chore(deps): update dependency containers/podman to v5.2.4

[uniget-bot]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Update	Change
containers/podman	patch	5.2.3 -> 5.2.4

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Release Notes

containers/podman (containers/podman)

v5.2.4

Compare Source

Security

• This release addresses CVE-2024-9407, which allows arbitrary access to the host filesystem from RUN --mount arguments to a Dockerfile being built.
• This release also addresses CVE-2024-9341, allowing the mounting of arbitrary directories from the host into containers on FIPS enabled systems using a malicious image with crafted symlinks.

Misc

• Updated Buildah to v1.37.4
• Updated the containers/common library to v0.60.4

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Configuration

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This PR has been generated by Renovate Bot.

[nicholasdille-bot]

Auto-approved because label type/renovate is present.

[github-actions]

🔍 Vulnerabilities of ghcr.io/uniget-org/tools/podman:5.2.4

📦 Image Reference ghcr.io/uniget-org/tools/podman:5.2.4

digest	sha256:faa474a6110c495929ce5050e5c3fa12bbc78db2148bafd807a3c7fac39644c7
vulnerabilities
platform	linux/amd64
size	34 MB
packages	172

github.com/opencontainers/runc 1.1.1-0.20240131200429-02120488a4c0 (golang) pkg:golang/github.com/opencontainers/[email protected] OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities Affected range <1.2.0-rc.1 Fixed version 1.2.0-rc.1 CVSS Score 7.2 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Description Withdrawn Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it was incorrectly attributed to runc. Please see the issue here for more information. Original Description A flaw was found in cri-o, where an arbitrary systemd property can be injected via a Pod annotation. Any user who can create a pod with an arbitrary annotation may perform an arbitrary action on the host system. This issue has its root in how runc handles Config Annotations lists. OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities Affected range <=v1.1.4 Fixed version Not Fixed CVSS Score 7 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Description runc through 1.1.4 has Incorrect Access Control leading to Escalation of Privileges, related to libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go. To exploit this, an attacker must be able to spawn two containers with custom volume-mount configurations, and be able to run custom images. NOTE: this issue exists because of a CVE-2019-19921 regression. Improper Preservation of Permissions Affected range <1.1.5 Fixed version 1.1.5 CVSS Score 6.1 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L Description Impact It was found that AppArmor, and potentially SELinux, can be bypassed when /proc inside the container is symlinked with a specific mount configuration. Patches Fixed in runc v1.1.5, by prohibiting symlinked /proc: opencontainers/runc#3785 This PR fixes CVE-2023-27561 as well. Workarounds Avoid using an untrusted container image. Incorrect Default Permissions Affected range <1.1.2 Fixed version 1.1.2 CVSS Score 5.9 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L Description Impact A bug was found in runc where runc exec --cap executed processes with non-empty inheritable Linux process capabilities, creating an atypical Linux environment and enabling programs with inheritable file capabilities to elevate those capabilities to the permitted set during execve(2). This bug did not affect the container security sandbox as the inheritable set never contained more capabilities than were included in the container's bounding set. Patches This bug has been fixed in runc 1.1.2. Users should update to this version as soon as possible. This fix changes runc exec --cap behavior such that the additional capabilities granted to the process being executed (as specified via --cap arguments) do not include inheritable capabilities. In addition, runc spec is changed to not set any inheritable capabilities in the created example OCI spec (config.json) file. Credits The opencontainers project would like to thank Andrew G. Morgan for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with the opencontainers org security policy. For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue Email us at [email protected] if you think you’ve found a security bug Race Condition Enabling Link Following Affected range <1.1.14 Fixed version 1.1.14 CVSS Score 3.6 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N Description Impact runc 1.1.13 and earlier as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host filesystem by sharing a volume between two containers and exploiting a race with os.MkdirAll. While this can be used to create empty files, existing files will not be truncated. An attacker must have the ability to start containers using some kind of custom volume configuration. Containers using user namespaces are still affected, but the scope of places an attacker can create inodes can be significantly reduced. Sufficiently strict LSM policies (SELinux/Apparmor) can also in principle block this attack -- we suspect the industry standard SELinux policy may restrict this attack's scope but the exact scope of protection hasn't been analysed. This is exploitable using runc directly as well as through Docker and Kubernetes. The CVSS score for this vulnerability is CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N (Low severity, 3.6). Workarounds Using user namespaces restricts this attack fairly significantly such that the attacker can only create inodes in directories that the remapped root user/group has write access to. Unless the root user is remapped to an actual user on the host (such as with rootless containers that don't use /etc/sub[ug]id), this in practice means that an attacker would only be able to create inodes in world-writable directories. A strict enough SELinux or AppArmor policy could in principle also restrict the scope if a specific label is applied to the runc runtime, though we haven't thoroughly tested to what extent the standard existing policies block this attack nor what exact policies are needed to sufficiently restrict this attack. Patches Fixed in runc v1.1.14 and v1.2.0-rc3. main patches: rootfs: consolidate mountpoint creation logic opencontainers/runc#4359 opencontainers/runc@63c2908 release-1.1 patches: opencontainers/runc@8781993 opencontainers/runc@f0b652e Credits Thanks to Rodrigo Campos Catelin (@rata) and Alban Crequy (@alban) from Microsoft for discovering and reporting this vulnerability. Improper Preservation of Permissions Affected range <1.1.5 Fixed version 1.1.5 CVSS Score 2.5 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L Description Impact It was found that rootless runc makes /sys/fs/cgroup writable in following conditons: when runc is executed inside the user namespace, and the config.json does not specify the cgroup namespace to be unshared (e.g.., (docker|podman|nerdctl) run --cgroupns=host, with Rootless Docker/Podman/nerdctl) or, when runc is executed outside the user namespace, and /sys is mounted with rbind, ro (e.g., runc spec --rootless; this condition is very rare) A container may gain the write access to user-owned cgroup hierarchy /sys/fs/cgroup/user.slice/... on the host . Other users's cgroup hierarchies are not affected. Patches v1.1.5 (planned) Workarounds Condition 1: Unshare the cgroup namespace ((docker|podman|nerdctl) run --cgroupns=private). This is the default behavior of Docker/Podman/nerdctl on cgroup v2 hosts. Condition 2 (very rare): add /sys/fs/cgroup to maskedPaths

[github-actions]

Attempting automerge. See https://github.com/uniget-org/tools/actions/runs/11220084937.

[github-actions]

PR is clean and can be merged. See https://github.com/uniget-org/tools/actions/runs/11220084937.