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[Core] structured generation mode for DiffusionGemma model (Jev-like) - #57250
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Documentation preview: https://vllm--57250.org.readthedocs.build/en/57250/ |
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Some small updates to the PR: there's more work we can skip when not actually diffusing which shaves off ~20-40% off decision time with no impact to decision quality. |
kvnloo
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This is genuinely exciting work — Jev-style structured reads turn DiffusionGemma into a calibrated multiple-choice machine: bounded answers with real uncertainty bars, which is exactly what evals, moderation, and agentic tool-calling need instead of prose you have to parse and pray over. The machinery here is close. A few things I'd want resolved before it lands.
Merge order needs a decision first. The three prerequisite PRs (#57414, #57416, #57417) are stacked as commits inside this branch and open as standalone PRs. Both can't survive: if the standalone PRs land first, this branch conflicts; if this lands first, they become empty. Either rebase this after they land (dropping the three commits) or absorb them here and close the standalone PRs. Right now it's both, which guarantees a mess.
Should-fix:
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No regression test for the claimed race. All 7 new sampler tests are single-slot state checks; nothing runs two lockstep requests where A converges (stash freshly written) while B commits (stash popped) — the exact case that 500'd with
list index out of range. Every new test stays green while this regresses. A two-request mixed-phase test would pin it. -
Example server has unbounded fan-out.
auto_maxis int-cast but never upper-bounded (fixedsamplesis capped at 32);read_manyspawns one thread per sample anddecideusesThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=len(groups))with unbounded question count.{"samples": "auto", "auto_max": 100000}→ ~10⁵ threads →can't start new threador OOM. The server binds0.0.0.0with no auth. Mirror themin(..., 32)cap and bound question count. -
_diffusion_read_in_flightis void withoutdiffusion_max_steps, which validation permits. Under async scheduling a read-only request without a cap gets one extra speculative denoise step after its converging output is already in flight; the output is dropped and its+widthplaceholders leak on the dead request — a wasted forward pass per read. Either require the cap alongsidediffusion_read_onlyor make the guard cap-independent. -
diffusion_max_stepsis silently clamped. Validation rejects< 1but allows huge values, which the sampler clamps tomax_denoising_stepswith no signal (request 200 steps, get 48, read-only emits at 48). Validate the upper bound or log the clamp. -
Read-only with
max_tokens < canvas widthtruncates the canvas. The cap only lowers (min(self.max_tokens or expected_len, expected_len)), contradicting the comment "one canvas is the whole output":max_tokens=5, width=16 → the structured reader gets 5 of 16 slots and downstream slot alignment breaks. Reject or canonicalize. -
verify()mutates the params it's validating. The read-only branch setsself.max_tokensand unconditionally stompsself.ignore_eos = True, overriding an explicit userignore_eos=False. Idempotent on re-verify, but validation with side effects is a footgun — document the override instead of silently applying it.
Nits: README field table omits diffusion_canvas_length and says read-only emits "as soon as the cap is reached" — it emits at convergence, which can precede the cap. slot_distribution's entropy is computed over unnormalized top-set probabilities, systematically understating true entropy and biasing the auto policy toward single reads; the (properly normalized) label distribution's entropy would be the honest signal. set_seed_canvas only overwrites [:len(ids)], so a shorter seed on a reused slot leaves the previous request's tail in device memory past the new width — likely benign since those positions are never scheduled, but worth a zeroing for hygiene. When diffusion_config is None the seed-length check degrades to unenforced, re-opening the device-side assert the validation was built to prevent.
What's strong: the stash fix matches the race mechanism exactly — I traced placeholder add/drain across _update_after_schedule, the rejection path, and the async commit override, and the books balance for narrowed and full widths. Slot-reuse hygiene is careful (add_request resets seed/read-only/cap/width and evicts stale stashes — the exact leak vector for a preempt between converge and commit). And validating seed ids against vocab size before GPU indexing turns an unrecoverable device-side assert into a clean 400, including the bool-is-int exclusion most validators miss.
Design question: extra_args as the API surface. It works, but it's an untyped escape hatch — invisible to the OpenAPI schema, no typed client support, validation bolted on the side. You already anticipate a template syntax in a followup; I'd argue the three knobs (seed canvas, step cap, read-only) deserve first-class SamplingParams fields when that lands, with extra_args as the incubator, not the permanent home. Agree with keeping the JSON format itself outside vLLM — the interposer server is the right layer for it.
Structured reads went upstream (vllm-project/vllm#57250), so the image now starts from nightly-e9757321 and overlays only the perf branches, tracked in vllm-stack.tsv: constrained-vocab (#58216), sc-last-step-skip (#58221), fused-sampler (#58226) with a fix for masked leading blocks, diffusion- entropy-masked (#58440), diffusion-samples (#58438), flashinfer-per-request- causal and adaptive-canvas. The fork branch djev-spark-stack holds each branch's own diff on the nightly's commit, so no other upstream change rides along. The fork stage checks that every manifest head is in the stack, and patches/verify_image.py that every branch's change is installed and imports. scripts/vllm-stack.sh status says per branch when the fork moved or upstream merged it into the base; build makes a new stack on a newer nightly. The server is mmastrac/djev at a pinned commit, with --constrained and --engine-samples on and the playground pages served from --pages. This repo's server copy, its fake-upstream test and the recompile-limit patch (upstream now, and a syntax error on this nightly) are gone. Defaults follow the measurements: canvas 256 with the adaptive schedule, the gemma4 reasoning and tool parsers, --language-model-only, max-logprobs 128, and a start-up budget of two fp32 copies (the container peaked at 33 GB). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Make admin analytics dense and searchable on one page * Fix payment reconciliation during overdue flags, refunds, and provider failures (#100) * Add TypeSafe SDK-compatible API (#102) * Reduce classification latency with west-region Laya and fewer account round trips (#103) * Cut Laya fast latency below 150ms * Retain Oregon placement and remove redundant account plan lookup * Apply workspace keys to TypeSafe SDK requests (#104) * Serve Laya on Beam and add Kev, retiring the Modal deployment (#105) Beam serves the same System One protocol as TypeSafe, so Laya stops being a bespoke HTTP client and becomes a third transport in src/jev.ts: one packer, one retry policy, one validator, one meter. Kev joins it as `model: "kev"`. Two Beam limits have no analogue at TypeSafe. Every model refuses more than 32 named questions per request, and the contexts are small — Laya answers within 512 tokens of state plus one question, Kev packs 8,192. Both reject an overflow rather than truncating, so a context refusal is translated to max_tokens_exceeded and runJevBatches halves the batch and recovers. Laya's 16-item ceiling is empirical: Beam accepted 20 items of ordinary support text and refused 25. Behaviour preserved deliberately: - Lane quotas (fast 60/min, bulk 1,000/min) are a product decision about shared capacity, not a property of Modal, so callers keep their limits. - Beam requests are not retried. The old Modal client did not retry either, and a lane quota counts attempts, so retrying would spend a caller's budget on a model that will not clear inside a backoff. Retries stay a Jev-only behaviour, now expressed as Backend.attempts. - The quota-refusal abort from #103 still cancels in-flight inference. Behaviour that changed, visibly: - A result is labelled jev/laya or jev/kev. Beam does not report which checkpoint answered, so laya-0.3.4-<checkpoint>-<lane> is gone, and with it the timing fields only Modal could populate (backendMs, headersMs). - Account analytics records a real provider cost for these models instead of marking spend unknown, because Beam reports token counts. - Cold-start 503s cannot happen: there is no pool of ours to start. Cost: usage-priced at $0.021 per 1M input tokens with no idle charge, against $1,168 a month for the warm Modal lane alone after the us-west multiplier. BEAM_API_KEY is the only credential either model needs; LAYA_FAST_URL, LAYA_BULK_URL, LAYA_MODAL_KEY and LAYA_MODAL_SECRET are removed. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Describe the Beam transport in the repository instructions (#106) AGENTS.md told contributors that Jev's transports live in src/jev.ts and said nothing about Laya or Kev. Both now go through the same module, and the two rules that are easy to get wrong — Beam's 32-question ceiling and the fact that a Beam request is never retried because a lane quota counts attempts — were only discoverable by reading the code. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Bound free inference spending and isolate internal endpoints (#107) * Bound public inference spending and protect internal endpoints * Verify spending boundaries and finish paid admission and recovery alerts * Demonstrate live provider billing through funded admission * Keep anonymous live smart checks within the request allowance (#108) * Simplify billing to input tokens plus Smart escalations (#109) * Price base input at Jev's rate and Smart reviews per escalation * Expose customer usage headers to browser API clients * Fix agent-reported batch recovery and spending error reporting (#110) * Let paid requests settle into a bounded negative balance (#111) * Allow bounded paid overdrafts and preserve completed Smart results * Describe the hold without implying prepaid coverage is required * Add agent testimonials to feedback (#112) * Route documents over 32,000 characters to chunklaya An input over MAX_CHARS used to be refused with input_too_long. When CHUNKLAYA_URL and CHUNKLAYA_TOKEN are set and CHUNKLAYA_ENABLED is "true", it is now answered by chunklaya, our own long-document service (Laya behind a chunk-and-index harness, github.com/myxamediyar/chunklaya, serve/), and the result is labelled chunklaya/multilingual. Nothing at or under 32,000 characters changes; an explicit model "jev" keeps its ceiling; model "chunklaya" selects it for shorter text. Unconfigured, the old 400 stands. The service speaks System One, so it is a fourth Backend in src/jev.ts through the bearer transport Beam already uses, with the URL and token read from the environment, one document per request, a 60 s deadline, and no per-token cost (the pod is billed by the hour). Its refusals are reported as chunklaya_input, chunklaya_busy and chunklaya_unavailable in our own words, and never fall back to Jev or the LLM chain. Ceilings: 4,000,000 characters per input, 20 inputs per request, no smart tier. Dimensions pack against the backend's limits so every question about a document travels in one request. Billing prices the model at zero in the rate card, the spending table and the reservation bound. Docs, OpenAPI, MCP and the CLI render the new model and codes from the same constants. The deploy workflow passes CHUNKLAYA_URL and CHUNKLAYA_TOKEN to the Worker when both exist as repository secrets, and leaves them out otherwise. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Price the chunklaya route as chunklaya under a spending permit postBeam sent every request through providerFetch under Beam's name, so a request routed to chunklaya was priced as beam:chunklaya/multilingual, which the price table does not have, and was refused as unpriced_model. The provider the function already receives is now the one it names. test/chunklaya.test.ts runs the route under a Permit, as production does, and asserts it is priced as chunklaya at zero. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Let the deploy's anonymous probe pass through the reputation gate The post-deploy check curls one anonymous classification from the hosted runner. The free-traffic reputation gate can refuse a runner's IP with 403 proxy_requires_payment, which is the Worker answering with its own gate, not a broken deploy; the last two deploys were marked failed by it, and `curl --fail` discarded the body that would have said so. The probe now prints the status and body, passes with a notice on the gate's own 403, still requires "spam" on a 200, and fails on anything else. The funded end-to-end step that followed it runs again. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Give operator inference a separate bounded daily allowance * Limit anonymous traffic by label set (#116) * Limit anonymous traffic by label set * Preserve public quota documentation contract * Close cross-endpoint label allowance bypasses * Add paginated admin view of all retained label sets (#117) * Exclude obsolete raw keys from the label registry (#118) * Index collected label names for the admin catalog (#119) * Expose classification token usage and customer pricing (#121) * Classify long documents with Jev screening and fixed context pricing (#122) * Implement Jev long-context screening with fixed context pricing * Budget selected evidence against serialized Jev requests * Give long-context Jev calls bounded longer deadlines (#123) * Open POST /v1/systemone to images through the dgemma service A System One body that names model "dgemma" or carries an images array is forwarded to the image-capable DiffusionGemma service (vLLM's structured-read mode, vllm-project/vllm#57250), which speaks the same contract. Every other body still goes to TypeSafe. Neither answers for the other: a refused body is 400 dgemma_input with the service's reason, a saturated service 429 dgemma_busy, a down or unconfigured one 503 dgemma_unavailable, and images sent under another model 400 images_unsupported. Images are data URLs (PNG, JPEG, WebP, GIF), at most 4 and 900,000 base64 characters together. The service is reached through the DGEMMA_URL and DGEMMA_TOKEN Worker secrets when DGEMMA_ENABLED is "true"; the deploy workflow passes the pair through when both repository secrets are set. The route is priced as dgemma at zero for workspace permits, since the service is billed by the hour. OpenAPI, the docs and AGENTS.md describe the field, the model and the codes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Enable paid 10M-token long-context classification jobs (#125) * Add paid ten-million-token long-context jobs * Allow browser preflight for long-context uploads * Tighten the dgemma door after review Route on the presence of the images field, so an empty array is refused rather than forwarded as an unknown key; require an https service address and reject redirects; keep the 60-second deadline through the body read; accept a 200 only when it reports this model, an entry for every question asked and a usage count; and scope the zero-rate trial to System One, where an images field selects the service as surely as its name. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Let the System One response schema carry a skipped dgemma answer A question the service skips under ask_if is answered null; the published response schema now allows that beside the answer objects. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Keep the dgemma request's redirects manual The Workers runtime has no redirect "error" mode and throws on the option, so every request to the image-capable service failed before it was sent and the route answered dgemma_unavailable. Redirects are now "manual": a 3xx comes back as a response and is answered as an outage, which is what the runtime's own message recommends. A test pins the option and the mapping. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Support time-limited complimentary Pro grants * Start complimentary Pro year on verified signup * Accept whole 10M-token documents in one upload (#127) * Add URL classification with metered Context.dev scraping (#128) * Restore public chat with classification tools (#130) * Restore public chat with classification tools * Keep non-chat private routes protected * Keep chat subtitle readable with conversation controls * Measure chat usage in the unified analytics dashboard * Align chart units and verify dashboard navigation and export * Count every chat classification tool variant --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: myxamediyar <mukhamediyar@berkeley.edu> Co-authored-by: Mukhamediyar <86684638+myxamediyar@users.noreply.github.com>
Prerequisite PRs
A few PRs that can go in on their own merits were split out:
Purpose
DiffusionGemma (and likely other models in vLLM) contains all of the necessary components to build a Jev-like model that provides structured answers with bounded choices.
By fixing canvas positions in the given structured output format, you can ask the model to provide a token and logprobs (from which a client derives entropy) that can be used to determine the models most likely answer and its confidence in that answer. If entropy does not pass a given threshold, you can perform additional sampling to determine agreement between runs and therefore the actual confidence of the model's answer.
This PR contains a prototype example server for serving the
/v1/systemoneendpoint. It does not implement a standard endpoint in vLLM.The model is sufficiently powerful to work with any structured output that follows one limitation: the token choices must be a single token, so that the canvas itself does not shift. The requesting client can always translate multi-token options into single token options, however (ie: "moderation_spam" -> "A"). The choices are always laid out in a system prompt and the model correctly diffuses single-token-slot answers (or makes a guess and flags it with uncertainty).
Why do we require the token IDs in the request? Currently we provide the token slot positions that are unfixed for the model to choose and this allows the two to be matched more accurately. A followup PR will likely add a template syntax.
The model, using this framework, can answer yes/no ("noul" in Jev parlance), scale, or multiple choice questions, and provides its certainty and error bars with the answer.
The only missing pieces for this to work in vLLM today are in this PR:
This PR currently contains the machinery to make this model work and a sample interposer server is included to demonstrate end-to-end functionality that is sufficient to serve traffic at reasonable scale.
diffusion_seed_canvaslist[int], exactly the request's canvas width[0, vocab), length checked againstdiffusion_canvas_length, else the served--diffusion-configdiffusion_max_stepsint >= 1max_denoising_stepsdiffusion_pinnedlist[int]of canvas positionsdiffusion_seed_canvas; positions must lie inside the request's canvasdiffusion_read_onlybool(the OpenAI server delivers JSON booleans invllm_xargsas 0/1, which is accepted)max_tokensat the canvas, setsignore_eosdiffusion_canvas_lengthint, 1 to the servedcanvas_lengthverify; the seed must be this longlogprob_token_ids(a request field, not invllm_xargs)list[int], up to 128Example request:
Example Queries
These are raw example queries passed to the model:
Answer template (@ standing in for a noised slot):
Seeded canvas:
Test Plan
Run locally on a DGX spark, with a concurrency sweep to ensure it scales and does not corrupt parallel generations.
Run with:
Test Result
Hardware: 1 DGX Spark, sole active GPU process.
Setup: read-only single reads, 32-row canvas, three decisions per request, cache-busted state with the schema prefix cached
Results: 1-way 8.7 req/s at 0.12 s, 32-way 54.0 req/s at 0.58 s, about 162 decisions/s.
Using a sample request/response corpus to determine, from a mock support request, the urgency, tone and routing of an outage report, we get the correct variable number of samples per request (the auto policy re-reads only when the first read is uncertain):
H1: is the first read's entropy per question over the top-20 logprobs (note that reads=4 when H1>0.1)
Additional Results
Solve an ASCII maze giving it only N/E/W/S options:
It even works with the vision tower!
Essential Elements of an Effective PR Description Checklist
supported_models.mdandexamplesfor a new model.