QVAC-13562 feat: add @qvac/diagnostics package with BaseInference integration#796
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…d CI - New @qvac/diagnostics package (v0.1.0) with DiagnosticReport schema, addon registration, environment/hardware collection, report generation - Wire BaseInference for optional diagnostics addon registration - Add CI/CD publishing workflow for diagnostics package - 13 unit tests, 44 assertions
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…d CI (#796) - New @qvac/diagnostics package (v0.1.0) with DiagnosticReport schema, addon registration, environment/hardware collection, report generation - Wire BaseInference for optional diagnostics addon registration - Add CI/CD publishing workflow for diagnostics package - 13 unit tests, 44 assertions
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…oning) Addresses CodeQL alert #796 (`actions/artifact-poisoning`) on PR #1946 flagged on the two `Download {Android,iOS} prebuilds (from artifacts)` steps in integration-mobile-test-tts-ggml.yml. The rule fires because the workflow has a `workflow_dispatch` entry point and downloads an artifact via `actions/download-artifact@v8` without an explicit `run-id`. Without that input, CodeQL has to assume the artifact could come from any prior run on the branch (including one uploaded by a fork PR's prebuild step) — which is the poisoning surface we are explicitly NOT exposing. Setting `run-id: ${{ github.run_id }}` (the action's existing default) plus `github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}` makes the trust boundary explicit at the call site so the analyzer can see the artifact is current-run only. No behavioural change: in `workflow_call` from on-pr-tts-ggml the parent workflow already produced the artifact in the same run, and `workflow_dispatch` falls into the `!inputs.package_spec` -> npm-pack branch since `package_spec` defaults to `@qvac/tts-ggml@latest` for that trigger. The four `actions/missing-workflow-permissions` findings on the benchmark stubs are addressed by the previous commit (ef8d4e2). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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* Add tts-ggml workflows * Add explicit file-level permissions to tts-ggml workflows Addresses GitHub Advanced Security findings on PR #1946 flagging the 4 benchmark stubs and the two integration workflows for the CodeQL actions/missing-workflow-permissions rule: every workflow file should declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block at the top so that any job added later inherits read-only by default instead of the implicit read/write GITHUB_TOKEN. - benchmark-{chatterbox,performance,rtf,supertonic}-tts-ggml.yml: add top-level `permissions: contents: read` plus a job-level mirror on the noop body (which only writes to stdout). - integration-test-tts-ggml.yml: add top-level `permissions: contents: read; packages: read` matching the existing job-level scope on `run-integration-tests`. - integration-mobile-test-tts-ggml.yml: add top-level `permissions: contents: read`; the existing `build-and-test` job continues to widen this to packages:read + pull-requests:write + id-token:write for the prebuild artifact pull and Device Farm hooks. The other six tts-ggml workflows (cpp-test-coverage, create-github-release, on-merge, on-pr, on-pr-close, prebuilds) already had top-level permissions declared and are untouched. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Pin mobile prebuild downloads to current run-id (CodeQL artifact poisoning) Addresses CodeQL alert #796 (`actions/artifact-poisoning`) on PR #1946 flagged on the two `Download {Android,iOS} prebuilds (from artifacts)` steps in integration-mobile-test-tts-ggml.yml. The rule fires because the workflow has a `workflow_dispatch` entry point and downloads an artifact via `actions/download-artifact@v8` without an explicit `run-id`. Without that input, CodeQL has to assume the artifact could come from any prior run on the branch (including one uploaded by a fork PR's prebuild step) — which is the poisoning surface we are explicitly NOT exposing. Setting `run-id: ${{ github.run_id }}` (the action's existing default) plus `github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}` makes the trust boundary explicit at the call site so the analyzer can see the artifact is current-run only. No behavioural change: in `workflow_call` from on-pr-tts-ggml the parent workflow already produced the artifact in the same run, and `workflow_dispatch` falls into the `!inputs.package_spec` -> npm-pack branch since `package_spec` defaults to `@qvac/tts-ggml@latest` for that trigger. The four `actions/missing-workflow-permissions` findings on the benchmark stubs are addressed by the previous commit (ef8d4e2). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Proletter
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May 24, 2026
…d CI (#796) - New @qvac/diagnostics package (v0.1.0) with DiagnosticReport schema, addon registration, environment/hardware collection, report generation - Wire BaseInference for optional diagnostics addon registration - Add CI/CD publishing workflow for diagnostics package - 13 unit tests, 44 assertions
Proletter
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that referenced
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May 24, 2026
* Add tts-ggml workflows * Add explicit file-level permissions to tts-ggml workflows Addresses GitHub Advanced Security findings on PR #1946 flagging the 4 benchmark stubs and the two integration workflows for the CodeQL actions/missing-workflow-permissions rule: every workflow file should declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block at the top so that any job added later inherits read-only by default instead of the implicit read/write GITHUB_TOKEN. - benchmark-{chatterbox,performance,rtf,supertonic}-tts-ggml.yml: add top-level `permissions: contents: read` plus a job-level mirror on the noop body (which only writes to stdout). - integration-test-tts-ggml.yml: add top-level `permissions: contents: read; packages: read` matching the existing job-level scope on `run-integration-tests`. - integration-mobile-test-tts-ggml.yml: add top-level `permissions: contents: read`; the existing `build-and-test` job continues to widen this to packages:read + pull-requests:write + id-token:write for the prebuild artifact pull and Device Farm hooks. The other six tts-ggml workflows (cpp-test-coverage, create-github-release, on-merge, on-pr, on-pr-close, prebuilds) already had top-level permissions declared and are untouched. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Pin mobile prebuild downloads to current run-id (CodeQL artifact poisoning) Addresses CodeQL alert #796 (`actions/artifact-poisoning`) on PR #1946 flagged on the two `Download {Android,iOS} prebuilds (from artifacts)` steps in integration-mobile-test-tts-ggml.yml. The rule fires because the workflow has a `workflow_dispatch` entry point and downloads an artifact via `actions/download-artifact@v8` without an explicit `run-id`. Without that input, CodeQL has to assume the artifact could come from any prior run on the branch (including one uploaded by a fork PR's prebuild step) — which is the poisoning surface we are explicitly NOT exposing. Setting `run-id: ${{ github.run_id }}` (the action's existing default) plus `github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}` makes the trust boundary explicit at the call site so the analyzer can see the artifact is current-run only. No behavioural change: in `workflow_call` from on-pr-tts-ggml the parent workflow already produced the artifact in the same run, and `workflow_dispatch` falls into the `!inputs.package_spec` -> npm-pack branch since `package_spec` defaults to `@qvac/tts-ggml@latest` for that trigger. The four `actions/missing-workflow-permissions` findings on the benchmark stubs are addressed by the previous commit (ef8d4e2). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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Summary
@qvac/diagnosticspackage (v0.1.0) with structured DiagnosticReport schemaregisterAddon/unregisterAddon)What changed
New package:
packages/qvac-lib-diagnostics/index.js: Singleton diagnostic system with JSDoc typedefs, runtime detection, report generationregisterAddon,unregisterAddon,registerExtension,collectEnvironment,collectHardware,generateReport,serializeReport,resetModified:
packages/qvac-lib-infer-base/@qvac/diagnosticsrequire with try/catch (no hard dependency)load(), unregister indestroy()getDiagnosticsdelegates to subclass_getDiagnosticsJSON()if implementedNew:
.github/workflows/trigger-reusable-lib-qvac-lib-diagnostics.ymlTest plan
npx standard index.js— lint passesnpx tsc— generates validindex.d.tsnpm test— 13/13 tests pass, 44/44 assertionsAsana: https://app.asana.com/0/0/1213438112051005