Harden TLS handshake verify by alii · Pull Request #43865 · oven-sh/bun

alii · 2026-09-24T00:27:45Z

Read the handshake verify result even when a shutdown ran during the handshake.

Adds a test that ends a Duplex-wrapped TLS client mid-handshake.

alii · 2026-09-24T00:27:53Z

coderabbitai · 2026-09-24T00:30:55Z

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Walkthrough

The change adds a handshake-specific SSL verification accessor and uses it in handshake outcome paths. New tests cover TLS client duplex shutdown during the handshake with certificate rejection enabled and disabled.

Changes

TLS handshake verification

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Separate handshake verification `src/uws/lib.rs`	The general verification accessor keeps its shutdown check and delegates result reading to a new helper. The helper reads the SSL verification result without checking shutdown flags.
Use handshake verification in outcomes `src/uws/lib.rs`, `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts`	Inline-rejection, handshake-error, and successful-handshake paths use the new helper. Tests check the verification error and client events after the duplex stream ends during the handshake.

Suggested reviewers: robobun

Priority: ⬇️ Low

Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to aa7b7

TLS clients whose underlying duplex stream ends during the handshake now still report the correct certificate verification result. The runtime change is narrow and its scope looks correct. The remaining item is a small test-convention fix: import test from bun:test. It is a quick follow-up and does not block the behavior change.

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4

✅ Passed checks (4 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Title check	✅ Passed	The title clearly and concisely describes the main change: hardening TLS handshake verification.
Description check	✅ Passed	The description explains the change and mentions the added test. It does not state how the code was verified, so the verification section is incomplete.
Linked Issues check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.

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Inline comments:
In `@test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts`:
- Line 6: Change the test import in this file from node:test to bun:test to
follow the repository’s test-style rule; leave the test bodies and other imports
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src/uws/lib.rs
test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts

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robobun · 2026-09-24T00:31:13Z

This PR is merged. The same wrong result remained on TCP sockets, on the server side, and after a renegotiation: a handshake that finishes on a shut-down or fatal connection reported a passed certificate check.
Follow-up #43924 is merged (92d6092).

claude

Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.

robobun · 2026-09-24T01:06:37Z

^{Updated 6:06 PM PT - Sep 23rd, 2026}

✅ @alii, your commit aa7b7013bfc34773533a8bfae1c81fad907b1c42 passed in Build #120118! 🎉

🧪 To try this PR locally:

bunx bun-pr 43865

That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-43865 executable, so you can run:

bun-43865 --bun

…43924) Follow-up to #43865. ### Problem - A handshake that finishes on a shut-down or fatal connection reports a passed certificate check. A `tls.Server` with `requestCert` and `rejectUnauthorized: true` emits `secureConnection authorized=true authError=null` for an untrusted client. - The peer can cause it alone, with one bad record behind its `Finished`. A local `end()` during the handshake causes it too. - `ssl_trigger_handshake` (`packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c`) reads `us_internal_ssl_verify_error`, which returns zero for such a socket. `SSLWrapper` (`src/uws/lib.rs`) does the same after a renegotiation. ### Fix - `ssl_trigger_handshake` reads the verdict from the `SSL` when the handshake succeeded. - `SSLWrapper::trigger_handshake_callback` takes a `HandshakeOutcome` and derives the result. A failed handshake reports what it reported before. - The server reports `tlsClientError` once for each connection, as Node does (`src/js/node/net.ts`). - Verified: `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts` (main fails 8 of 12, Node v26.3.0 passes 12) and `renegotiation.test.ts`. Self-reviewed: 9 concerns raised, 8 addressed. ### Background - Bun has two TLS engines. `openssl.c` serves sockets. `SSLWrapper` serves TLS over a Duplex, a named pipe or a proxy tunnel. - Both report a handshake as `(success, verify error)`. Consumers read error 0 as "verified". - Considered a getter swap per call site. #43865 did that and three sites stayed wrong. ### Downsides - Connections that these cases accepted are now refused, or report `authorized=false`. - After a server `end()` in the handshake, Node reports `ECONNRESET`. Bun reports `DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT`. Both refuse the client. - Release `.text`: 58154908 B before and after. `ssl_trigger_handshake`: 175 to 178 instructions, 24 conditional branches both. <details><summary>Notes</summary> **Cases, measured on Node v26.3.0, on `main`, and with this change** The peer's certificate is untrusted in every row. | Case | Node | `main` | This PR | |---|---|---|---| | TCP client, `rejectUnauthorized: false`, `end()` on its last handshake flight (TLS 1.2 and 1.3) | `authorized=false`, `UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE` | `authorized=true`, `authError=null` | same as Node | | Server with `requestCert`, `end()` on its socket in the handshake, `rejectUnauthorized: false` | `authorized=false`, `DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT` | `authorized=true`, then it reads the client's data | same as Node | | Same server, `rejectUnauthorized: true` | `tlsClientError ECONNRESET` | `secureConnection authorized=true`, then it reads the client's data | `tlsClientError DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT` | | Same server, `end()` comes from its `tlsClientError` listener after `handshakeTimeout`, slow client | `tlsClientError ERR_TLS_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT`, then `close` | then `secureConnection authorized=true` and the client's data | same as Node | | No `end()`. One bad record behind the peer's `Finished`, client side, `rejectUnauthorized: false` | `authorized=false` | `authorized=true` | same as Node | | Same, server side with `requestCert`, `rejectUnauthorized: true` | `tlsClientError ERR_SSL_*` (the bad record) | `secureConnection authorized=true` | `tlsClientError DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT` | | Rejecting client that resumes a session, `end()` on its last flight | `error UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE` | `secureConnect authorized=true` | same as Node | | Client over a Duplex, `end()` in the first handshake, then the server renegotiates | not reachable, its own `end()` fails the connection | second handshake flips to `authorized=true` | `authorized=false` on both handshakes | | `Bun.connect`, `shutdown()` after the ClientHello, `rejectUnauthorized: false` | n/a | `success=true`, `authorized=true`, `getAuthorizationError()` null | `authorized=false`, error set | With `rejectUnauthorized: true` a TCP client on `main` is safe in the full-handshake rows. The inline reject from #43694 reads the verdict directly. A resumed handshake verifies no chain, so the inline reject cannot act there. A slow client with a trusted certificate is accepted after the handshake timeout, on Node and on Bun. That does not change. **Mechanism** - `us_internal_ssl_is_shut_down` is true for a socket whose TCP write side is shut down, for `SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN`, and for `ssl_fatal_error`. - `end()` during a handshake sends no alert (BoringSSL returns from `SSL_shutdown` while `SSL_in_init`). It still shuts the TCP write side down, and `SSLWrapper` still sets `sent_ssl_shutdown`. The handshake continues to run. - A bad record behind `Finished` makes one `SSL_read` finish the handshake and fail. `ssl_park_fatal_reason` sets `ssl_fatal_error` before the handshake is reported. - Consumers that read error 0 as verified: `TLSSocket::on_handshake` (`src/runtime/socket/socket_body.rs`), `net.ts`, `HttpContext.h` (`Bun.serve`, `node:https`), and the Postgres, MySQL and Valkey clients. **What does not change** - Every failed handshake reports the same result as on `main`. `HandshakeOutcome::Aborted` keeps the old rule for its two sites: zero after a shutdown, else the verdict. - A failed handshake over a Duplex still reports `UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT` for a certificate that never arrived. Open PR #32929 covers that. - In a normal handshake the same consumers already get `(success, verdict)`. So no consumer gets a pair that it could not get before. - A transport that closes during the handshake: `destroy()` or `end()` by the peer, and `destroy()` or end of the Duplex, with both policies. `main` and this change give the same events, and none is `secureConnect`. **Self-review** Addressed: 1. The TCP proxy in the tests acted on TCP chunks. It now acts on TLS records, and releases a held flight in one write. 2. No test for the case without `end()`. Three tests added. 3. A rename of the test file from #43865 made its diff hard to read. The file keeps its name, and the diff to it only adds lines. 4. Unused derives on the new enum. Removed. 5. `require` inside the new renegotiation test. Replaced with module imports. 6. Failure results must not change, because `net.ts` reads them. Checked with a plaintext peer on both engines: same events as `main`. 7. The verdict can now close the socket from inside `us_internal_ssl_close`. The `ssl_gone` checks already cover a close from a handshake callback there. The new tests run that path on an ASAN build. 8. A handshake that completes after its timeout was reported gave a second `tlsClientError`. The reject branch now checks `kerrorEmitted`, as Node's `onSocketTLSError` does. Not addressed here: 9. `us_internal_ssl_verify_error` keeps its shutdown test for `getAuthorizationError()`. The getter falls back to the stored result of the handshake report, which is now correct. The cleanup is a separate change. **Not in this PR** After `end()` in the handshake, a final flight that arrives in two reads is never reported on a TCP socket. The socket gets no `secureConnect`, no `error` and no `close`. Node reports the handshake. `authorized` stays `false`, so this is a missing report and not a wrong one. It is the same on `main`, and this change does not touch it. **Measurements** Release builds of the base `8884311404` and of this change. - release `.text`: +0 B (`llvm-size -A`, 58154908 B both). Stripped `bun`: 80844320 B both. - `ssl_trigger_handshake`: 178 instructions, 24 conditional branches, 669 B. Before: 175, 24, 649 B (`llvm-objdump`, `llvm-nm -S`). The success path skips the two state tests inside `us_internal_ssl_verify_error` and adds one `s->ssl` test. - X509 verdict reads per successful handshake: TCP 39 and 39, Duplex 20 and 20 (gdb breakpoint hit counts on `us_ssl_socket_verify_error_from_ssl`, 20 handshakes each, debug builds). - Shutdown tests inside the verdict reader: Rust 0 (1 before), C 0. - Syscall counts per handshake: not measured. `strace` and `perf` are not installed on the test machine. The change adds no write, read or shutdown call. **Tests** - `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts` uses `node:test`, so the same file runs on Node: `node --experimental-strip-types --test` passes 12 of 12. The two tests from #43865 are unchanged. Two tests assert a different `tlsClientError` code for each runtime, because Bun reports the certificate check there and Node reports how the connection ended. - `renegotiation.test.ts`: `main` fails 1 of 21, the row with `end()`. The row without `end()` passes on `main` and shows that the rule is not new. Node cannot be the client of the `end()` row. - Also run with this change: `test/js/node/tls/`, `test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts`, `test/js/bun/http/proxy.test.ts`, `test/js/web/websocket/websocket-proxy.test.ts`, `test/js/web/fetch/fetch.tls.test.ts`, `test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js`: 1037 pass, 2 fail. Both failures are the same on a build of `main`: `SNICallback runs even when the requested servername matches the bind hostname` (`localhost` resolves to `::1` on the test machine) and `should not call drain before handshake` (needs `www.example.com`). - 22 ported Node tests that use `tlsClientError`, `handshakeTimeout` or `requestCert` (`test/js/node/test/parallel/test-tls-*.js`, `test-https-*.js`): all exit 0 on `main` and with this change. </details>  --- **[human-review]** gate passed · iteration 0 · 5 files touched <details><summary>fails on main (without fix)</summary> ```console ASAN without fix: BUILD FAILED (no junit output) $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts ninja: Entering directory `/workspace/bun/build/debug' [0/2] cargo plan → /workspace/bun/build/debug/rust-target/plan.json FAILED: [code=1] rust-target/plan.json /workspace/bun/build/debug/rust-target/plan.json /workspace/bun/build/release/bun /workspace/bun/scripts/build/stream.ts cargo --console /workspace/bun/build/release/bun /workspace/bun/scripts/build/rust/plan.ts /workspace/bun/build/debug/rust-target/plan.input.json /workspace/bun/build/debug/rust-target/plan.json �[1m�[91merror�[0m: cannot update the lock file /workspace/bun/Cargo.lock because --locked was passed to prevent this help: to generate the lock file without accessing the network, remove the --locked flag and use --offline instead. error: /root/.cargo/bin/cargo build -p bun_runtime --lib … exited with 101 ninja: error: rebuilding 'build.ninja': subcommand failed error: script "bd" exited with code 1 __F:-1:S:0 release without fix: all passed bun test v1.4.3-canary.1 (65eea2a) test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts: HTTP/1.1 GET https://localhost:46229/ User-Agent: Bun/1.4.3 Accept: */* Host: localhost:46229 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br, zstd < 200 OK < Content-Type: text/plain < X-Peer-CN: < Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2026 22:06:48 GMT < Connection: keep-alive < Keep-Alive: timeout=5 < Transfer-Encoding: chunked (pass) allow renegotiation in fetch [13.74ms] (pass) should fail if renegotiation fails using fetch [2.80ms] (pass) allow renegotiation in https module [24.80ms] (pass) should fail if renegotiation fails using https [4.71ms] (pass) allow renegotiation in tls module [5.06ms] (pass) pauseOnConnect acts on the first handshake only, not on a renegotiation [105.36ms] (pass) should not crash when socket is closed inside the renegotiation handshake callback [13.31ms] (pass) should terminate the connection when the peer exceeds the renegotiation limit over a duplex socket [224.50ms] (pass) a renegotiation keeps the failed certificate check (end() mid-handshake: true) [97.95ms] (pass) a renegotiation keeps the failed certificate check (end() mid-handshake: false) [100.16ms] (pass) should fail if r ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>passes on PR (with fix)</summary> ```console ASAN with fix: all passed $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts bun test v1.4.3 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts: HTTP/1.1 GET https://localhost:39677/ User-Agent: Bun/1.4.3-debug Accept: */* Host: localhost:39677 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br, zstd < 200 OK < Content-Type: text/plain < X-Peer-CN: < Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2026 22:07:43 GMT < Connection: keep-alive < Keep-Alive: timeout=5 < Transfer-Encoding: chunked (pass) allow renegotiation in fetch [53.61ms] (pass) should fail if renegotiation fails using fetch [14.55ms] (pass) allow renegotiation in https module [1317.12ms] (pass) should fail if renegotiation fails using https [121.66ms] (pass) allow renegotiation in tls module [71.41ms] (pass) pauseOnConnect acts on the first handshake only, not on a renegotiation [138.94ms] (pass) should not crash when socket is closed inside the renegotiation handshake callback [337.80ms] (pass) should terminate the connection when the peer exceeds the renegotiation limit over a duplex socket [ ... (truncated) release with fix: all passed $ bun scripts/build.ts --profile=release [configured] bun-profile → bun (stripped) in 1103ms (unchanged) ninja: Entering directory `/workspace/bun/build/release' [0/2] cargo plan → /workspace/bun/build/release/rust-target/plan.json 244 units: 172 lib, 16 proc-macro (host), 19 custom-build (host), 15 run custom-build, 17 lib (host), 4 run custom-build (host), 1 rlib [1/214] gen generated_host_exports.rs generated_host_exports.rs: 121 exports (host=5, lazy=10, generic=106, rust=0); 245 extern-C blocks audited [2/214] gen BunProcess.lut.h Generating /workspace/bun/build/release/codegen/BunProcess.lut.h from /workspace/bun/src/jsc/bindings/BunProcess.cpp [3/214] gen cpp.rs (cppbind) [4/214] gen JS modules (bundle-modules) Preprocess modules (7364ms) Bundle modules (95ms) Postprocesss modules (197ms) Bundle Functions (518ms) Generate Code (40ms) [8.23s] Bundled "src/js" for production 2597 kb 197 internal modules 13 native modules 50 internal functions across 16 files [5/211] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c.o [6/211] build.rs build_script_build [7/211] rustc bun_platform [8/211] rustc bun_core [9/211] rustc bun_output [10/211] rustc bun_ ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>diff hotspot</summary> ``` packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c | 5 +- src/js/node/net.ts | 7 +- src/uws/lib.rs | 57 ++-- .../js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts | 334 +++++++++++++++++++++ test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts | 94 ++++++ 5 files changed, 470 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) ``` </details> **gate history** · 1 passed · 0 rejected · iteration 0 <details><summary>evidence per changed file</summary> ``` file reads edits tests packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c 1 2 37 src/js/node/net.ts 2 0 36 src/uws/lib.rs 6 6 38 test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts 2 0 28 test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts 2 1 16 ``` </details>

…r end() (#44290) Regression from #42181 (in no release). Merge before 1.4.3 is tagged, and before #43957 and #43962. ### Problem - After `end()` during its handshake, a node:tls client accepts a trusted certificate for another name: no error, and it reads the server's data. Node and Bun 1.4.2 report `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. - `on_handshake` (`src/runtime/socket/socket_body.rs`) passed its name verdict to the handler as the success flag. After `end()`, `onClientHandshake` (`src/js/node/net.ts:496`) reads a failure with no error as the client's own close and skips `checkServerIdentity`. ### Fix - `on_handshake` no longer runs the native name check for a node:tls socket. The handler's flag is the handshake result. - `Bun.connect` and `upgradeTLS` sockets do not change. - Verified: `node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts`, 19 new tests. `main` fails 18. Node v26.3.0 passes 49, skips 1. - Self-reviewed: 10 concerns raised, 10 addressed. One is #44422 (`onClientHandshake` reads some failed handshakes as established). ### Background - node:tls checks the name in JS (`checkServerIdentity`), on sockets that `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY` marks. The native check ran for them: another name gave `(false, null)`, like a handshake that fails after this side's FIN. - Considered a `getAuthorizationError()` test in the guard, or a second flag variable: both keep an unused native check. ### Downsides - Needs a maintainer's yes: the internal `socket._handle.authorized` and `getAuthorizationError()` of a node:tls client drop the name check (no reader in `src/js` or `test`). The public values do not change. - Still open (#43957): only the first such connection of a process reports if its server keeps its side open. <details><summary>Notes</summary> **The regression** (`tls.connect({ socket })` on a connected socket, then `end()`. Trusted chain, certificate for another name, server in the same process, 3 runs each) | Runtime | Output | |---|---| | Node v26.3.0 | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | | Bun 1.4.2 (744846f) | `error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | | Bun 1.3.13 | `end, finish, error ECONNRESET, close` | | canary 1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939, has #42181) | `finish, end, close`, no error | | this PR | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | - #42181 (44e51b7) is on `main` and is not an ancestor of the tag `bun-v1.4.2`. The client handler at that tag has no such guard. **Merge order, and why** - This PR first. Both later PRs let more handshakes complete after `end()`, and on `main` each of those accepts a certificate for another name. - #43957 removes the engine defect that today keeps the second and later connections of a process from completing such a handshake. Merged before this PR, it turns one silently accepted connection into all of them. Measured with five connections in one process (`tls.connect({ socket })`, another name, server keeps its side open): on `main` 1 of 5 handshakes completes, and the client reports no error for it. On `main` with the source change of #43957, 5 of 5 complete with no error. - #43962 sends a client's FIN after its ClientHello. It contains this PR's commits. - With #43957 only the test file conflicts: both PRs insert a block. Keep both. **Where the native check came from** - #31339 added the native name check for all clients. - #32359 proposed to remove it and was closed for #33755. #33755 added `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY`: the check stayed enforced for `Bun.connect`, and for node:tls it was computed but not enforced. It took node:tls sockets out of `reject_unauthorized` and out of the error argument. - #42181 then added the guard for "failed after our own FIN", which is the same pair as "computed, another name". - #43863 says "Each connection has one server name check", and lists node:tls as "checked after the handshake, in JS". - This PR is the node:tls half of #32359. It does not touch the check for `Bun.connect`. - #43865, #43924 and #43947 are the fixes of the chain check in the same test file. **What the client handler gets from the fd engine** (`packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c`) `on_handshake` calls the handler with `(socket, flag, error)`. For a node:tls client: | Case | Before | Now | |---|---|---| | Handshake completed, chain and name good | `true, null` | `true, null` | | Handshake completed, chain good, another name | `false, null` | `true, null` | | Handshake completed, chain bad | `true, X509 error` | `true, X509 error` | | Chain refused inside the handshake | `false, X509 error` | `false, X509 error` | | Handshake failed after this side's FIN | `false, null` | `false, null` | | Handshake failed with a TLS reason | `false, EPROTO` | `false, EPROTO` | | The peer closed before the handshake finished | `false, ECONNRESET` | `false, ECONNRESET` | - Row 2 and row 5 were the same pair. The guard that #42181 added for row 5 also caught row 2 once the client had ended. - With no `end()`, row 2 already reached `checkServerIdentity`, because the guard tests `writableFinished`. So a client that does not end behaves as before. - `Bun.connect` and `upgradeTLS` sockets do not carry `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY`. Their flag is `authorized`, as documented. **Rows that this PR does not change** The engine for a Duplex, a named pipe and TLS inside TLS (`SSLWrapper`, `src/uws/lib.rs`) reports no TLS reason. A failed handshake arrives as `(false, null)` after a verified chain and as `(false, X509 code)` otherwise. `onClientHandshake` reads both as an established session unless the client rejects the code. Measured on this PR with a client over a Duplex that does not call `end()`: | The peer answers the ClientHello with | `rejectUnauthorized` | `main`, Bun 1.4.2 and this PR | Node v26.3.0 | |---|---|---|---| | a fatal `handshake_failure` alert | `true` | `error UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, close` | `error ERR_SSL_SSL/TLS_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, close` | | a fatal `handshake_failure` alert | `false` | `secureConnect authorized=false authError=UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT`, `end` | `error ERR_SSL_SSL/TLS_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, close` | | bytes that are not TLS | `false` | `secureConnect authorized=false authError=UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT`, `end` | `error ERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER, close` | | a `close_notify` alert | either | no event | `end, error ECONNRESET, close` | - These rows are older than this PR: Bun 1.4.2 prints them too. The native socket is marked unusable after a failed handshake (`transport_unusable` in `on_handshake`). - Owners: #32929 (the engine reports the fatal alert over a Duplex), #44223 and #44021 (a refused renegotiation). - #44422 makes a handshake that did not complete terminal in `onClientHandshake`, as it is in the server handler. This PR is the step before it: while `(false, null)` could be a completed handshake, that arm could not go. It stays out of this PR so that this PR can land, or be reverted, alone. **What the native handle of a node:tls client reports** (trusted chain, another name, `rejectUnauthorized: false`, measured) | Value | `main` | This PR | |---|---|---| | `socket.authorized` | `false` | `false` | | `socket.authorizationError` | `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` | `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` | | `socket._handle.authorized` | `false` | `true` | | `socket._handle.getAuthorizationError()` | `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` | `null` | - The native check for these sockets had three effects on `main`: the flag in row 2 above, and the two internal values. - The in-handshake check (`server_identity`) already left node:tls sockets out. Both sites now agree. - `Flags::HOSTNAME_MISMATCH` has no reader on `main`. This PR does not remove it. - The hunk that stops the native check came from an optional finding of an automated review. No person has reviewed it yet. **Measured** (Linux x64, debug builds, Node v26.3.0, server in its own Node process, 40 s watchdog) `tls.connect({ socket })` on a connected socket, then `end()`. The chain is trusted, the certificate is for another name, `rejectUnauthorized: true`: | Server | TLS | Node | `main` (d115f54) | This PR | |---|---|---|---|---| | keeps its side open | 1.3 | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | `finish`, never exits | same as Node | | ordinary | 1.3 | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | `finish, end, close`, no error | same as Node | | keeps its side open | 1.2 | `finish`, never exits | `finish`, never exits | same as Node | | ordinary | 1.2 | `finish, end, error ECONNRESET, close` | same as Node | same as Node | - `end()` in the same tick and `end()` one `setImmediate` later give the same lines. - In the new tests the handshake completes after the client's `end()` under TLS 1.2 and over a Duplex as well. There `main` delivers `secret-banner` to a client with `rejectUnauthorized: true`. - A client that passes its own `checkServerIdentity` is asked: one test asserts the name that it gets, and `authorized=true` when it accepts. **Still open, the engine** - Each line of the table above is the first connection of its process. Five such connections, one after the other in one process, against a server that keeps its side open: with this PR the first reports and the other four print `finish` only. `main` does the same when the name is good. The flight that the first socket seals after its FIN takes the event loop's one spill slot and never leaves it. #43957 is open for that. - `tls.connect(port)` followed at once by `end()` still sends its FIN before its ClientHello, so no handshake runs there. #43962 changes that order. - #43957 is open for the spill slot. Measured with its source change on this PR: all five connections report, for another name and for a good name. - A handshake that fails after `end()` with no certificate still reports nothing. The tests of #42181 and #43947 for that case pass. **Tests** - 19 new tests against `main`: the name check after `end()` over a Duplex, over TCP behind a record proxy (TLS 1.2 and 1.3) and on a connected `net.Socket` (3 each), `end()` and `end("")` in the turn of `tls.connect()` over a socket that is still connecting and over a Duplex (6), and a resumed session (1, Bun only). - 7 of them are the commit of another branch (`robobun/baba0385/tls-early-end-hostname-check`), taken as it is. The resumed-session test now asserts `isSessionReused()`. - `main` (4b02e10) fails 18 of the 19. The one that passes is `end("")` over a Duplex. **Suites** (this machine ran at a load average of 200 to 800) - On this head: `node-tls-duplex-end-verify` (50 of 50), `node-tls-connect` (121), `tls-reject-before-client-cert` (121), `node-https-agent-checkserveridentity-reuse` (30), `renegotiation` (21), `node-tls-wrapped-socket-close` (15), `node-tls-connect-hostname-verification` (11), `node-tls-upgrade` (5), `node-tls-raw-end` (4), `node-https-checkServerIdentity` (4). - On the head before the rebase: 14 vendored Node tests that use `checkServerIdentity` or the name error, `fetch.tls` (61). `socket.test.ts`, `node-tls-cert` and `node-tls-server` had only failures that `main` has on this machine too (timeouts of child processes, and one test that needs `www.example.com`). - Not run on this machine: macOS, Windows. </details>

keep certificate check when a tls socket ends early

aa7b701

coderabbitai Bot reviewed Sep 24, 2026

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Comment thread test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts

claude Bot reviewed Sep 24, 2026

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Comment thread src/uws/lib.rs

Comment thread src/uws/lib.rs

alii merged commit 0cbfe81 into main Sep 24, 2026
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alii deleted the claude/tls-shutdown-keeps-verify-error branch September 24, 2026 01:21

robobun mentioned this pull request Sep 24, 2026

tls: always report the certificate verdict of a finished handshake #43924

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robobun mentioned this pull request Oct 1, 2026

node:tls: check the server's name for a handshake that completes after end() #44290

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Harden TLS handshake verify - #43865

Harden TLS handshake verify#43865
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