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Migrate to the new stack probes option #85

Merged
merged 1 commit into from
Feb 11, 2021
Merged

Migrate to the new stack probes option #85

merged 1 commit into from
Feb 11, 2021

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ojeda
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@ojeda ojeda commented Feb 11, 2021

The stack probes options changed from taking a boolean to a set
of options. For the moment, use inline-or-call for both x86_64
and arm64, since that is what the x86 builtin targets moved to
and since we had it enabled for arm64 too (although note that
arm64 does not have it in the builtin target).

This also raises the minimum version of rustc to 2021-01-24,
which is just a few days from the previous one (2021-01-21), which
is easier than trying to support both formats.

Triggered by #84.

Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda [email protected]

The stack probes options changed from taking a boolean to a set
of options. For the moment, use `inline-or-call` for both x86_64
and arm64, since that is what the x86 builtin targets moved to
and since we had it enabled for arm64 too (although note that
arm64 does not have it in the builtin target).

This also raises the minimum version of `rustc` to 2021-01-24,
which is just a few days from the previous one (2021-01-21), which
is easier than trying to support both formats.

Triggered by #84.

Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <[email protected]>
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seems good :-)

@ojeda ojeda merged commit 095daad into rust Feb 11, 2021
@ojeda ojeda deleted the rust-stack-probes branch February 11, 2021 20:18
@ojeda ojeda mentioned this pull request Feb 12, 2021
ojeda pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 4, 2022
…sted

The current EOI handler for LEVEL triggered interrupts calls clk_enable(),
register IO, clk_disable(). The clock manipulation requires locking which
happens with IRQs disabled in clk_enable_lock(). Instead of turning the
clock on and off all the time, enable the clock in case LEVEL interrupt is
requested and keep the clock enabled until all LEVEL interrupts are freed.
The LEVEL interrupts are an exception on this platform and seldom used, so
this does not affect the common case.

This simplifies the LEVEL interrupt handling considerably and also fixes
the following splat found when using preempt-rt:
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:2040 __rt_mutex_trylock+0x37/0x62
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.109-rt65-stable-standard-00068-g6a5afc4b1217 #85
 Hardware name: STM32 (Device Tree Support)
 [<c010a45d>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010766f>] (show_stack+0xb/0xc)
 [<c010766f>] (show_stack) from [<c06353ab>] (dump_stack+0x6f/0x84)
 [<c06353ab>] (dump_stack) from [<c01145e3>] (__warn+0x7f/0xa4)
 [<c01145e3>] (__warn) from [<c063386f>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x3b/0x74)
 [<c063386f>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c063b43d>] (__rt_mutex_trylock+0x37/0x62)
 [<c063b43d>] (__rt_mutex_trylock) from [<c063c053>] (rt_spin_trylock+0x7/0x16)
 [<c063c053>] (rt_spin_trylock) from [<c036a2f3>] (clk_enable_lock+0xb/0x80)
 [<c036a2f3>] (clk_enable_lock) from [<c036ba69>] (clk_core_enable_lock+0x9/0x18)
 [<c036ba69>] (clk_core_enable_lock) from [<c034e9f3>] (stm32_gpio_get+0x11/0x24)
 [<c034e9f3>] (stm32_gpio_get) from [<c034ef43>] (stm32_gpio_irq_trigger+0x1f/0x48)
 [<c034ef43>] (stm32_gpio_irq_trigger) from [<c014aa53>] (handle_fasteoi_irq+0x71/0xa8)
 [<c014aa53>] (handle_fasteoi_irq) from [<c0147111>] (generic_handle_irq+0x19/0x22)
 [<c0147111>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<c014752d>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x55/0x64)
 [<c014752d>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c0346f13>] (gic_handle_irq+0x53/0x64)
 [<c0346f13>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c0100ba5>] (__irq_svc+0x65/0xc0)
 Exception stack(0xc0e01f18 to 0xc0e01f60)
 1f00:                                                       0000300c 00000000
 1f20: 0000300c c010ff01 00000000 00000000 c0e00000 c0e07714 00000001 c0e01f78
 1f40: c0e07758 00000000 ef7cd0ff c0e01f68 c010554b c0105542 40000033 ffffffff
 [<c0100ba5>] (__irq_svc) from [<c0105542>] (arch_cpu_idle+0xc/0x1e)
 [<c0105542>] (arch_cpu_idle) from [<c063be95>] (default_idle_call+0x21/0x3c)
 [<c063be95>] (default_idle_call) from [<c01324f7>] (do_idle+0xe3/0x1e4)
 [<c01324f7>] (do_idle) from [<c01327b3>] (cpu_startup_entry+0x13/0x14)
 [<c01327b3>] (cpu_startup_entry) from [<c0a00c13>] (start_kernel+0x397/0x3d4)
 [<c0a00c13>] (start_kernel) from [<00000000>] (0x0)
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000002 ]---

Power consumption measured on STM32MP157C DHCOM SoM is not increased or
is below noise threshold.

Fixes: 47beed5 ("pinctrl: stm32: Add level interrupt support to gpio irq chip")
Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexandre Torgue <[email protected]>
Cc: Fabien Dessenne <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Fabien Dessenne <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
ojeda pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 22, 2024
When I was testing mongodb over bcachefs with compression,
there is a lockdep warning when snapshotting mongodb data volume.

$ cat test.sh
prog=bcachefs

$prog subvolume create /mnt/data
$prog subvolume create /mnt/data/snapshots

while true;do
    $prog subvolume snapshot /mnt/data /mnt/data/snapshots/$(date +%s)
    sleep 1s
done

$ cat /etc/mongodb.conf
systemLog:
  destination: file
  logAppend: true
  path: /mnt/data/mongod.log

storage:
  dbPath: /mnt/data/

lockdep reports:
[ 3437.452330] ======================================================
[ 3437.452750] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 3437.453168] 6.7.0-rc7-custom+ #85 Tainted: G            E
[ 3437.453562] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 3437.453981] bcachefs/35533 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 3437.454325] ffffa0a02b2b1418 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: filename_create+0x62/0x190
[ 3437.454875]
               but task is already holding lock:
[ 3437.455268] ffffa0a02b2b10e0 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.456009]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[ 3437.456553]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 3437.457054]
               -> #3 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}:
[ 3437.457507]        down_read+0x3e/0x170
[ 3437.457772]        bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.458206]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0
[ 3437.458498]        do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0
[ 3437.458779]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 3437.459155]
               -> #2 (&c->snapshot_create_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
[ 3437.459615]        down_read+0x3e/0x170
[ 3437.459878]        bch2_truncate+0x82/0x110 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.460276]        bchfs_truncate+0x254/0x3c0 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.460686]        notify_change+0x1f1/0x4a0
[ 3437.461283]        do_truncate+0x7f/0xd0
[ 3437.461555]        path_openat+0xa57/0xce0
[ 3437.461836]        do_filp_open+0xb4/0x160
[ 3437.462116]        do_sys_openat2+0x91/0xc0
[ 3437.462402]        __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0
[ 3437.462701]        do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0
[ 3437.462982]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 3437.463359]
               -> #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#15){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 3437.463843]        down_write+0x3b/0xc0
[ 3437.464223]        bch2_write_iter+0x5b/0xcc0 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.464493]        vfs_write+0x21b/0x4c0
[ 3437.464653]        ksys_write+0x69/0xf0
[ 3437.464839]        do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0
[ 3437.465009]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 3437.465231]
               -> #0 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}-{0:0}:
[ 3437.465471]        __lock_acquire+0x1455/0x21b0
[ 3437.465656]        lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0
[ 3437.465822]        mnt_want_write+0x46/0x1a0
[ 3437.465996]        filename_create+0x62/0x190
[ 3437.466175]        user_path_create+0x2d/0x50
[ 3437.466352]        bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x2ec/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.466617]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0
[ 3437.466791]        do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0
[ 3437.466957]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 3437.467180]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[ 3437.469670] 2 locks held by bcachefs/35533:
               other info that might help us debug this:

[ 3437.467507] Chain exists of:
                 sb_writers#10 --> &c->snapshot_create_lock --> &type->s_umount_key#48

[ 3437.467979]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[ 3437.468223]        CPU0                    CPU1
[ 3437.468405]        ----                    ----
[ 3437.468585]   rlock(&type->s_umount_key#48);
[ 3437.468758]                                lock(&c->snapshot_create_lock);
[ 3437.469030]                                lock(&type->s_umount_key#48);
[ 3437.469291]   rlock(sb_writers#10);
[ 3437.469434]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[ 3437.469670] 2 locks held by bcachefs/35533:
[ 3437.469838]  #0: ffffa0a02ce00a88 (&c->snapshot_create_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x1e3/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.470294]  #1: ffffa0a02b2b10e0 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.470744]
               stack backtrace:
[ 3437.470922] CPU: 7 PID: 35533 Comm: bcachefs Kdump: loaded Tainted: G            E      6.7.0-rc7-custom+ #85
[ 3437.471313] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
[ 3437.471694] Call Trace:
[ 3437.471795]  <TASK>
[ 3437.471884]  dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x90
[ 3437.472035]  check_noncircular+0x132/0x150
[ 3437.472202]  __lock_acquire+0x1455/0x21b0
[ 3437.472369]  lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0
[ 3437.472518]  ? filename_create+0x62/0x190
[ 3437.472683]  ? lock_is_held_type+0x97/0x110
[ 3437.472856]  mnt_want_write+0x46/0x1a0
[ 3437.473025]  ? filename_create+0x62/0x190
[ 3437.473204]  filename_create+0x62/0x190
[ 3437.473380]  user_path_create+0x2d/0x50
[ 3437.473555]  bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x2ec/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.473819]  ? lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0
[ 3437.474002]  ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x190
[ 3437.474195]  ? __fget_files+0xbc/0x190
[ 3437.474380]  ? lock_release+0xc5/0x270
[ 3437.474567]  ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0
[ 3437.474764]  ? __pfx_bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.475090]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0
[ 3437.475277]  do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0
[ 3437.475454]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 3437.475691] RIP: 0033:0x7f2743c313af
======================================================

In __bch2_ioctl_subvolume_create(), we grab s_umount unconditionally
and unlock it at the end of the function. There is a comment
"why do we need this lock?" about the lock coming from
commit 42d2373 ("bcachefs: Snapshot creation, deletion")
The reason is that __bch2_ioctl_subvolume_create() calls
sync_inodes_sb() which enforce locked s_umount to writeback all dirty
nodes before doing snapshot works.

Fix it by read locking s_umount for snapshotting only and unlocking
s_umount after sync_inodes_sb().

Signed-off-by: Su Yue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>
ojeda pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 8, 2024
Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-*
results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as
shown below.

    kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
    Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
    LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
    Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc
    scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
    CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 #85
    Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries
    NIP:  c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8
    REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.10.0-rc3)
    MSR:  8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 2828220f  XER: 0000000e
    CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0
    [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
    NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0
    LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0
    Call Trace:
     usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable)
     __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120
     check_heap_object+0x218/0x240
     __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4
     dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4
     full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110
     vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0
     ksys_read+0x84/0x144
     system_call_exception+0x124/0x330
     system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34

Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to
userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by
privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access.
Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the
entire object.

Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anjali K <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
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