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docs: add more useful 3p references #198

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Nov 24, 2024
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docs: add more useful 3p references #198

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8 changes: 6 additions & 2 deletions docs/audits.md
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Expand Up @@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ fork.
Other resources:

* [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests]
* [Vulnerable GitHub Actions Workflows Part 1: Privilege Escalation Inside Your CI/CD Pipeline]

### Remediation

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -652,7 +653,7 @@ In general, users should use for [Github Actions environment files]

Detects dangerous usages of the `GITHUB_ENV` environment variable.

When used in workflows with dangerous triggers (such as `pull_request_target` and `workflow_run`),
When used in workflows with dangerous triggers (such as `pull_request_target` and `workflow_run`),
`GITHUB_ENV` can be an arbitrary code execution risk. In particular, if the attacker is able to set
arbitrary variables or variable contents via `GITHUB_ENV`, they made be able to set `LD_PRELOAD`
or otherwise induce code execution implicitly within subsequent steps.
Expand All @@ -661,10 +662,11 @@ Other resources:

* [GitHub Actions exploitation: environment manipulation]
* [GHSL-2024-177: Environment Variable injection in an Actions workflow of Litestar]
* [Google & Apache Found Vulnerable to GitHub Environment Injection]

### Remediation

In general, you should avoid setting `GITHUB_ENV` within workflows that are attacker-triggered,
In general, you should avoid setting `GITHUB_ENV` within workflows that are attacker-triggered,
like `pull_request_target`.

If you need to pass state between steps, consider using `GITHUB_OUTPUT` instead.
Expand All @@ -684,3 +686,5 @@ If you need to pass state between steps, consider using `GITHUB_OUTPUT` instead.
[Semgrep audit]: https://semgrep.dev/r?q=yaml.github-actions.security.allowed-unsecure-commands.allowed-unsecure-commands
[GitHub Actions exploitation: environment manipulation]: https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/github-actions-exploitation-repo-jacking-and-environment-manipulation
[GHSL-2024-177: Environment Variable injection in an Actions workflow of Litestar]: https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-177_Litestar/
[Vulnerable GitHub Actions Workflows Part 1: Privilege Escalation Inside Your CI/CD Pipeline]: https://www.legitsecurity.com/blog/github-privilege-escalation-vulnerability
[Google & Apache Found Vulnerable to GitHub Environment Injection]: https://www.legitsecurity.com/blog/github-privilege-escalation-vulnerability-0