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Merge pull request #1 from torvalds/master #85

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pull from torvalds

@e-mailky e-mailky closed this Mar 31, 2014
brianlilly pushed a commit to crystalfontz/cfa_10036_kernel that referenced this pull request Apr 1, 2014
Turn it into (for example):

[    0.073380] x86: Booting SMP configuration:
[    0.074005] .... node   #0, CPUs:          #1   #2   #3   #4   #5   torvalds#6   torvalds#7
[    0.603005] .... node   #1, CPUs:     torvalds#8   torvalds#9  torvalds#10  torvalds#11  torvalds#12  torvalds#13  torvalds#14  torvalds#15
[    1.200005] .... node   #2, CPUs:    torvalds#16  torvalds#17  torvalds#18  torvalds#19  torvalds#20  torvalds#21  torvalds#22  torvalds#23
[    1.796005] .... node   #3, CPUs:    torvalds#24  torvalds#25  torvalds#26  torvalds#27  torvalds#28  torvalds#29  torvalds#30  torvalds#31
[    2.393005] .... node   #4, CPUs:    torvalds#32  torvalds#33  torvalds#34  torvalds#35  torvalds#36  torvalds#37  torvalds#38  torvalds#39
[    2.996005] .... node   #5, CPUs:    torvalds#40  torvalds#41  torvalds#42  torvalds#43  torvalds#44  torvalds#45  torvalds#46  torvalds#47
[    3.600005] .... node   torvalds#6, CPUs:    torvalds#48  torvalds#49  torvalds#50  torvalds#51  #52  #53  torvalds#54  torvalds#55
[    4.202005] .... node   torvalds#7, CPUs:    torvalds#56  torvalds#57  #58  torvalds#59  torvalds#60  torvalds#61  torvalds#62  torvalds#63
[    4.811005] .... node   torvalds#8, CPUs:    torvalds#64  torvalds#65  torvalds#66  torvalds#67  torvalds#68  torvalds#69  #70  torvalds#71
[    5.421006] .... node   torvalds#9, CPUs:    torvalds#72  torvalds#73  torvalds#74  torvalds#75  torvalds#76  torvalds#77  torvalds#78  torvalds#79
[    6.032005] .... node  torvalds#10, CPUs:    torvalds#80  torvalds#81  torvalds#82  torvalds#83  torvalds#84  torvalds#85  torvalds#86  torvalds#87
[    6.648006] .... node  torvalds#11, CPUs:    torvalds#88  torvalds#89  torvalds#90  torvalds#91  torvalds#92  torvalds#93  torvalds#94  torvalds#95
[    7.262005] .... node  torvalds#12, CPUs:    torvalds#96  torvalds#97  torvalds#98  torvalds#99 torvalds#100 torvalds#101 torvalds#102 torvalds#103
[    7.865005] .... node  torvalds#13, CPUs:   torvalds#104 torvalds#105 torvalds#106 torvalds#107 torvalds#108 torvalds#109 torvalds#110 torvalds#111
[    8.466005] .... node  torvalds#14, CPUs:   torvalds#112 torvalds#113 torvalds#114 torvalds#115 torvalds#116 torvalds#117 torvalds#118 torvalds#119
[    9.073006] .... node  torvalds#15, CPUs:   torvalds#120 torvalds#121 torvalds#122 torvalds#123 torvalds#124 torvalds#125 torvalds#126 torvalds#127
[    9.679901] x86: Booted up 16 nodes, 128 CPUs

and drop useless elements.

Change num_digits() to hpa's division-avoiding, cell-phone-typed
version which he went at great lengths and pains to submit on a
Saturday evening.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
brianlilly pushed a commit to crystalfontz/cfa_10036_kernel that referenced this pull request Apr 1, 2014
Fixing the below dump:

root@freescale ~$ modprobe g_serial
g_serial gadget: Gadget Serial v2.4
g_serial gadget: g_serial ready
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at /home/b29397/work/projects/upstream/usb/usb/drivers/base/power/runtime.c:952
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, pid: 805, name: modprobe
2 locks held by modprobe/805:
 #0:  (udc_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<7f000a74>] usb_gadget_probe_driver+0x44/0xb4 [udc_core]
 #1:  (&(&ci->lock)->rlock){......}, at: [<7f033488>] ci_udc_start+0x94/0x110 [ci_hdrc]
irq event stamp: 3878
hardirqs last  enabled at (3877): [<806b6720>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x40/0x6c
hardirqs last disabled at (3878): [<806b6474>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2c/0xa8
softirqs last  enabled at (3872): [<8002ec0c>] __do_softirq+0x1c8/0x2e8
softirqs last disabled at (3857): [<8002f180>] irq_exit+0xbc/0x110
CPU: 0 PID: 805 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 3.11.0-next-20130910+ torvalds#85
[<80016b94>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf8) from [<80012e0c>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[<80012e0c>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) from [<806af554>] (dump_stack+0x9c/0xc4)
[<806af554>] (dump_stack+0x9c/0xc4) from [<8005940c>] (__might_sleep+0xf4/0x134)
[<8005940c>] (__might_sleep+0xf4/0x134) from [<803a04a4>] (__pm_runtime_resume+0x94/0xa0)
[<803a04a4>] (__pm_runtime_resume+0x94/0xa0) from [<7f0334a4>] (ci_udc_start+0xb0/0x110 [ci_hdrc])
[<7f0334a4>] (ci_udc_start+0xb0/0x110 [ci_hdrc]) from [<7f0009b4>] (udc_bind_to_driver+0x5c/0xd8 [udc_core])
[<7f0009b4>] (udc_bind_to_driver+0x5c/0xd8 [udc_core]) from [<7f000ab0>] (usb_gadget_probe_driver+0x80/0xb4 [udc_core])
[<7f000ab0>] (usb_gadget_probe_driver+0x80/0xb4 [udc_core]) from [<7f008618>] (usb_composite_probe+0xac/0xd8 [libcomposite])
[<7f008618>] (usb_composite_probe+0xac/0xd8 [libcomposite]) from [<7f04b168>] (init+0x8c/0xb4 [g_serial])
[<7f04b168>] (init+0x8c/0xb4 [g_serial]) from [<800088e8>] (do_one_initcall+0x108/0x16c)
[<800088e8>] (do_one_initcall+0x108/0x16c) from [<8008e518>] (load_module+0x1b00/0x20a4)
[<8008e518>] (load_module+0x1b00/0x20a4) from [<8008eba8>] (SyS_init_module+0xec/0x100)
[<8008eba8>] (SyS_init_module+0xec/0x100) from [<8000ec40>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)

Signed-off-by: Peter Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
liubogithub pushed a commit to liubogithub/btrfs-work that referenced this pull request Apr 2, 2014
The @cn is stay in @clk_notifier_list after it is freed, it cause
memory corruption.

Example, if @clk is registered(first), unregistered(first),
registered(second), unregistered(second).

The freed @cn will be used when @clk is registered(second),
and the bug will be happened when @clk is unregistered(second):

[  517.040000] clk_notif_dbg clk_notif_dbg.1: clk_notifier_unregister()
[  517.040000] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00df3008
[  517.050000] pgd = ed858000
[  517.050000] [00df3008] *pgd=00000000
[  517.060000] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[  517.060000] Modules linked in: clk_notif_dbg(O-) [last unloaded: clk_notif_dbg]
[  517.060000] CPU: 1 PID: 499 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G           O 3.10.0-rc3-00119-ga93cb29-dirty torvalds#85
[  517.060000] task: ee1e0180 ti: ee3e6000 task.ti: ee3e6000
[  517.060000] PC is at srcu_readers_seq_idx+0x48/0x84
[  517.060000] LR is at srcu_readers_seq_idx+0x60/0x84
[  517.060000] pc : [<c0052720>]    lr : [<c0052738>]    psr: 80070013
[  517.060000] sp : ee3e7d48  ip : 00000000  fp : ee3e7d6c
[  517.060000] r10: 00000000  r9 : ee3e6000  r8 : 00000000
[  517.060000] r7 : ed84fe4c  r6 : c068ec90  r5 : c068e430  r4 : 00000000
[  517.060000] r3 : 00df3000  r2 : 00000000  r1 : 00000002  r0 : 00000000
[  517.060000] Flags: Nzcv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
[  517.060000] Control: 18c5387d  Table: 2d85804a  DAC: 00000015
[  517.060000] Process modprobe (pid: 499, stack limit = 0xee3e6238)
[  517.060000] Stack: (0xee3e7d48 to 0xee3e8000)
....
[  517.060000] [<c0052720>] (srcu_readers_seq_idx+0x48/0x84) from [<c0052790>] (try_check_zero+0x34/0xfc)
[  517.060000] [<c0052790>] (try_check_zero+0x34/0xfc) from [<c00528b0>] (srcu_advance_batches+0x58/0x114)
[  517.060000] [<c00528b0>] (srcu_advance_batches+0x58/0x114) from [<c0052c30>] (__synchronize_srcu+0x114/0x1ac)
[  517.060000] [<c0052c30>] (__synchronize_srcu+0x114/0x1ac) from [<c0052d14>] (synchronize_srcu+0x2c/0x34)
[  517.060000] [<c0052d14>] (synchronize_srcu+0x2c/0x34) from [<c0053a08>] (srcu_notifier_chain_unregister+0x68/0x74)
[  517.060000] [<c0053a08>] (srcu_notifier_chain_unregister+0x68/0x74) from [<c0375a78>] (clk_notifier_unregister+0x7c/0xc0)
[  517.060000] [<c0375a78>] (clk_notifier_unregister+0x7c/0xc0) from [<bf008034>] (clk_notif_dbg_remove+0x34/0x9c [clk_notif_dbg])
[  517.060000] [<bf008034>] (clk_notif_dbg_remove+0x34/0x9c [clk_notif_dbg]) from [<c02bb974>] (platform_drv_remove+0x24/0x28)
[  517.060000] [<c02bb974>] (platform_drv_remove+0x24/0x28) from [<c02b9bf8>] (__device_release_driver+0x8c/0xd4)
[  517.060000] [<c02b9bf8>] (__device_release_driver+0x8c/0xd4) from [<c02ba680>] (driver_detach+0x9c/0xc4)
[  517.060000] [<c02ba680>] (driver_detach+0x9c/0xc4) from [<c02b99c4>] (bus_remove_driver+0xcc/0xfc)
[  517.060000] [<c02b99c4>] (bus_remove_driver+0xcc/0xfc) from [<c02bace4>] (driver_unregister+0x54/0x78)
[  517.060000] [<c02bace4>] (driver_unregister+0x54/0x78) from [<c02bbb44>] (platform_driver_unregister+0x1c/0x20)
[  517.060000] [<c02bbb44>] (platform_driver_unregister+0x1c/0x20) from [<bf0081f8>] (clk_notif_dbg_driver_exit+0x14/0x1c [clk_notif_dbg])
[  517.060000] [<bf0081f8>] (clk_notif_dbg_driver_exit+0x14/0x1c [clk_notif_dbg]) from [<c00835e4>] (SyS_delete_module+0x200/0x28c)
[  517.060000] [<c00835e4>] (SyS_delete_module+0x200/0x28c) from [<c000edc0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
[  517.060000] Code: e5973004 e7911102 e0833001 e2881002 (e7933101)

Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Sören Brinkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sören Brinkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Turquette <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: shortened $SUBJECT]
gregnietsky pushed a commit to Distrotech/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 9, 2014
commit 72b5322 upstream.

The @cn is stay in @clk_notifier_list after it is freed, it cause
memory corruption.

Example, if @clk is registered(first), unregistered(first),
registered(second), unregistered(second).

The freed @cn will be used when @clk is registered(second),
and the bug will be happened when @clk is unregistered(second):

[  517.040000] clk_notif_dbg clk_notif_dbg.1: clk_notifier_unregister()
[  517.040000] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00df3008
[  517.050000] pgd = ed858000
[  517.050000] [00df3008] *pgd=00000000
[  517.060000] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[  517.060000] Modules linked in: clk_notif_dbg(O-) [last unloaded: clk_notif_dbg]
[  517.060000] CPU: 1 PID: 499 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G           O 3.10.0-rc3-00119-ga93cb29-dirty torvalds#85
[  517.060000] task: ee1e0180 ti: ee3e6000 task.ti: ee3e6000
[  517.060000] PC is at srcu_readers_seq_idx+0x48/0x84
[  517.060000] LR is at srcu_readers_seq_idx+0x60/0x84
[  517.060000] pc : [<c0052720>]    lr : [<c0052738>]    psr: 80070013
[  517.060000] sp : ee3e7d48  ip : 00000000  fp : ee3e7d6c
[  517.060000] r10: 00000000  r9 : ee3e6000  r8 : 00000000
[  517.060000] r7 : ed84fe4c  r6 : c068ec90  r5 : c068e430  r4 : 00000000
[  517.060000] r3 : 00df3000  r2 : 00000000  r1 : 00000002  r0 : 00000000
[  517.060000] Flags: Nzcv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
[  517.060000] Control: 18c5387d  Table: 2d85804a  DAC: 00000015
[  517.060000] Process modprobe (pid: 499, stack limit = 0xee3e6238)
[  517.060000] Stack: (0xee3e7d48 to 0xee3e8000)
....
[  517.060000] [<c0052720>] (srcu_readers_seq_idx+0x48/0x84) from [<c0052790>] (try_check_zero+0x34/0xfc)
[  517.060000] [<c0052790>] (try_check_zero+0x34/0xfc) from [<c00528b0>] (srcu_advance_batches+0x58/0x114)
[  517.060000] [<c00528b0>] (srcu_advance_batches+0x58/0x114) from [<c0052c30>] (__synchronize_srcu+0x114/0x1ac)
[  517.060000] [<c0052c30>] (__synchronize_srcu+0x114/0x1ac) from [<c0052d14>] (synchronize_srcu+0x2c/0x34)
[  517.060000] [<c0052d14>] (synchronize_srcu+0x2c/0x34) from [<c0053a08>] (srcu_notifier_chain_unregister+0x68/0x74)
[  517.060000] [<c0053a08>] (srcu_notifier_chain_unregister+0x68/0x74) from [<c0375a78>] (clk_notifier_unregister+0x7c/0xc0)
[  517.060000] [<c0375a78>] (clk_notifier_unregister+0x7c/0xc0) from [<bf008034>] (clk_notif_dbg_remove+0x34/0x9c [clk_notif_dbg])
[  517.060000] [<bf008034>] (clk_notif_dbg_remove+0x34/0x9c [clk_notif_dbg]) from [<c02bb974>] (platform_drv_remove+0x24/0x28)
[  517.060000] [<c02bb974>] (platform_drv_remove+0x24/0x28) from [<c02b9bf8>] (__device_release_driver+0x8c/0xd4)
[  517.060000] [<c02b9bf8>] (__device_release_driver+0x8c/0xd4) from [<c02ba680>] (driver_detach+0x9c/0xc4)
[  517.060000] [<c02ba680>] (driver_detach+0x9c/0xc4) from [<c02b99c4>] (bus_remove_driver+0xcc/0xfc)
[  517.060000] [<c02b99c4>] (bus_remove_driver+0xcc/0xfc) from [<c02bace4>] (driver_unregister+0x54/0x78)
[  517.060000] [<c02bace4>] (driver_unregister+0x54/0x78) from [<c02bbb44>] (platform_driver_unregister+0x1c/0x20)
[  517.060000] [<c02bbb44>] (platform_driver_unregister+0x1c/0x20) from [<bf0081f8>] (clk_notif_dbg_driver_exit+0x14/0x1c [clk_notif_dbg])
[  517.060000] [<bf0081f8>] (clk_notif_dbg_driver_exit+0x14/0x1c [clk_notif_dbg]) from [<c00835e4>] (SyS_delete_module+0x200/0x28c)
[  517.060000] [<c00835e4>] (SyS_delete_module+0x200/0x28c) from [<c000edc0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
[  517.060000] Code: e5973004 e7911102 e0833001 e2881002 (e7933101)

Reported-by: Sören Brinkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sören Brinkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Turquette <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: shortened $SUBJECT]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
gregnietsky pushed a commit to Distrotech/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 9, 2014
commit 72b5322 upstream.

The @cn is stay in @clk_notifier_list after it is freed, it cause
memory corruption.

Example, if @clk is registered(first), unregistered(first),
registered(second), unregistered(second).

The freed @cn will be used when @clk is registered(second),
and the bug will be happened when @clk is unregistered(second):

[  517.040000] clk_notif_dbg clk_notif_dbg.1: clk_notifier_unregister()
[  517.040000] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00df3008
[  517.050000] pgd = ed858000
[  517.050000] [00df3008] *pgd=00000000
[  517.060000] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[  517.060000] Modules linked in: clk_notif_dbg(O-) [last unloaded: clk_notif_dbg]
[  517.060000] CPU: 1 PID: 499 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G           O 3.10.0-rc3-00119-ga93cb29-dirty torvalds#85
[  517.060000] task: ee1e0180 ti: ee3e6000 task.ti: ee3e6000
[  517.060000] PC is at srcu_readers_seq_idx+0x48/0x84
[  517.060000] LR is at srcu_readers_seq_idx+0x60/0x84
[  517.060000] pc : [<c0052720>]    lr : [<c0052738>]    psr: 80070013
[  517.060000] sp : ee3e7d48  ip : 00000000  fp : ee3e7d6c
[  517.060000] r10: 00000000  r9 : ee3e6000  r8 : 00000000
[  517.060000] r7 : ed84fe4c  r6 : c068ec90  r5 : c068e430  r4 : 00000000
[  517.060000] r3 : 00df3000  r2 : 00000000  r1 : 00000002  r0 : 00000000
[  517.060000] Flags: Nzcv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
[  517.060000] Control: 18c5387d  Table: 2d85804a  DAC: 00000015
[  517.060000] Process modprobe (pid: 499, stack limit = 0xee3e6238)
[  517.060000] Stack: (0xee3e7d48 to 0xee3e8000)
....
[  517.060000] [<c0052720>] (srcu_readers_seq_idx+0x48/0x84) from [<c0052790>] (try_check_zero+0x34/0xfc)
[  517.060000] [<c0052790>] (try_check_zero+0x34/0xfc) from [<c00528b0>] (srcu_advance_batches+0x58/0x114)
[  517.060000] [<c00528b0>] (srcu_advance_batches+0x58/0x114) from [<c0052c30>] (__synchronize_srcu+0x114/0x1ac)
[  517.060000] [<c0052c30>] (__synchronize_srcu+0x114/0x1ac) from [<c0052d14>] (synchronize_srcu+0x2c/0x34)
[  517.060000] [<c0052d14>] (synchronize_srcu+0x2c/0x34) from [<c0053a08>] (srcu_notifier_chain_unregister+0x68/0x74)
[  517.060000] [<c0053a08>] (srcu_notifier_chain_unregister+0x68/0x74) from [<c0375a78>] (clk_notifier_unregister+0x7c/0xc0)
[  517.060000] [<c0375a78>] (clk_notifier_unregister+0x7c/0xc0) from [<bf008034>] (clk_notif_dbg_remove+0x34/0x9c [clk_notif_dbg])
[  517.060000] [<bf008034>] (clk_notif_dbg_remove+0x34/0x9c [clk_notif_dbg]) from [<c02bb974>] (platform_drv_remove+0x24/0x28)
[  517.060000] [<c02bb974>] (platform_drv_remove+0x24/0x28) from [<c02b9bf8>] (__device_release_driver+0x8c/0xd4)
[  517.060000] [<c02b9bf8>] (__device_release_driver+0x8c/0xd4) from [<c02ba680>] (driver_detach+0x9c/0xc4)
[  517.060000] [<c02ba680>] (driver_detach+0x9c/0xc4) from [<c02b99c4>] (bus_remove_driver+0xcc/0xfc)
[  517.060000] [<c02b99c4>] (bus_remove_driver+0xcc/0xfc) from [<c02bace4>] (driver_unregister+0x54/0x78)
[  517.060000] [<c02bace4>] (driver_unregister+0x54/0x78) from [<c02bbb44>] (platform_driver_unregister+0x1c/0x20)
[  517.060000] [<c02bbb44>] (platform_driver_unregister+0x1c/0x20) from [<bf0081f8>] (clk_notif_dbg_driver_exit+0x14/0x1c [clk_notif_dbg])
[  517.060000] [<bf0081f8>] (clk_notif_dbg_driver_exit+0x14/0x1c [clk_notif_dbg]) from [<c00835e4>] (SyS_delete_module+0x200/0x28c)
[  517.060000] [<c00835e4>] (SyS_delete_module+0x200/0x28c) from [<c000edc0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
[  517.060000] Code: e5973004 e7911102 e0833001 e2881002 (e7933101)

Reported-by: Sören Brinkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sören Brinkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Turquette <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: shortened $SUBJECT]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
sr105 referenced this pull request in RealDigitalMedia/linux-shuttle Jun 3, 2014
Fixing the below dump:

root@freescale ~$ modprobe g_serial
g_serial gadget: Gadget Serial v2.4
g_serial gadget: g_serial ready
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at /home/b29397/work/projects/upstream/usb/usb/drivers/base/power/runtime.c:952
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, pid: 805, name: modprobe
2 locks held by modprobe/805:
 #0:  (udc_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<7f000a74>] usb_gadget_probe_driver+0x44/0xb4 [udc_core]
 Freescale#1:  (&(&ci->lock)->rlock){......}, at: [<7f033488>] ci_udc_start+0x94/0x110 [ci_hdrc]
irq event stamp: 3878
hardirqs last  enabled at (3877): [<806b6720>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x40/0x6c
hardirqs last disabled at (3878): [<806b6474>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2c/0xa8
softirqs last  enabled at (3872): [<8002ec0c>] __do_softirq+0x1c8/0x2e8
softirqs last disabled at (3857): [<8002f180>] irq_exit+0xbc/0x110
CPU: 0 PID: 805 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 3.11.0-next-20130910+ Freescale#85
[<80016b94>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf8) from [<80012e0c>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[<80012e0c>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) from [<806af554>] (dump_stack+0x9c/0xc4)
[<806af554>] (dump_stack+0x9c/0xc4) from [<8005940c>] (__might_sleep+0xf4/0x134)
[<8005940c>] (__might_sleep+0xf4/0x134) from [<803a04a4>] (__pm_runtime_resume+0x94/0xa0)
[<803a04a4>] (__pm_runtime_resume+0x94/0xa0) from [<7f0334a4>] (ci_udc_start+0xb0/0x110 [ci_hdrc])
[<7f0334a4>] (ci_udc_start+0xb0/0x110 [ci_hdrc]) from [<7f0009b4>] (udc_bind_to_driver+0x5c/0xd8 [udc_core])
[<7f0009b4>] (udc_bind_to_driver+0x5c/0xd8 [udc_core]) from [<7f000ab0>] (usb_gadget_probe_driver+0x80/0xb4 [udc_core])
[<7f000ab0>] (usb_gadget_probe_driver+0x80/0xb4 [udc_core]) from [<7f008618>] (usb_composite_probe+0xac/0xd8 [libcomposite])
[<7f008618>] (usb_composite_probe+0xac/0xd8 [libcomposite]) from [<7f04b168>] (init+0x8c/0xb4 [g_serial])
[<7f04b168>] (init+0x8c/0xb4 [g_serial]) from [<800088e8>] (do_one_initcall+0x108/0x16c)
[<800088e8>] (do_one_initcall+0x108/0x16c) from [<8008e518>] (load_module+0x1b00/0x20a4)
[<8008e518>] (load_module+0x1b00/0x20a4) from [<8008eba8>] (SyS_init_module+0xec/0x100)
[<8008eba8>] (SyS_init_module+0xec/0x100) from [<8000ec40>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)

Signed-off-by: Peter Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Gnurou pushed a commit to Gnurou/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2014
When runing with the kernel(3.15-rc7+), the follow bug occurs:
[ 9969.258987] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:586
[ 9969.359906] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 160655, name: python
[ 9969.441175] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ 9969.488184] CPU: 26 PID: 160655 Comm: python Tainted: G       A      3.15.0-rc7+ torvalds#85
[ 9969.581032] Hardware name: FUJITSU-SV PRIMEQUEST 1800E/SB, BIOS PRIMEQUEST 1000 Series BIOS Version 1.39 11/16/2012
[ 9969.706052]  ffffffff81a20e60 ffff8803e941fbd0 ffffffff8162f523 ffff8803e941fd18
[ 9969.795323]  ffff8803e941fbe0 ffffffff8109995a ffff8803e941fc58 ffffffff81633e6c
[ 9969.884710]  ffffffff811ba5dc ffff880405c6b480 ffff88041fdd90a0 0000000000002000
[ 9969.974071] Call Trace:
[ 9970.003403]  [<ffffffff8162f523>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x66
[ 9970.065074]  [<ffffffff8109995a>] __might_sleep+0xfa/0x130
[ 9970.130743]  [<ffffffff81633e6c>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3c/0x4f0
[ 9970.200638]  [<ffffffff811ba5dc>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x1bc/0x210
[ 9970.272610]  [<ffffffff81105807>] cpuset_mems_allowed+0x27/0x140
[ 9970.344584]  [<ffffffff811b1303>] ? __mpol_dup+0x63/0x150
[ 9970.409282]  [<ffffffff811b1385>] __mpol_dup+0xe5/0x150
[ 9970.471897]  [<ffffffff811b1303>] ? __mpol_dup+0x63/0x150
[ 9970.536585]  [<ffffffff81068c86>] ? copy_process.part.23+0x606/0x1d40
[ 9970.613763]  [<ffffffff810bf28d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 9970.683660]  [<ffffffff810ddddf>] ? monotonic_to_bootbased+0x2f/0x50
[ 9970.759795]  [<ffffffff81068cf0>] copy_process.part.23+0x670/0x1d40
[ 9970.834885]  [<ffffffff8106a598>] do_fork+0xd8/0x380
[ 9970.894375]  [<ffffffff81110e4c>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x9c/0xf0
[ 9970.969470]  [<ffffffff8106a8c6>] SyS_clone+0x16/0x20
[ 9971.030011]  [<ffffffff81642009>] stub_clone+0x69/0x90
[ 9971.091573]  [<ffffffff81641c29>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

The cause is that cpuset_mems_allowed() try to take
mutex_lock(&callback_mutex) under the rcu_read_lock(which was hold in
__mpol_dup()). And in cpuset_mems_allowed(), the access to cpuset is
under rcu_read_lock, so in __mpol_dup, we can reduce the rcu_read_lock
protection region to protect the access to cpuset only in
current_cpuset_is_being_rebound(). So that we can avoid this bug.

This patch is a temporary solution that just addresses the bug
mentioned above, can not fix the long-standing issue about cpuset.mems
rebinding on fork():

"When the forker's task_struct is duplicated (which includes
 ->mems_allowed) and it races with an update to cpuset_being_rebound
 in update_tasks_nodemask() then the task's mems_allowed doesn't get
 updated. And the child task's mems_allowed can be wrong if the
 cpuset's nodemask changes before the child has been added to the
 cgroup's tasklist."

Signed-off-by: Gu Zheng <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
heftig referenced this pull request in zen-kernel/zen-kernel Jul 18, 2014
commit 391acf9 upstream.

When runing with the kernel(3.15-rc7+), the follow bug occurs:
[ 9969.258987] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:586
[ 9969.359906] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 160655, name: python
[ 9969.441175] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ 9969.488184] CPU: 26 PID: 160655 Comm: python Tainted: G       A      3.15.0-rc7+ #85
[ 9969.581032] Hardware name: FUJITSU-SV PRIMEQUEST 1800E/SB, BIOS PRIMEQUEST 1000 Series BIOS Version 1.39 11/16/2012
[ 9969.706052]  ffffffff81a20e60 ffff8803e941fbd0 ffffffff8162f523 ffff8803e941fd18
[ 9969.795323]  ffff8803e941fbe0 ffffffff8109995a ffff8803e941fc58 ffffffff81633e6c
[ 9969.884710]  ffffffff811ba5dc ffff880405c6b480 ffff88041fdd90a0 0000000000002000
[ 9969.974071] Call Trace:
[ 9970.003403]  [<ffffffff8162f523>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x66
[ 9970.065074]  [<ffffffff8109995a>] __might_sleep+0xfa/0x130
[ 9970.130743]  [<ffffffff81633e6c>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3c/0x4f0
[ 9970.200638]  [<ffffffff811ba5dc>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x1bc/0x210
[ 9970.272610]  [<ffffffff81105807>] cpuset_mems_allowed+0x27/0x140
[ 9970.344584]  [<ffffffff811b1303>] ? __mpol_dup+0x63/0x150
[ 9970.409282]  [<ffffffff811b1385>] __mpol_dup+0xe5/0x150
[ 9970.471897]  [<ffffffff811b1303>] ? __mpol_dup+0x63/0x150
[ 9970.536585]  [<ffffffff81068c86>] ? copy_process.part.23+0x606/0x1d40
[ 9970.613763]  [<ffffffff810bf28d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 9970.683660]  [<ffffffff810ddddf>] ? monotonic_to_bootbased+0x2f/0x50
[ 9970.759795]  [<ffffffff81068cf0>] copy_process.part.23+0x670/0x1d40
[ 9970.834885]  [<ffffffff8106a598>] do_fork+0xd8/0x380
[ 9970.894375]  [<ffffffff81110e4c>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x9c/0xf0
[ 9970.969470]  [<ffffffff8106a8c6>] SyS_clone+0x16/0x20
[ 9971.030011]  [<ffffffff81642009>] stub_clone+0x69/0x90
[ 9971.091573]  [<ffffffff81641c29>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

The cause is that cpuset_mems_allowed() try to take
mutex_lock(&callback_mutex) under the rcu_read_lock(which was hold in
__mpol_dup()). And in cpuset_mems_allowed(), the access to cpuset is
under rcu_read_lock, so in __mpol_dup, we can reduce the rcu_read_lock
protection region to protect the access to cpuset only in
current_cpuset_is_being_rebound(). So that we can avoid this bug.

This patch is a temporary solution that just addresses the bug
mentioned above, can not fix the long-standing issue about cpuset.mems
rebinding on fork():

"When the forker's task_struct is duplicated (which includes
 ->mems_allowed) and it races with an update to cpuset_being_rebound
 in update_tasks_nodemask() then the task's mems_allowed doesn't get
 updated. And the child task's mems_allowed can be wrong if the
 cpuset's nodemask changes before the child has been added to the
 cgroup's tasklist."

Signed-off-by: Gu Zheng <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
n-aizu pushed a commit to n-aizu/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 10, 2014
… context

Fixing the below dump:

root@freescale ~$ modprobe g_serial
g_serial gadget: Gadget Serial v2.4
g_serial gadget: g_serial ready
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at /home/b29397/work/projects/upstream/usb/usb/drivers/base/power/runtime.c:952
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, pid: 805, name: modprobe
2 locks held by modprobe/805:
 #0:  (udc_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<7f000a74>] usb_gadget_probe_driver+0x44/0xb4 [udc_core]
 #1:  (&(&ci->lock)->rlock){......}, at: [<7f033488>] ci_udc_start+0x94/0x110 [ci_hdrc]
irq event stamp: 3878
hardirqs last  enabled at (3877): [<806b6720>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x40/0x6c
hardirqs last disabled at (3878): [<806b6474>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2c/0xa8
softirqs last  enabled at (3872): [<8002ec0c>] __do_softirq+0x1c8/0x2e8
softirqs last disabled at (3857): [<8002f180>] irq_exit+0xbc/0x110
CPU: 0 PID: 805 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 3.11.0-next-20130910+ torvalds#85
[<80016b94>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf8) from [<80012e0c>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[<80012e0c>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) from [<806af554>] (dump_stack+0x9c/0xc4)
[<806af554>] (dump_stack+0x9c/0xc4) from [<8005940c>] (__might_sleep+0xf4/0x134)
[<8005940c>] (__might_sleep+0xf4/0x134) from [<803a04a4>] (__pm_runtime_resume+0x94/0xa0)
[<803a04a4>] (__pm_runtime_resume+0x94/0xa0) from [<7f0334a4>] (ci_udc_start+0xb0/0x110 [ci_hdrc])
[<7f0334a4>] (ci_udc_start+0xb0/0x110 [ci_hdrc]) from [<7f0009b4>] (udc_bind_to_driver+0x5c/0xd8 [udc_core])
[<7f0009b4>] (udc_bind_to_driver+0x5c/0xd8 [udc_core]) from [<7f000ab0>] (usb_gadget_probe_driver+0x80/0xb4 [udc_core])
[<7f000ab0>] (usb_gadget_probe_driver+0x80/0xb4 [udc_core]) from [<7f008618>] (usb_composite_probe+0xac/0xd8 [libcomposite])
[<7f008618>] (usb_composite_probe+0xac/0xd8 [libcomposite]) from [<7f04b168>] (init+0x8c/0xb4 [g_serial])
[<7f04b168>] (init+0x8c/0xb4 [g_serial]) from [<800088e8>] (do_one_initcall+0x108/0x16c)
[<800088e8>] (do_one_initcall+0x108/0x16c) from [<8008e518>] (load_module+0x1b00/0x20a4)
[<8008e518>] (load_module+0x1b00/0x20a4) from [<8008eba8>] (SyS_init_module+0xec/0x100)
[<8008eba8>] (SyS_init_module+0xec/0x100) from [<8000ec40>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)

Signed-off-by: Peter Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
pstglia pushed a commit to pstglia/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 6, 2014
When runing with the kernel(3.15-rc7+), the follow bug occurs:
[ 9969.258987] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:586
[ 9969.359906] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 160655, name: python
[ 9969.441175] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ 9969.488184] CPU: 26 PID: 160655 Comm: python Tainted: G       A      3.15.0-rc7+ torvalds#85
[ 9969.581032] Hardware name: FUJITSU-SV PRIMEQUEST 1800E/SB, BIOS PRIMEQUEST 1000 Series BIOS Version 1.39 11/16/2012
[ 9969.706052]  ffffffff81a20e60 ffff8803e941fbd0 ffffffff8162f523 ffff8803e941fd18
[ 9969.795323]  ffff8803e941fbe0 ffffffff8109995a ffff8803e941fc58 ffffffff81633e6c
[ 9969.884710]  ffffffff811ba5dc ffff880405c6b480 ffff88041fdd90a0 0000000000002000
[ 9969.974071] Call Trace:
[ 9970.003403]  [<ffffffff8162f523>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x66
[ 9970.065074]  [<ffffffff8109995a>] __might_sleep+0xfa/0x130
[ 9970.130743]  [<ffffffff81633e6c>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3c/0x4f0
[ 9970.200638]  [<ffffffff811ba5dc>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x1bc/0x210
[ 9970.272610]  [<ffffffff81105807>] cpuset_mems_allowed+0x27/0x140
[ 9970.344584]  [<ffffffff811b1303>] ? __mpol_dup+0x63/0x150
[ 9970.409282]  [<ffffffff811b1385>] __mpol_dup+0xe5/0x150
[ 9970.471897]  [<ffffffff811b1303>] ? __mpol_dup+0x63/0x150
[ 9970.536585]  [<ffffffff81068c86>] ? copy_process.part.23+0x606/0x1d40
[ 9970.613763]  [<ffffffff810bf28d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 9970.683660]  [<ffffffff810ddddf>] ? monotonic_to_bootbased+0x2f/0x50
[ 9970.759795]  [<ffffffff81068cf0>] copy_process.part.23+0x670/0x1d40
[ 9970.834885]  [<ffffffff8106a598>] do_fork+0xd8/0x380
[ 9970.894375]  [<ffffffff81110e4c>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x9c/0xf0
[ 9970.969470]  [<ffffffff8106a8c6>] SyS_clone+0x16/0x20
[ 9971.030011]  [<ffffffff81642009>] stub_clone+0x69/0x90
[ 9971.091573]  [<ffffffff81641c29>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

The cause is that cpuset_mems_allowed() try to take
mutex_lock(&callback_mutex) under the rcu_read_lock(which was hold in
__mpol_dup()). And in cpuset_mems_allowed(), the access to cpuset is
under rcu_read_lock, so in __mpol_dup, we can reduce the rcu_read_lock
protection region to protect the access to cpuset only in
current_cpuset_is_being_rebound(). So that we can avoid this bug.

This patch is a temporary solution that just addresses the bug
mentioned above, can not fix the long-standing issue about cpuset.mems
rebinding on fork():

"When the forker's task_struct is duplicated (which includes
 ->mems_allowed) and it races with an update to cpuset_being_rebound
 in update_tasks_nodemask() then the task's mems_allowed doesn't get
 updated. And the child task's mems_allowed can be wrong if the
 cpuset's nodemask changes before the child has been added to the
 cgroup's tasklist."

Signed-off-by: Gu Zheng <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
chrillomat pushed a commit to chrillomat/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 6, 2014
Fixing the below dump:

root@freescale ~$ modprobe g_serial
g_serial gadget: Gadget Serial v2.4
g_serial gadget: g_serial ready
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at /home/b29397/work/projects/upstream/usb/usb/drivers/base/power/runtime.c:952
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, pid: 805, name: modprobe
2 locks held by modprobe/805:
 #0:  (udc_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<7f000a74>] usb_gadget_probe_driver+0x44/0xb4 [udc_core]
 wandboard-org#1:  (&(&ci->lock)->rlock){......}, at: [<7f033488>] ci_udc_start+0x94/0x110 [ci_hdrc]
irq event stamp: 3878
hardirqs last  enabled at (3877): [<806b6720>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x40/0x6c
hardirqs last disabled at (3878): [<806b6474>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2c/0xa8
softirqs last  enabled at (3872): [<8002ec0c>] __do_softirq+0x1c8/0x2e8
softirqs last disabled at (3857): [<8002f180>] irq_exit+0xbc/0x110
CPU: 0 PID: 805 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 3.11.0-next-20130910+ torvalds#85
[<80016b94>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf8) from [<80012e0c>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[<80012e0c>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) from [<806af554>] (dump_stack+0x9c/0xc4)
[<806af554>] (dump_stack+0x9c/0xc4) from [<8005940c>] (__might_sleep+0xf4/0x134)
[<8005940c>] (__might_sleep+0xf4/0x134) from [<803a04a4>] (__pm_runtime_resume+0x94/0xa0)
[<803a04a4>] (__pm_runtime_resume+0x94/0xa0) from [<7f0334a4>] (ci_udc_start+0xb0/0x110 [ci_hdrc])
[<7f0334a4>] (ci_udc_start+0xb0/0x110 [ci_hdrc]) from [<7f0009b4>] (udc_bind_to_driver+0x5c/0xd8 [udc_core])
[<7f0009b4>] (udc_bind_to_driver+0x5c/0xd8 [udc_core]) from [<7f000ab0>] (usb_gadget_probe_driver+0x80/0xb4 [udc_core])
[<7f000ab0>] (usb_gadget_probe_driver+0x80/0xb4 [udc_core]) from [<7f008618>] (usb_composite_probe+0xac/0xd8 [libcomposite])
[<7f008618>] (usb_composite_probe+0xac/0xd8 [libcomposite]) from [<7f04b168>] (init+0x8c/0xb4 [g_serial])
[<7f04b168>] (init+0x8c/0xb4 [g_serial]) from [<800088e8>] (do_one_initcall+0x108/0x16c)
[<800088e8>] (do_one_initcall+0x108/0x16c) from [<8008e518>] (load_module+0x1b00/0x20a4)
[<8008e518>] (load_module+0x1b00/0x20a4) from [<8008eba8>] (SyS_init_module+0xec/0x100)
[<8008eba8>] (SyS_init_module+0xec/0x100) from [<8000ec40>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)

Signed-off-by: Peter Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
kees pushed a commit to kees/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 9, 2014
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1356913

commit 391acf9 upstream.

When runing with the kernel(3.15-rc7+), the follow bug occurs:
[ 9969.258987] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:586
[ 9969.359906] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 160655, name: python
[ 9969.441175] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ 9969.488184] CPU: 26 PID: 160655 Comm: python Tainted: G       A      3.15.0-rc7+ torvalds#85
[ 9969.581032] Hardware name: FUJITSU-SV PRIMEQUEST 1800E/SB, BIOS PRIMEQUEST 1000 Series BIOS Version 1.39 11/16/2012
[ 9969.706052]  ffffffff81a20e60 ffff8803e941fbd0 ffffffff8162f523 ffff8803e941fd18
[ 9969.795323]  ffff8803e941fbe0 ffffffff8109995a ffff8803e941fc58 ffffffff81633e6c
[ 9969.884710]  ffffffff811ba5dc ffff880405c6b480 ffff88041fdd90a0 0000000000002000
[ 9969.974071] Call Trace:
[ 9970.003403]  [<ffffffff8162f523>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x66
[ 9970.065074]  [<ffffffff8109995a>] __might_sleep+0xfa/0x130
[ 9970.130743]  [<ffffffff81633e6c>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3c/0x4f0
[ 9970.200638]  [<ffffffff811ba5dc>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x1bc/0x210
[ 9970.272610]  [<ffffffff81105807>] cpuset_mems_allowed+0x27/0x140
[ 9970.344584]  [<ffffffff811b1303>] ? __mpol_dup+0x63/0x150
[ 9970.409282]  [<ffffffff811b1385>] __mpol_dup+0xe5/0x150
[ 9970.471897]  [<ffffffff811b1303>] ? __mpol_dup+0x63/0x150
[ 9970.536585]  [<ffffffff81068c86>] ? copy_process.part.23+0x606/0x1d40
[ 9970.613763]  [<ffffffff810bf28d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 9970.683660]  [<ffffffff810ddddf>] ? monotonic_to_bootbased+0x2f/0x50
[ 9970.759795]  [<ffffffff81068cf0>] copy_process.part.23+0x670/0x1d40
[ 9970.834885]  [<ffffffff8106a598>] do_fork+0xd8/0x380
[ 9970.894375]  [<ffffffff81110e4c>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x9c/0xf0
[ 9970.969470]  [<ffffffff8106a8c6>] SyS_clone+0x16/0x20
[ 9971.030011]  [<ffffffff81642009>] stub_clone+0x69/0x90
[ 9971.091573]  [<ffffffff81641c29>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

The cause is that cpuset_mems_allowed() try to take
mutex_lock(&callback_mutex) under the rcu_read_lock(which was hold in
__mpol_dup()). And in cpuset_mems_allowed(), the access to cpuset is
under rcu_read_lock, so in __mpol_dup, we can reduce the rcu_read_lock
protection region to protect the access to cpuset only in
current_cpuset_is_being_rebound(). So that we can avoid this bug.

This patch is a temporary solution that just addresses the bug
mentioned above, can not fix the long-standing issue about cpuset.mems
rebinding on fork():

"When the forker's task_struct is duplicated (which includes
 ->mems_allowed) and it races with an update to cpuset_being_rebound
 in update_tasks_nodemask() then the task's mems_allowed doesn't get
 updated. And the child task's mems_allowed can be wrong if the
 cpuset's nodemask changes before the child has been added to the
 cgroup's tasklist."

Signed-off-by: Gu Zheng <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Salisbury <[email protected]>
hzhuang1 pushed a commit to hzhuang1/linux that referenced this pull request Jul 6, 2015
enbable vblank event and reserve 128MB memory for graphic usage
torvalds pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 2, 2015
This is due to  commit 86839c5
"xen/block: add multi-page ring support"

When using an guest under UEFI - after the domain is destroyed
the following warning comes from blkback.

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 95 at
/home/julien/works/linux/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c:274
xen_blkif_deferred_free+0x1f4/0x1f8()
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 95 Comm: kworker/2:1 Tainted: G        W       4.2.0 #85
Hardware name: APM X-Gene Mustang board (DT)
Workqueue: events xen_blkif_deferred_free
Call trace:
[<ffff8000000890a8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x124
[<ffff8000000891dc>] show_stack+0x10/0x1c
[<ffff8000007653bc>] dump_stack+0x78/0x98
[<ffff800000097e88>] warn_slowpath_common+0x9c/0xd4
[<ffff800000097f80>] warn_slowpath_null+0x14/0x20
[<ffff800000557a0c>] xen_blkif_deferred_free+0x1f0/0x1f8
[<ffff8000000ad020>] process_one_work+0x160/0x3b4
[<ffff8000000ad3b4>] worker_thread+0x140/0x494
[<ffff8000000b2e34>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0
---[ end trace 6f859b7883c88cdd ]---

Request allocation has been moved to connect_ring, which is called every
time blkback connects to the frontend (this can happen multiple times during
a blkback instance life cycle). On the other hand, request freeing has not
been moved, so it's only called when destroying the backend instance. Due to
this mismatch, blkback can allocate the request pool multiple times, without
freeing it.

In order to fix it, move the freeing of requests to xen_blkif_disconnect to
restore the symmetry between request allocation and freeing.

Reported-by: Julien Grall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Julien Grall <[email protected]>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: David Vrabel <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CC: [email protected] # 4.2
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
heftig referenced this pull request in zen-kernel/zen-kernel Oct 22, 2015
commit f929d42 upstream.

This is due to  commit 86839c5
"xen/block: add multi-page ring support"

When using an guest under UEFI - after the domain is destroyed
the following warning comes from blkback.

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 95 at
/home/julien/works/linux/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c:274
xen_blkif_deferred_free+0x1f4/0x1f8()
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 95 Comm: kworker/2:1 Tainted: G        W       4.2.0 #85
Hardware name: APM X-Gene Mustang board (DT)
Workqueue: events xen_blkif_deferred_free
Call trace:
[<ffff8000000890a8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x124
[<ffff8000000891dc>] show_stack+0x10/0x1c
[<ffff8000007653bc>] dump_stack+0x78/0x98
[<ffff800000097e88>] warn_slowpath_common+0x9c/0xd4
[<ffff800000097f80>] warn_slowpath_null+0x14/0x20
[<ffff800000557a0c>] xen_blkif_deferred_free+0x1f0/0x1f8
[<ffff8000000ad020>] process_one_work+0x160/0x3b4
[<ffff8000000ad3b4>] worker_thread+0x140/0x494
[<ffff8000000b2e34>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0
---[ end trace 6f859b7883c88cdd ]---

Request allocation has been moved to connect_ring, which is called every
time blkback connects to the frontend (this can happen multiple times during
a blkback instance life cycle). On the other hand, request freeing has not
been moved, so it's only called when destroying the backend instance. Due to
this mismatch, blkback can allocate the request pool multiple times, without
freeing it.

In order to fix it, move the freeing of requests to xen_blkif_disconnect to
restore the symmetry between request allocation and freeing.

Reported-by: Julien Grall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Julien Grall <[email protected]>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: David Vrabel <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
ddstreet pushed a commit to ddstreet/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 1, 2015
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1509886

commit f929d42 upstream.

This is due to  commit 86839c5
"xen/block: add multi-page ring support"

When using an guest under UEFI - after the domain is destroyed
the following warning comes from blkback.

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 95 at
/home/julien/works/linux/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c:274
xen_blkif_deferred_free+0x1f4/0x1f8()
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 95 Comm: kworker/2:1 Tainted: G        W       4.2.0 torvalds#85
Hardware name: APM X-Gene Mustang board (DT)
Workqueue: events xen_blkif_deferred_free
Call trace:
[<ffff8000000890a8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x124
[<ffff8000000891dc>] show_stack+0x10/0x1c
[<ffff8000007653bc>] dump_stack+0x78/0x98
[<ffff800000097e88>] warn_slowpath_common+0x9c/0xd4
[<ffff800000097f80>] warn_slowpath_null+0x14/0x20
[<ffff800000557a0c>] xen_blkif_deferred_free+0x1f0/0x1f8
[<ffff8000000ad020>] process_one_work+0x160/0x3b4
[<ffff8000000ad3b4>] worker_thread+0x140/0x494
[<ffff8000000b2e34>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0
---[ end trace 6f859b7883c88cdd ]---

Request allocation has been moved to connect_ring, which is called every
time blkback connects to the frontend (this can happen multiple times during
a blkback instance life cycle). On the other hand, request freeing has not
been moved, so it's only called when destroying the backend instance. Due to
this mismatch, blkback can allocate the request pool multiple times, without
freeing it.

In order to fix it, move the freeing of requests to xen_blkif_disconnect to
restore the symmetry between request allocation and freeing.

Reported-by: Julien Grall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Julien Grall <[email protected]>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: David Vrabel <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Brad Figg <[email protected]>
nkskjames referenced this pull request in nkskjames/linux Jan 13, 2016
This is due to  commit 86839c5
"xen/block: add multi-page ring support"

When using an guest under UEFI - after the domain is destroyed
the following warning comes from blkback.

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 95 at
/home/julien/works/linux/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c:274
xen_blkif_deferred_free+0x1f4/0x1f8()
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 95 Comm: kworker/2:1 Tainted: G        W       4.2.0 openbmc#85
Hardware name: APM X-Gene Mustang board (DT)
Workqueue: events xen_blkif_deferred_free
Call trace:
[<ffff8000000890a8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x124
[<ffff8000000891dc>] show_stack+0x10/0x1c
[<ffff8000007653bc>] dump_stack+0x78/0x98
[<ffff800000097e88>] warn_slowpath_common+0x9c/0xd4
[<ffff800000097f80>] warn_slowpath_null+0x14/0x20
[<ffff800000557a0c>] xen_blkif_deferred_free+0x1f0/0x1f8
[<ffff8000000ad020>] process_one_work+0x160/0x3b4
[<ffff8000000ad3b4>] worker_thread+0x140/0x494
[<ffff8000000b2e34>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0
---[ end trace 6f859b7883c88cdd ]---

Request allocation has been moved to connect_ring, which is called every
time blkback connects to the frontend (this can happen multiple times during
a blkback instance life cycle). On the other hand, request freeing has not
been moved, so it's only called when destroying the backend instance. Due to
this mismatch, blkback can allocate the request pool multiple times, without
freeing it.

In order to fix it, move the freeing of requests to xen_blkif_disconnect to
restore the symmetry between request allocation and freeing.

Reported-by: Julien Grall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Julien Grall <[email protected]>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: David Vrabel <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CC: [email protected] # 4.2
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
0day-ci pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 15, 2016
This adds test cases mostly around ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK to check the
verifier behaviour.

  [...]
  torvalds#84 raw_stack: no skb_load_bytes OK
  torvalds#85 raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, no init OK
  torvalds#86 raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, init OK
  torvalds#87 raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, spilled regs around bounds OK
  torvalds#88 raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, spilled regs corruption OK
  torvalds#89 raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, spilled regs corruption 2 OK
  torvalds#90 raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, spilled regs + data OK
  torvalds#91 raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 1 OK
  torvalds#92 raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 2 OK
  torvalds#93 raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 3 OK
  torvalds#94 raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 4 OK
  torvalds#95 raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 5 OK
  torvalds#96 raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 6 OK
  torvalds#97 raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, large access OK
  Summary: 98 PASSED, 0 FAILED

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
sashalevin pushed a commit to sashalevin/linux-stable-security that referenced this pull request Apr 29, 2016
commit 72b5322 upstream.

The @cn is stay in @clk_notifier_list after it is freed, it cause
memory corruption.

Example, if @clk is registered(first), unregistered(first),
registered(second), unregistered(second).

The freed @cn will be used when @clk is registered(second),
and the bug will be happened when @clk is unregistered(second):

[  517.040000] clk_notif_dbg clk_notif_dbg.1: clk_notifier_unregister()
[  517.040000] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00df3008
[  517.050000] pgd = ed858000
[  517.050000] [00df3008] *pgd=00000000
[  517.060000] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[  517.060000] Modules linked in: clk_notif_dbg(O-) [last unloaded: clk_notif_dbg]
[  517.060000] CPU: 1 PID: 499 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G           O 3.10.0-rc3-00119-ga93cb29-dirty torvalds#85
[  517.060000] task: ee1e0180 ti: ee3e6000 task.ti: ee3e6000
[  517.060000] PC is at srcu_readers_seq_idx+0x48/0x84
[  517.060000] LR is at srcu_readers_seq_idx+0x60/0x84
[  517.060000] pc : [<c0052720>]    lr : [<c0052738>]    psr: 80070013
[  517.060000] sp : ee3e7d48  ip : 00000000  fp : ee3e7d6c
[  517.060000] r10: 00000000  r9 : ee3e6000  r8 : 00000000
[  517.060000] r7 : ed84fe4c  r6 : c068ec90  r5 : c068e430  r4 : 00000000
[  517.060000] r3 : 00df3000  r2 : 00000000  r1 : 00000002  r0 : 00000000
[  517.060000] Flags: Nzcv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
[  517.060000] Control: 18c5387d  Table: 2d85804a  DAC: 00000015
[  517.060000] Process modprobe (pid: 499, stack limit = 0xee3e6238)
[  517.060000] Stack: (0xee3e7d48 to 0xee3e8000)
....
[  517.060000] [<c0052720>] (srcu_readers_seq_idx+0x48/0x84) from [<c0052790>] (try_check_zero+0x34/0xfc)
[  517.060000] [<c0052790>] (try_check_zero+0x34/0xfc) from [<c00528b0>] (srcu_advance_batches+0x58/0x114)
[  517.060000] [<c00528b0>] (srcu_advance_batches+0x58/0x114) from [<c0052c30>] (__synchronize_srcu+0x114/0x1ac)
[  517.060000] [<c0052c30>] (__synchronize_srcu+0x114/0x1ac) from [<c0052d14>] (synchronize_srcu+0x2c/0x34)
[  517.060000] [<c0052d14>] (synchronize_srcu+0x2c/0x34) from [<c0053a08>] (srcu_notifier_chain_unregister+0x68/0x74)
[  517.060000] [<c0053a08>] (srcu_notifier_chain_unregister+0x68/0x74) from [<c0375a78>] (clk_notifier_unregister+0x7c/0xc0)
[  517.060000] [<c0375a78>] (clk_notifier_unregister+0x7c/0xc0) from [<bf008034>] (clk_notif_dbg_remove+0x34/0x9c [clk_notif_dbg])
[  517.060000] [<bf008034>] (clk_notif_dbg_remove+0x34/0x9c [clk_notif_dbg]) from [<c02bb974>] (platform_drv_remove+0x24/0x28)
[  517.060000] [<c02bb974>] (platform_drv_remove+0x24/0x28) from [<c02b9bf8>] (__device_release_driver+0x8c/0xd4)
[  517.060000] [<c02b9bf8>] (__device_release_driver+0x8c/0xd4) from [<c02ba680>] (driver_detach+0x9c/0xc4)
[  517.060000] [<c02ba680>] (driver_detach+0x9c/0xc4) from [<c02b99c4>] (bus_remove_driver+0xcc/0xfc)
[  517.060000] [<c02b99c4>] (bus_remove_driver+0xcc/0xfc) from [<c02bace4>] (driver_unregister+0x54/0x78)
[  517.060000] [<c02bace4>] (driver_unregister+0x54/0x78) from [<c02bbb44>] (platform_driver_unregister+0x1c/0x20)
[  517.060000] [<c02bbb44>] (platform_driver_unregister+0x1c/0x20) from [<bf0081f8>] (clk_notif_dbg_driver_exit+0x14/0x1c [clk_notif_dbg])
[  517.060000] [<bf0081f8>] (clk_notif_dbg_driver_exit+0x14/0x1c [clk_notif_dbg]) from [<c00835e4>] (SyS_delete_module+0x200/0x28c)
[  517.060000] [<c00835e4>] (SyS_delete_module+0x200/0x28c) from [<c000edc0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
[  517.060000] Code: e5973004 e7911102 e0833001 e2881002 (e7933101)

Reported-by: Sören Brinkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sören Brinkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Turquette <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: shortened $SUBJECT]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
sashalevin pushed a commit to sashalevin/linux-stable-security that referenced this pull request Apr 29, 2016
commit 72b5322 upstream.

The @cn is stay in @clk_notifier_list after it is freed, it cause
memory corruption.

Example, if @clk is registered(first), unregistered(first),
registered(second), unregistered(second).

The freed @cn will be used when @clk is registered(second),
and the bug will be happened when @clk is unregistered(second):

[  517.040000] clk_notif_dbg clk_notif_dbg.1: clk_notifier_unregister()
[  517.040000] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00df3008
[  517.050000] pgd = ed858000
[  517.050000] [00df3008] *pgd=00000000
[  517.060000] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[  517.060000] Modules linked in: clk_notif_dbg(O-) [last unloaded: clk_notif_dbg]
[  517.060000] CPU: 1 PID: 499 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G           O 3.10.0-rc3-00119-ga93cb29-dirty torvalds#85
[  517.060000] task: ee1e0180 ti: ee3e6000 task.ti: ee3e6000
[  517.060000] PC is at srcu_readers_seq_idx+0x48/0x84
[  517.060000] LR is at srcu_readers_seq_idx+0x60/0x84
[  517.060000] pc : [<c0052720>]    lr : [<c0052738>]    psr: 80070013
[  517.060000] sp : ee3e7d48  ip : 00000000  fp : ee3e7d6c
[  517.060000] r10: 00000000  r9 : ee3e6000  r8 : 00000000
[  517.060000] r7 : ed84fe4c  r6 : c068ec90  r5 : c068e430  r4 : 00000000
[  517.060000] r3 : 00df3000  r2 : 00000000  r1 : 00000002  r0 : 00000000
[  517.060000] Flags: Nzcv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
[  517.060000] Control: 18c5387d  Table: 2d85804a  DAC: 00000015
[  517.060000] Process modprobe (pid: 499, stack limit = 0xee3e6238)
[  517.060000] Stack: (0xee3e7d48 to 0xee3e8000)
....
[  517.060000] [<c0052720>] (srcu_readers_seq_idx+0x48/0x84) from [<c0052790>] (try_check_zero+0x34/0xfc)
[  517.060000] [<c0052790>] (try_check_zero+0x34/0xfc) from [<c00528b0>] (srcu_advance_batches+0x58/0x114)
[  517.060000] [<c00528b0>] (srcu_advance_batches+0x58/0x114) from [<c0052c30>] (__synchronize_srcu+0x114/0x1ac)
[  517.060000] [<c0052c30>] (__synchronize_srcu+0x114/0x1ac) from [<c0052d14>] (synchronize_srcu+0x2c/0x34)
[  517.060000] [<c0052d14>] (synchronize_srcu+0x2c/0x34) from [<c0053a08>] (srcu_notifier_chain_unregister+0x68/0x74)
[  517.060000] [<c0053a08>] (srcu_notifier_chain_unregister+0x68/0x74) from [<c0375a78>] (clk_notifier_unregister+0x7c/0xc0)
[  517.060000] [<c0375a78>] (clk_notifier_unregister+0x7c/0xc0) from [<bf008034>] (clk_notif_dbg_remove+0x34/0x9c [clk_notif_dbg])
[  517.060000] [<bf008034>] (clk_notif_dbg_remove+0x34/0x9c [clk_notif_dbg]) from [<c02bb974>] (platform_drv_remove+0x24/0x28)
[  517.060000] [<c02bb974>] (platform_drv_remove+0x24/0x28) from [<c02b9bf8>] (__device_release_driver+0x8c/0xd4)
[  517.060000] [<c02b9bf8>] (__device_release_driver+0x8c/0xd4) from [<c02ba680>] (driver_detach+0x9c/0xc4)
[  517.060000] [<c02ba680>] (driver_detach+0x9c/0xc4) from [<c02b99c4>] (bus_remove_driver+0xcc/0xfc)
[  517.060000] [<c02b99c4>] (bus_remove_driver+0xcc/0xfc) from [<c02bace4>] (driver_unregister+0x54/0x78)
[  517.060000] [<c02bace4>] (driver_unregister+0x54/0x78) from [<c02bbb44>] (platform_driver_unregister+0x1c/0x20)
[  517.060000] [<c02bbb44>] (platform_driver_unregister+0x1c/0x20) from [<bf0081f8>] (clk_notif_dbg_driver_exit+0x14/0x1c [clk_notif_dbg])
[  517.060000] [<bf0081f8>] (clk_notif_dbg_driver_exit+0x14/0x1c [clk_notif_dbg]) from [<c00835e4>] (SyS_delete_module+0x200/0x28c)
[  517.060000] [<c00835e4>] (SyS_delete_module+0x200/0x28c) from [<c000edc0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
[  517.060000] Code: e5973004 e7911102 e0833001 e2881002 (e7933101)

Reported-by: Sören Brinkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sören Brinkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Turquette <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: shortened $SUBJECT]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
sashalevin pushed a commit to sashalevin/linux-stable-security that referenced this pull request Apr 29, 2016
commit f929d42 upstream.

This is due to  commit 86839c5
"xen/block: add multi-page ring support"

When using an guest under UEFI - after the domain is destroyed
the following warning comes from blkback.

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 95 at
/home/julien/works/linux/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c:274
xen_blkif_deferred_free+0x1f4/0x1f8()
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 95 Comm: kworker/2:1 Tainted: G        W       4.2.0 torvalds#85
Hardware name: APM X-Gene Mustang board (DT)
Workqueue: events xen_blkif_deferred_free
Call trace:
[<ffff8000000890a8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x124
[<ffff8000000891dc>] show_stack+0x10/0x1c
[<ffff8000007653bc>] dump_stack+0x78/0x98
[<ffff800000097e88>] warn_slowpath_common+0x9c/0xd4
[<ffff800000097f80>] warn_slowpath_null+0x14/0x20
[<ffff800000557a0c>] xen_blkif_deferred_free+0x1f0/0x1f8
[<ffff8000000ad020>] process_one_work+0x160/0x3b4
[<ffff8000000ad3b4>] worker_thread+0x140/0x494
[<ffff8000000b2e34>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0
---[ end trace 6f859b7883c88cdd ]---

Request allocation has been moved to connect_ring, which is called every
time blkback connects to the frontend (this can happen multiple times during
a blkback instance life cycle). On the other hand, request freeing has not
been moved, so it's only called when destroying the backend instance. Due to
this mismatch, blkback can allocate the request pool multiple times, without
freeing it.

In order to fix it, move the freeing of requests to xen_blkif_disconnect to
restore the symmetry between request allocation and freeing.

Reported-by: Julien Grall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Julien Grall <[email protected]>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: David Vrabel <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 25, 2016
WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#69: FILE: ipc/sem.c:1997:
+		 * fastpath: the semop has completed, either successfully or not, from

WARNING: line over 80 characters
#70: FILE: ipc/sem.c:1998:
+		 * the syscall pov, is quite irrelevant to us at this point; we're done.

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#73: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2001:
+		 * spuriously.  The queue.status is checked again in the slowpath (aka

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#74: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2002:
+		 * after taking sem_lock), such that we can detect scenarios where we

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#75: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2003:
+		 * were awakened externally, during the window between wake_q_add() and

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#84: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2009:
+			 * User space could assume that semop() is a memory barrier:

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#85: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2010:
+			 * Without the mb(), the cpu could speculatively read in user

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#86: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2011:
+			 * space stale data that was overwritten by the previous owner

total: 0 errors, 8 warnings, 127 lines checked

NOTE: For some of the reported defects, checkpatch may be able to
      mechanically convert to the typical style using --fix or --fix-inplace.

./patches/ipc-sem-simplify-wait-wake-loop.patch has style problems, please review.

NOTE: If any of the errors are false positives, please report
      them to the maintainer, see CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS.

Please run checkpatch prior to sending patches

Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 30, 2016
WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#69: FILE: ipc/sem.c:1997:
+		 * fastpath: the semop has completed, either successfully or not, from

WARNING: line over 80 characters
#70: FILE: ipc/sem.c:1998:
+		 * the syscall pov, is quite irrelevant to us at this point; we're done.

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#73: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2001:
+		 * spuriously.  The queue.status is checked again in the slowpath (aka

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#74: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2002:
+		 * after taking sem_lock), such that we can detect scenarios where we

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#75: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2003:
+		 * were awakened externally, during the window between wake_q_add() and

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#84: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2009:
+			 * User space could assume that semop() is a memory barrier:

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#85: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2010:
+			 * Without the mb(), the cpu could speculatively read in user

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#86: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2011:
+			 * space stale data that was overwritten by the previous owner

total: 0 errors, 8 warnings, 127 lines checked

NOTE: For some of the reported defects, checkpatch may be able to
      mechanically convert to the typical style using --fix or --fix-inplace.

./patches/ipc-sem-simplify-wait-wake-loop.patch has style problems, please review.

NOTE: If any of the errors are false positives, please report
      them to the maintainer, see CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS.

Please run checkpatch prior to sending patches

Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 2, 2016
WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#69: FILE: ipc/sem.c:1997:
+		 * fastpath: the semop has completed, either successfully or not, from

WARNING: line over 80 characters
#70: FILE: ipc/sem.c:1998:
+		 * the syscall pov, is quite irrelevant to us at this point; we're done.

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#73: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2001:
+		 * spuriously.  The queue.status is checked again in the slowpath (aka

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#74: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2002:
+		 * after taking sem_lock), such that we can detect scenarios where we

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#75: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2003:
+		 * were awakened externally, during the window between wake_q_add() and

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#84: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2009:
+			 * User space could assume that semop() is a memory barrier:

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#85: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2010:
+			 * Without the mb(), the cpu could speculatively read in user

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#86: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2011:
+			 * space stale data that was overwritten by the previous owner

total: 0 errors, 8 warnings, 127 lines checked

NOTE: For some of the reported defects, checkpatch may be able to
      mechanically convert to the typical style using --fix or --fix-inplace.

./patches/ipc-sem-simplify-wait-wake-loop.patch has style problems, please review.

NOTE: If any of the errors are false positives, please report
      them to the maintainer, see CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS.

Please run checkpatch prior to sending patches

Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2016
WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#69: FILE: ipc/sem.c:1997:
+		 * fastpath: the semop has completed, either successfully or not, from

WARNING: line over 80 characters
#70: FILE: ipc/sem.c:1998:
+		 * the syscall pov, is quite irrelevant to us at this point; we're done.

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#73: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2001:
+		 * spuriously.  The queue.status is checked again in the slowpath (aka

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#74: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2002:
+		 * after taking sem_lock), such that we can detect scenarios where we

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#75: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2003:
+		 * were awakened externally, during the window between wake_q_add() and

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#84: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2009:
+			 * User space could assume that semop() is a memory barrier:

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#85: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2010:
+			 * Without the mb(), the cpu could speculatively read in user

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#86: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2011:
+			 * space stale data that was overwritten by the previous owner

total: 0 errors, 8 warnings, 127 lines checked

NOTE: For some of the reported defects, checkpatch may be able to
      mechanically convert to the typical style using --fix or --fix-inplace.

./patches/ipc-sem-simplify-wait-wake-loop.patch has style problems, please review.

NOTE: If any of the errors are false positives, please report
      them to the maintainer, see CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS.

Please run checkpatch prior to sending patches

Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2016
WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#69: FILE: ipc/sem.c:1997:
+		 * fastpath: the semop has completed, either successfully or not, from

WARNING: line over 80 characters
#70: FILE: ipc/sem.c:1998:
+		 * the syscall pov, is quite irrelevant to us at this point; we're done.

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#73: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2001:
+		 * spuriously.  The queue.status is checked again in the slowpath (aka

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#74: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2002:
+		 * after taking sem_lock), such that we can detect scenarios where we

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#75: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2003:
+		 * were awakened externally, during the window between wake_q_add() and

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#84: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2009:
+			 * User space could assume that semop() is a memory barrier:

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#85: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2010:
+			 * Without the mb(), the cpu could speculatively read in user

WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#86: FILE: ipc/sem.c:2011:
+			 * space stale data that was overwritten by the previous owner

total: 0 errors, 8 warnings, 127 lines checked

NOTE: For some of the reported defects, checkpatch may be able to
      mechanically convert to the typical style using --fix or --fix-inplace.

./patches/ipc-sem-simplify-wait-wake-loop.patch has style problems, please review.

NOTE: If any of the errors are false positives, please report
      them to the maintainer, see CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS.

Please run checkpatch prior to sending patches

Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Kaz205 pushed a commit to Kaz205/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 5, 2024
[ Upstream commit 8ecf3c1 ]

Recent additions in BPF like cpu v4 instructions, test_bpf module
exhibits the following failures:

  test_bpf: torvalds#82 ALU_MOVSX | BPF_B jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times)
  test_bpf: torvalds#83 ALU_MOVSX | BPF_H jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times)
  test_bpf: torvalds#84 ALU64_MOVSX | BPF_B jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times)
  test_bpf: torvalds#85 ALU64_MOVSX | BPF_H jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times)
  test_bpf: torvalds#86 ALU64_MOVSX | BPF_W jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times)

  test_bpf: torvalds#165 ALU_SDIV_X: -6 / 2 = -3 jited:1 ret 2147483645 != -3 (0x7ffffffd != 0xfffffffd)FAIL (1 times)
  test_bpf: torvalds#166 ALU_SDIV_K: -6 / 2 = -3 jited:1 ret 2147483645 != -3 (0x7ffffffd != 0xfffffffd)FAIL (1 times)

  test_bpf: torvalds#169 ALU_SMOD_X: -7 % 2 = -1 jited:1 ret 1 != -1 (0x1 != 0xffffffff)FAIL (1 times)
  test_bpf: torvalds#170 ALU_SMOD_K: -7 % 2 = -1 jited:1 ret 1 != -1 (0x1 != 0xffffffff)FAIL (1 times)

  test_bpf: torvalds#172 ALU64_SMOD_K: -7 % 2 = -1 jited:1 ret 1 != -1 (0x1 != 0xffffffff)FAIL (1 times)

  test_bpf: torvalds#313 BSWAP 16: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0xefcd
  eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported
  jited:0 301 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#314 BSWAP 32: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0xefcdab89
  eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported
  jited:0 555 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#315 BSWAP 64: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0x67452301
  eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported
  jited:0 268 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#316 BSWAP 64: 0x0123456789abcdef >> 32 -> 0xefcdab89
  eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported
  jited:0 269 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#317 BSWAP 16: 0xfedcba9876543210 -> 0x1032
  eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported
  jited:0 460 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#318 BSWAP 32: 0xfedcba9876543210 -> 0x10325476
  eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported
  jited:0 320 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#319 BSWAP 64: 0xfedcba9876543210 -> 0x98badcfe
  eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported
  jited:0 222 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#320 BSWAP 64: 0xfedcba9876543210 >> 32 -> 0x10325476
  eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported
  jited:0 273 PASS

  test_bpf: torvalds#344 BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_B
  eBPF filter opcode 0091 (@5) unsupported
  jited:0 432 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#345 BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_H
  eBPF filter opcode 0089 (@5) unsupported
  jited:0 381 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#346 BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_W
  eBPF filter opcode 0081 (@5) unsupported
  jited:0 505 PASS

  test_bpf: torvalds#490 JMP32_JA: Unconditional jump: if (true) return 1
  eBPF filter opcode 0006 (@1) unsupported
  jited:0 261 PASS

  test_bpf: Summary: 1040 PASSED, 10 FAILED, [924/1038 JIT'ed]

Fix them by adding missing processing.

Fixes: daabb2b ("bpf/tests: add tests for cpuv4 instructions")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/91de862dda99d170697eb79ffb478678af7e0b27.1709652689.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
hdeller pushed a commit to hdeller/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 12, 2024
[ Upstream commit 8ecf3c1 ]

Recent additions in BPF like cpu v4 instructions, test_bpf module
exhibits the following failures:

  test_bpf: torvalds#82 ALU_MOVSX | BPF_B jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times)
  test_bpf: torvalds#83 ALU_MOVSX | BPF_H jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times)
  test_bpf: torvalds#84 ALU64_MOVSX | BPF_B jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times)
  test_bpf: torvalds#85 ALU64_MOVSX | BPF_H jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times)
  test_bpf: torvalds#86 ALU64_MOVSX | BPF_W jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times)

  test_bpf: torvalds#165 ALU_SDIV_X: -6 / 2 = -3 jited:1 ret 2147483645 != -3 (0x7ffffffd != 0xfffffffd)FAIL (1 times)
  test_bpf: torvalds#166 ALU_SDIV_K: -6 / 2 = -3 jited:1 ret 2147483645 != -3 (0x7ffffffd != 0xfffffffd)FAIL (1 times)

  test_bpf: torvalds#169 ALU_SMOD_X: -7 % 2 = -1 jited:1 ret 1 != -1 (0x1 != 0xffffffff)FAIL (1 times)
  test_bpf: torvalds#170 ALU_SMOD_K: -7 % 2 = -1 jited:1 ret 1 != -1 (0x1 != 0xffffffff)FAIL (1 times)

  test_bpf: torvalds#172 ALU64_SMOD_K: -7 % 2 = -1 jited:1 ret 1 != -1 (0x1 != 0xffffffff)FAIL (1 times)

  test_bpf: torvalds#313 BSWAP 16: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0xefcd
  eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported
  jited:0 301 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#314 BSWAP 32: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0xefcdab89
  eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported
  jited:0 555 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#315 BSWAP 64: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0x67452301
  eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported
  jited:0 268 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#316 BSWAP 64: 0x0123456789abcdef >> 32 -> 0xefcdab89
  eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported
  jited:0 269 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#317 BSWAP 16: 0xfedcba9876543210 -> 0x1032
  eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported
  jited:0 460 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#318 BSWAP 32: 0xfedcba9876543210 -> 0x10325476
  eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported
  jited:0 320 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#319 BSWAP 64: 0xfedcba9876543210 -> 0x98badcfe
  eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported
  jited:0 222 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#320 BSWAP 64: 0xfedcba9876543210 >> 32 -> 0x10325476
  eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported
  jited:0 273 PASS

  test_bpf: torvalds#344 BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_B
  eBPF filter opcode 0091 (@5) unsupported
  jited:0 432 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#345 BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_H
  eBPF filter opcode 0089 (@5) unsupported
  jited:0 381 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#346 BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_W
  eBPF filter opcode 0081 (@5) unsupported
  jited:0 505 PASS

  test_bpf: torvalds#490 JMP32_JA: Unconditional jump: if (true) return 1
  eBPF filter opcode 0006 (@1) unsupported
  jited:0 261 PASS

  test_bpf: Summary: 1040 PASSED, 10 FAILED, [924/1038 JIT'ed]

Fix them by adding missing processing.

Fixes: daabb2b ("bpf/tests: add tests for cpuv4 instructions")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/91de862dda99d170697eb79ffb478678af7e0b27.1709652689.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 14, 2024
Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-*
results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as
shown below.

    kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
    Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
    LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
    Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc
    scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
    CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 torvalds#85
    Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries
    NIP:  c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8
    REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.10.0-rc3)
    MSR:  8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 2828220f  XER: 0000000e
    CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0
    [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
    NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0
    LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0
    Call Trace:
     usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable)
     __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120
     check_heap_object+0x218/0x240
     __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4
     dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4
     full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110
     vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0
     ksys_read+0x84/0x144
     system_call_exception+0x124/0x330
     system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34

Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to
userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by
privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access.
Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the
entire object.

Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anjali K <[email protected]>
mpe pushed a commit to linuxppc/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 19, 2024
Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-*
results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as
shown below.

    kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
    Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
    LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
    Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc
    scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
    CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 torvalds#85
    Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries
    NIP:  c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8
    REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.10.0-rc3)
    MSR:  8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 2828220f  XER: 0000000e
    CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0
    [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
    NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0
    LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0
    Call Trace:
     usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable)
     __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120
     check_heap_object+0x218/0x240
     __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4
     dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4
     full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110
     vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0
     ksys_read+0x84/0x144
     system_call_exception+0x124/0x330
     system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34

Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to
userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by
privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access.
Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the
entire object.

Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anjali K <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
mpe pushed a commit to linuxppc/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 23, 2024
Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-*
results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as
shown below.

    kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
    Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
    LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
    Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc
    scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
    CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 torvalds#85
    Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries
    NIP:  c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8
    REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.10.0-rc3)
    MSR:  8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 2828220f  XER: 0000000e
    CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0
    [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
    NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0
    LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0
    Call Trace:
     usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable)
     __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120
     check_heap_object+0x218/0x240
     __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4
     dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4
     full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110
     vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0
     ksys_read+0x84/0x144
     system_call_exception+0x124/0x330
     system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34

Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to
userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by
privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access.
Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the
entire object.

Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anjali K <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Jul 23, 2024
[ Upstream commit 1a14150 ]

Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-*
results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as
shown below.

    kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
    Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
    LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
    Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc
    scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
    CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 torvalds#85
    Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries
    NIP:  c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8
    REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.10.0-rc3)
    MSR:  8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 2828220f  XER: 0000000e
    CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0
    [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
    NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0
    LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0
    Call Trace:
     usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable)
     __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120
     check_heap_object+0x218/0x240
     __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4
     dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4
     full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110
     vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0
     ksys_read+0x84/0x144
     system_call_exception+0x124/0x330
     system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34

Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to
userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by
privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access.
Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the
entire object.

Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anjali K <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Jul 23, 2024
[ Upstream commit 1a14150 ]

Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-*
results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as
shown below.

    kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
    Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
    LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
    Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc
    scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
    CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 torvalds#85
    Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries
    NIP:  c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8
    REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.10.0-rc3)
    MSR:  8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 2828220f  XER: 0000000e
    CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0
    [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
    NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0
    LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0
    Call Trace:
     usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable)
     __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120
     check_heap_object+0x218/0x240
     __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4
     dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4
     full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110
     vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0
     ksys_read+0x84/0x144
     system_call_exception+0x124/0x330
     system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34

Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to
userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by
privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access.
Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the
entire object.

Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anjali K <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
staging-kernelci-org pushed a commit to kernelci/linux that referenced this pull request Jul 25, 2024
[ Upstream commit 1a14150 ]

Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-*
results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as
shown below.

    kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
    Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
    LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
    Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc
    scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
    CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 torvalds#85
    Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries
    NIP:  c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8
    REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.10.0-rc3)
    MSR:  8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 2828220f  XER: 0000000e
    CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0
    [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
    NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0
    LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0
    Call Trace:
     usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable)
     __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120
     check_heap_object+0x218/0x240
     __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4
     dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4
     full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110
     vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0
     ksys_read+0x84/0x144
     system_call_exception+0x124/0x330
     system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34

Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to
userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by
privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access.
Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the
entire object.

Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anjali K <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
staging-kernelci-org pushed a commit to kernelci/linux that referenced this pull request Jul 25, 2024
[ Upstream commit 1a14150 ]

Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-*
results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as
shown below.

    kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
    Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
    LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
    Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc
    scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
    CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 torvalds#85
    Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries
    NIP:  c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8
    REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.10.0-rc3)
    MSR:  8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 2828220f  XER: 0000000e
    CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0
    [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
    NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0
    LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0
    Call Trace:
     usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable)
     __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120
     check_heap_object+0x218/0x240
     __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4
     dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4
     full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110
     vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0
     ksys_read+0x84/0x144
     system_call_exception+0x124/0x330
     system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34

Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to
userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by
privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access.
Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the
entire object.

Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anjali K <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ericwoud pushed a commit to ericwoud/linux that referenced this pull request Jul 26, 2024
[ Upstream commit 1a14150 ]

Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-*
results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as
shown below.

    kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
    Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
    LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
    Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc
    scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
    CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 torvalds#85
    Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries
    NIP:  c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8
    REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.10.0-rc3)
    MSR:  8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 2828220f  XER: 0000000e
    CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0
    [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
    NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0
    LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0
    Call Trace:
     usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable)
     __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120
     check_heap_object+0x218/0x240
     __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4
     dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4
     full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110
     vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0
     ksys_read+0x84/0x144
     system_call_exception+0x124/0x330
     system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34

Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to
userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by
privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access.
Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the
entire object.

Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anjali K <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
tobetter pushed a commit to tobetter/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 7, 2024
[ Upstream commit 1a14150 ]

Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-*
results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as
shown below.

    kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
    Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
    LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
    Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc
    scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
    CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 torvalds#85
    Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries
    NIP:  c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8
    REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.10.0-rc3)
    MSR:  8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 2828220f  XER: 0000000e
    CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0
    [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
    NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0
    LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0
    Call Trace:
     usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable)
     __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120
     check_heap_object+0x218/0x240
     __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4
     dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4
     full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110
     vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0
     ksys_read+0x84/0x144
     system_call_exception+0x124/0x330
     system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34

Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to
userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by
privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access.
Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the
entire object.

Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anjali K <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
intelfx pushed a commit to intelfx/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 15, 2024
When I was testing mongodb over bcachefs with compression,
there is a lockdep warning when snapshotting mongodb data volume.

$ cat test.sh
prog=bcachefs

$prog subvolume create /mnt/data
$prog subvolume create /mnt/data/snapshots

while true;do
    $prog subvolume snapshot /mnt/data /mnt/data/snapshots/$(date +%s)
    sleep 1s
done

$ cat /etc/mongodb.conf
systemLog:
  destination: file
  logAppend: true
  path: /mnt/data/mongod.log

storage:
  dbPath: /mnt/data/

lockdep reports:
[ 3437.452330] ======================================================
[ 3437.452750] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 3437.453168] 6.7.0-rc7-custom+ torvalds#85 Tainted: G            E
[ 3437.453562] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 3437.453981] bcachefs/35533 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 3437.454325] ffffa0a02b2b1418 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: filename_create+0x62/0x190
[ 3437.454875]
               but task is already holding lock:
[ 3437.455268] ffffa0a02b2b10e0 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.456009]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[ 3437.456553]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 3437.457054]
               -> #3 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}:
[ 3437.457507]        down_read+0x3e/0x170
[ 3437.457772]        bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.458206]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0
[ 3437.458498]        do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0
[ 3437.458779]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 3437.459155]
               -> #2 (&c->snapshot_create_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
[ 3437.459615]        down_read+0x3e/0x170
[ 3437.459878]        bch2_truncate+0x82/0x110 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.460276]        bchfs_truncate+0x254/0x3c0 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.460686]        notify_change+0x1f1/0x4a0
[ 3437.461283]        do_truncate+0x7f/0xd0
[ 3437.461555]        path_openat+0xa57/0xce0
[ 3437.461836]        do_filp_open+0xb4/0x160
[ 3437.462116]        do_sys_openat2+0x91/0xc0
[ 3437.462402]        __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0
[ 3437.462701]        do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0
[ 3437.462982]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 3437.463359]
               -> #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#15){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 3437.463843]        down_write+0x3b/0xc0
[ 3437.464223]        bch2_write_iter+0x5b/0xcc0 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.464493]        vfs_write+0x21b/0x4c0
[ 3437.464653]        ksys_write+0x69/0xf0
[ 3437.464839]        do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0
[ 3437.465009]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 3437.465231]
               -> #0 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}-{0:0}:
[ 3437.465471]        __lock_acquire+0x1455/0x21b0
[ 3437.465656]        lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0
[ 3437.465822]        mnt_want_write+0x46/0x1a0
[ 3437.465996]        filename_create+0x62/0x190
[ 3437.466175]        user_path_create+0x2d/0x50
[ 3437.466352]        bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x2ec/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.466617]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0
[ 3437.466791]        do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0
[ 3437.466957]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 3437.467180]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[ 3437.469670] 2 locks held by bcachefs/35533:
               other info that might help us debug this:

[ 3437.467507] Chain exists of:
                 sb_writers#10 --> &c->snapshot_create_lock --> &type->s_umount_key#48

[ 3437.467979]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[ 3437.468223]        CPU0                    CPU1
[ 3437.468405]        ----                    ----
[ 3437.468585]   rlock(&type->s_umount_key#48);
[ 3437.468758]                                lock(&c->snapshot_create_lock);
[ 3437.469030]                                lock(&type->s_umount_key#48);
[ 3437.469291]   rlock(sb_writers#10);
[ 3437.469434]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[ 3437.469670] 2 locks held by bcachefs/35533:
[ 3437.469838]  #0: ffffa0a02ce00a88 (&c->snapshot_create_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x1e3/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.470294]  #1: ffffa0a02b2b10e0 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.470744]
               stack backtrace:
[ 3437.470922] CPU: 7 PID: 35533 Comm: bcachefs Kdump: loaded Tainted: G            E      6.7.0-rc7-custom+ torvalds#85
[ 3437.471313] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
[ 3437.471694] Call Trace:
[ 3437.471795]  <TASK>
[ 3437.471884]  dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x90
[ 3437.472035]  check_noncircular+0x132/0x150
[ 3437.472202]  __lock_acquire+0x1455/0x21b0
[ 3437.472369]  lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0
[ 3437.472518]  ? filename_create+0x62/0x190
[ 3437.472683]  ? lock_is_held_type+0x97/0x110
[ 3437.472856]  mnt_want_write+0x46/0x1a0
[ 3437.473025]  ? filename_create+0x62/0x190
[ 3437.473204]  filename_create+0x62/0x190
[ 3437.473380]  user_path_create+0x2d/0x50
[ 3437.473555]  bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x2ec/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.473819]  ? lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0
[ 3437.474002]  ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x190
[ 3437.474195]  ? __fget_files+0xbc/0x190
[ 3437.474380]  ? lock_release+0xc5/0x270
[ 3437.474567]  ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0
[ 3437.474764]  ? __pfx_bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.475090]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0
[ 3437.475277]  do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0
[ 3437.475454]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 3437.475691] RIP: 0033:0x7f2743c313af
======================================================

In __bch2_ioctl_subvolume_create(), we grab s_umount unconditionally
and unlock it at the end of the function. There is a comment
"why do we need this lock?" about the lock coming from
commit 42d2373 ("bcachefs: Snapshot creation, deletion")
The reason is that __bch2_ioctl_subvolume_create() calls
sync_inodes_sb() which enforce locked s_umount to writeback all dirty
nodes before doing snapshot works.

Fix it by read locking s_umount for snapshotting only and unlocking
s_umount after sync_inodes_sb().

Signed-off-by: Su Yue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>
jhautbois pushed a commit to YoseliSAS/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 21, 2024
Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-*
results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as
shown below.

    kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
    Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
    LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
    Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc
    scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
    CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 torvalds#85
    Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries
    NIP:  c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8
    REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.10.0-rc3)
    MSR:  8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 2828220f  XER: 0000000e
    CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0
    [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
    NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0
    LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0
    Call Trace:
     usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable)
     __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120
     check_heap_object+0x218/0x240
     __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4
     dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4
     full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110
     vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0
     ksys_read+0x84/0x144
     system_call_exception+0x124/0x330
     system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34

Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to
userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by
privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access.
Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the
entire object.

Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anjali K <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit 1a14150 ]

Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-*
results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as
shown below.

    kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
    Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
    LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
    Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc
    scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
    CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 torvalds#85
    Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries
    NIP:  c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8
    REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.10.0-rc3)
    MSR:  8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 2828220f  XER: 0000000e
    CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0
    [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
    NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0
    LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0
    Call Trace:
     usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable)
     __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120
     check_heap_object+0x218/0x240
     __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4
     dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4
     full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110
     vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0
     ksys_read+0x84/0x144
     system_call_exception+0x124/0x330
     system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34

Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to
userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by
privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access.
Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the
entire object.

Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anjali K <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
1054009064 pushed a commit to 1054009064/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 9, 2024
[ Upstream commit 1a14150 ]

Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-*
results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as
shown below.

    kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
    Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
    LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
    Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc
    scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
    CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 torvalds#85
    Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries
    NIP:  c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8
    REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.10.0-rc3)
    MSR:  8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 2828220f  XER: 0000000e
    CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0
    [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
    NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0
    LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0
    Call Trace:
     usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable)
     __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120
     check_heap_object+0x218/0x240
     __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4
     dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4
     full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110
     vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0
     ksys_read+0x84/0x144
     system_call_exception+0x124/0x330
     system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34

Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to
userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by
privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access.
Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the
entire object.

Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anjali K <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2024
Commit 94a23e9 ("cgroup: Disable cgroup "memory" by default")
disabled the memory cgroup by default when initing the cgroups. However,
it's possible to disable the memory cgroup by a kernel command line.
Hard-coding such a feature can be problematic as some memory management
features depend on the order that things are set.

For example, it is possible to see a NULL pointer dereference caused by
commit 94a23e9. The NULL pointer
dereference is triggered by the memory shrinker and ends up in a kernel
crash.

[   50.028629] ==================================================================
[   50.028645] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in do_shrink_slab+0x1fc/0x978
[   50.028663] Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000000000 by task gfxrecon-replay/1965

[   50.028676] CPU: 3 UID: 1000 PID: 1965 Comm: gfxrecon-replay Tainted: G         C         6.12.0-rc4-v8-thp-kasan+ torvalds#85
[   50.028685] Tainted: [C]=CRAP
[   50.028689] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 5 Model B Rev 1.0 (DT)
[   50.028694] Call trace:
[   50.028697]  dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x120
[   50.028706]  show_stack+0x24/0x38
[   50.028711]  dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0x88
[   50.028720]  print_report+0xe4/0x708
[   50.028728]  kasan_report+0xcc/0x130
[   50.028733]  kasan_check_range+0x254/0x298
[   50.028738]  __kasan_check_write+0x20/0x30
[   50.028745]  do_shrink_slab+0x1fc/0x978
[   50.028751]  shrink_slab+0x318/0xc38
[   50.028756]  shrink_one+0x254/0x6d8
[   50.028762]  shrink_node+0x26b4/0x2848
[   50.028767]  do_try_to_free_pages+0x3e4/0x1190
[   50.028773]  try_to_free_pages+0x5a4/0xb40
[   50.028778]  __alloc_pages_direct_reclaim+0x144/0x298
[   50.028787]  __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x5c4/0xc70
[   50.028793]  __alloc_pages_noprof+0x4a8/0x6a8
[   50.028800]  __folio_alloc_noprof+0x24/0xa8
[   50.028806]  shmem_alloc_and_add_folio+0x2ec/0xce0
[   50.028812]  shmem_get_folio_gfp+0x380/0xc20
[   50.028818]  shmem_read_folio_gfp+0xe0/0x160
[   50.028824]  drm_gem_get_pages+0x238/0x620 [drm]
[   50.029039]  drm_gem_shmem_get_pages_sgt+0xd8/0x4b8 [drm_shmem_helper]
[   50.029053]  v3d_bo_create_finish+0x58/0x1e0 [v3d]
[   50.029083]  v3d_create_bo_ioctl+0xac/0x210 [v3d]
[   50.029105]  drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1d8/0x2b8 [drm]
[   50.029220]  drm_ioctl+0x4b4/0x920 [drm]
[   50.029330]  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x11c/0x160
[   50.029337]  invoke_syscall+0x88/0x268
[   50.029345]  el0_svc_common+0x160/0x1d8
[   50.029351]  do_el0_svc+0x50/0x68
[   50.029358]  el0_svc+0x34/0x80
[   50.029364]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0x100
[   50.029371]  el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198
[   50.029376] ==================================================================

This happens because the memory shrinker is unaware that we are
artificially disabling the memory cgroups and therefore it doesn't
allocate `nr_deferred` (as it would if we used the kernel command line).

To avoid such an issue, revert the artificial disablement and disable it
through the command line. If a user wants to enable the feature, it can
use the `cgroup_enable=` command line.

Signed-off-by: Maíra Canal <[email protected]>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 31, 2024
In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following
stack trace:

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty torvalds#85
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0
  ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0
  ? die_addr+0x54/0x90
  ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0
  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
  ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110
  f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0
  f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0
  __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0
  f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0
  vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0
  x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540
  do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from
different f2fs shutdown paths:

  [CPU0]                       [CPU1]
  ----------------------       -----------------------
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread          f2fs_stop_gc_thread
                                 gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    kfree(gc_th)
    sbi->gc_thread = NULL
                                 < gc_th != NULL >
                                 kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF

The commit c7f114d ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in
f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read
semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but
itfails to prevent all race conditions.

While upgrading to s_umount write lock in f2fs_do_shutdown() would fix
the current issue, however, using s_umount lock requires extreme caution
to avoid lock recursion. A better solution is to introduce a semaphore
to prevent races between concurrent f2fs_stop_gc_thread calls.

Fixes: 7950e9a ("f2fs: stop gc/discard thread after fs shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <[email protected]>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 4, 2024
In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following
stack trace:

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty torvalds#85
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0
  ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0
  ? die_addr+0x54/0x90
  ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0
  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
  ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110
  f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0
  f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0
  __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0
  f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0
  vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0
  x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540
  do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from
different f2fs shutdown paths:

  [CPU0]                       [CPU1]
  ----------------------       -----------------------
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread          f2fs_stop_gc_thread
                                 gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    kfree(gc_th)
    sbi->gc_thread = NULL
                                 < gc_th != NULL >
                                 kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF

The commit c7f114d ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in
f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read
semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but
it fails to prevent all race conditions.

Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown().

Fixes: 7950e9a ("f2fs: stop gc/discard thread after fs shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <[email protected]>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 6, 2024
In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following
stack trace:

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty torvalds#85
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0
  ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0
  ? die_addr+0x54/0x90
  ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0
  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
  ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110
  f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0
  f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0
  __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0
  f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0
  vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0
  x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540
  do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from
different f2fs shutdown paths:

  [CPU0]                       [CPU1]
  ----------------------       -----------------------
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread          f2fs_stop_gc_thread
                                 gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    kfree(gc_th)
    sbi->gc_thread = NULL
                                 < gc_th != NULL >
                                 kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF

The commit c7f114d ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in
f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read
semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but
it fails to prevent all race conditions.

Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown().

Fixes: 7950e9a ("f2fs: stop gc/discard thread after fs shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 3, 2024
[ Upstream commit 7b0033d ]

In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following
stack trace:

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty torvalds#85
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0
  ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0
  ? die_addr+0x54/0x90
  ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0
  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
  ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110
  f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0
  f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0
  __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0
  f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0
  vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0
  x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540
  do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from
different f2fs shutdown paths:

  [CPU0]                       [CPU1]
  ----------------------       -----------------------
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread          f2fs_stop_gc_thread
                                 gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    kfree(gc_th)
    sbi->gc_thread = NULL
                                 < gc_th != NULL >
                                 kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF

The commit c7f114d ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in
f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read
semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but
it fails to prevent all race conditions.

Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown().

Fixes: 7950e9a ("f2fs: stop gc/discard thread after fs shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit 7b0033d ]

In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following
stack trace:

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty torvalds#85
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0
  ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0
  ? die_addr+0x54/0x90
  ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0
  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
  ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110
  f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0
  f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0
  __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0
  f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0
  vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0
  x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540
  do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from
different f2fs shutdown paths:

  [CPU0]                       [CPU1]
  ----------------------       -----------------------
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread          f2fs_stop_gc_thread
                                 gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    kfree(gc_th)
    sbi->gc_thread = NULL
                                 < gc_th != NULL >
                                 kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF

The commit c7f114d ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in
f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read
semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but
it fails to prevent all race conditions.

Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown().

Fixes: 7950e9a ("f2fs: stop gc/discard thread after fs shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit 7b0033d ]

In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following
stack trace:

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty torvalds#85
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0
  ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0
  ? die_addr+0x54/0x90
  ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0
  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
  ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110
  f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0
  f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0
  __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0
  f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0
  vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0
  x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540
  do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from
different f2fs shutdown paths:

  [CPU0]                       [CPU1]
  ----------------------       -----------------------
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread          f2fs_stop_gc_thread
                                 gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    kfree(gc_th)
    sbi->gc_thread = NULL
                                 < gc_th != NULL >
                                 kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF

The commit c7f114d ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in
f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read
semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but
it fails to prevent all race conditions.

Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown().

Fixes: 7950e9a ("f2fs: stop gc/discard thread after fs shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ptr1337 pushed a commit to CachyOS/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 5, 2024
[ Upstream commit 7b0033d ]

In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following
stack trace:

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty torvalds#85
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0
  ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0
  ? die_addr+0x54/0x90
  ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0
  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
  ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110
  f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0
  f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0
  __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0
  f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0
  vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0
  x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540
  do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from
different f2fs shutdown paths:

  [CPU0]                       [CPU1]
  ----------------------       -----------------------
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread          f2fs_stop_gc_thread
                                 gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    kfree(gc_th)
    sbi->gc_thread = NULL
                                 < gc_th != NULL >
                                 kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF

The commit c7f114d ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in
f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read
semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but
it fails to prevent all race conditions.

Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown().

Fixes: 7950e9a ("f2fs: stop gc/discard thread after fs shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Kaz205 pushed a commit to Kaz205/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 5, 2024
[ Upstream commit 7b0033d ]

In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following
stack trace:

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty torvalds#85
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0
  ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0
  ? die_addr+0x54/0x90
  ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0
  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
  ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110
  f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0
  f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0
  __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0
  f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0
  vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0
  x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540
  do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from
different f2fs shutdown paths:

  [CPU0]                       [CPU1]
  ----------------------       -----------------------
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread          f2fs_stop_gc_thread
                                 gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    kfree(gc_th)
    sbi->gc_thread = NULL
                                 < gc_th != NULL >
                                 kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF

The commit c7f114d ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in
f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read
semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but
it fails to prevent all race conditions.

Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown().

Fixes: 7950e9a ("f2fs: stop gc/discard thread after fs shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 6, 2024
[ Upstream commit 7b0033d ]

In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following
stack trace:

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty torvalds#85
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0
  ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0
  ? die_addr+0x54/0x90
  ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0
  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
  ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110
  f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0
  f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0
  __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0
  f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0
  vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0
  x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540
  do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from
different f2fs shutdown paths:

  [CPU0]                       [CPU1]
  ----------------------       -----------------------
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread          f2fs_stop_gc_thread
                                 gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    kfree(gc_th)
    sbi->gc_thread = NULL
                                 < gc_th != NULL >
                                 kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF

The commit c7f114d ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in
f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read
semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but
it fails to prevent all race conditions.

Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown().

Fixes: 7950e9a ("f2fs: stop gc/discard thread after fs shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
klarasm pushed a commit to klarasm/linux that referenced this pull request Dec 9, 2024
[ Upstream commit 7b0033d ]

In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following
stack trace:

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty torvalds#85
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0
  ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0
  ? die_addr+0x54/0x90
  ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0
  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
  ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110
  f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0
  f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0
  __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0
  f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0
  vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0
  x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540
  do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from
different f2fs shutdown paths:

  [CPU0]                       [CPU1]
  ----------------------       -----------------------
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread          f2fs_stop_gc_thread
                                 gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    kfree(gc_th)
    sbi->gc_thread = NULL
                                 < gc_th != NULL >
                                 kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF

The commit c7f114d ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in
f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read
semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but
it fails to prevent all race conditions.

Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown().

Fixes: 7950e9a ("f2fs: stop gc/discard thread after fs shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Jan 5, 2025
The result is as follows,

  $ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs --name=dynamic_tp
  torvalds#85      dynamic_tp:OK
  Summary: 1/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED

Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <[email protected]>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Jan 12, 2025
The result is as follows,

  $ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs --name=dynamic_tp
  torvalds#85      dynamic_tp:OK
  Summary: 1/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED

Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <[email protected]>
hogliux pushed a commit to hogliux/yogalinux7x that referenced this pull request Jan 21, 2025
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2091625

[ Upstream commit 7b0033d ]

In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following
stack trace:

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty torvalds#85
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0
  ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0
  ? die_addr+0x54/0x90
  ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0
  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
  ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110
  f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0
  f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0
  __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0
  f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0
  vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0
  x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540
  do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from
different f2fs shutdown paths:

  [CPU0]                       [CPU1]
  ----------------------       -----------------------
  f2fs_stop_gc_thread          f2fs_stop_gc_thread
                                 gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
    kfree(gc_th)
    sbi->gc_thread = NULL
                                 < gc_th != NULL >
                                 kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF

The commit c7f114d ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in
f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read
semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but
it fails to prevent all race conditions.

Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown().

Fixes: 7950e9a ("f2fs: stop gc/discard thread after fs shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>
paralin pushed a commit to skiffos/linux that referenced this pull request Jan 24, 2025
commit 745f17a upstream.

We got a WARNING in ext4_add_complete_io:
==================================================================
 WARNING: at fs/ext4/page-io.c:231 ext4_put_io_end_defer+0x182/0x250
 CPU: 10 PID: 77 Comm: ksoftirqd/10 Tainted: 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#85
 RIP: 0010:ext4_put_io_end_defer+0x182/0x250 [ext4]
 [...]
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ext4_end_bio+0xa8/0x240 [ext4]
  bio_endio+0x195/0x310
  blk_update_request+0x184/0x770
  scsi_end_request+0x2f/0x240
  scsi_io_completion+0x75/0x450
  scsi_finish_command+0xef/0x160
  scsi_complete+0xa3/0x180
  blk_complete_reqs+0x60/0x80
  blk_done_softirq+0x25/0x40
  __do_softirq+0x119/0x4c8
  run_ksoftirqd+0x42/0x70
  smpboot_thread_fn+0x136/0x3c0
  kthread+0x140/0x1a0
  ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50
==================================================================

Above issue may happen as follows:

            cpu1                        cpu2
----------------------------|----------------------------
mount -o dioread_lock
ext4_writepages
 ext4_do_writepages
  *if (ext4_should_dioread_nolock(inode))*
    // rsv_blocks is not assigned here
                                 mount -o remount,dioread_nolock
  ext4_journal_start_with_reserve
   __ext4_journal_start
    __ext4_journal_start_sb
     jbd2__journal_start
      *if (rsv_blocks)*
        // h_rsv_handle is not initialized here
  mpage_map_and_submit_extent
    mpage_map_one_extent
      dioread_nolock = ext4_should_dioread_nolock(inode)
      if (dioread_nolock && (map->m_flags & EXT4_MAP_UNWRITTEN))
        mpd->io_submit.io_end->handle = handle->h_rsv_handle
        ext4_set_io_unwritten_flag
          io_end->flag |= EXT4_IO_END_UNWRITTEN
      // now io_end->handle is NULL but has EXT4_IO_END_UNWRITTEN flag

scsi_finish_command
 scsi_io_completion
  scsi_io_completion_action
   scsi_end_request
    blk_update_request
     req_bio_endio
      bio_endio
       bio->bi_end_io  > ext4_end_bio
        ext4_put_io_end_defer
	 ext4_add_complete_io
	  // trigger WARN_ON(!io_end->handle && sbi->s_journal);

The immediate cause of this problem is that ext4_should_dioread_nolock()
function returns inconsistent values in the ext4_do_writepages() and
mpage_map_one_extent(). There are four conditions in this function that
can be changed at mount time to cause this problem. These four conditions
can be divided into two categories:

    (1) journal_data and EXT4_EXTENTS_FL, which can be changed by ioctl
    (2) DELALLOC and DIOREAD_NOLOCK, which can be changed by remount

The two in the first category have been fixed by commit c8585c6
("ext4: fix races between changing inode journal mode and ext4_writepages")
and commit cb85f4d ("ext4: fix race between writepages and enabling
EXT4_EXTENTS_FL") respectively.

Two cases in the other category have not yet been fixed, and the above
issue is caused by this situation. We refer to the fix for the first
category, when applying options during remount, we grab s_writepages_rwsem
to avoid racing with writepages ops to trigger this problem.

Fixes: 6b523df ("ext4: use transaction reservation for extent conversion in ext4_end_io")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit a937cf1)
Signed-off-by: Robert Beckett <[email protected]>
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