fix(security): let an operator grant host execution to a shared runtime - #4242
fix(security): let an operator grant host execution to a shared runtime#4242kwakayama wants to merge 4 commits into
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#4166 made resolveHostProjectExecutionPosture return 'allowHostProjectCodeExecution: !sharedRuntime', so the operator grant at the host-owned entrypoint stopped having any effect. Its rationale was that dedicated single-project runtimes already carry the capability, making the grant redundant. That premise does not hold for this platform. veryfront-server is the shared rendering and executor runtime and no dedicated isolated runtime is provisioned for hosted project previews or agents, so the capability was withdrawn while the product still depended on it. Tenant /api/* now returns 503 PROJECT_EXECUTION_UNAVAILABLE and the Studio preview pane fails to load (veryfront-issue-inbox#848). Honour the grant on a shared runtime again. A shared runtime with no grant stays fail-closed, and on a dedicated runtime the grant is still reported as ignored so startup can surface stale operator configuration. This re-accepts a known posture rather than discovering a new one: tenant code runs in the shared process, where per-request separation is source scoping and not a tenant boundary. It is what production runs today on 0.1.1252. Retiring it belongs with routing execution to a dedicated runtime (#356), not ahead of it. Red before green: the shared-runtime-with-grant and fail-closed cases both fail against #4166's behaviour and pass with this change.
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughShared runtimes now permit tenant code execution when ChangesHost execution grant
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The PR restores shared-runtime execution only when an explicit host-execution grant is enabled and keeps ungranted access fail-closed. It is mergeable with owner follow-up because the security documentation still needs correction to avoid misleading operators about valid grant values, precedence, and the no-grant 503 behavior. Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 83.33% which is sufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 6 functions across 6 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
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…, align the docs Addresses three P1 review findings on this PR. 1. The grant never reached the execution surfaces. resolveHostProjectExecutionPosture set the capability, but isHostProjectCodeExecutionAllowedForTopology discarded it for any shared runtime, so the SSR guard and API handler returned the same 503 this PR was meant to fix. The resolver change alone was a no-op. Honour the grant in the topology predicate and update the test that pinned the denial. The topology parameter is now unused, so it is removed; requiresIsolatedProjectRuntime still samples the topology once for its own decision, and the single-sample invariant test now exercises the ungranted path where topology actually decides. 2. No startup warning when the grant is active. production-server warned only when the setting was ignored, so switching same-process tenant execution on -- including a formerly stale setting becoming effective on upgrade -- was silent. Warn distinctly on an active grant, and keep the ignored-setting warning for dedicated runtimes. 3. Documented posture contradicted the effective one. security/README.md said a shared runtime never executes tenant source and the setting was ignored; the module header and worker-pool posture repeated it. Replace the "deprecated override" section with one that states plainly that granting reduces isolation, why this deployment needs it, and that it is retired by routing execution to a dedicated runtime (#356). Verified red before green on the predicate: the shared-runtime-with-grant case fails against the previous behaviour and passes with this change.
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All three Codex P1 findings addressed@codex #2 — "Restore the grant in the topology-aware execution predicate" — correct, and it meant this PR did nothing.
return isExplicitlyLocalProject(value) ||
(!sharedRuntime && isExplicitHostProjectCodeExecutionAllowed(value));So the resolver set the capability and the predicate threw it away. The SSR guard and API handler would have kept returning the same 503 this PR exists to fix. My verification was the failure here: I tested the resolver in isolation and ran four consumer suites, but none of them exercised shared-runtime-with-grant, so "all green" meant nothing. Good catch — this would have merged as a no-op and then looked like the staging deploy had failed. Fixed, and @codex #3 — "Warn when a shared runtime activates host execution" — correct.
@codex #1 — "Align security guidance with the restored grant" — correct.
I also found a fourth instance you did not flag: Verificationgitar-bot approved with no issues; greptile never ran (trial credit limit). |
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Code Review ✅ ApprovedRestores operator grant capability for shared runtimes to resolve project preview 503 errors. No issues found. OptionsAuto-apply is off → Gitar will not commit updates to this branch. Comment with these commands to change the behavior for this request:
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Actionable comments posted: 2
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Inline comments:
In `@src/security/README.md`:
- Around line 440-444: Update the documentation describing
VERYFRONT_HOST_ALLOW_PROJECT_EXECUTION to state that only 1, true, yes, and on
enable it, while all other values fail closed. Also document that
WORKER_ISOLATION_API=1 takes precedence in compiled deployments and that the
grant does not prevent the documented 503 response when that precedence applies.
- Around line 400-403: Update the shared-runtime no-grant routing description in
the security documentation to state that preview and API requests return the
typed project-execution-unavailable 503 response when no dedicated runtime
exists, until routing to a genuinely external or dedicated isolated runtime is
available. Remove any claim that requests are routed to a dedicated runtime
without the grant, while preserving the host-owned execution grant behavior.
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src/security/README.mdsrc/security/host-execution-policy.test.tssrc/security/host-execution-policy.tssrc/security/project-locality.test.tssrc/security/project-locality.tssrc/security/sandbox/worker-pool.tssrc/server/production-server.ts
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| // isolated renderer path wired to it, so honouring the grant here would | ||
| // silently downgrade that request to host execution. Fail closed instead | ||
| // of rendering in the host process. | ||
| if (ssrIsolationRequested() && isSharedProjectRuntime(ctx)) { |
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Preserve the execution-surface inventory check
src/server/handlers/execution-surface-policy.test.ts scans every handler and fails whenever a non-allowlisted file directly calls isSharedProjectRuntime; ssr.handler.ts is in the capability-gated inventory and is not allowlisted, so this new call deterministically adds it to the test's drifted result and breaks the unit suite. Express this isolation-specific condition without violating the inventory, or update the inventory test to explicitly support and verify this exceptional gate.
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| runtime does so only where an operator has granted host execution at the | ||
| host-owned entrypoint (see below); without that grant, API ownership returns | ||
| the typed `project-execution-unavailable` 503 response until the request is | ||
| routed to a genuinely external or dedicated isolated project runtime. Raw-path server-data |
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Qualify the remaining shared-runtime denial claims
Fresh evidence in this head updates this paragraph to say a granted shared runtime executes tenant code, but the same section still says at lines 406-408 that shared snippet and markdown requests always stop before execution, and lines 435-436 still say shared proxy runtimes reject capability-gated operations. The changed tests now prove those surfaces execute when granted, so operators still receive contradictory security guidance unless those remaining statements are qualified as the ungranted behavior.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L13-L14
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| case-insensitive) enable the grant; every other value is treated as | ||
| unconfigured and fails closed. The grant does not override requested worker | ||
| isolation: with `WORKER_ISOLATION_API=1`, API execution keeps the isolation | ||
| posture — in a compiled deployment, which cannot prepare isolated API route |
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Replace the prohibited em dash
This public security documentation introduces an em dash even though the repository's public-copy rules explicitly prohibit em and en dash characters. Replace it with permitted punctuation so the updated documentation conforms to the required copy standard.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L77-L77
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| // outside the scoped environment facade -- that is the accepted cost of running this | ||
| // platform's shared executor, and it is retired by routing execution to a dedicated | ||
| // runtime (#356), not by dropping the capability here. | ||
| return isExplicitlyLocalProject(value) || isExplicitHostProjectCodeExecutionAllowed(value); |
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Preserve requested SSR isolation for RSC endpoints
When a shared runtime enables the host-execution grant together with WORKER_ISOLATION_ENABLED=1 and WORKER_ISOLATION_SSR=1, this topology-independent result makes RSCHandler pass allowHostProjectCodeExecution: true to handleRSCEndpoint. The endpoint router rejects server-executing RSC transports only when that value is false, so action and server-component modules are still imported and evaluated in the shared host even though the operator explicitly requested SSR isolation; apply the same fail-closed isolation gate to server-executing RSC endpoints.
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Superseded by #4243. This attempted a targeted fix. Three iterations each looked complete and were not — the grant is discarded at two structurally independent points ( #4243 reverts the 20-file host-execution set to its pre-#4166 state instead, which restores a posture production runs healthily today and passes all eight affected suites unmodified — including the three this PR kept breaking. |



Fixes veryfront/veryfront-issue-inbox#848 — preview returns 503 on staging.
What broke
#4166 (
d4c0ddb410, 2026-08-26 13:14) changedresolveHostProjectExecutionPosture:The operator grant is read, recorded as ignored, and discarded. Its stated rationale:
That premise does not hold here.
veryfront-serveris this platform's shared rendering and executor runtime, and no dedicated isolated runtime is provisioned for hosted project previews or agents. So the capability was withdrawn while the product still depended on it.Observed impact
Staging,
0.1.1253-rc.16336:In Studio this shows as the preview pane reporting "refused to connect".
0.1.12520.1.1253-rc.16336The chart sets
VERYFRONT_HOST_ALLOW_PROJECT_EXECUTION: "1"in both environments, so promoting the0.1.1253line would break production the same way.The change
overrideIgnoredso startup can surface stale operator configuration.This is a security posture decision, made deliberately
#4166 is a security change and the boundary it describes is real: tenant code runs in the shared process, and per-request separation there is source scoping, not a tenant boundary.
This PR re-accepts that posture rather than discovering it. It is what production runs today. The argument is one of sequencing: the capability was removed before the replacement (routing execution to a dedicated isolated runtime, #356) existed, which produced a broken product surface rather than a tightened boundary.
Retiring the grant should land with that routing, not ahead of it. #848 records this so it is not lost.
Verification — red before green
Consumers of the posture, all passing:
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Security