fix(ci): complete injection prevention in translation review workflow

[pettinarip]

Summary

• Move remaining GitHub context values to env blocks in "Get PR number" step to prevent shell injection
• Add numeric validation for PR numbers before downstream usage
• Apply same pattern to "Post acknowledgment" step for consistency

Context

This extends the security fixes from #17560, which addressed auth bypass and command injection vulnerabilities but left the "Get PR number" step using direct shell interpolation. While the risk was lower (PR numbers are typically numeric), this change applies defense-in-depth by:

1. Moving github.event_name, github.event.inputs.pr_number, github.event.pull_request.number, and github.event.issue.number to the env: block
2. Adding explicit numeric validation before outputting the PR number
3. Applying the same pattern to the "Post acknowledgment" step

Test plan

• Verify workflow triggers correctly on workflow_dispatch
• Verify workflow triggers correctly on issue_comment
• Verify workflow triggers correctly on pull_request
• Verify numeric validation rejects non-numeric inputs

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[wackerow]

Security Review

PR: fix(ci): complete injection prevention in translation review workflow #17576
Reviewed: 2026-02-16
Risk: CLEAR

Findings

No security issues identified.

This PR is a security hardening that closes the remaining injection vectors in the "Get PR number" and "Post acknowledgment" steps, extending the fixes from #17560.

Changes reviewed:

• "Get PR number" step (.github/workflows/claude-review-translations.yml:84-101): Moves github.event_name, github.event.inputs.pr_number, github.event.pull_request.number, and github.event.issue.number from direct ${{ }} interpolation in run: to env: block. Adds numeric regex validation (^[0-9]+$) before output. Both correct.

• "Post acknowledgment" step (:162-176): Moves steps.pr.outputs.number and run URL to env vars. Properly quotes "$PR_NUMBER" in the gh pr comment call. Correct.

• Remaining ${{ }} in file: All remaining references (lines 177-189) are inside with: YAML inputs to the Claude Code Action, not run: blocks — not shell injection vectors.

• Authorization logic: Unchanged — still uses correct fromJSON('["..."]') array matching (lines 55, 62, 69). No regression.

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Areas Reviewed

• GitHub Workflow Security

Not applicable: API Route Security, SSRF & External Fetching, XSS & Content Injection, Security Headers & Transport, Dependencies & Supply Chain, Secrets & Configuration

Limitations

None.

[fmendezespinoza887-max]