoll_poll_dev+0xbd/0x1a0 __netpoll_send_skb+0x1b2/0x210 netpoll_send_udp+0x2c9/0x406 write_ext_msg+0x1d7/0x1f0 console_unlock+0x23c/0x520 vprintk_emit+0xe0/0x1d0 printk+0x58/0x6f x86_vector_activate.cold+0xf/0x46 __irq_domain_activate_irq+0x50/0x80 __irq_domain_activate_irq+0x32/0x80 __irq_domain_activate_irq+0x32/0x80 irq_domain_activate_irq+0x25/0x40 __setup_irq+0x2d2/0x700 request_threaded_irq+0xfb/0x160 __bnxt_open_nic+0x3b1/0x750 bnxt_open_nic+0x19/0x30 ethtool_set_channels+0x1ac/0x220 dev_ethtool+0x11ba/0x2240 dev_ioctl+0x1cf/0x390 sock_do_ioctl+0x95/0x130 Reported-by: Rob Sherwood <[email protected]> Fixes: c0c050c ("bnxt_en: New Broadcom ethernet driver.") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 96ecdcc ] Netpoll can try to poll napi as soon as napi_enable() is called. It crashes trying to access a doorbell which is still NULL: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 CPU: 59 PID: 6039 Comm: ethtool Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S 5.9.0-rc1-00469-g5fd99b5d9950-dirty #26 RIP: 0010:bnxt_poll+0x121/0x1c0 Code: c4 20 44 89 e0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 41 8b 86 a0 01 00 00 41 23 85 18 01 00 00 49 8b 96 a8 01 00 00 0d 00 00 00 24 <89> 02 41 f6 45 77 02 74 cb 49 8b ae d8 01 00 00 31 c0 c7 44 24 1a netpoll_poll_dev+0xbd/0x1a0 __netpoll_send_skb+0x1b2/0x210 netpoll_send_udp+0x2c9/0x406 write_ext_msg+0x1d7/0x1f0 console_unlock+0x23c/0x520 vprintk_emit+0xe0/0x1d0 printk+0x58/0x6f x86_vector_activate.cold+0xf/0x46 __irq_domain_activate_irq+0x50/0x80 __irq_domain_activate_irq+0x32/0x80 __irq_domain_activate_irq+0x32/0x80 irq_domain_activate_irq+0x25/0x40 __setup_irq+0x2d2/0x700 request_threaded_irq+0xfb/0x160 __bnxt_open_nic+0x3b1/0x750 bnxt_open_nic+0x19/0x30 ethtool_set_channels+0x1ac/0x220 dev_ethtool+0x11ba/0x2240 dev_ioctl+0x1cf/0x390 sock_do_ioctl+0x95/0x130 Reported-by: Rob Sherwood <[email protected]> Fixes: c0c050c ("bnxt_en: New Broadcom ethernet driver.") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 96ecdcc ] Netpoll can try to poll napi as soon as napi_enable() is called. It crashes trying to access a doorbell which is still NULL: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 CPU: 59 PID: 6039 Comm: ethtool Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S 5.9.0-rc1-00469-g5fd99b5d9950-dirty hardkernel#26 RIP: 0010:bnxt_poll+0x121/0x1c0 Code: c4 20 44 89 e0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 41 8b 86 a0 01 00 00 41 23 85 18 01 00 00 49 8b 96 a8 01 00 00 0d 00 00 00 24 <89> 02 41 f6 45 77 02 74 cb 49 8b ae d8 01 00 00 31 c0 c7 44 24 1a netpoll_poll_dev+0xbd/0x1a0 __netpoll_send_skb+0x1b2/0x210 netpoll_send_udp+0x2c9/0x406 write_ext_msg+0x1d7/0x1f0 console_unlock+0x23c/0x520 vprintk_emit+0xe0/0x1d0 printk+0x58/0x6f x86_vector_activate.cold+0xf/0x46 __irq_domain_activate_irq+0x50/0x80 __irq_domain_activate_irq+0x32/0x80 __irq_domain_activate_irq+0x32/0x80 irq_domain_activate_irq+0x25/0x40 __setup_irq+0x2d2/0x700 request_threaded_irq+0xfb/0x160 __bnxt_open_nic+0x3b1/0x750 bnxt_open_nic+0x19/0x30 ethtool_set_channels+0x1ac/0x220 dev_ethtool+0x11ba/0x2240 dev_ioctl+0x1cf/0x390 sock_do_ioctl+0x95/0x130 Reported-by: Rob Sherwood <[email protected]> Fixes: c0c050c ("bnxt_en: New Broadcom ethernet driver.") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 96298f6 ] According to Core Spec Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part A 6.1.5, the incoming L2CAP_ConfigReq should be handled during OPEN state. The section below shows the btmon trace when running L2CAP/COS/CFD/BV-12-C before and after this change. === Before === ... > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #22 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4 PSM: 1 (0x0001) Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16 #23 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #24 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #25 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #26 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #27 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 .. < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 #28 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #29 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14 #30 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6 Source CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20 #31 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 91 02 11 11 ...... < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 14 #32 L2CAP: Command Reject (0x01) ident 3 len 6 Reason: Invalid CID in request (0x0002) Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #33 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 ... === After === ... > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #22 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 2 len 4 PSM: 1 (0x0001) Source CID: 65 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 16 #23 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 65 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #24 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 2 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #25 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #26 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #27 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 .. < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 #28 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #29 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14 #30 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 2 len 6 Source CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) > ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 20 #31 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 12 Destination CID: 64 Flags: 0x0000 Option: Unknown (0x10) [hint] 01 00 91 02 11 11 ..... < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 #32 L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10 Source CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 Result: Success (0x0000) Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory] MTU: 672 < ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #33 L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 4 Destination CID: 65 Flags: 0x0000 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #34 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 #35 Num handles: 1 Handle: 256 Count: 1 ... Signed-off-by: Howard Chung <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6c881ca ] To quote Alexey[1]: I was adding custom tracepoint to the kernel, grabbed full F34 kernel .config, disabled modules and booted whole shebang as VM kernel. Then did perf record -a -e ... It crashed: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x435f5346592e4243: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 842 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.12.6+ #26 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:t_show+0x22/0xd0 Then reproducer was narrowed to # cat /sys/kernel/tracing/printk_formats Original F34 kernel with modules didn't crash. So I started to disable options and after disabling AFS everything started working again. The root cause is that AFS was placing char arrays content into a section full of _pointers_ to strings with predictable consequences. Non canonical address 435f5346592e4243 is "CB.YFS_" which came from CM_NAME macro. Steps to reproduce: CONFIG_AFS=y CONFIG_TRACING=y # cat /sys/kernel/tracing/printk_formats Fix this by the following means: (1) Add enum->string translation tables in the event header with the AFS and YFS cache/callback manager operations listed by RPC operation ID. (2) Modify the afs_cb_call tracepoint to print the string from the translation table rather than using the string at the afs_call name pointer. (3) Switch translation table depending on the service we're being accessed as (AFS or YFS) in the tracepoint print clause. Will this cause problems to userspace utilities? Note that the symbolic representation of the YFS service ID isn't available to this header, so I've put it in as a number. I'm not sure if this is the best way to do this. (4) Remove the name wrangling (CM_NAME) macro and put the names directly into the afs_call_type structs in cmservice.c. Fixes: 8e8d7f1 ("afs: Add some tracepoints") Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan (SK hynix) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <[email protected]> cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YLAXfvZ+rObEOdc%[email protected]/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/162430903582.2896199.6098150063997983353.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/162609463957.3133237.15916579353149746363.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 (repost) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/162610726860.3408253.445207609466288531.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit b7fb2da upstream. struct rpmsg_ctrldev contains a struct cdev. The current code frees the rpmsg_ctrldev struct in rpmsg_ctrldev_release_device(), but the cdev is a managed object, therefore its release is not predictable and the rpmsg_ctrldev could be freed before the cdev is entirely released, as in the backtrace below. [ 93.625603] ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x7c [ 93.636115] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 12 at lib/debugobjects.c:488 debug_print_object+0x13c/0x1b0 [ 93.644799] Modules linked in: veth xt_cgroup xt_MASQUERADE rfcomm algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg uinput ip6table_nat fuse uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc venus_enc venus_dec videobuf2_dma_contig hci_uart btandroid btqca snd_soc_rt5682_i2c bluetooth qcom_spmi_temp_alarm snd_soc_rt5682v [ 93.715175] CPU: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G B 5.4.163-lockdep hardkernel#26 [ 93.723855] Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev3 - 8) with LTE (DT) [ 93.730055] Workqueue: events kobject_delayed_cleanup [ 93.735271] pstate: 60c00009 (nZCv daif +PAN +UAO) [ 93.740216] pc : debug_print_object+0x13c/0x1b0 [ 93.744890] lr : debug_print_object+0x13c/0x1b0 [ 93.749555] sp : ffffffacf5bc7940 [ 93.752978] x29: ffffffacf5bc7940 x28: dfffffd000000000 [ 93.758448] x27: ffffffacdb11a800 x26: dfffffd000000000 [ 93.763916] x25: ffffffd0734f856c x24: dfffffd000000000 [ 93.769389] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffffd0733c35b0 [ 93.774860] x21: ffffffd0751994a0 x20: ffffffd075ec27c0 [ 93.780338] x19: ffffffd075199100 x18: 00000000000276e0 [ 93.785814] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: dfffffd000000000 [ 93.791291] x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: 6e6968207473696c [ 93.796768] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffffffd075e2b000 [ 93.802244] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000000 [ 93.807723] x9 : d13400dff1921900 x8 : d13400dff1921900 [ 93.813200] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 93.818676] x5 : 0000000000000080 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 93.824152] x3 : ffffffd0732a0fa4 x2 : 0000000000000001 [ 93.829628] x1 : ffffffacf5bc7580 x0 : 0000000000000061 [ 93.835104] Call trace: [ 93.837644] debug_print_object+0x13c/0x1b0 [ 93.841963] __debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x25c/0x3c0 [ 93.846987] debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x18/0x20 [ 93.851669] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xbc/0x1e4 [ 93.856346] kfree+0xfc/0x2f4 [ 93.859416] rpmsg_ctrldev_release_device+0x78/0xb8 [ 93.864445] device_release+0x84/0x168 [ 93.868310] kobject_cleanup+0x12c/0x298 [ 93.872356] kobject_delayed_cleanup+0x10/0x18 [ 93.876948] process_one_work+0x578/0x92c [ 93.881086] worker_thread+0x804/0xcf8 [ 93.884963] kthread+0x2a8/0x314 [ 93.888303] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 The cdev_device_add/del() API was created to address this issue (see commit '233ed09d7fda ("chardev: add helper function to register char devs with a struct device")'), use it instead of cdev add/del(). Fixes: c0cdc19 ("rpmsg: Driver for user space endpoint interface") Signed-off-by: Sujit Kautkar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mathieu Poirier <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220110104706.v6.1.Iaac908f3e3149a89190ce006ba166e2d3fd247a3@changeid Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4224cfd ] When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already removed. [ 755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called [ 756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called ... [ 757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 758.031397] IP: [<ffffffff8ee11acb>] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280 crash> bt ... PID: 12649 TASK: ffff8924108f2100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "amsd" ... #9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778 [exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab] RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb RSP: ffff89240e1a3968 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff89243d874100 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff89243d874090 RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0 R8: 000000000001f080 R9: ffff8905ffc03c00 R10: ffffffffc04680d4 R11: ffffffff8edde9fd R12: 00000000000080d0 R13: ffff89243d874090 R14: ffff89243d874080 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core] #11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core] #12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core] #13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core] #14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core] #15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core] #16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core] #17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46 #18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208 #19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3 #20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf #21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596 #22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10 #23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5 #24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff #25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f #26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92 crash> net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000 state = 0x5 (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER) To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present. Signed-off-by: suresh kumar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 2ea3528 upstream. Commit bf5c25d ("skbuff: in skb_segment, call zerocopy functions once per nskb") added the call to zero copy functions in skb_segment(). The change introduced a bug in skb_segment() because skb_orphan_frags() may possibly change the number of fragments or allocate new fragments altogether leaving nrfrags and frag to point to the old values. This can cause a panic with stacktrace like the one below. [ 193.894380] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000bc [ 193.895273] CPU: 13 PID: 18164 Comm: vh-net-17428 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G O 5.15.123+ #26 [ 193.903919] RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0xb0e/0x12f0 [ 194.021892] Call Trace: [ 194.027422] <TASK> [ 194.072861] tcp_gso_segment+0x107/0x540 [ 194.082031] inet_gso_segment+0x15c/0x3d0 [ 194.090783] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x9f/0x110 [ 194.095016] __skb_gso_segment+0xc1/0x190 [ 194.103131] netem_enqueue+0x290/0xb10 [sch_netem] [ 194.107071] dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x16/0x70 [ 194.110884] __dev_queue_xmit+0x63b/0xb30 [ 194.121670] bond_start_xmit+0x159/0x380 [bonding] [ 194.128506] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc3/0x1e0 [ 194.131787] __dev_queue_xmit+0x8a0/0xb30 [ 194.138225] macvlan_start_xmit+0x4f/0x100 [macvlan] [ 194.141477] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc3/0x1e0 [ 194.144622] sch_direct_xmit+0xe3/0x280 [ 194.147748] __dev_queue_xmit+0x54a/0xb30 [ 194.154131] tap_get_user+0x2a8/0x9c0 [tap] [ 194.157358] tap_sendmsg+0x52/0x8e0 [tap] [ 194.167049] handle_tx_zerocopy+0x14e/0x4c0 [vhost_net] [ 194.173631] handle_tx+0xcd/0xe0 [vhost_net] [ 194.176959] vhost_worker+0x76/0xb0 [vhost] [ 194.183667] kthread+0x118/0x140 [ 194.190358] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 194.193670] </TASK> In this case calling skb_orphan_frags() updated nr_frags leaving nrfrags local variable in skb_segment() stale. This resulted in the code hitting i >= nrfrags prematurely and trying to move to next frag_skb using list_skb pointer, which was NULL, and caused kernel panic. Move the call to zero copy functions before using frags and nr_frags. Fixes: bf5c25d ("skbuff: in skb_segment, call zerocopy functions once per nskb") Signed-off-by: Mohamed Khalfella <[email protected]> Reported-by: Amit Goyal <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 0b0747d upstream. The following processes run into a deadlock. CPU 41 was waiting for CPU 29 to handle a CSD request while holding spinlock "crashdump_lock", but CPU 29 was hung by that spinlock with IRQs disabled. PID: 17360 TASK: ffff95c1090c5c40 CPU: 41 COMMAND: "mrdiagd" !# 0 [ffffb80edbf37b58] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b871a40 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0 !# 1 [ffffb80edbf37b58] atomic_read at ffffffff9b871a40 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:27:0 !# 2 [ffffb80edbf37b58] dump_stack at ffffffff9b871a40 lib/dump_stack.c:54:0 # 3 [ffffb80edbf37b78] csd_lock_wait_toolong at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:364:0 # 4 [ffffb80edbf37b78] __csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:384:0 # 5 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:394:0 # 6 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] smp_call_function_many at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:843:0 # 7 [ffffb80edbf37c50] smp_call_function at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:867:0 # 8 [ffffb80edbf37c50] on_each_cpu at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:976:0 # 9 [ffffb80edbf37c78] flush_tlb_kernel_range at ffffffff9b085c4b arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:742:0 #10 [ffffb80edbf37cb8] __purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a1e0 mm/vmalloc.c:701:0 #11 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] try_purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:722:0 #12 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] free_vmap_area_noflush at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:754:0 #13 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] free_unmap_vmap_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:764:0 #14 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] remove_vm_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:1509:0 #15 [ffffb80edbf37d18] __vunmap at ffffffff9b23bb8a mm/vmalloc.c:1537:0 #16 [ffffb80edbf37d40] vfree at ffffffff9b23bc85 mm/vmalloc.c:1612:0 #17 [ffffb80edbf37d58] megasas_free_host_crash_buffer [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc020b7f2 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c:3932:0 #18 [ffffb80edbf37d80] fw_crash_state_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f804d drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3291:0 #19 [ffffb80edbf37dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0 #20 [ffffb80edbf37dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0 #21 [ffffb80edbf37de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0 #22 [ffffb80edbf37e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0 #23 [ffffb80edbf37ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0 #24 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0 #25 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0 #26 [ffffb80edbf37f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0 #27 [ffffb80edbf37f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0 PID: 17355 TASK: ffff95c1090c3d80 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "mrdiagd" !# 0 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0 !# 1 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 kernel/locking/qspinlock.c:368:0 # 2 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:674:0 # 3 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/qspinlock.h:53:0 # 4 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] queued_spin_lock at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:90:0 # 5 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] do_raw_spin_lock_flags at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock.h:173:0 # 6 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:122:0 # 7 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:160:0 # 8 [ffffb80f2d3c7d88] fw_crash_buffer_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f8129 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3205:0 # 9 [ffffb80f2d3c7dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0 #10 [ffffb80f2d3c7dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0 #11 [ffffb80f2d3c7de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0 #12 [ffffb80f2d3c7e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0 #13 [ffffb80f2d3c7ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0 #14 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0 #15 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0 #16 [ffffb80f2d3c7f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0 #17 [ffffb80f2d3c7f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0 The lock is used to synchronize different sysfs operations, it doesn't protect any resource that will be touched by an interrupt. Consequently it's not required to disable IRQs. Replace the spinlock with a mutex to fix the deadlock. Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 2ea3528 upstream. Commit bf5c25d ("skbuff: in skb_segment, call zerocopy functions once per nskb") added the call to zero copy functions in skb_segment(). The change introduced a bug in skb_segment() because skb_orphan_frags() may possibly change the number of fragments or allocate new fragments altogether leaving nrfrags and frag to point to the old values. This can cause a panic with stacktrace like the one below. [ 193.894380] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000bc [ 193.895273] CPU: 13 PID: 18164 Comm: vh-net-17428 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G O 5.15.123+ #26 [ 193.903919] RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0xb0e/0x12f0 [ 194.021892] Call Trace: [ 194.027422] <TASK> [ 194.072861] tcp_gso_segment+0x107/0x540 [ 194.082031] inet_gso_segment+0x15c/0x3d0 [ 194.090783] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x9f/0x110 [ 194.095016] __skb_gso_segment+0xc1/0x190 [ 194.103131] netem_enqueue+0x290/0xb10 [sch_netem] [ 194.107071] dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x16/0x70 [ 194.110884] __dev_queue_xmit+0x63b/0xb30 [ 194.121670] bond_start_xmit+0x159/0x380 [bonding] [ 194.128506] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc3/0x1e0 [ 194.131787] __dev_queue_xmit+0x8a0/0xb30 [ 194.138225] macvlan_start_xmit+0x4f/0x100 [macvlan] [ 194.141477] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc3/0x1e0 [ 194.144622] sch_direct_xmit+0xe3/0x280 [ 194.147748] __dev_queue_xmit+0x54a/0xb30 [ 194.154131] tap_get_user+0x2a8/0x9c0 [tap] [ 194.157358] tap_sendmsg+0x52/0x8e0 [tap] [ 194.167049] handle_tx_zerocopy+0x14e/0x4c0 [vhost_net] [ 194.173631] handle_tx+0xcd/0xe0 [vhost_net] [ 194.176959] vhost_worker+0x76/0xb0 [vhost] [ 194.183667] kthread+0x118/0x140 [ 194.190358] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 194.193670] </TASK> In this case calling skb_orphan_frags() updated nr_frags leaving nrfrags local variable in skb_segment() stale. This resulted in the code hitting i >= nrfrags prematurely and trying to move to next frag_skb using list_skb pointer, which was NULL, and caused kernel panic. Move the call to zero copy functions before using frags and nr_frags. Fixes: bf5c25d ("skbuff: in skb_segment, call zerocopy functions once per nskb") Signed-off-by: Mohamed Khalfella <[email protected]> Reported-by: Amit Goyal <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 0b0747d upstream. The following processes run into a deadlock. CPU 41 was waiting for CPU 29 to handle a CSD request while holding spinlock "crashdump_lock", but CPU 29 was hung by that spinlock with IRQs disabled. PID: 17360 TASK: ffff95c1090c5c40 CPU: 41 COMMAND: "mrdiagd" !# 0 [ffffb80edbf37b58] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b871a40 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0 !# 1 [ffffb80edbf37b58] atomic_read at ffffffff9b871a40 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:27:0 !# 2 [ffffb80edbf37b58] dump_stack at ffffffff9b871a40 lib/dump_stack.c:54:0 # 3 [ffffb80edbf37b78] csd_lock_wait_toolong at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:364:0 # 4 [ffffb80edbf37b78] __csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:384:0 # 5 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:394:0 # 6 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] smp_call_function_many at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:843:0 # 7 [ffffb80edbf37c50] smp_call_function at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:867:0 # 8 [ffffb80edbf37c50] on_each_cpu at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:976:0 # 9 [ffffb80edbf37c78] flush_tlb_kernel_range at ffffffff9b085c4b arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:742:0 #10 [ffffb80edbf37cb8] __purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a1e0 mm/vmalloc.c:701:0 #11 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] try_purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:722:0 #12 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] free_vmap_area_noflush at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:754:0 #13 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] free_unmap_vmap_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:764:0 #14 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] remove_vm_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:1509:0 #15 [ffffb80edbf37d18] __vunmap at ffffffff9b23bb8a mm/vmalloc.c:1537:0 #16 [ffffb80edbf37d40] vfree at ffffffff9b23bc85 mm/vmalloc.c:1612:0 #17 [ffffb80edbf37d58] megasas_free_host_crash_buffer [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc020b7f2 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c:3932:0 #18 [ffffb80edbf37d80] fw_crash_state_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f804d drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3291:0 #19 [ffffb80edbf37dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0 #20 [ffffb80edbf37dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0 #21 [ffffb80edbf37de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0 #22 [ffffb80edbf37e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0 #23 [ffffb80edbf37ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0 #24 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0 #25 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0 #26 [ffffb80edbf37f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0 #27 [ffffb80edbf37f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0 PID: 17355 TASK: ffff95c1090c3d80 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "mrdiagd" !# 0 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0 !# 1 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 kernel/locking/qspinlock.c:368:0 # 2 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:674:0 # 3 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/qspinlock.h:53:0 # 4 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] queued_spin_lock at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:90:0 # 5 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] do_raw_spin_lock_flags at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock.h:173:0 # 6 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:122:0 # 7 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:160:0 # 8 [ffffb80f2d3c7d88] fw_crash_buffer_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f8129 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3205:0 # 9 [ffffb80f2d3c7dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0 #10 [ffffb80f2d3c7dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0 #11 [ffffb80f2d3c7de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0 #12 [ffffb80f2d3c7e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0 #13 [ffffb80f2d3c7ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0 #14 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0 #15 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0 #16 [ffffb80f2d3c7f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0 #17 [ffffb80f2d3c7f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0 The lock is used to synchronize different sysfs operations, it doesn't protect any resource that will be touched by an interrupt. Consequently it's not required to disable IRQs. Replace the spinlock with a mutex to fix the deadlock. Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

mdrjr closed this as completed Aug 14, 2013

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Kernel fails to build #26

Kernel fails to build #26

declanmalone commented Aug 14, 2013

mdrjr commented Aug 14, 2013

Kernel fails to build #26

Kernel fails to build #26

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declanmalone commented Aug 14, 2013

mdrjr commented Aug 14, 2013