gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin

This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to
extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot time as
possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in CPU operation
(due to runtime data differences, hardware differences, SMP ordering,
thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc).

At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example for
how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals.

The need for very-early boot entropy tends to be very architecture or
system design specific, so this plugin is more suited for those sorts
of special cases. The existing kernel RNG already attempts to extract
entropy from reliable runtime variation, but this plugin takes the idea to
a logical extreme by permuting a global variable based on any variation
in code execution (e.g. a different value (and permutation function)
is used to permute the global based on loop count, case statement,
if/then/else branching, etc).

To do this, the plugin starts by inserting a local variable in every
marked function. The plugin then adds logic so that the value of this
variable is modified by randomly chosen operations (add, xor and rol) and
random values (gcc generates separate static values for each location at
compile time and also injects the stack pointer at runtime). The resulting
value depends on the control flow path (e.g., loops and branches taken).

Before the function returns, the plugin mixes this local variable into
the latent_entropy global variable. The value of this global variable
is added to the kernel entropy pool in do_one_initcall() and _do_fork(),
though it does not credit any bytes of entropy to the pool; the contents
of the global are just used to mix the pool.

Additionally, the plugin can pre-initialize arrays with build-time
random contents, so that two different kernel builds running on identical
hardware will not have the same starting values.

Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <[email protected]>
[kees: expanded commit message and code comments]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

arch/Kconfig

@@ -383,6 +383,24 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV
 	  gcc-4.5 on). It is based on the commit "Add fuzzing coverage support"
 	  by Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>.
 
+config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
+	bool "Generate some entropy during boot and runtime"
+	depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+	help
+	  By saying Y here the kernel will instrument some kernel code to
+	  extract some entropy from both original and artificially created
+	  program state.  This will help especially embedded systems where
+	  there is little 'natural' source of entropy normally.  The cost
+	  is some slowdown of the boot process (about 0.5%) and fork and
+	  irq processing.
+
+	  Note that entropy extracted this way is not cryptographically
+	  secure!
+
+	  This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
+	   * https://grsecurity.net/
+	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
+
 config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 	bool
 	help

arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile

@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ CFLAGS_prom_init.o      += -fPIC
 CFLAGS_btext.o		+= -fPIC
 endif
 
+CFLAGS_cputable.o += $(DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
+CFLAGS_init.o += $(DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
+CFLAGS_btext.o += $(DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
+CFLAGS_prom.o += $(DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
+
 ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
 # Do not trace early boot code
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_cputable.o = -mno-sched-epilog $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)

include/linux/random.h

@@ -18,6 +18,17 @@ struct random_ready_callback {
 };
 
 extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
+static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
+{
+	add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy,
+			      sizeof(latent_entropy));
+}
+#else
+static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {}
+#endif
+
 extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
 				 unsigned int value);
 extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);

init/main.c

@@ -789,6 +789,7 @@ int __init_or_module do_one_initcall(initcall_t fn)
 	}
 	WARN(msgbuf[0], "initcall %pF returned with %s\n", fn, msgbuf);
 
+	add_latent_entropy();
 	return ret;
 }
 

kernel/fork.c

@@ -1780,6 +1780,7 @@ long _do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
 
 	p = copy_process(clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size,
 			 child_tidptr, NULL, trace, tls, NUMA_NO_NODE);
+	add_latent_entropy();
 	/*
 	 * Do this prior waking up the new thread - the thread pointer
 	 * might get invalid after that point, if the thread exits quickly.

mm/page_alloc.c

@@ -91,6 +91,11 @@ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(_numa_mem_);
 int _node_numa_mem_[MAX_NUMNODES];
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
+volatile u64 latent_entropy;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(latent_entropy);
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Array of node states.
  */

scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins

@@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS
 
   gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_CYC_COMPLEXITY)	+= cyc_complexity_plugin.so
 
+  gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY)	+= latent_entropy_plugin.so
+  gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY)	+= -DLATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN
+  ifdef CONFIG_PAX_LATENT_ENTROPY
+    DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN			+= -fplugin-arg-latent_entropy_plugin-disable
+  endif
+
   ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV
     ifeq ($(CFLAGS_KCOV),)
       # It is needed because of the gcc-plugin.sh and gcc version checks.
@@ -21,7 +27,8 @@ ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS
 
   GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS := $(strip $(addprefix -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/, $(gcc-plugin-y)) $(gcc-plugin-cflags-y))
 
-  export PLUGINCC GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS GCC_PLUGIN GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR SANCOV_PLUGIN
+  export PLUGINCC GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS GCC_PLUGIN GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR
+  export SANCOV_PLUGIN DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN
 
   ifneq ($(PLUGINCC),)
     # SANCOV_PLUGIN can be only in CFLAGS_KCOV because avoid duplication.