fix(security): prevent shell injection in sudo password piping - #65
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teknium1 merged 1 commit intoFeb 27, 2026
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The sudo password was embedded in shell commands via single-quote
interpolation: echo '{password}' | sudo -S
If the password contained shell metacharacters (single quotes,
$(), backticks), they would be interpreted by the shell, enabling
arbitrary command execution.
Fix: use shlex.quote() which properly escapes all shell-special
characters, ensuring the password is always treated as a literal
string argument to echo.
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…-shell-injection fix(security): prevent shell injection in sudo password piping
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This was referenced Jun 9, 2026
v6.7 Tranche 1: kanban_complete verification gates (#28, #62, #64)
1Team-Engineering/hermes-agent#11
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…arch#34, NousResearch#65) - NousResearch#33 GH_TOKEN propagation: _inject_gh_token_into_env runs `gh auth token` before each worker subprocess.Popen and injects into env if the worker doesn't have GH_TOKEN/GITHUB_TOKEN. - NousResearch#34 respawn_guarded active_pr exempts review roles (tony/tchalla/ vision/reviewer). Bounded: exemption only applies while consecutive_failures < max_retries; once exhausted the guard fires. - NousResearch#65 fabricated github-auth block claims rejected: FabricatedAuthClaimError raised when kanban_block reason matches auth-claim pattern AND dispatcher's `gh auth status` succeeds. Strict leading-position regex with cause:/blocker:/reason:/infra: prefix exemption. Context: hermes-jarvis#61. 33 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…ploy-durabel (setgid-Gruppendir) Die Bridge (UID 10024) SCHREIBT cron/enqueue/<job>.json; die Engine (UID 10000) liest/claimt. Der unbedingte `chown -R hermes:hermes cron`-Block setzt cron/enqueue bei JEDEM Boot auf 10000-only zurueck -> die Bridge EACCESt (RESEARCH_ENQUEUE_WRITE_FAILED). Das Image hat kein `acl`-Paket -> Standard-POSIX statt ACL: stage2-hook.sh: NACH dem `chown -R cron`-Block (sonst clobbert er) eine dedizierte shared-GID (JARVIS_RESEARCH_GID, Default 10240) + setgid-Verzeichnis cron/enqueue mit Mode 2770 (rwx Owner, rwx Gruppe, setgid -> neue Dateien erben die Gruppe, KEIN other-Bit = nicht world-writable). hermes wird Mitglied der Gruppe; die Bridge erhaelt die GID per group_add (compose.bridge.yaml, im Haupt-Repo). Loest zugleich den Subpath-Mount-CAVEAT (cron/enqueue muss existieren). Test (tests/tools/test_stage2_hook_research_enqueue.py): Block vorhanden + NACH `chown -R cron`, chmod 2770 (kein world-writable), idempotent, legt cron/enqueue an. bash -n gruen; das Block-Verhalten ist via gestubbtem Harness validiert (python-build/pytest im Engine-Container ist der gated Recreate-Verify-Schritt, hier nicht ausgefuehrt). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ohungerCH
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…chaft zur Build-Zeit anlegen Rootfs ist zur Laufzeit read-only -> groupadd/usermod im stage2-Hook scheitern (/etc/group nicht schreibbar). Gruppe + Mitgliedschaft gehoeren in den Dockerfile (Build-Zeit). stage2 macht dann nur noch chgrp 10240 + chmod 2770 aufs Volume-Dir -> setgid greift, hermes ist Mitglied, Enqueue-Handoff fresh-volume-durabel. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Jul 2, 2026
…-shell-injection fix(security): prevent shell injection in sudo password piping
Meraniya
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Aug 6, 2026
…NousResearch#65) - Add deploy_skill_scripts() to tools/skills_sync.py — copies .py files from skill scripts/ subdirectories to ~/.hermes/scripts/ when content has changed - Call deploy_skill_scripts() at end of sync_skills() so it runs on every Hermes startup - Move ugw-health-check.py into scripts/ subdirectory to match the convention used by other skills - Fixes UGW Health Monitor cron job: on next startup, the correct script (which reads gateway_state not report) overwrites the stale broken copy Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MnmdLAbTdbTo66Uc2tK31x Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Soju06
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Problem
The sudo password in
_transform_sudo_command()was embedded in a shell command using single-quote interpolation:If the password contained shell metacharacters (single quotes,
$(), backticks), they would escape the quoting and be interpreted by the shell — enabling arbitrary command execution.Example — a password like
test'; rm -rf / #produces:Fix
Use
shlex.quote()which properly handles all shell-special characters:The same attack payload now produces:
Scope
Single file, 3-line change in
tools/terminal_tool.py. No behavior change for normal passwords —shlex.quote()is a no-op for simple alphanumeric strings.