Conversation
**Why**: A crypto model everyone can agree on.
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marked as DO NOT MERGE until we get NIST and USCIS sign-off. |
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cc: @alex @regenscheid @bandrzej -- would love your 👀 on this please. |
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When you get a chance, could you please run benchmarks to see how long it takes to generate a password with the current settings? |
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Interesting. The current scrypt settings are 1.78x faster than the default 11 stretches for BCrypt. Should we increase the scrypt settings so that it's as slow as BCrypt, or are the current settings secure enough that we should be happy about the speed improvement? |
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afaik, scrypt derives some advantages over bcrypt and pbkdf2 not because of its speed but because of how memory resource intensive it is. So it's not a strict apples-vs-apples comparison. Still, I think we might slow it down with some other config settings. |
Correct. I think this article has a good description of the various hashing algorithms that we've considered (sans Argon2): https://medium.com/@mpreziuso/password-hashing-pbkdf2-scrypt-bcrypt-1ef4bb9c19b3#.3nh9cxd1s (also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_bound_function)
I agree and would like to do some experimentation around this. Off the bat i'd like to suggest that we should pay the cost for memory rich server instances if they prove effective. |
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The SCrypt |
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this particular implementation isn't truly finished and we will probably end up with a custom encryptor to help integrate more closely with how we encrypt PII. |
Why: A crypto model everyone can agree on.