Vllm/last good commit for vllm gaudi#1
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12010486 merged 10 commits intoFeb 27, 2026
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Signed-off-by: Patryk Wolsza <patryk.wolsza@intel.com>
…MMUNITY_COMMIT Signed-off-by: PatrykWo <patryk.wolsza@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Patryk Wolsza <patryk.wolsza@intel.com>
12010486
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…llm-project#1473) ## Summary Adds `environment: approved-workflow` to every job that consumes `secrets.HF_TOKEN` across the three CI workflows. Together with the existing approval gate in `pre-merge-trigger.yaml` (`environment: pre-merge-approval`, added in vllm-project#1471), this completes the two-layer protection model: ``` PR opened -> pre-merge-trigger `gate` job: pauses for required reviewer (approval #1) -> on approval, pre-merge.yaml is dispatched -> downstream secret-using jobs resolve HF_TOKEN from the `approved-workflow` environment (no second per-job approval) ``` ## Why With `HF_TOKEN` previously at repo-secret scope, any matrix entry of any e2e/test job had direct access the moment CI started. The recent malicious fork PR exfiltrated it via an auto-discovered `run_*` function. After this change, the token is only released from a GitHub Environment that a maintainer-controlled deployment-branch rule restricts to `main` / `releases/**`, and only after the upstream gate has approved the dispatch. We deliberately add the environment only on jobs that actually use the secret (15 jobs). Helper jobs (`gatekeeper`, `discover_*`, `retrieve_*`, `pre-commit`, `post-comment`, `cleanup_*`, `build_nixl_dockerfile`, `check_dockerfile_changes`, `prepare-release-branch`, `summarize_and_notify`, `setup_and_build`, `store_last_stable_vllm_commit`) do not touch HF_TOKEN and are not modified, to avoid pointless extra gate evaluations. ## Affected jobs (15) - `pre-merge.yaml`: `hpu_unit_tests`, `hpu_pd_tests`, `hpu_perf_tests`, `hpu_dp_tests`, `e2e`, `calibration_tests` - `hourly-ci.yaml`: `run_unit_tests`, `e2e`, `run_data_parallel_test`, `run_pd_disaggregate_test` - `create-release-branch.yaml`: `run_unit_tests`, `e2e`, `run_data_parallel_test`, `run_pd_disaggregate_test`, `run_hpu_perf_tests` ## Diff +15 lines, 0 deletions. Each touched job gets exactly one new line: `environment: approved-workflow`, inserted immediately after `runs-on:`. ## Required repo configuration (before this PR can be merged safely) 1. Settings → Environments → create environment **`approved-workflow`**. 2. Add **`HF_TOKEN`** as an environment secret (the rotated value). 3. **No required reviewers** on this environment (the upstream `pre-merge-approval` gate already enforces approval; adding reviewers here would prompt once per job). 4. **Deployment branches and tags**: Selected branches → `main`, `releases/**`. Prevents a fork PR from claiming the environment from a non-trusted ref. 5. **Delete** `HF_TOKEN` from repository-level secrets so the environment value is the only source. ## Testing Validated end-to-end against `bmyrcha/vllm-gaudi` first using a benign fork PR. With the two environments configured as above, the gate paused as expected, jobs received the secret after approval without a second prompt, and a deliberately mis-authored downstream PR could not reach the secret. Close-cross-ref: builds on vllm-project#1471. Signed-off-by: Agata Dobrzyniewicz <adobrzyniewicz@habana.ai>
12010486
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 21, 2026
…llm-project#1473) ## Summary Adds `environment: approved-workflow` to every job that consumes `secrets.HF_TOKEN` across the three CI workflows. Together with the existing approval gate in `pre-merge-trigger.yaml` (`environment: pre-merge-approval`, added in vllm-project#1471), this completes the two-layer protection model: ``` PR opened -> pre-merge-trigger `gate` job: pauses for required reviewer (approval #1) -> on approval, pre-merge.yaml is dispatched -> downstream secret-using jobs resolve HF_TOKEN from the `approved-workflow` environment (no second per-job approval) ``` ## Why With `HF_TOKEN` previously at repo-secret scope, any matrix entry of any e2e/test job had direct access the moment CI started. The recent malicious fork PR exfiltrated it via an auto-discovered `run_*` function. After this change, the token is only released from a GitHub Environment that a maintainer-controlled deployment-branch rule restricts to `main` / `releases/**`, and only after the upstream gate has approved the dispatch. We deliberately add the environment only on jobs that actually use the secret (15 jobs). Helper jobs (`gatekeeper`, `discover_*`, `retrieve_*`, `pre-commit`, `post-comment`, `cleanup_*`, `build_nixl_dockerfile`, `check_dockerfile_changes`, `prepare-release-branch`, `summarize_and_notify`, `setup_and_build`, `store_last_stable_vllm_commit`) do not touch HF_TOKEN and are not modified, to avoid pointless extra gate evaluations. ## Affected jobs (15) - `pre-merge.yaml`: `hpu_unit_tests`, `hpu_pd_tests`, `hpu_perf_tests`, `hpu_dp_tests`, `e2e`, `calibration_tests` - `hourly-ci.yaml`: `run_unit_tests`, `e2e`, `run_data_parallel_test`, `run_pd_disaggregate_test` - `create-release-branch.yaml`: `run_unit_tests`, `e2e`, `run_data_parallel_test`, `run_pd_disaggregate_test`, `run_hpu_perf_tests` ## Diff +15 lines, 0 deletions. Each touched job gets exactly one new line: `environment: approved-workflow`, inserted immediately after `runs-on:`. ## Required repo configuration (before this PR can be merged safely) 1. Settings → Environments → create environment **`approved-workflow`**. 2. Add **`HF_TOKEN`** as an environment secret (the rotated value). 3. **No required reviewers** on this environment (the upstream `pre-merge-approval` gate already enforces approval; adding reviewers here would prompt once per job). 4. **Deployment branches and tags**: Selected branches → `main`, `releases/**`. Prevents a fork PR from claiming the environment from a non-trusted ref. 5. **Delete** `HF_TOKEN` from repository-level secrets so the environment value is the only source. ## Testing Validated end-to-end against `bmyrcha/vllm-gaudi` first using a benign fork PR. With the two environments configured as above, the gate paused as expected, jobs received the secret after approval without a second prompt, and a deliberately mis-authored downstream PR could not reach the secret. Close-cross-ref: builds on vllm-project#1471. Signed-off-by: Agata Dobrzyniewicz <adobrzyniewicz@habana.ai> Signed-off-by: 12010486 <silvia.colabrese@intel.com>
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