You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
containerd-<VERSION>-<OS>-<ARCH>.tar.gz: ✅Recommended. Dynamically linked with glibc 2.35 (Ubuntu 22.04).
containerd-static-<VERSION>-<OS>-<ARCH>.tar.gz: Statically linked. Expected to be used on Linux distributions that do not use glibc >= 2.35. Not position-independent.
In addition to containerd, typically you will have to install runc
and CNI plugins from their official sites too.
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
It is an Authorization Bypass resulting from Improper Input Validation of the HTTP/2 :path pseudo-header.
The gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the :path omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., Service/Method instead of /Service/Method). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official grpc/authz package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, "deny" rules defined using canonical paths (starting with /) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback "allow" rule was present.
Who is impacted?
This affects gRPC-Go servers that meet both of the following criteria:
They use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in google.golang.org/grpc/authz or custom interceptors relying on info.FullMethod or grpc.Method(ctx).
Their security policy contains specific "deny" rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback "allow" rule).
The vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed :path headers directly to the gRPC server.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Yes, the issue has been patched. The fix ensures that any request with a :path that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected with a codes.Unimplemented error, preventing it from reaching authorization interceptors or handlers with a non-canonical path string.
Users should upgrade to the following versions (or newer):
v1.79.3
The latest master branch.
It is recommended that all users employing path-based authorization (especially grpc/authz) upgrade as soon as the patch is available in a tagged release.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
While upgrading is the most secure and recommended path, users can mitigate the vulnerability using one of the following methods:
1. Use a Validating Interceptor (Recommended Mitigation)
Add an "outermost" interceptor to your server that validates the path before any other authorization logic runs:
funcpathValidationInterceptor(ctx context.Context, reqany, info*grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {
ifinfo.FullMethod==""||info.FullMethod[0] !='/' {
returnnil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, "malformed method name")
}
returnhandler(ctx, req)
}
// Ensure this is the FIRST interceptor in your chains:=grpc.NewServer(
grpc.ChainUnaryInterceptor(pathValidationInterceptor, authzInterceptor),
)
2. Infrastructure-Level Normalization
If your gRPC server is behind a reverse proxy or load balancer (such as Envoy, NGINX, or an L7 Cloud Load Balancer), ensure it is configured to enforce strict HTTP/2 compliance for pseudo-headers and reject or normalize requests where the :path header does not start with a leading slash.
3. Policy Hardening
Switch to a "default deny" posture in your authorization policies (explicitly listing all allowed paths and denying everything else) to reduce the risk of bypasses via malformed inputs.
The fix for GHSA-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq (CVE-2026-24051) changed the Darwin ioreg command to use an absolute path but left the BSD kenv command using a bare name, allowing the same PATH hijacking attack on BSD and Solaris platforms.
The execCommand helper at sdk/resource/host_id_exec.go uses exec.Command(name, arg...) which searches $PATH when the command name contains no path separator.
Affected platforms (per build tag in host_id_bsd.go:4): DragonFly BSD, FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, Solaris.
The kenv path is reached when /etc/hostid does not exist (line 38-40), which is common on FreeBSD systems.
Attack
Attacker has local access to a system running a Go application that imports go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk
Attacker places a malicious kenv binary earlier in $PATH
Application initializes OpenTelemetry resource detection at startup
hostIDReaderBSD.read() calls exec.Command("kenv", ...) which resolves to the malicious binary
Arbitrary code executes in the context of the application
The OpenTelemetry Go SDK in version v1.20.0-1.39.0 is vulnerable to Path Hijacking (Untrusted Search Paths) on macOS/Darwin systems. The resource detection code in sdk/resource/host_id.go executes the ioreg system command using a search path. An attacker with the ability to locally modify the PATH environment variable can achieve Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) within the context of the application.
Patches
This has been patched in d45961b, which was released with v1.40.0.
Decrypting a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) object will panic if the alg field indicates a key wrapping algorithm (one ending in KW, with the exception of A128GCMKW, A192GCMKW, and A256GCMKW) and the encrypted_key field is empty. The panic happens when cipher.KeyUnwrap() in key_wrap.go attempts to allocate a slice with a zero or negative length based on the length of the encrypted_key.
This code path is reachable from ParseEncrypted() / ParseEncryptedJSON() / ParseEncryptedCompact() followed by Decrypt() on the resulting object. Note that the parse functions take a list of accepted key algorithms. If the accepted key algorithms do not include any key wrapping algorithms, parsing will fail and the application will be unaffected.
This panic is also reachable by calling cipher.KeyUnwrap() directly with any ciphertext parameter less than 16 bytes long, but calling this function directly is less common.
Panics can lead to denial of service.
Fixed In
4.1.4 and v3.0.5
Workarounds
If the list of keyAlgorithms passed to ParseEncrypted() / ParseEncryptedJSON() / ParseEncryptedCompact() does not include key wrapping algorithms (those ending in KW), your application is unaffected.
If your application uses key wrapping, you can prevalidate to the JWE objects to ensure the encrypted_key field is nonempty. If your application accepts JWE Compact Serialization, apply that validation to the corresponding field of that serialization (the data between the first and second .).
Thanks
Thanks to Datadog's Security team for finding this issue.
overview:
this report shows that the otlp HTTP exporters (traces/metrics/logs) read the full HTTP response body into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without a size cap.
this is exploitable for memory exhaustion when the configured collector endpoint is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker can mitm the exporter connection).
severity
HIGH
not claiming: this is a remote dos against every default deployment.
claiming: if the exporter sends traces to an untrusted collector endpoint (or over a network segment where mitm is realistic), that endpoint can crash the process via a large response body.
root cause:
each exporter client reads resp.Body using io.Copy(&respData, resp.Body) into a bytes.Buffer on both success and error paths, with no upper bound.
impact:
a malicious collector can force large transient heap allocations during export (peak memory scales with attacker-chosen response size) and can potentially crash the instrumented process (oom).
overview:
this report shows that the otlp HTTP exporters (traces/metrics/logs) read the full HTTP response body into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without a size cap.
this is exploitable for memory exhaustion when the configured collector endpoint is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker can mitm the exporter connection).
severity
HIGH
not claiming: this is a remote dos against every default deployment.
claiming: if the exporter sends traces to an untrusted collector endpoint (or over a network segment where mitm is realistic), that endpoint can crash the process via a large response body.
root cause:
each exporter client reads resp.Body using io.Copy(&respData, resp.Body) into a bytes.Buffer on both success and error paths, with no upper bound.
impact:
a malicious collector can force large transient heap allocations during export (peak memory scales with attacker-chosen response size) and can potentially crash the instrumented process (oom).
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
nicholasdille-bot
left a comment
This PR contains the following updates:
2.2.2→2.2.3Warning
Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.
Release Notes
containerd/containerd (containerd)
v2.2.3: containerd 2.2.3Compare Source
Welcome to the v2.2.3 release of containerd!
The third patch release for containerd 2.2 contains various fixes
and updates including a security patch.
Security Updates
Highlights
Container Runtime Interface (CRI)
Go client
Image Distribution
Runtime
Snapshotters
Please try out the release binaries and report any issues at
https://github.com/containerd/containerd/issues.
Contributors
Changes
40 commits
8a0f4ed5dPrepare release notes for v2.2.331bd34a06update github.com/moby/spdystream v0.5.11336f6c45vendor: github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.5409f75be8diff/walking: enable mount manager3f33146c1update runhcs to v0.14.18bd1b74e5vendor: github.com/Microsoft/hcsshim v0.14.1c6b0be8e1vendor: github.com/Microsoft/hcsshim v0.14.02ecde8cfeupdate to Go 1.25.9, 1.26.2be554f478Skip TestExportAndImportMultiLayer on s390x660de195bTweak mount info for overlayfs in case of parallel unpackbc9274a4bAdd integration test for issue 13030c387890b5Add integration test for privileged container cgroup mounts047a335a6Forward RUNC_FLAVOR env var down to integration tests9b2d72ee0Preserve host cgroup mount options for privileged containers5b66cd6a0Move cgroup namespace placement higher in spec builder584205c2f[release/2.2] update runc binary to v1.3.577c6886dfIgnore NOCHANGE errorfbed68b8fFix TOCTOU race bug in tar extractiona83510103cri: UpdatePodSandbox should return Unimplementedee4179e52fix(oci): apply absolute symlink resolution to /etc/groupfd061b848test(oci): use fstest and mock fs for better symlink coverage5d44d2c22fix(oci): handle absolute symlinks in rootfs user lookup00c776f07update to go1.25.8, test go1.26.1Dependency Changes
Previous release can be found at v2.2.2
Which file should I download?
containerd-<VERSION>-<OS>-<ARCH>.tar.gz: ✅Recommended. Dynamically linked with glibc 2.35 (Ubuntu 22.04).containerd-static-<VERSION>-<OS>-<ARCH>.tar.gz: Statically linked. Expected to be used on Linux distributions that do not use glibc >= 2.35. Not position-independent.In addition to containerd, typically you will have to install runc
and CNI plugins from their official sites too.
See also the Getting Started documentation.
Configuration
📅 Schedule: (in timezone Europe/Berlin)
🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
This PR has been generated by Renovate Bot.