[Bugfix][Security] Bound the validation-error response body - #54684
DarkLight1337 merged 2 commits into
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`validation_exception_handler` renders every entry of `exc.errors()` into the 400 body. Pydantic puts the whole offending value under `input` in each entry, so a request whose `input` fails per-element echoes that input once per error and the response grows with request_size x error_count. Measured against the real `ResponsesRequest` model and the real handler: a 4,475-byte `/v1/responses` body produces 12,001 errors and a 23.6 MB response, and a 71 KB body produces 378 MB and 7 s of event-loop time. The amplification factor is flat at ~5,300x, so it scales with whatever body limit sits in front of the server. Reported in vllm-project#49239 as 12,047 errors and a ~114 MB body, which stalled the proxy in front of vLLM. Report at most 10 entries followed by "...and N more errors" (the true count still leads the message), replace each entry's `input` with a bounded summary, and cap each rendered entry at 1000 characters since `loc` tuples for union-typed fields are long on their own. `_summarize_error_input` describes containers rather than rendering them: `repr()` of a large list materializes the whole string first, which is the cost being avoided. `str()` on a scalar is wrapped because it can raise -- an integer past `sys.get_int_max_str_digits()` would otherwise turn the error handler into a 500. Small values are still echoed verbatim, so a client debugging a genuine mistake loses nothing. After the fix the response is flat at ~9.5 KB and 0.026 s at 192,001 errors. The handler is registered for `RequestValidationError` app-wide, so this applies to every endpoint. Fixes vllm-project#49239 Signed-off-by: lzhan011 <35493221+lzhan011@users.noreply.github.com>
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Could you print out some examples of what the error message looks like now and put them in the PR description? |
For a union-typed field pydantic spells every branch out in `loc`. On
`/v1/responses` that is ~800 characters of type names per entry, which
dominated the bounded message: 8 of the 10 reported entries were padded to the
1000-character cap by their `loc` alone.
`clean_loc_for_param` already exists in this module and is already applied to
`param` for exactly this reason. Applying it to the rendered `loc` as well
takes the example in the PR description from 9,384 to 2,292 characters and
turns the entry into something a caller can act on:
before: 'loc': ('input', 'list[union[EasyInputMessageParam,Message,...']
after: 'loc': 'input.0.EasyInputMessageParam.content.0.ResponseInputTextParam.text'
Signed-off-by: lzhan011 <35493221+lzhan011@users.noreply.github.com>
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Added, thanks — the PR description now has a "What the error body actually looks like" section with real before/after output for two cases. Short version. The shape from #49239 (a 4,475-byte Writing those out surfaced something I had missed, so I pushed one more commit for it. Bounding the size alone still left the body at 9,384 characters, because for a union-typed field pydantic spells every branch out in An ordinary small mistake ( Happy to drop the |
DarkLight1337
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This looks good, thanks!
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/ci run |
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✅ Triggered Buildkite CI #86502 for commit |
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CI came back red on Schemathesis fuzzed What rules this PR out, from the build log:
It also matches a known signature. #54116 was filed for the same test and the same endpoint with the byte-identical body ( Retrying CI, since the fuzzer picks a different seed each run. Happy to file a separate CI-failure issue for the |
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/ci retry |
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✅ Queued 1 failed job(s) for retry in Buildkite CI #86502. |
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CI is green now — the retried job passed (30m 8s) and Buildkite is 68/68 with nothing red. Auto-merge has not fired though, and the reason is a stale check rather than a real failure, so noting the mechanics here to save you the diagnosis:
So the failing check is evaluating a state that no longer exists. Re-running it should turn it green; I do not have the rights to ( I deliberately have not pushed anything to force a re-run, since a new commit would dismiss your approval and cost another review round for no change in content. |
…ject#54684) Signed-off-by: lzhan011 <35493221+lzhan011@users.noreply.github.com>
…ject#54684) Signed-off-by: lzhan011 <35493221+lzhan011@users.noreply.github.com>
…ject#54684) Signed-off-by: lzhan011 <35493221+lzhan011@users.noreply.github.com>
Purpose
Fixes #49239.
validation_exception_handlerrenders every entry ofexc.errors()into the400 body:
Pydantic puts the whole offending value under
inputin each error entry, so arequest whose
inputfails per-element echoes that input once per error. Theresponse grows with
request_size × error_countwhile the request stays small.Measured on
mainby validating a malformed/v1/responsesbody with the realResponsesRequestmodel and passing the resulting errors to the real handler:inputitemsThe amplification factor is flat at ~5,300x, so it scales linearly with request
size: whatever body limit sits in front of the server, the 400 is ~5,000 times
larger. The reporter observed 12,047 errors and a ~114 MB body in production,
which stalled the proxy in front of vLLM.
There is a second cost on the server itself. Building the string is
O(request × errors), andsanitize_messagethen runs several regexes over the whole thing —7 seconds of event-loop time at 800 items, for a request that is only 71 KB.
The fix
Bound both factors in the handler:
_MAX_REPORTED_ERRORS(10) entries, then...and N more errors— the true count still leads the message, so nothing is hidden
inputwith a bounded summary before rendering_MAX_ERROR_CHARS(1000) as a backstop, sinceloctuples for union-typed fields are long on their own_summarize_error_inputdescribes containers (<list of 300 items>) instead ofrendering them. That is deliberate:
repr()of a large list materializes thewhole string first, which is exactly the cost being avoided. Strings are sliced
before being rendered, and
str()on a scalar is wrapped because it can raise —an integer past
sys.get_int_max_str_digits()would otherwise turn the errorhandler itself into a 500.
A union-typed field is also spelled out branch-by-branch in
loc— ~800characters of type names per entry on
/v1/responses, which dominated what wasleft.
clean_loc_for_paramalready exists in this module and is already appliedto
paramfor exactly that reason, so the renderedlocnow goes through ittoo. That is what turns the entry from noise into something a caller can act on.
After the fix the same measurement is flat:
inputitemsSmall
inputvalues are still echoed verbatim, so a client debugging a genuinemistake loses nothing.
What the error body actually looks like
Requested by @DarkLight1337. Produced by validating a malformed body with the
real
ResponsesRequestmodel and passing the result to the real handler; onlyline-wrapping and the
<...>elisions are mine.Case A — the shape from #49239:
/v1/responseswithinput= 50message-shaped objects whose
content[].textis an int instead of a string.Request body is 4,475 bytes and produces 12,001 validation errors.
Before — 23,658,207 bytes:
After — 2,391 bytes:
The third entry is the actual mistake, and it now names the field and shows the
offending value.
Case B — an ordinary small mistake:
{"model": "m", "input": 123}.Before — 1,769 bytes:
After — 400 bytes:
The value is still there; nothing a caller needs was dropped.
This handler is registered for
RequestValidationErrorapp-wide, so the boundapplies to every endpoint, not just
/v1/responses.I checked for overlap: #52120 also touches validation-error handling but changes
sanitize_message's regex invllm/entrypoints/serve/utils/api_utils.py, adifferent file and a different problem (ReDoS in the sanitizer). The two are
complementary — bounding the message before it reaches the sanitizer reduces the
input that PR has to sanitize. #45390 adds request input-size bounds in
sampling_params.py/protocol.py, also disjoint.Test Plan
Four tests added to the existing file as
TestValidationErrorBodyIsBounded:test_many_errors_are_capped— 5,000 errors each carrying a 500-item input;the whole body must stay under 32 KB and still report the real count
test_container_input_is_described_not_echoed— a 300-item list becomes<list of 300 items>and its contents do not appeartest_long_string_input_is_truncated— a 100 KB string input is truncatedtest_small_input_is_still_reported_verbatim— the diagnostics a legitimateclient needs are unchanged
test_union_loc_is_cleaned_in_the_message— a unionlocrenders asbody.input.0.content, not 800 characters of branch namesTest Result
Whole directory passes with the fix:
Reverting only
handlers/validation.pytomainand running the new class:test_small_input_is_still_reported_verbatimpasses both before and after, whichis the point — the bound does not cost legitimate clients their diagnostics.