chore(deps): update dependency containers/podman to v5.0.3

[uniget-bot]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Update	Change
containers/podman	patch	5.0.2 -> 5.0.3

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Release Notes

containers/podman (containers/podman)

v5.0.3

Compare Source

Security

• This release addresses CVE-2024-3727, a vulnerability in the containers/image library which allows attackers to trigger authenticated registry access on behalf of the victim user.

Bugfixes

• Fixed a bug where podman machine start would fail if the machine had a volume with a long target path (#​22226).
• Fixed a bug where podman machine start mounted volumes with paths that included dashes in the wrong location (#​22505).

Misc

• Updated Buildah to v1.35.4
• Updated the containers/common library to v0.58.3
• Updated the containers/image library to v5.30.1

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This PR has been generated by Renovate Bot.

[nicholasdille-bot]

Auto-approved because label type/renovate is present.

[github-actions]

🔍 Vulnerabilities of ghcr.io/uniget-org/tools/podman:5.0.3

📦 Image Reference ghcr.io/uniget-org/tools/podman:5.0.3

digest	sha256:53f52881ff32695c612c762be1f1d558120ff6c34485882846e3132faff4ee32
vulnerabilities
platform	linux/amd64
size	33 MB
packages	171

github.com/opencontainers/runc 1.1.1-0.20240131200429-02120488a4c0 (golang) pkg:golang/github.com/opencontainers/[email protected] OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities Affected range <=v1.1.4 Fixed version Not Fixed CVSS Score 7 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Description runc through 1.1.4 has Incorrect Access Control leading to Escalation of Privileges, related to libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go. To exploit this, an attacker must be able to spawn two containers with custom volume-mount configurations, and be able to run custom images. NOTE: this issue exists because of a CVE-2019-19921 regression. Improper Preservation of Permissions Affected range <1.1.5 Fixed version 1.1.5 CVSS Score 6.1 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L Description Impact It was found that AppArmor, and potentially SELinux, can be bypassed when /proc inside the container is symlinked with a specific mount configuration. Patches Fixed in runc v1.1.5, by prohibiting symlinked /proc: opencontainers/runc#3785 This PR fixes CVE-2023-27561 as well. Workarounds Avoid using an untrusted container image. Incorrect Default Permissions Affected range <1.1.2 Fixed version 1.1.2 CVSS Score 5.9 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L Description Impact A bug was found in runc where runc exec --cap executed processes with non-empty inheritable Linux process capabilities, creating an atypical Linux environment and enabling programs with inheritable file capabilities to elevate those capabilities to the permitted set during execve(2). This bug did not affect the container security sandbox as the inheritable set never contained more capabilities than were included in the container's bounding set. Patches This bug has been fixed in runc 1.1.2. Users should update to this version as soon as possible. This fix changes runc exec --cap behavior such that the additional capabilities granted to the process being executed (as specified via --cap arguments) do not include inheritable capabilities. In addition, runc spec is changed to not set any inheritable capabilities in the created example OCI spec (config.json) file. Credits The opencontainers project would like to thank Andrew G. Morgan for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with the opencontainers org security policy. For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue Email us at [email protected] if you think you’ve found a security bug Improper Preservation of Permissions Affected range <1.1.5 Fixed version 1.1.5 CVSS Score 2.5 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L Description Impact It was found that rootless runc makes /sys/fs/cgroup writable in following conditons: when runc is executed inside the user namespace, and the config.json does not specify the cgroup namespace to be unshared (e.g.., (docker|podman|nerdctl) run --cgroupns=host, with Rootless Docker/Podman/nerdctl) or, when runc is executed outside the user namespace, and /sys is mounted with rbind, ro (e.g., runc spec --rootless; this condition is very rare) A container may gain the write access to user-owned cgroup hierarchy /sys/fs/cgroup/user.slice/... on the host . Other users's cgroup hierarchies are not affected. Patches v1.1.5 (planned) Workarounds Condition 1: Unshare the cgroup namespace ((docker|podman|nerdctl) run --cgroupns=private). This is the default behavior of Docker/Podman/nerdctl on cgroup v2 hosts. Condition 2 (very rare): add /sys/fs/cgroup to maskedPaths

github.com/docker/docker 25.0.3+incompatible (golang) pkg:golang/github.com/docker/[email protected]+incompatible Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres Affected range >=25.0.0 <25.0.5 Fixed version 25.0.5 CVSS Score 5.9 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Description Moby is an open source container framework originally developed by Docker Inc. as Docker. It is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. As a batteries-included container runtime, Moby comes with a built-in networking implementation that enables communication between containers, and between containers and external resources. Moby's networking implementation allows for creating and using many networks, each with their own subnet and gateway. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters, and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the --internal flag is used to designate a network as internal. The internal attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network internal, and other API clients may specify the internal parameter as well. When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses (typically from a non-routable RFC 1918 subnet). The root network namespace (hereafter referred to as the 'host') serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs. Containers on an internal network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly. In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking, dockerd directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery (looking up other containers on the network by name), and resolution of names from an upstream resolver. When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver (by default, the host's configured resolver). This request is made from the container network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself. As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to internal network(s) will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved. Many systems will run a local forwarding DNS resolver, typically present on a loopback address (127.0.0.0/8), such as systemd-resolved or dnsmasq. Common loopback address examples include 127.0.0.1 or 127.0.0.53. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device. To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address, dockerd will detect this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host/root network namespace. The loopback resolver will then forward the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected. Impact Because dockerd will forward DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, internal networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. For example, if the domain evil.example was registered, the authoritative nameserver(s) for that domain could (eventually and indirectly) receive a request for this-is-a-secret.evil.example. Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address. Patches Moby releases 26.0.0-rc3, 25.0.5 (released) and 23.0.11 (to be released) are patched to prevent forwarding DNS requests from internal networks. Workarounds Run containers intended to be solely attached to internal networks with a custom upstream address (--dns argument to docker run, or API equivalent), which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container network namespace. Background yair zak originally reported this issue to the Docker security team. PR libnet: Don't forward to upstream resolvers on internal nw moby/moby#46609 was opened in public to fix this issue, as it was not originally considered to have a security implication. The official documentation claims that "the --internal flag that will completely isolate containers on a network from any communications external to that network," which necessitated this advisory and CVE.

golang.org/x/net 0.22.0 (golang) pkg:golang/golang.org/x/[email protected] Uncontrolled Resource Consumption Affected range <0.23.0 Fixed version 0.23.0 CVSS Score 5.3 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L Description An attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames. Maintaining HPACK state requires parsing and processing all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request's headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, no memory is allocated to store the excess headers, but they are still parsed. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode than for an attacker to send. The fix sets a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before closing a connection.

[github-actions]

Attempting automerge. See https://github.com/uniget-org/tools/actions/runs/9040106744.

[github-actions]

PR is clean and can be merged. See https://github.com/uniget-org/tools/actions/runs/9040106744.