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chore(deps): update dagger to v0.20.4#20601

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Apr 9, 2026
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chore(deps): update dagger to v0.20.4#20601
github-actions[bot] merged 1 commit intomainfrom
renovate/dagger-0.20.x

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Update Change
dagger patch 0.20.30.20.4

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Release Notes

dagger/dagger (dagger)

v0.20.4

Compare Source

Added
  • Add experimental dagger up to start module-defined services on the host, including @up annotations, workspace/module services() APIs, and configurable port mappings by Yves Brissaud in #​11959
  • Add @cache directive for module function cache control by Alex Suraci in #​12920
  • Add --failfast to dagger check and WithFailFast in SDKs by @​kpenfound in #​11956
  • Add support to set primitive values and secret arrays in user defaults by @​marcosnils in #​12898
  • Add Changeset.diffStats() and structured DiffStat entries for renames and line-count summaries by @​grouville + @​tiborvass in #​12002
  • Add support for Directory.chown() with usernames and group names by @​alexcb in #​12128
  • Add Dockerfile ADD --unpack support by @​tiborvass + @​grouville in #​12096
  • Add Go toolchain tag support for Dockerfile frontend features such as COPY --exclude and COPY --parents by @​alexcb in #​12896
  • Dang SDK: add enum/interface/scalar support plus @check and @generate directives by Alex Suraci in #​12830
  • Dang SDK: add @up annotation support by Yves Brissaud in #​12919
  • Elixir SDK: support Enum types by @​Nero-F in #​12862
  • Go SDK: write dependency bindings to separate internal/dagger/<dep>.gen.go files by @​TomChv in #​11962
  • PHP SDK: add support for implicit getters by @​charjr in #​11689
  • Rust SDK: add a builder for Config by @​fdiakh in #​12832
Changed
  • Make dagger connect faster by reducing driver probing and setup work before command execution by @​tiborvass in #​11769
  • Expand workspace support with workspace-scoped checks() and generators() APIs, richer workspace metadata, and clearer path/boundary semantics by @​shykes in #​11995
  • dagger check and dagger generate now resolve against the current workspace rather than only the current module by @​shykes in #​11995
  • Stop expanding literal dotenv values and arguments so literal strings remain literal by @​marcosnils in #​11957
  • Go SDK: pin generated modules to the matching dagger-go-sdk commit by @​TomChv in #​11826
Deprecated
  • Set secrets via dotenv segments without a scheme is deprecated and will require an explicit scheme in a future release by @​marcosnils in #​11957
Fixed
  • Fix Dockerfile RUN heredoc failing with command not found (exit 127) by preserving /dev/pipes/ mounts in the OCI spec by @​majiayu000 in #​12020
  • Fix dagger init crashing when .env exists as a directory by @​paikend in #​12868
  • Fix WithExec with Expand=true so environment variables are also expanded in RedirectStdout, RedirectStderr, and RedirectStdin paths by @​shykes in #​12846
  • Fix Helm chart support for custom liveness/readiness probes by @​shykes in #​12859
  • Fix Helm chart envFrom.secretRef indentation in the engine StatefulSet by @​fixeasy in #​12906
  • Fix dagger shell object-argument errors to show a clear message when a string literal is passed instead of an object ID by @​shykes in #​12842
  • Fix lazy image blob handling so container results remain local after ContainerDagOp returns by @​marcosnils in #​12861
  • Fix .env user defaults being silently ignored when a constructor arg has a schema default value by @​shykes in #​12854
  • Dang SDK: fix workspace arguments and filesync support to match /dagger-sdk behavior by Alex Suraci in #​12830
  • Python SDK: fix Config.log_output handling for in-memory streams such as StringIO by @​paikend in #​12867
  • Rust SDK: fix timeouts and default Config behavior, and improve GraphQL error parsing by @​fdiakh in #​12832
Contributors

Special thanks to our external contributors this release!

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Auto-approved because label type/renovate is present.

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github-actions bot commented Apr 9, 2026

🔍 Vulnerabilities of ghcr.io/uniget-org/tools/dagger:0.20.4

📦 Image Reference ghcr.io/uniget-org/tools/dagger:0.20.4
digestsha256:e7d9452b5f56e867d58837b12a5e069a60c83bc24cb090f87c63ba381ac57448
vulnerabilitiescritical: 0 high: 6 medium: 7 low: 0 unspecified: 6
platformlinux/amd64
size22 MB
packages311
critical: 0 high: 1 medium: 1 low: 0 github.com/docker/docker 28.5.2+incompatible (golang)

pkg:golang/github.com/docker/docker@28.5.2%2Bincompatible

high 8.8: CVE--2026--34040 Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel

Affected range<29.3.1
Fixed versionNot Fixed
CVSS Score8.8
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS Score0.014%
EPSS Percentile2nd percentile
Description

Summary

A security vulnerability has been detected that allows attackers to bypass authorization plugins (AuthZ) under specific circumstances. The base likelihood of this being exploited is low.

This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-41110.

Impact

If you don't use AuthZ plugins, you are not affected.

Using a specially-crafted API request, an attacker could make the Docker daemon forward the request to an authorization plugin without the body. The authorization plugin may allow a request which it would have otherwise denied if the body had been forwarded to it.

Anyone who depends on authorization plugins that introspect the request body to make access control decisions is potentially impacted.

Workarounds

If unable to update immediately:

  • Avoid using AuthZ plugins that rely on request body inspection for security decisions.
  • Restrict access to the Docker API to trusted parties, following the principle of least privilege.

Credits

  • 1seal / Oleh Konko (@1seal)
  • Cody (c@wormhole.guru)
  • Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada (@manizada)

Resources

medium 6.8: CVE--2026--33997 Off-by-one Error

Affected range<29.3.1
Fixed versionNot Fixed
CVSS Score6.8
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
EPSS Score0.013%
EPSS Percentile2nd percentile
Description

Summary

A security vulnerability has been detected that allows plugins privilege validation to be bypassed during docker plugin install. Due to an error in the daemon's privilege comparison logic, the daemon may incorrectly accept a privilege set that differs from the one approved by the user.

Plugins that request exactly one privilege are also affected, because no comparison is performed at all.

Impact

If plugins are not in use, there is no impact.

When a plugin is installed, the daemon computes the privileges required by the plugin's configuration and compares them with the privileges approved during installation. A malicious plugin can exploit this bug so that the daemon accepts privileges that differ from what was intended to be approved.

Anyone who depends on the plugin installation approval flow as a meaningful security boundary is potentially impacted.

Depending on the privilege set involved, this may include highly sensitive plugin permissions such as broad device access.

For consideration: exploitation still requires a plugin to be installed from a malicious source, and Docker plugins are relatively uncommon. Docker Desktop also does not support plugins.

Workarounds

If unable to update immediately:

  • Do not install plugins from untrusted sources
  • Carefully review all privileges requested during docker plugin install
  • Restrict access to the Docker daemon to trusted parties, following the principle of least privilege
  • Avoid relying on plugin privilege approval as the only control boundary for sensitive environments

Credits

  • Reported by Cody (c@wormhole.guru, PGP 0x9FA5B73E)
critical: 0 high: 1 medium: 0 low: 0 unspecified: 6stdlib 1.26.1 (golang)

pkg:golang/stdlib@1.26.1

high : CVE--2026--32280

Affected range>=1.26.0-0
<1.26.2
Fixed version1.26.2
EPSS Score0.007%
EPSS Percentile0th percentile
Description

During chain building, the amount of work that is done is not correctly limited when a large number of intermediate certificates are passed in VerifyOptions.Intermediates, which can lead to a denial of service. This affects both direct users of crypto/x509 and users of crypto/tls.

unspecified : CVE--2026--33810

Affected range>=1.26.0-0
<1.26.2
Fixed version1.26.2
EPSS Score0.005%
EPSS Percentile0th percentile
Description

When verifying a certificate chain containing excluded DNS constraints, these constraints are not correctly applied to wildcard DNS SANs which use a different case than the constraint.

This only affects validation of otherwise trusted certificate chains, issued by a root CA in the VerifyOptions.Roots CertPool, or in the system certificate pool.

unspecified : CVE--2026--32289

Affected range>=1.26.0-0
<1.26.2
Fixed version1.26.2
EPSS Score0.011%
EPSS Percentile1st percentile
Description

Context was not properly tracked across template branches for JS template literals, leading to possibly incorrect escaping of content when branches were used. Additionally template actions within JS template literals did not properly track the brace depth, leading to incorrect escaping being applied.

These issues could cause actions within JS template literals to be incorrectly or improperly escaped, leading to XSS vulnerabilities.

unspecified : CVE--2026--32288

Affected range>=1.26.0-0
<1.26.2
Fixed version1.26.2
EPSS Score0.009%
EPSS Percentile1st percentile
Description

tar.Reader can allocate an unbounded amount of memory when reading a maliciously-crafted archive containing a large number of sparse regions encoded in the "old GNU sparse map" format.

unspecified : CVE--2026--32283

Affected range>=1.26.0-0
<1.26.2
Fixed version1.26.2
EPSS Score0.007%
EPSS Percentile0th percentile
Description

If one side of the TLS connection sends multiple key update messages post-handshake in a single record, the connection can deadlock, causing uncontrolled consumption of resources. This can lead to a denial of service.

This only affects TLS 1.3.

unspecified : CVE--2026--32282

Affected range>=1.26.0-0
<1.26.2
Fixed version1.26.2
EPSS Score0.010%
EPSS Percentile1st percentile
Description

On Linux, if the target of Root.Chmod is replaced with a symlink while the chmod operation is in progress, Chmod can operate on the target of the symlink, even when the target lies outside the root.

The Linux fchmodat syscall silently ignores the AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flag, which Root.Chmod uses to avoid symlink traversal. Root.Chmod checks its target before acting and returns an error if the target is a symlink lying outside the root, so the impact is limited to cases where the target is replaced with a symlink between the check and operation.

unspecified : CVE--2026--32281

Affected range>=1.26.0-0
<1.26.2
Fixed version1.26.2
EPSS Score0.007%
EPSS Percentile0th percentile
Description

Validating certificate chains which use policies is unexpectedly inefficient when certificates in the chain contain a very large number of policy mappings, possibly causing denial of service.

This only affects validation of otherwise trusted certificate chains, issued by a root CA in the VerifyOptions.Roots CertPool, or in the system certificate pool.

critical: 0 high: 1 medium: 0 low: 0 github.com/buger/jsonparser 1.1.2 (golang)

pkg:golang/github.com/buger/jsonparser@1.1.2

high : CVE--2026--32285

Affected range>=0.0.0
Fixed versionNot Fixed
EPSS Score0.054%
EPSS Percentile17th percentile
Description

The Delete function fails to properly validate offsets when processing malformed JSON input. This can lead to a negative slice index and a runtime panic, allowing a denial of service attack.

critical: 0 high: 1 medium: 0 low: 0 go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk 1.42.0 (golang)

pkg:golang/go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk@1.42.0

high 7.3: CVE--2026--39883 Untrusted Search Path

Affected range>=1.15.0
<=1.42.0
Fixed version1.43.0
CVSS Score7.3
CVSS VectorCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Description

Summary

The fix for GHSA-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq (CVE-2026-24051) changed the Darwin ioreg command to use an absolute path but left the BSD kenv command using a bare name, allowing the same PATH hijacking attack on BSD and Solaris platforms.

Root Cause

sdk/resource/host_id.go line 42:

if result, err := r.execCommand("kenv", "-q", "smbios.system.uuid"); err == nil {

Compare with the fixed Darwin path at line 58:

result, err := r.execCommand("/usr/sbin/ioreg", "-rd1", "-c", "IOPlatformExpertDevice")

The execCommand helper at sdk/resource/host_id_exec.go uses exec.Command(name, arg...) which searches $PATH when the command name contains no path separator.

Affected platforms (per build tag in host_id_bsd.go:4): DragonFly BSD, FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, Solaris.

The kenv path is reached when /etc/hostid does not exist (line 38-40), which is common on FreeBSD systems.

Attack

  1. Attacker has local access to a system running a Go application that imports go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk
  2. Attacker places a malicious kenv binary earlier in $PATH
  3. Application initializes OpenTelemetry resource detection at startup
  4. hostIDReaderBSD.read() calls exec.Command("kenv", ...) which resolves to the malicious binary
  5. Arbitrary code executes in the context of the application

Same attack vector and impact as CVE-2026-24051.

Suggested Fix

Use the absolute path:

if result, err := r.execCommand("/bin/kenv", "-q", "smbios.system.uuid"); err == nil {

On FreeBSD, kenv is located at /bin/kenv.

critical: 0 high: 1 medium: 0 low: 0 github.com/docker/cli 29.3.1+incompatible (golang)

pkg:golang/github.com/docker/cli@29.3.1%2Bincompatible

high : CVE--2025--15558

Affected range>=19.03.0+incompatible
Fixed versionNot Fixed
EPSS Score0.023%
EPSS Percentile6th percentile
Description

Docker CLI Plugins: Uncontrolled Search Path Element Leads to Local Privilege Escalation on Windows in github.com/docker/cli

critical: 0 high: 1 medium: 0 low: 0 github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 4.1.3 (golang)

pkg:golang/github.com/go-jose/go-jose@4.1.3#v4

high 7.5: CVE--2026--34986 Uncaught Exception

Affected range<4.1.4
Fixed version4.1.4
CVSS Score7.5
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
EPSS Score0.015%
EPSS Percentile3rd percentile
Description

Impact

Decrypting a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) object will panic if the alg field indicates a key wrapping algorithm (one ending in KW, with the exception of A128GCMKW, A192GCMKW, and A256GCMKW) and the encrypted_key field is empty. The panic happens when cipher.KeyUnwrap() in key_wrap.go attempts to allocate a slice with a zero or negative length based on the length of the encrypted_key.

This code path is reachable from ParseEncrypted() / ParseEncryptedJSON() / ParseEncryptedCompact() followed by Decrypt() on the resulting object. Note that the parse functions take a list of accepted key algorithms. If the accepted key algorithms do not include any key wrapping algorithms, parsing will fail and the application will be unaffected.

This panic is also reachable by calling cipher.KeyUnwrap() directly with any ciphertext parameter less than 16 bytes long, but calling this function directly is less common.

Panics can lead to denial of service.

Fixed In

4.1.4 and v3.0.5

Workarounds

If the list of keyAlgorithms passed to ParseEncrypted() / ParseEncryptedJSON() / ParseEncryptedCompact() does not include key wrapping algorithms (those ending in KW), your application is unaffected.

If your application uses key wrapping, you can prevalidate to the JWE objects to ensure the encrypted_key field is nonempty. If your application accepts JWE Compact Serialization, apply that validation to the corresponding field of that serialization (the data between the first and second .).

Thanks

Thanks to Datadog's Security team for finding this issue.

critical: 0 high: 0 medium: 1 low: 0 go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp 1.41.0 (golang)

pkg:golang/go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters@1.41.0#otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp

medium 5.3: CVE--2026--39882 Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value

Affected range<1.43.0
Fixed version1.43.0
CVSS Score5.3
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Description

overview:
this report shows that the otlp HTTP exporters (traces/metrics/logs) read the full HTTP response body into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without a size cap.

this is exploitable for memory exhaustion when the configured collector endpoint is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker can mitm the exporter connection).

severity

HIGH

not claiming: this is a remote dos against every default deployment.
claiming: if the exporter sends traces to an untrusted collector endpoint (or over a network segment where mitm is realistic), that endpoint can crash the process via a large response body.

callsite (pinned):

  • exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp/client.go:199
  • exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp/client.go:230
  • exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp/client.go:170
  • exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp/client.go:201
  • exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp/client.go:190
  • exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp/client.go:221

permalinks (pinned):

root cause:
each exporter client reads resp.Body using io.Copy(&respData, resp.Body) into a bytes.Buffer on both success and error paths, with no upper bound.

impact:
a malicious collector can force large transient heap allocations during export (peak memory scales with attacker-chosen response size) and can potentially crash the instrumented process (oom).

affected component:

  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp
  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp
  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp

repro (local-only):

unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make canonical resp_bytes=33554432 chunk_delay_ms=0

expected output contains:

[CALLSITE_HIT]: otlptracehttp.UploadTraces::io.Copy(resp.Body)
[PROOF_MARKER]: resp_bytes=33554432 peak_alloc_bytes=118050512

control (same env, patched target):

unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make control resp_bytes=33554432 chunk_delay_ms=0

expected control output contains:

[CALLSITE_HIT]: otlptracehttp.UploadTraces::io.Copy(resp.Body)
[NC_MARKER]: resp_bytes=33554432 peak_alloc_bytes=512232

attachments: poc.zip (attached)

PR_DESCRIPTION.md

attack_scenario.md

poc.zip

Fixed in: open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go#8108

critical: 0 high: 0 medium: 1 low: 0 go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp 0.16.0 (golang)

pkg:golang/go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp@0.16.0

medium 5.3: CVE--2026--39882 Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value

Affected range<0.19.0
Fixed version0.19.0
CVSS Score5.3
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Description

overview:
this report shows that the otlp HTTP exporters (traces/metrics/logs) read the full HTTP response body into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without a size cap.

this is exploitable for memory exhaustion when the configured collector endpoint is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker can mitm the exporter connection).

severity

HIGH

not claiming: this is a remote dos against every default deployment.
claiming: if the exporter sends traces to an untrusted collector endpoint (or over a network segment where mitm is realistic), that endpoint can crash the process via a large response body.

callsite (pinned):

  • exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp/client.go:199
  • exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp/client.go:230
  • exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp/client.go:170
  • exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp/client.go:201
  • exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp/client.go:190
  • exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp/client.go:221

permalinks (pinned):

root cause:
each exporter client reads resp.Body using io.Copy(&respData, resp.Body) into a bytes.Buffer on both success and error paths, with no upper bound.

impact:
a malicious collector can force large transient heap allocations during export (peak memory scales with attacker-chosen response size) and can potentially crash the instrumented process (oom).

affected component:

  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp
  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp
  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp

repro (local-only):

unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make canonical resp_bytes=33554432 chunk_delay_ms=0

expected output contains:

[CALLSITE_HIT]: otlptracehttp.UploadTraces::io.Copy(resp.Body)
[PROOF_MARKER]: resp_bytes=33554432 peak_alloc_bytes=118050512

control (same env, patched target):

unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make control resp_bytes=33554432 chunk_delay_ms=0

expected control output contains:

[CALLSITE_HIT]: otlptracehttp.UploadTraces::io.Copy(resp.Body)
[NC_MARKER]: resp_bytes=33554432 peak_alloc_bytes=512232

attachments: poc.zip (attached)

PR_DESCRIPTION.md

attack_scenario.md

poc.zip

Fixed in: open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go#8108

critical: 0 high: 0 medium: 1 low: 0 go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp 0.16.0 (golang)

pkg:golang/go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters@0.16.0#otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp

medium 5.3: CVE--2026--39882 Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value

Affected range<0.19.0
Fixed version0.19.0
CVSS Score5.3
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Description

overview:
this report shows that the otlp HTTP exporters (traces/metrics/logs) read the full HTTP response body into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without a size cap.

this is exploitable for memory exhaustion when the configured collector endpoint is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker can mitm the exporter connection).

severity

HIGH

not claiming: this is a remote dos against every default deployment.
claiming: if the exporter sends traces to an untrusted collector endpoint (or over a network segment where mitm is realistic), that endpoint can crash the process via a large response body.

callsite (pinned):

  • exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp/client.go:199
  • exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp/client.go:230
  • exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp/client.go:170
  • exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp/client.go:201
  • exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp/client.go:190
  • exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp/client.go:221

permalinks (pinned):

root cause:
each exporter client reads resp.Body using io.Copy(&respData, resp.Body) into a bytes.Buffer on both success and error paths, with no upper bound.

impact:
a malicious collector can force large transient heap allocations during export (peak memory scales with attacker-chosen response size) and can potentially crash the instrumented process (oom).

affected component:

  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp
  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp
  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp

repro (local-only):

unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make canonical resp_bytes=33554432 chunk_delay_ms=0

expected output contains:

[CALLSITE_HIT]: otlptracehttp.UploadTraces::io.Copy(resp.Body)
[PROOF_MARKER]: resp_bytes=33554432 peak_alloc_bytes=118050512

control (same env, patched target):

unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make control resp_bytes=33554432 chunk_delay_ms=0

expected control output contains:

[CALLSITE_HIT]: otlptracehttp.UploadTraces::io.Copy(resp.Body)
[NC_MARKER]: resp_bytes=33554432 peak_alloc_bytes=512232

attachments: poc.zip (attached)

PR_DESCRIPTION.md

attack_scenario.md

poc.zip

Fixed in: open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go#8108

critical: 0 high: 0 medium: 1 low: 0 go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp 1.41.0 (golang)

pkg:golang/go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp@1.41.0

medium 5.3: CVE--2026--39882 Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value

Affected range<1.43.0
Fixed version1.43.0
CVSS Score5.3
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Description

overview:
this report shows that the otlp HTTP exporters (traces/metrics/logs) read the full HTTP response body into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without a size cap.

this is exploitable for memory exhaustion when the configured collector endpoint is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker can mitm the exporter connection).

severity

HIGH

not claiming: this is a remote dos against every default deployment.
claiming: if the exporter sends traces to an untrusted collector endpoint (or over a network segment where mitm is realistic), that endpoint can crash the process via a large response body.

callsite (pinned):

  • exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp/client.go:199
  • exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp/client.go:230
  • exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp/client.go:170
  • exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp/client.go:201
  • exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp/client.go:190
  • exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp/client.go:221

permalinks (pinned):

root cause:
each exporter client reads resp.Body using io.Copy(&respData, resp.Body) into a bytes.Buffer on both success and error paths, with no upper bound.

impact:
a malicious collector can force large transient heap allocations during export (peak memory scales with attacker-chosen response size) and can potentially crash the instrumented process (oom).

affected component:

  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp
  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp
  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp

repro (local-only):

unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make canonical resp_bytes=33554432 chunk_delay_ms=0

expected output contains:

[CALLSITE_HIT]: otlptracehttp.UploadTraces::io.Copy(resp.Body)
[PROOF_MARKER]: resp_bytes=33554432 peak_alloc_bytes=118050512

control (same env, patched target):

unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make control resp_bytes=33554432 chunk_delay_ms=0

expected control output contains:

[CALLSITE_HIT]: otlptracehttp.UploadTraces::io.Copy(resp.Body)
[NC_MARKER]: resp_bytes=33554432 peak_alloc_bytes=512232

attachments: poc.zip (attached)

PR_DESCRIPTION.md

attack_scenario.md

poc.zip

Fixed in: open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go#8108

critical: 0 high: 0 medium: 1 low: 0 go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp 1.41.0 (golang)

pkg:golang/go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters@1.41.0#otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp

medium 5.3: CVE--2026--39882 Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value

Affected range<1.43.0
Fixed version1.43.0
CVSS Score5.3
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Description

overview:
this report shows that the otlp HTTP exporters (traces/metrics/logs) read the full HTTP response body into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without a size cap.

this is exploitable for memory exhaustion when the configured collector endpoint is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker can mitm the exporter connection).

severity

HIGH

not claiming: this is a remote dos against every default deployment.
claiming: if the exporter sends traces to an untrusted collector endpoint (or over a network segment where mitm is realistic), that endpoint can crash the process via a large response body.

callsite (pinned):

  • exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp/client.go:199
  • exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp/client.go:230
  • exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp/client.go:170
  • exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp/client.go:201
  • exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp/client.go:190
  • exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp/client.go:221

permalinks (pinned):

root cause:
each exporter client reads resp.Body using io.Copy(&respData, resp.Body) into a bytes.Buffer on both success and error paths, with no upper bound.

impact:
a malicious collector can force large transient heap allocations during export (peak memory scales with attacker-chosen response size) and can potentially crash the instrumented process (oom).

affected component:

  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp
  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp
  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp

repro (local-only):

unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make canonical resp_bytes=33554432 chunk_delay_ms=0

expected output contains:

[CALLSITE_HIT]: otlptracehttp.UploadTraces::io.Copy(resp.Body)
[PROOF_MARKER]: resp_bytes=33554432 peak_alloc_bytes=118050512

control (same env, patched target):

unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make control resp_bytes=33554432 chunk_delay_ms=0

expected control output contains:

[CALLSITE_HIT]: otlptracehttp.UploadTraces::io.Copy(resp.Body)
[NC_MARKER]: resp_bytes=33554432 peak_alloc_bytes=512232

attachments: poc.zip (attached)

PR_DESCRIPTION.md

attack_scenario.md

poc.zip

Fixed in: open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go#8108

critical: 0 high: 0 medium: 1 low: 0 go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp 1.41.0 (golang)

pkg:golang/go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp@1.41.0

medium 5.3: CVE--2026--39882 Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value

Affected range<1.43.0
Fixed version1.43.0
CVSS Score5.3
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Description

overview:
this report shows that the otlp HTTP exporters (traces/metrics/logs) read the full HTTP response body into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without a size cap.

this is exploitable for memory exhaustion when the configured collector endpoint is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker can mitm the exporter connection).

severity

HIGH

not claiming: this is a remote dos against every default deployment.
claiming: if the exporter sends traces to an untrusted collector endpoint (or over a network segment where mitm is realistic), that endpoint can crash the process via a large response body.

callsite (pinned):

  • exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp/client.go:199
  • exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp/client.go:230
  • exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp/client.go:170
  • exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp/client.go:201
  • exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp/client.go:190
  • exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp/client.go:221

permalinks (pinned):

root cause:
each exporter client reads resp.Body using io.Copy(&respData, resp.Body) into a bytes.Buffer on both success and error paths, with no upper bound.

impact:
a malicious collector can force large transient heap allocations during export (peak memory scales with attacker-chosen response size) and can potentially crash the instrumented process (oom).

affected component:

  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp
  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlpmetric/otlpmetrichttp
  • go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp

repro (local-only):

unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make canonical resp_bytes=33554432 chunk_delay_ms=0

expected output contains:

[CALLSITE_HIT]: otlptracehttp.UploadTraces::io.Copy(resp.Body)
[PROOF_MARKER]: resp_bytes=33554432 peak_alloc_bytes=118050512

control (same env, patched target):

unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make control resp_bytes=33554432 chunk_delay_ms=0

expected control output contains:

[CALLSITE_HIT]: otlptracehttp.UploadTraces::io.Copy(resp.Body)
[NC_MARKER]: resp_bytes=33554432 peak_alloc_bytes=512232

attachments: poc.zip (attached)

PR_DESCRIPTION.md

attack_scenario.md

poc.zip

Fixed in: open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go#8108

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github-actions bot commented Apr 9, 2026

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github-actions bot commented Apr 9, 2026

@github-actions github-actions bot merged commit b738dbc into main Apr 9, 2026
9 of 11 checks passed
@github-actions github-actions bot deleted the renovate/dagger-0.20.x branch April 9, 2026 09:44
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3 participants