fix(ci): prevent auth bypass and command injection in Claude workflows#17560
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Replace substring-matching contains() with array-based exact matching in both claude.yml and claude-review-translations.yml to prevent unauthorized users with partial username matches from triggering workflows. Move github.event.comment.body from direct shell interpolation to env variable to prevent command injection via crafted PR comments. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pettinarip
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Feb 16, 2026
Move remaining GitHub context values to env blocks to prevent potential shell injection. Add numeric validation for PR numbers before downstream usage. Extends the security fixes from #17560 to cover the "Get PR number" and "Post acknowledgment" steps that were not addressed in the original PR.
This was referenced Feb 16, 2026
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Summary
Fixes two security vulnerabilities in the Claude workflow files (
claude.ymlandclaude-review-translations.yml) reported via responsible disclosure.1. Auth bypass via substring matching
contains('minimalsm,pettinarip,wackerow,nloureiro,konopkja', github.event.comment.user.login)performs string substring matching, meaning a GitHub user with a login likewacke,sm, oripwould pass the authorization check.Fix: Replaced with
contains(fromJSON('["minimalsm","pettinarip","wackerow","nloureiro","konopkja"]'), ...)which performs exact array element matching.claude-review-translations.yml: 3 locations (issue_comment, PR review comment, pull_request triggers)claude.yml: 4 locations (issue_comment, PR review comment, PR review, issues triggers)2. Command injection via shell interpolation
COMMENT_BODY="${{ github.event.comment.body }}"directly interpolated user-controlled comment content into a bash script. An attacker passing the (broken) auth check could execute arbitrary commands via$(malicious_command)in their comment body, enabling secret exfiltration.Fix: Moved all user-controlled values (
comment.body,event_name, workflow dispatch inputs) into the step'senv:block. Environment variables are not subject to shell expansion, preventing injection. Added input validation regex for the language parameter as defense-in-depth.Branch impact assessment
The
devbranch hasrestrictionsconfigured limiting pushes to the team.github-actions[bot]is not in this team, so direct writes todevwere not possible via this vector. Prior to thix fix, the command injection could have been used to exfiltrate repository secrets (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, NETLIFY_TOKEN, etc.) and modify PR branch content. Both vectors are now closed.