Add pre-merge-approval for execute_pre_merge#1471
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Signed-off-by: Bartosz Myrcha <bartosz.myrcha@intel.com>
bmyrcha
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adobrzyn,
afierka-intel,
iboiko-habana,
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🚧 CI BlockedThe main CI workflow was not started for the following reason:
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This was referenced May 21, 2026
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Adds 'step-security/harden-runner@v2.19.3' (SHA-pinned) as the first
step of every CI job that consumes secrets.HF_TOKEN, configured with
'egress-policy: block' and a curated allow-list of endpoints that the
current build + test pipeline actually needs.
Allow-list (derived from reading .github/Dockerfile.ci, the workflow
files, and tests/full_tests/ci_e2e_discoverable_tests.sh):
GitHub Actions infrastructure:
api.github.com, github.com, codeload.github.com,
objects.githubusercontent.com, raw.githubusercontent.com,
release-assets.githubusercontent.com,
*.actions.githubusercontent.com,
results-receiver.actions.githubusercontent.com,
ghcr.io, pkg-containers.githubusercontent.com,
*.blob.core.windows.net (cache / artifacts)
Docker base image (build phase):
vault.habana.ai (Habana Gaudi base)
Python packages (build + test phase):
pypi.org, files.pythonhosted.org,
download.pytorch.org (torchaudio CPU wheel)
Model weights (test phase):
huggingface.co, cdn-lfs.huggingface.co, cdn-lfs.hf.co,
cdn-lfs-us-1.hf.co, cas-bridge.xethub.hf.co, xet-lfs-us-1.hf.co
Because every test container is launched with '--network=host', the
host-level eBPF filter installed by harden-runner sees and enforces
on the container's traffic — no per-container instrumentation needed.
This is defense-in-depth, layered on top of:
- pre-merge-trigger approval gate (vllm-project#1471)
- approved-workflow environment for HF_TOKEN (vllm-project#1473)
Together these three changes mean a planted payload in a PR cannot:
1. run at all without maintainer approval (vllm-project#1471)
2. receive HF_TOKEN without environment approval (vllm-project#1473)
3. exfiltrate to an attacker-controlled host (this PR)
If anything legitimate gets blocked, the harden-runner check run
will identify the host that was denied; we add it to the allow-list
in a follow-up.
Affected jobs (15 - same set as vllm-project#1473):
pre-merge.yaml: hpu_unit_tests, hpu_pd_tests, hpu_perf_tests,
hpu_dp_tests, e2e, calibration_tests
hourly-ci.yaml: run_unit_tests, e2e, run_data_parallel_test,
run_pd_disaggregate_test
create-release-branch: run_unit_tests, e2e, run_data_parallel_test,
run_pd_disaggregate_test, run_hpu_perf_tests
Signed-off-by: Agata Dobrzyniewicz <adobrzyniewicz@habana.ai>
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…1473) ## Summary Adds `environment: approved-workflow` to every job that consumes `secrets.HF_TOKEN` across the three CI workflows. Together with the existing approval gate in `pre-merge-trigger.yaml` (`environment: pre-merge-approval`, added in #1471), this completes the two-layer protection model: ``` PR opened -> pre-merge-trigger `gate` job: pauses for required reviewer (approval #1) -> on approval, pre-merge.yaml is dispatched -> downstream secret-using jobs resolve HF_TOKEN from the `approved-workflow` environment (no second per-job approval) ``` ## Why With `HF_TOKEN` previously at repo-secret scope, any matrix entry of any e2e/test job had direct access the moment CI started. The recent malicious fork PR exfiltrated it via an auto-discovered `run_*` function. After this change, the token is only released from a GitHub Environment that a maintainer-controlled deployment-branch rule restricts to `main` / `releases/**`, and only after the upstream gate has approved the dispatch. We deliberately add the environment only on jobs that actually use the secret (15 jobs). Helper jobs (`gatekeeper`, `discover_*`, `retrieve_*`, `pre-commit`, `post-comment`, `cleanup_*`, `build_nixl_dockerfile`, `check_dockerfile_changes`, `prepare-release-branch`, `summarize_and_notify`, `setup_and_build`, `store_last_stable_vllm_commit`) do not touch HF_TOKEN and are not modified, to avoid pointless extra gate evaluations. ## Affected jobs (15) - `pre-merge.yaml`: `hpu_unit_tests`, `hpu_pd_tests`, `hpu_perf_tests`, `hpu_dp_tests`, `e2e`, `calibration_tests` - `hourly-ci.yaml`: `run_unit_tests`, `e2e`, `run_data_parallel_test`, `run_pd_disaggregate_test` - `create-release-branch.yaml`: `run_unit_tests`, `e2e`, `run_data_parallel_test`, `run_pd_disaggregate_test`, `run_hpu_perf_tests` ## Diff +15 lines, 0 deletions. Each touched job gets exactly one new line: `environment: approved-workflow`, inserted immediately after `runs-on:`. ## Required repo configuration (before this PR can be merged safely) 1. Settings → Environments → create environment **`approved-workflow`**. 2. Add **`HF_TOKEN`** as an environment secret (the rotated value). 3. **No required reviewers** on this environment (the upstream `pre-merge-approval` gate already enforces approval; adding reviewers here would prompt once per job). 4. **Deployment branches and tags**: Selected branches → `main`, `releases/**`. Prevents a fork PR from claiming the environment from a non-trusted ref. 5. **Delete** `HF_TOKEN` from repository-level secrets so the environment value is the only source. ## Testing Validated end-to-end against `bmyrcha/vllm-gaudi` first using a benign fork PR. With the two environments configured as above, the gate paused as expected, jobs received the secret after approval without a second prompt, and a deliberately mis-authored downstream PR could not reach the secret. Close-cross-ref: builds on #1471. Signed-off-by: Agata Dobrzyniewicz <adobrzyniewicz@habana.ai>
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Signed-off-by: Bartosz Myrcha <bartosz.myrcha@intel.com> Signed-off-by: 12010486 <silvia.colabrese@intel.com>
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…llm-project#1473) ## Summary Adds `environment: approved-workflow` to every job that consumes `secrets.HF_TOKEN` across the three CI workflows. Together with the existing approval gate in `pre-merge-trigger.yaml` (`environment: pre-merge-approval`, added in vllm-project#1471), this completes the two-layer protection model: ``` PR opened -> pre-merge-trigger `gate` job: pauses for required reviewer (approval #1) -> on approval, pre-merge.yaml is dispatched -> downstream secret-using jobs resolve HF_TOKEN from the `approved-workflow` environment (no second per-job approval) ``` ## Why With `HF_TOKEN` previously at repo-secret scope, any matrix entry of any e2e/test job had direct access the moment CI started. The recent malicious fork PR exfiltrated it via an auto-discovered `run_*` function. After this change, the token is only released from a GitHub Environment that a maintainer-controlled deployment-branch rule restricts to `main` / `releases/**`, and only after the upstream gate has approved the dispatch. We deliberately add the environment only on jobs that actually use the secret (15 jobs). Helper jobs (`gatekeeper`, `discover_*`, `retrieve_*`, `pre-commit`, `post-comment`, `cleanup_*`, `build_nixl_dockerfile`, `check_dockerfile_changes`, `prepare-release-branch`, `summarize_and_notify`, `setup_and_build`, `store_last_stable_vllm_commit`) do not touch HF_TOKEN and are not modified, to avoid pointless extra gate evaluations. ## Affected jobs (15) - `pre-merge.yaml`: `hpu_unit_tests`, `hpu_pd_tests`, `hpu_perf_tests`, `hpu_dp_tests`, `e2e`, `calibration_tests` - `hourly-ci.yaml`: `run_unit_tests`, `e2e`, `run_data_parallel_test`, `run_pd_disaggregate_test` - `create-release-branch.yaml`: `run_unit_tests`, `e2e`, `run_data_parallel_test`, `run_pd_disaggregate_test`, `run_hpu_perf_tests` ## Diff +15 lines, 0 deletions. Each touched job gets exactly one new line: `environment: approved-workflow`, inserted immediately after `runs-on:`. ## Required repo configuration (before this PR can be merged safely) 1. Settings → Environments → create environment **`approved-workflow`**. 2. Add **`HF_TOKEN`** as an environment secret (the rotated value). 3. **No required reviewers** on this environment (the upstream `pre-merge-approval` gate already enforces approval; adding reviewers here would prompt once per job). 4. **Deployment branches and tags**: Selected branches → `main`, `releases/**`. Prevents a fork PR from claiming the environment from a non-trusted ref. 5. **Delete** `HF_TOKEN` from repository-level secrets so the environment value is the only source. ## Testing Validated end-to-end against `bmyrcha/vllm-gaudi` first using a benign fork PR. With the two environments configured as above, the gate paused as expected, jobs received the secret after approval without a second prompt, and a deliberately mis-authored downstream PR could not reach the secret. Close-cross-ref: builds on vllm-project#1471. Signed-off-by: Agata Dobrzyniewicz <adobrzyniewicz@habana.ai> Signed-off-by: 12010486 <silvia.colabrese@intel.com>
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May 25, 2026
#1491) …#1473) Adds `environment: approved-workflow` to every job that consumes `secrets.HF_TOKEN` across the three CI workflows. Together with the existing approval gate in `pre-merge-trigger.yaml` (`environment: pre-merge-approval`, added in #1471), this completes the two-layer protection model: ``` PR opened -> pre-merge-trigger `gate` job: pauses for required reviewer (approval #1) -> on approval, pre-merge.yaml is dispatched -> downstream secret-using jobs resolve HF_TOKEN from the `approved-workflow` environment (no second per-job approval) ``` With `HF_TOKEN` previously at repo-secret scope, any matrix entry of any e2e/test job had direct access the moment CI started. The recent malicious fork PR exfiltrated it via an auto-discovered `run_*` function. After this change, the token is only released from a GitHub Environment that a maintainer-controlled deployment-branch rule restricts to `main` / `releases/**`, and only after the upstream gate has approved the dispatch. We deliberately add the environment only on jobs that actually use the secret (15 jobs). Helper jobs (`gatekeeper`, `discover_*`, `retrieve_*`, `pre-commit`, `post-comment`, `cleanup_*`, `build_nixl_dockerfile`, `check_dockerfile_changes`, `prepare-release-branch`, `summarize_and_notify`, `setup_and_build`, `store_last_stable_vllm_commit`) do not touch HF_TOKEN and are not modified, to avoid pointless extra gate evaluations. - `pre-merge.yaml`: `hpu_unit_tests`, `hpu_pd_tests`, `hpu_perf_tests`, `hpu_dp_tests`, `e2e`, `calibration_tests` - `hourly-ci.yaml`: `run_unit_tests`, `e2e`, `run_data_parallel_test`, `run_pd_disaggregate_test` - `create-release-branch.yaml`: `run_unit_tests`, `e2e`, `run_data_parallel_test`, `run_pd_disaggregate_test`, `run_hpu_perf_tests` +15 lines, 0 deletions. Each touched job gets exactly one new line: `environment: approved-workflow`, inserted immediately after `runs-on:`. 1. Settings → Environments → create environment **`approved-workflow`**. 2. Add **`HF_TOKEN`** as an environment secret (the rotated value). 3. **No required reviewers** on this environment (the upstream `pre-merge-approval` gate already enforces approval; adding reviewers here would prompt once per job). 4. **Deployment branches and tags**: Selected branches → `main`, `releases/**`. Prevents a fork PR from claiming the environment from a non-trusted ref. 5. **Delete** `HF_TOKEN` from repository-level secrets so the environment value is the only source. Validated end-to-end against `bmyrcha/vllm-gaudi` first using a benign fork PR. With the two environments configured as above, the gate paused as expected, jobs received the secret after approval without a second prompt, and a deliberately mis-authored downstream PR could not reach the secret. Close-cross-ref: builds on #1471. (cherry picked from commit ca2d952) Signed-off-by: Agata Dobrzyniewicz <adobrzyniewicz@habana.ai>
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