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…secureConnection') Node's https.Server is a tls.Server: 'connection' runs tlsConnectionListener, which puts the server-side TLS layer over the fed duplex, and the HTTP parser attaches on the 'secureConnection' its handshake emits. Bun's https.Server is http.Server with TLS options, so a fed plain socket had its ClientHello parsed as HTTP (plaintext 400 into the TLS client) and a fed TLSSocket was ignored. On a TLS http.Server, connectionListener now wraps the socket in a server-side TLSSocket the way tls.Server's 'connection' listener does, a 'secureConnection' listener attaches the HTTP/1 parser, and 'tlsClientError' forwards to 'clientError' like lib/https.js.
Lift the server-side TLSSocket wrap out of tls.Server's constructor into one tlsConnectionListener (tls.Server.prototype[kTlsConnectionListener]) and register that from node:http's TLS-mode Server instead of a copy. The http.Server carries the tls.Server fields it reads (_requestCert, _rejectUnauthorized, _SNICallback, ALPNProtocols, _ALPNCallback, _handshakeTimeout) and a [kSharedCreds] built from its options with the tls.Server server-cipher-preference default, so SNICallback and ALPNCallback run for a fed connection as they do in Node.
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No actionable comments were generated in the recent review. 🎉 ℹ️ Recent review info⚙️ Run configurationConfiguration used: Path: .coderabbit.yaml Review profile: ASSERTIVE Plan: Essentials Run ID: 📒 Files selected for processing (3)
Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 10 included reviews per hour; 0 remain after this review. WalkthroughThis change adds reusable TLS connection handling, integrates TLS options and shared credentials into HTTP servers, routes completed handshakes into HTTP processing, and adds HTTPS socket adoption tests covering HTTP parsing, errors, SNI, ALPN, and keep-alive behavior. ChangesHTTPS server adoption
Suggested reviewers: Priority: ➖ Normal Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The HTTPS socket-adoption changes are ready to merge based on the reviewed behavior and passing coverage. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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Status: ready for review. Reproduced on bun 1.4.2 / main @ 4ff9193 against node v26.3.0 with a front
With this branch both feeds serve CI: the diff is green. The one red test, |
…egotiates from the static list
https.createServer() already converts the list onto the server, new
https.Server({ ALPNProtocols }) did not, and tlsConnectionListener reads
this.ALPNProtocols.
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Actionable comments posted: 1
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Inline comments:
In `@src/js/node/_http_server.ts`:
- Around line 437-443: Update Server.prototype[kSharedCreds] to construct the
shared secure context from the normalized TLS state in this[tlsSymbol],
including normalized requestCert and rejectUnauthorized values, rather than raw
this[optionsSymbol]. Preserve the existing honorCipherOrder behavior and lazy
caching via _sharedCreds.
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src/js/internal/net/symbols.tssrc/js/node/_http_server.tssrc/js/node/tls.tstest/js/node/http/node-http.test.ts
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Updated 5:29 PM PT - Sep 10th, 2026
❌ @robobun, your commit 6d320a8 has 1 failures in 🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 42239That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-42239 --bun |
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Re-reviewed after 97b26d2 — the ALPNProtocols gap I flagged is fixed (convertALPNProtocols now runs in the TLS-mode Server constructor, and the new assertion on new https.Server({..., ALPNProtocols}).ALPNProtocols covers it). No further bugs found; a human look is still worthwhile since this reshapes the https.Server → tls.Server bridge for fed connections.
What was reviewed:
- The extracted
tlsConnectionListenerin tls.ts is byte-equivalent to the old inline body except for theNetServer.prototype[kArmHandshakeTimeout].$call(this, ...)change, which is needed because the http.Serverthishas no own[kArmHandshakeTimeout]. _requestCert/_rejectUnauthorized/_SNICallback/_ALPNCallback/ALPNProtocols/_handshakeTimeout/[kSharedCreds]now cover every fieldtlsConnectionListenerreads offthis.- The
convertALPNProtocolscall added here overlaps with the onehttps.createServeralready does at https.ts:518-520 — redundant for that entry point but not incorrect, and needed for directnew https.Server(...).
Extended reasoning...
Overview
This PR makes Bun's TLS-mode http.Server (i.e. https.Server) adopt sockets injected via emit('connection', sock) and emit('secureConnection', tlsSock), matching Node where https.Server is a tls.Server. It extracts tls.Server's inline 'connection' handler into a shared tlsConnectionListener exposed via a private symbol, and the http.Server constructor's TLS branch now stores the tls.Server-shape instance fields that listener reads, registers 'secureConnection' → HTTP-parser and 'tlsClientError' → 'clientError' forwarding, and lazily builds _sharedCreds. Four tests exercise fed-connection HTTP over TLS, direct secureConnection feed, plaintext-into-TLS error routing, and SNI/ALPN callback dispatch.
Security risks
The change touches TLS server setup for the fed-connection path only: _requestCert, _rejectUnauthorized, SNI/ALPN callbacks, handshake timeout, and secure-context construction. These are read from the same options object the native listener already consumes and are stored the way tls.Server stores them; rejectUnauthorized is passed through from the normalized TLS options without truthy-coercion. The native Bun.serve accept path is unchanged (fed listeners early-return on NodeHTTPServerSocket). I did not find a way this weakens verification for existing connections, but it is TLS-adjacent surface.
Level of scrutiny
Medium-high. The diff is modest (~150 src lines) and largely a refactor-and-share of an existing listener body plus field mirroring, with Node source permalinks cited for each piece. However, it wires TLS handshake, ALPN/SNI, and cert verification options through a new code path and adds new user-observable validation (ERR_TLS_ALPN_CALLBACK_WITH_PROTOCOLS, handshakeTimeout type check) on https.Server construction. Per the approval guidelines, TLS/crypto paths should get a human look rather than auto-approval.
Other factors
The previous inline finding (missing ALPNProtocols on the TLS-mode Server) was addressed in 97b26d2 with both the constructor fix and a direct test on new https.Server(...).ALPNProtocols, plus the existing fed-connection test already asserts alpnProtocol === "http/1.1" via the https.createServer default. The added convertALPNProtocols call duplicates what https.createServer in https.ts already does after constructing the server, but that is benign (idempotent overwrite) and necessary for the new https.Server(opts) entry point. No outstanding third-party CHANGES_REQUESTED reviews are visible in the timeline.
…ctUnauthorized, trim comments
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Closing in favor of #42594. It fixes the same bug with a smaller change that applies to current I built #42594 at 82a9d26 and ran this PR's tests and probes on it, with node v26.3.0 as the reference:
What this PR has and #42594 does not have:
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Problem
https.Servercannot be fed a connection by a front server that hands sockets over (sticky-sessionworkers, SNI routers).server.emit('connection', plainSocket)parses the TLS ClientHello as HTTP:clientErrorfires withHPE_INVALID_METHODand a plaintextHTTP/1.1 400 Bad Requestgoes into the TLS client.server.emit('secureConnection', tlsSocket)is ignored. Node serves both.https.Serverishttp.Serverwith TLS options (http.Serverandhttps.Serverare the same class, soserver instanceof https.Serveris true for a plain HTTP server #41781), which registers only the plain-HTTPconnectionListener(src/js/node/_http_server.ts:267). Node'shttps.Serveris atls.Server:'connection'runstlsConnectionListener,'secureConnection'attaches the parser.Fix
tls.Server's'connection'wrap (a server-sideTLSSocketover the fed duplex) becomes onetlsConnectionListenerintls.ts. The TLS-modehttp.Serverregisters the same function and carries thetls.Serverfields it reads (_requestCert,_SNICallback,_ALPNCallback,_handshakeTimeout,[kSharedCreds], ...).'secureConnection'attaches the HTTP/1 parser that plainhttp.Server.emit('connection')already uses.'tlsClientError'forwards to'clientError'like lib/https.js.NodeHTTPServerSocket) skip both listeners, so theBun.servepath is unchanged.test/js/node/http/node-http.test.ts(four new tests, all fail on stock bun), the whole file, and the vendoredtest-https-*/test-tls-*subsets.Background
https.Serverextendstls.Serverextendsnet.Server, and each layer is an event listener. So user code can inject a socket withemit().https.Serverserves its own connections natively throughBun.serve. Injected sockets take JS fallbacks:new tls.TLSSocket(duplex, { isServer: true })for TLS,internal/http1_server_fallbackfor HTTP/1.TLSSockethas.serverset to the https server, so the accept handlers innet.tsemit'secureConnection'and'tlsClientError'there and run its SNI and ALPN callbacks.Notes
Upgradehandoff,close()/closeIdleConnections()/closeAllConnections()reaching an idle fed connection, handshake timeout (ERR_TLS_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUTthroughclientError), plaintext into the fed socket (ERR_SSL_HTTP_REQUESTthroughtlsClientErrorthenclientError, nothing written back), mutual TLS withrequestCert(authorized peer, andERR_SSL_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATEwithout a client cert),pfx,minVersion/maxVersion/ciphers,SNICallbackandALPNCallback. Event counts and socket properties (encrypted,instanceof TLSSocket,server,servername,alpnProtocol,getProtocol()) match. The only difference seen is the order in which the TLS library calls the SNI and ALPN callbacks (BoringSSL: SNI first).server._sharedCreds(Node's field name), from the constructor options plus the normalizedrequestCert/rejectUnauthorized, withhonorCipherOrderdefaulting to true as ontls.Server. A context that fails to build destroys the socket and emits'error'on the server, astls.Server's fed path does. The native listener keeps building its own config from the same options.options.handshakeTimeout,options.SNICallbackandoptions.ALPNCallbackare now validated on anhttps.Serverthe waytls.Servervalidates them (ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE,ERR_TLS_ALPN_CALLBACK_WITH_PROTOCOLS), andnew https.Server({ ALPNProtocols })stores the converted list on the server ashttps.createServer()already did. They only take effect on the fed path here. The native https listener still does not run them (node:https: thread SNICallback through to the TLS listener #36707 threadsSNICallbackthere, node:https: enforce server handshakeTimeout #33541 / node: fix the genuine-hang class — MessagePort loop starvation, pinned sockets, https handshakeTimeout, TLS alert errors (+2 tests) #35538 enforcehandshakeTimeoutthere, node:https: emit tlsClientError on server handshake failures #33531 emitstlsClientErrorthere). This PR does not conflict with what those do, but it touches the same constructor block, so whichever lands second rebases.https.Serverinto its own class. When one lands, the TLS-mode registrations added here move with the TLS option handling into that class unchanged.test-https-timeout.jshangs on debug builds with and without this change. That is a separate client-side bug (req.setTimeout()shorter than the TLS handshake never fires) and is tracked separately. So is atls.Servergap found while probing: anSNICallbackthat returns aSecureContextdrops ALPN negotiation.[human-review] gate passed · iteration 0 · 4 files touched
fails on main (without fix)
passes on PR (with fix)
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