fix: gracefully handle missing systemctl in container environments

[dashed]

Summary

hermes status and hermes gateway status crash with FileNotFoundError when running inside Docker/Kubernetes containers where systemd is not available.

This PR adds container/K8s environment detection and shows proper gateway status using PID-based health checks instead of systemctl.

Before (container)

$ hermes status
...
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File ".../status.py", line 293, in show_status
    result = subprocess.run(["systemctl", "--user", "is-active", ...])
FileNotFoundError: [Errno 2] No such file or directory: 'systemctl'

After (container)

◆ Gateway Service
  Status:       ✓ running
  Manager:      container/K8s

Matches the systemd path's format exactly (✓ running / ✗ stopped) — only the manager line differs.

Fork branch: fix/container-systemctl-status — part of the dashed/hermes-agent modular fork. See FORK_WORKFLOW.md. Also submitted upstream as NousResearch/hermes-agent#4415.

Problem

On Linux, show_status() and systemd_status() unconditionally run systemctl --user is-active hermes-gateway. The except clause only catches TimeoutExpired, not FileNotFoundError.

Fix

Container detection

_is_container_env() in gateway.py checks:

• KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST env var (K8s-injected)
• shutil.which("systemctl") fallback (Docker, LXC, etc.)

Gateway status in containers

Uses is_gateway_running() from gateway.status — PID-based liveness check:

• Reads gateway.pid, verifies process alive via os.kill(pid, 0)
• Displays ✓ running / ✗ stopped (same format as systemd path)

systemd_status() also shows runtime details from gateway_state.json (platform statuses, gateway state).

Changes

File	Change
hermes_cli/gateway.py	_is_container_env() helper; container-aware systemd_status() with runtime details; _is_service_running() early return
hermes_cli/status.py	Container detection + PID-based health check via is_gateway_running()
tests/hermes_cli/test_container_detection.py	10 tests (unit + e2e)

Behavior matrix

Environment	Before	After
Linux + systemd	✓ running / ✗ stopped	No change
macOS + launchd	Works normally	No change
K8s container	Crashes	✓ running / ✗ stopped, Manager: container/K8s
Docker container	Crashes	✓ running / ✗ stopped, Manager: container/K8s

Test coverage

10 tests in tests/hermes_cli/test_container_detection.py:

Class	Tests	What's tested
TestIsContainerEnv	4	K8s env var, missing systemctl, normal Linux, both indicators
TestSystemdStatusContainer	2	Running status in containers, no subprocess calls
TestIsServiceRunningContainer	2	Returns False in containers, calls systemctl otherwise
TestStatusOutputContainer	2	E2E: full show_status() output — container vs normal Linux

uv run pytest tests/hermes_cli/test_container_detection.py -v

Test plan

• All 10 tests pass
• hermes status shows ✓ running + container/K8s in K8s pod (verified on Hetzner K3s)
• hermes gateway status shows running state with runtime details
• Non-container behavior unchanged
• Deployed and verified on live Hetzner K3s cluster (image 36f3d3853dc7)

[github-actions]

⚠️ Supply Chain Risk Detected

This PR contains patterns commonly associated with supply chain attacks. This does not mean the PR is malicious — but these patterns require careful human review before merging.

⚠️ WARNING: exec() or eval() usage

Dynamic code execution can hide malicious behavior, especially when combined with base64 or network fetches.

Matches (first 20):

15104:+Persistent memory via the `brv` CLI — hierarchical knowledge tree with tiered retrieval (fuzzy text → LLM-driven search).
15152:+a hierarchical context tree with tiered retrieval (fuzzy text → LLM-driven
29305:+shell injection, SQL injection, path traversal, eval()/exec() with user input,
50300:+    def _start_modal_exec(self, prepared: PreparedModalExec) -> ModalExecStart:
50349:+    def _poll_modal_exec(self, handle: _ManagedModalExecHandle) -> dict | None:
50376:+    def _cancel_modal_exec(self, handle: _ManagedModalExecHandle) -> None:
50377:+        self._cancel_exec(handle.exec_id)
50476:+    def _cancel_exec(self, exec_id: str) -> None:
50528:+Uses ``Sandbox.create()`` + ``Sandbox.exec()`` instead of the older runtime
50880:+    def _start_modal_exec(self, prepared: PreparedModalExec) -> ModalExecStart:
50946:+    def _poll_modal_exec(self, handle: _DirectModalExecHandle) -> dict | None:
50953:+    def _cancel_modal_exec(self, handle: _DirectModalExecHandle) -> None:
51060:+        prepared = self._prepare_modal_exec(
51068:+            start = self._start_modal_exec(prepared)
51087:+                    self._cancel_modal_exec(start.handle)
51093:+                result = self._poll_modal_exec(start.handle)
51102:+                    self._cancel_modal_exec(start.handle)
51113:+    def _prepare_modal_exec(
51153:+    def _start_modal_exec(self, prepared: PreparedModalExec) -> ModalExecStart:
51157:+    def _poll_modal_exec(self, handle: Any) -> dict | None:

⚠️ WARNING: Outbound network calls (POST/PUT)

Outbound POST/PUT requests in new code could be data exfiltration. Verify the destination URLs are legitimate.

Matches (first 10):

1024:+        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=15) as resp:
20065:+        resp = self._httpx.post(
53920:+    response = requests.post(base_url, json=payload, headers=headers, timeout=60)

⚠️ WARNING: Install hook files modified

These files can execute code during package installation or interpreter startup.

Files:

hermes_cli/memory_setup.py
hermes_cli/setup.py
skills/productivity/google-workspace/scripts/setup.py
tests/hermes_cli/test_setup.py
tests/skills/test_google_oauth_setup.py

⚠️ WARNING: marshal/pickle/compile usage

These can deserialize or construct executable code objects.

Matches:

29306:+pickle.loads(), obfuscated commands.

---

Automated scan triggered by supply-chain-audit. If this is a false positive, a maintainer can approve after manual review.

[github-actions]

⚠️ Supply Chain Risk Detected

This PR contains patterns commonly associated with supply chain attacks. This does not mean the PR is malicious — but these patterns require careful human review before merging.

⚠️ WARNING: base64 encoding/decoding detected

Base64 has legitimate uses (images, JWT, etc.) but is also commonly used to obfuscate malicious payloads. Verify the usage is appropriate.

Matches (first 20):

69508:+    encoded = base64.b64encode(content.encode("utf-8")).decode("ascii")
69634:+                encoded_result = base64.b64encode(

⚠️ WARNING: exec() or eval() usage

Dynamic code execution can hide malicious behavior, especially when combined with base64 or network fetches.

Matches (first 20):

69069:+        return _browser_eval(expression, task_id)
69079:+def _browser_eval(expression: str, task_id: Optional[str] = None) -> str:
69082:+        return _camofox_eval(expression, task_id)
69119:+def _camofox_eval(expression: str, task_id: Optional[str] = None) -> str:

⚠️ WARNING: Outbound network calls (POST/PUT)

Outbound POST/PUT requests in new code could be data exfiltration. Verify the destination URLs are legitimate.

Matches (first 10):

14678:+        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
20714:+        resp = requests.post(url, files={"file": (filename, io.BytesIO(data), mime_type)}, data=fields, headers=headers, timeout=30)
21731:+        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=self._timeout + 3):
68341:+        with patch("tools.osv_check.urllib.request.urlopen", side_effect=ConnectionError("timeout")):
68797:+        response = requests.post(
71688:+    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=_TIMEOUT) as resp:
73999:+content = urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30).read().decode()
74099:+data = json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=30).read())
74360:+        resp = httpx.post(f"{MEMORY_API}/recall", json={
76820:+        resp = httpx.post(f"{MEMORY_API}/recall", json={

⚠️ WARNING: Install hook files modified

These files can execute code during package installation or interpreter startup.

Files:

hermes_cli/memory_setup.py
hermes_cli/setup.py
skills/productivity/google-workspace/scripts/setup.py

---

Automated scan triggered by supply-chain-audit. If this is a false positive, a maintainer can approve after manual review.

[dashed]

Closing — superseded by upstream PR NousResearch#8614 (salvaged from @alt-glitch's NousResearch#8573) / commit 5e1197a on 2026-04-12, which centralizes container detection in hermes_constants.is_container() + _run_systemctl() wrapper + shutil.which guard. More thorough than our fix. Branch kept on origin for historical reference.