Prevent cache poisoning in x-forwarded headers

.changeset/secure-headers.md

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+'astro': patch
+---
+
+Improves X-Forwarded header validation to prevent cache poisoning and header injection attacks. Now properly validates X-Forwarded-Proto, X-Forwarded-Host, and X-Forwarded-Port headers against configured allowedDomains patterns, rejecting malformed or suspicious values. This is especially important when running behind a reverse proxy or load balancer.

packages/astro/src/core/app/index.ts

@@ -174,6 +174,98 @@ export class App {
 		}
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Validate a hostname by rejecting any with path separators.
+	 * Prevents path injection attacks. Invalid hostnames return undefined.
+	 */
+	static sanitizeHost(hostname: string | undefined): string | undefined {
+		if (!hostname) return undefined;
+		// Reject any hostname containing path separators - they're invalid
+		if (/[/\\]/.test(hostname)) return undefined;
+		return hostname;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Validate forwarded headers (proto, host, port) against allowedDomains.
+	 * Returns validated values or undefined for rejected headers.
+	 * Uses strict defaults: http/https only for proto, rejects port if not in allowedDomains.
+	 */
+	static validateForwardedHeaders(
+		forwardedProtocol?: string,
+		forwardedHost?: string,
+		forwardedPort?: string,
+		allowedDomains?: Partial<RemotePattern>[],
+	): { protocol?: string; host?: string; port?: string } {
+		const result: { protocol?: string; host?: string; port?: string } = {};
+
+		// Validate protocol
+		if (forwardedProtocol) {
+			if (allowedDomains && allowedDomains.length > 0) {
+				const hasProtocolPatterns = allowedDomains.some(
+					(pattern) => pattern.protocol !== undefined,
+				);
+				if (hasProtocolPatterns) {
+					// Validate against allowedDomains patterns
+					try {
+						const testUrl = new URL(`${forwardedProtocol}://example.com`);
+						const isAllowed = allowedDomains.some((pattern) => matchPattern(testUrl, pattern));
+						if (isAllowed) {
+							result.protocol = forwardedProtocol;
+						}
+					} catch {
+						// Invalid protocol, omit from result
+					}
+				} else if (/^https?$/.test(forwardedProtocol)) {
+					// allowedDomains exist but no protocol patterns, allow http/https
+					result.protocol = forwardedProtocol;
+				}
+			} else if (/^https?$/.test(forwardedProtocol)) {
+				// No allowedDomains, only allow http/https
+				result.protocol = forwardedProtocol;
+			}
+		}
+
+		// Validate port first
+		if (forwardedPort && allowedDomains && allowedDomains.length > 0) {
+			const hasPortPatterns = allowedDomains.some((pattern) => pattern.port !== undefined);
+			if (hasPortPatterns) {
+				// Validate against allowedDomains patterns
+				const isAllowed = allowedDomains.some((pattern) => pattern.port === forwardedPort);
+				if (isAllowed) {
+					result.port = forwardedPort;
+				}
+			}
+			// If no port patterns, reject the header (strict security default)
+		}
+
+		// Validate host (extract port from hostname for validation)
+		// Reject empty strings and sanitize to prevent path injection
+		if (forwardedHost && forwardedHost.length > 0 && allowedDomains && allowedDomains.length > 0) {
+			const protoForValidation = result.protocol || 'https';
+			const sanitized = App.sanitizeHost(forwardedHost);
+			if (sanitized) {
+				try {
+					// Extract hostname without port for validation
+					const hostnameOnly = sanitized.split(':')[0];
+					// Use full hostname:port for validation so patterns with ports match correctly
+					// Include validated port if available, otherwise use port from forwardedHost if present
+					const portFromHost = sanitized.includes(':') ? sanitized.split(':')[1] : undefined;
+					const portForValidation = result.port || portFromHost;
+					const hostWithPort = portForValidation ? `${hostnameOnly}:${portForValidation}` : hostnameOnly;
+					const testUrl = new URL(`${protoForValidation}://${hostWithPort}`);
+					const isAllowed = allowedDomains.some((pattern) => matchPattern(testUrl, pattern));
+					if (isAllowed) {
+						result.host = sanitized;
+					}
+				} catch {
+					// Invalid host, omit from result
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		return result;
+	}
+
 	/**
 	 * Creates a pipeline by reading the stored manifest
 	 *
@@ -271,29 +363,19 @@ export class App {
 				this.#manifest.i18n.strategy === 'domains-prefix-other-locales' ||
 				this.#manifest.i18n.strategy === 'domains-prefix-always-no-redirect')
 		) {
-			// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-Forwarded-Host
-			let forwardedHost = request.headers.get('X-Forwarded-Host');
-			// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-Forwarded-Proto
-			let protocol = request.headers.get('X-Forwarded-Proto');
-			if (protocol) {
-				// this header doesn't have a colon at the end, so we add to be in line with URL#protocol, which does have it
-				protocol = protocol + ':';
-			} else {
-				// we fall back to the protocol of the request
-				protocol = url.protocol;
-			}
+			// Validate forwarded headers
+			const validated = App.validateForwardedHeaders(
+				request.headers.get('X-Forwarded-Proto') ?? undefined,
+				request.headers.get('X-Forwarded-Host') ?? undefined,
+				request.headers.get('X-Forwarded-Port') ?? undefined,
+				this.#manifest.allowedDomains,
+			);
 
-			// Validate X-Forwarded-Host against allowedDomains if configured
-			if (forwardedHost && !this.matchesAllowedDomains(forwardedHost, protocol?.replace(':', ''))) {
-				// If not allowed, ignore the X-Forwarded-Host header
-				forwardedHost = null;
-			}
+			// Build protocol with fallback
+			let protocol = validated.protocol ? validated.protocol + ':' : url.protocol;
 
-			let host = forwardedHost;
-			if (!host) {
-				// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Host
-				host = request.headers.get('Host');
-			}
+			// Build host with fallback
+			let host = validated.host ?? request.headers.get('Host');
 			// If we don't have a host and a protocol, it's impossible to proceed
 			if (host && protocol) {
 				// The header might have a port in their name, so we remove it

packages/astro/src/core/app/node.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import fs from 'node:fs';
 import type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from 'node:http';
 import { Http2ServerResponse } from 'node:http2';
 import type { Socket } from 'node:net';
-// matchPattern is used in App.validateForwardedHost, no need to import here
 import type { RemotePattern } from '../../types/public/config.js';
 import type { RouteData } from '../../types/public/internal.js';
 import { clientAddressSymbol, nodeRequestAbortControllerCleanupSymbol } from '../constants.js';
@@ -90,35 +89,25 @@ export class NodeApp extends App {
 				.map((e) => e.trim())?.[0];
 		};
 
-		// Get the used protocol between the end client and first proxy.
-		// NOTE: Some proxies append values with spaces and some do not.
-		// We need to handle it here and parse the header correctly.
-		// @example "https, http,http" => "http"
-		const forwardedProtocol = getFirstForwardedValue(req.headers['x-forwarded-proto']);
 		const providedProtocol = isEncrypted ? 'https' : 'http';
-		const protocol = forwardedProtocol ?? providedProtocol;
-
-		// @example "example.com,www2.example.com" => "example.com"
-		let forwardedHostname = getFirstForwardedValue(req.headers['x-forwarded-host']);
 		const providedHostname = req.headers.host ?? req.headers[':authority'];
 
-		// Validate X-Forwarded-Host against allowedDomains if configured
-		if (
-			forwardedHostname &&
-			!App.validateForwardedHost(
-				forwardedHostname,
-				allowedDomains,
-				forwardedProtocol ?? providedProtocol,
-			)
-		) {
-			// If not allowed, ignore the X-Forwarded-Host header
-			forwardedHostname = undefined;
-		}
-
-		const hostname = forwardedHostname ?? providedHostname;
+		// Validate forwarded headers
+		// NOTE: Header values may have commas/spaces from proxy chains, extract first value
+		const validated = App.validateForwardedHeaders(
+			getFirstForwardedValue(req.headers['x-forwarded-proto']),
+			getFirstForwardedValue(req.headers['x-forwarded-host']),
+			getFirstForwardedValue(req.headers['x-forwarded-port']),
+			allowedDomains,
+		);
 
-		// @example "443,8080,80" => "443"
-		const port = getFirstForwardedValue(req.headers['x-forwarded-port']);
+		const protocol = validated.protocol ?? providedProtocol;
+		// validated.host is already sanitized, only sanitize providedHostname
+		const sanitizedProvidedHostname = App.sanitizeHost(
+			typeof providedHostname === 'string' ? providedHostname : undefined,
+		);
+		const hostname = validated.host ?? sanitizedProvidedHostname;
+		const port = validated.port;
 
 		let url: URL;
 		try {