fixed spelling errors #184

dgucsekelly · 2015-05-11T11:57:07Z

No description provided.

ecnepsnai · 2015-05-11T20:33:16Z

Please read the documentation: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/Documentation/SubmittingPatches

Linus doesn't accept pull requests from GitHub: #17 (comment)

Orabug: 20189959 PID: 614 TASK: ffff882a739da580 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "ocfs2dc" #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5 #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8 #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0 #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5 torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208] RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940 RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0 RFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 000000000000654b RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDX: 00000000000017d9 RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318 RBP: ffff882ecc375d20 R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60 R9: ffff88301f272200 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffffffffff R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2] torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2] torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2] torvalds#10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2] torvalds#11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2] torvalds#12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7 torvalds#13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884 assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR. Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert. system_call_fastpath -> my_chmod -> sys_chmod -> sys_fchmodat -> notify_change -> ocfs2_setattr -> posix_acl_chmod -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl -> ocfs2_set_acl -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode Here is how. 1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 1120 { 1247 ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do. .. 1258 if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) { 1259 status = posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode); 519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode) 520 { .. 539 ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS); 287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ... 288 { 289 return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL); 224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle, 225 struct inode *inode, ... 231 { .. 252 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh, 253 handle, mode); 168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ... 170 { 183 if (handle == NULL) { >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<< 184 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb), 185 OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS); ocfs2_setattr.#1247 we unlock and at #1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX mode (it should be). How this could have happended? We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in ocfs2_setattr.#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc). Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL) for the request. ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does, takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two. Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

Orabug: 20189959 PID: 614 TASK: ffff882a739da580 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "ocfs2dc" #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5 #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8 #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0 #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5 torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208] RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940 RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0 RFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 000000000000654b RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDX: 00000000000017d9 RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318 RBP: ffff882ecc375d20 R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60 R9: ffff88301f272200 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffffffffff R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2] torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2] torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2] torvalds#10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2] torvalds#11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2] torvalds#12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7 torvalds#13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884 assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR. Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert. system_call_fastpath -> my_chmod -> sys_chmod -> sys_fchmodat -> notify_change -> ocfs2_setattr -> posix_acl_chmod -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl -> ocfs2_set_acl -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode Here is how. 1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 1120 { 1247 ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do. .. 1258 if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) { 1259 status = posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode); 519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode) 520 { .. 539 ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS); 287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ... 288 { 289 return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL); 224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle, 225 struct inode *inode, ... 231 { .. 252 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh, 253 handle, mode); 168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ... 170 { 183 if (handle == NULL) { >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<< 184 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb), 185 OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS); ocfs2_setattr.#1247 we unlock and at #1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX mode (it should be). How this could have happended? We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in ocfs2_setattr.#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc). Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL) for the request. ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does, takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two. Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Cc: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

PID: 614 TASK: ffff882a739da580 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "ocfs2dc" #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5 #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8 #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0 #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5 #6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208] RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940 RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0 RFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 000000000000654b RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDX: 00000000000017d9 RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318 RBP: ffff882ecc375d20 R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60 R9: ffff88301f272200 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffffffffff R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2] #8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2] #9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2] #10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2] #11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2] #12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7 #13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884 assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR. Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert. system_call_fastpath -> my_chmod -> sys_chmod -> sys_fchmodat -> notify_change -> ocfs2_setattr -> posix_acl_chmod -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl -> ocfs2_set_acl -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode Here is how. 1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 1120 { 1247 ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do. .. 1258 if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) { 1259 status = posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode); 519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode) 520 { .. 539 ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS); 287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ... 288 { 289 return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL); 224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle, 225 struct inode *inode, ... 231 { .. 252 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh, 253 handle, mode); 168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ... 170 { 183 if (handle == NULL) { >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<< 184 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb), 185 OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS); ocfs2_setattr.#1247 we unlock and at #1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach ocfs2_acl_set_mode.#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX mode (it should be). How this could have happended? We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in ocfs2_setattr.#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in ocfs2_acl_set_mode.#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc). Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL) for the request. ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does, takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two. Orabug: 20189959 Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Cc: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

The PM runtime API can't be used in atomic contex on -RT even if it's configured as irqsafe. As result, below error report can be seen when PM runtime API called from IRQ chip's callbacks irq_startup/irq_shutdown/irq_set_type, because they are protected by RAW spinlock: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:917 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, pid: 96, name: insmod 3 locks held by insmod/96: #0: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04752c8>] __driver_attach+0x54/0xa0 #1: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04752d4>] __driver_attach+0x60/0xa0 #2: (class){......}, at: [<c00a408c>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x60/0xa4 irq event stamp: 1834 hardirqs last enabled at (1833): [<c06ab2a4>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x88/0x90 hardirqs last disabled at (1834): [<c06ab068>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2c/0x64 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<c003d220>] copy_process.part.52+0x410/0x19d8 softirqs last disabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null) Preemption disabled at:[< (null)>] (null) CPU: 1 PID: 96 Comm: insmod Tainted: G W O 4.1.3-rt3-00618-g57e2387-dirty torvalds#184 Hardware name: Generic DRA74X (Flattened Device Tree) [<c00190f4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0014734>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [<c0014734>] (show_stack) from [<c06a62ec>] (dump_stack+0x88/0xdc) [<c06a62ec>] (dump_stack) from [<c006ca44>] (___might_sleep+0x198/0x2a8) [<c006ca44>] (___might_sleep) from [<c06ab6d4>] (rt_spin_lock+0x30/0x70) [<c06ab6d4>] (rt_spin_lock) from [<c04815ac>] (__pm_runtime_resume+0x68/0xa4) [<c04815ac>] (__pm_runtime_resume) from [<c04123f4>] (omap_gpio_irq_type+0x188/0x1d8) [<c04123f4>] (omap_gpio_irq_type) from [<c00a64e4>] (__irq_set_trigger+0x68/0x130) [<c00a64e4>] (__irq_set_trigger) from [<c00a7bc4>] (irq_set_irq_type+0x44/0x6c) [<c00a7bc4>] (irq_set_irq_type) from [<c00abbf8>] (irq_create_of_mapping+0x120/0x174) [<c00abbf8>] (irq_create_of_mapping) from [<c0577b74>] (of_irq_get+0x48/0x58) [<c0577b74>] (of_irq_get) from [<c0540a14>] (i2c_device_probe+0x54/0x15c) [<c0540a14>] (i2c_device_probe) from [<c04750dc>] (driver_probe_device+0x184/0x2c8) [<c04750dc>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c0475310>] (__driver_attach+0x9c/0xa0) [<c0475310>] (__driver_attach) from [<c0473238>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xb0) [<c0473238>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0474af4>] (driver_attach+0x28/0x30) [<c0474af4>] (driver_attach) from [<c0474760>] (bus_add_driver+0x154/0x200) [<c0474760>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c0476348>] (driver_register+0x88/0x108) [<c0476348>] (driver_register) from [<c0541600>] (i2c_register_driver+0x3c/0x90) [<c0541600>] (i2c_register_driver) from [<bf003018>] (pcf857x_init+0x18/0x24 [gpio_pcf857x]) [<bf003018>] (pcf857x_init [gpio_pcf857x]) from [<c000998c>] (do_one_initcall+0x128/0x1e8) [<c000998c>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c06a4220>] (do_init_module+0x6c/0x1bc) [<c06a4220>] (do_init_module) from [<c00dd0c8>] (load_module+0x18e8/0x21c4) [<c00dd0c8>] (load_module) from [<c00ddaa0>] (SyS_init_module+0xfc/0x158) [<c00ddaa0>] (SyS_init_module) from [<c000ff40>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) The IRQ chip interface defines only two callbacks which are executed in non-atomic contex - irq_bus_lock/irq_bus_sync_unlock, so lets move PM runtime calls there. Cc: <[email protected]> Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]> Tested-by: Austin Schuh <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Grygorii Strashko <[email protected]>

In multi-core system, if the clock is not sync perfectly, it will make cycle_last that recorded by CPU-A is a little more than cycle_now that read by CPU-B. With the negative result, hrtimer_update_base() return a huge and wrong time. It leads to the cpu can not finish the while loop in hrtimer_interrupt() until the real nowtime which is returned from ktime_get() catch up with the wrong time on clock monotonic base. I was able to reproudce the problem with calling clock_settime and clock_adjtime repeatedly on each cpu. The params of the calls is random. Here is the calltrace: Jan 01 00:02:29 Linux kernel: INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: Jan 01 00:02:29 Linux kernel: 0: (2 GPs behind) idle=913/1/0 softirq=59289/59291 fqs=488 Jan 01 00:02:29 Linux kernel: (detected by 20, t=5252 jiffies, g=35769, c=35768, q=567) Jan 01 00:02:29 Linux kernel: Task dump for CPU 0: Jan 01 00:02:29 Linux kernel: swapper/0 R running task 0 0 0 0x00000002 Jan 01 00:02:29 Linux kernel: Call trace: Jan 01 00:02:29 Linux kernel: [<ffffffc000086c5c>] __switch_to+0x74/0x8c Jan 01 00:02:29 Linux kernel: rcu_sched kthread starved for 4764 jiffies! Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 23s! [swapper/0:0] Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.1.6+ torvalds#184 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: task: ffffffc00091cdf0 ti: ffffffc000910000 task.ti: ffffffc000910000 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: PC is at arch_cpu_idle+0x10/0x18 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: LR is at arch_cpu_idle+0xc/0x18 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: pc : [<ffffffc00008686c>] lr : [<ffffffc000086868>] pstate: 60000145 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: sp : ffffffc000913f20 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x29: ffffffc000913f20 x28: 000000003f4bbab0 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x27: ffffffc00091669c x26: ffffffc00096e000 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x25: ffffffc000804000 x24: ffffffc000913f30 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x23: 0000000000000001 x22: ffffffc0006817f8 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x21: ffffffc0008fdb00 x20: ffffffc000916618 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x19: ffffffc000910000 x18: 00000000ffffffff Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x17: 0000007f9d6f682c x16: ffffffc0001e19d0 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x15: 0000000000000061 x14: 0000000000000072 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x13: 0000000000000067 x12: ffffffc000682528 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x11: 0000000000000005 x10: 00000001000faf9a Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x9 : ffffffc000913e60 x8 : ffffffc00091d350 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 002b24c4f00026aa Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x5 : 0000001ffd5c6000 x4 : ffffffc000913ea0 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x3 : ffffffdffdec3b44 x2 : ffffffdffdec3b44 Jan 01 00:03:32 Linux kernel: x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 CPU-A updates the cycle_last in do_settimeofday64() under lock and CPU-B reads the current cycles which is slightly behind CPU-A to substract the cycle_last after unlock, then we get a negative result, after masking it comes to a extremely huge value and lead to "hang" in hrtimer_interrupt(). And multi-core system on X86 had already met such problem and Thomas introduce a fix which is commit 47001d6 ("x86: tsc prevent time going backwards"). And then Thomas moved the fix code into the core code file of time in commit 09ec544 ("clocksource: Move cycle_last validation to core code"). Now the validation can be enabled by config CLOCKSOURCE_VALIDATE_LAST_CYCLE. I think we can fix the problem on arm64 by selecting the config. This is no side effect for systems with counters running properly. Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>

The PM runtime API can't be used in atomic contex on -RT even if it's configured as irqsafe. As result, below error report can be seen when PM runtime API called from IRQ chip's callbacks irq_startup/irq_shutdown/irq_set_type, because they are protected by RAW spinlock: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:917 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, pid: 96, name: insmod 3 locks held by insmod/96: #0: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04752c8>] __driver_attach+0x54/0xa0 #1: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04752d4>] __driver_attach+0x60/0xa0 #2: (class){......}, at: [<c00a408c>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x60/0xa4 irq event stamp: 1834 hardirqs last enabled at (1833): [<c06ab2a4>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x88/0x90 hardirqs last disabled at (1834): [<c06ab068>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2c/0x64 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<c003d220>] copy_process.part.52+0x410/0x19d8 softirqs last disabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null) Preemption disabled at:[< (null)>] (null) CPU: 1 PID: 96 Comm: insmod Tainted: G W O 4.1.3-rt3-00618-g57e2387-dirty torvalds#184 Hardware name: Generic DRA74X (Flattened Device Tree) [<c00190f4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0014734>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [<c0014734>] (show_stack) from [<c06a62ec>] (dump_stack+0x88/0xdc) [<c06a62ec>] (dump_stack) from [<c006ca44>] (___might_sleep+0x198/0x2a8) [<c006ca44>] (___might_sleep) from [<c06ab6d4>] (rt_spin_lock+0x30/0x70) [<c06ab6d4>] (rt_spin_lock) from [<c04815ac>] (__pm_runtime_resume+0x68/0xa4) [<c04815ac>] (__pm_runtime_resume) from [<c04123f4>] (omap_gpio_irq_type+0x188/0x1d8) [<c04123f4>] (omap_gpio_irq_type) from [<c00a64e4>] (__irq_set_trigger+0x68/0x130) [<c00a64e4>] (__irq_set_trigger) from [<c00a7bc4>] (irq_set_irq_type+0x44/0x6c) [<c00a7bc4>] (irq_set_irq_type) from [<c00abbf8>] (irq_create_of_mapping+0x120/0x174) [<c00abbf8>] (irq_create_of_mapping) from [<c0577b74>] (of_irq_get+0x48/0x58) [<c0577b74>] (of_irq_get) from [<c0540a14>] (i2c_device_probe+0x54/0x15c) [<c0540a14>] (i2c_device_probe) from [<c04750dc>] (driver_probe_device+0x184/0x2c8) [<c04750dc>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c0475310>] (__driver_attach+0x9c/0xa0) [<c0475310>] (__driver_attach) from [<c0473238>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xb0) [<c0473238>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0474af4>] (driver_attach+0x28/0x30) [<c0474af4>] (driver_attach) from [<c0474760>] (bus_add_driver+0x154/0x200) [<c0474760>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c0476348>] (driver_register+0x88/0x108) [<c0476348>] (driver_register) from [<c0541600>] (i2c_register_driver+0x3c/0x90) [<c0541600>] (i2c_register_driver) from [<bf003018>] (pcf857x_init+0x18/0x24 [gpio_pcf857x]) [<bf003018>] (pcf857x_init [gpio_pcf857x]) from [<c000998c>] (do_one_initcall+0x128/0x1e8) [<c000998c>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c06a4220>] (do_init_module+0x6c/0x1bc) [<c06a4220>] (do_init_module) from [<c00dd0c8>] (load_module+0x18e8/0x21c4) [<c00dd0c8>] (load_module) from [<c00ddaa0>] (SyS_init_module+0xfc/0x158) [<c00ddaa0>] (SyS_init_module) from [<c000ff40>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) The IRQ chip interface defines only two callbacks which are executed in non-atomic contex - irq_bus_lock/irq_bus_sync_unlock, so lets move PM runtime calls there. Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]> Tested-by: Austin Schuh <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Grygorii Strashko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>

The PM runtime API can't be used in atomic contex on -RT even if it's configured as irqsafe. As result, below error report can be seen when PM runtime API called from IRQ chip's callbacks irq_startup/irq_shutdown/irq_set_type, because they are protected by RAW spinlock: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:917 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, pid: 96, name: insmod 3 locks held by insmod/96: #0: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04752c8>] __driver_attach+0x54/0xa0 #1: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c04752d4>] __driver_attach+0x60/0xa0 #2: (class){......}, at: [<c00a408c>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x60/0xa4 irq event stamp: 1834 hardirqs last enabled at (1833): [<c06ab2a4>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x88/0x90 hardirqs last disabled at (1834): [<c06ab068>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2c/0x64 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<c003d220>] copy_process.part.52+0x410/0x19d8 softirqs last disabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null) Preemption disabled at:[< (null)>] (null) CPU: 1 PID: 96 Comm: insmod Tainted: G W O 4.1.3-rt3-00618-g57e2387-dirty torvalds#184 Hardware name: Generic DRA74X (Flattened Device Tree) [<c00190f4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0014734>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [<c0014734>] (show_stack) from [<c06a62ec>] (dump_stack+0x88/0xdc) [<c06a62ec>] (dump_stack) from [<c006ca44>] (___might_sleep+0x198/0x2a8) [<c006ca44>] (___might_sleep) from [<c06ab6d4>] (rt_spin_lock+0x30/0x70) [<c06ab6d4>] (rt_spin_lock) from [<c04815ac>] (__pm_runtime_resume+0x68/0xa4) [<c04815ac>] (__pm_runtime_resume) from [<c04123f4>] (omap_gpio_irq_type+0x188/0x1d8) [<c04123f4>] (omap_gpio_irq_type) from [<c00a64e4>] (__irq_set_trigger+0x68/0x130) [<c00a64e4>] (__irq_set_trigger) from [<c00a7bc4>] (irq_set_irq_type+0x44/0x6c) [<c00a7bc4>] (irq_set_irq_type) from [<c00abbf8>] (irq_create_of_mapping+0x120/0x174) [<c00abbf8>] (irq_create_of_mapping) from [<c0577b74>] (of_irq_get+0x48/0x58) [<c0577b74>] (of_irq_get) from [<c0540a14>] (i2c_device_probe+0x54/0x15c) [<c0540a14>] (i2c_device_probe) from [<c04750dc>] (driver_probe_device+0x184/0x2c8) [<c04750dc>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c0475310>] (__driver_attach+0x9c/0xa0) [<c0475310>] (__driver_attach) from [<c0473238>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xb0) [<c0473238>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0474af4>] (driver_attach+0x28/0x30) [<c0474af4>] (driver_attach) from [<c0474760>] (bus_add_driver+0x154/0x200) [<c0474760>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c0476348>] (driver_register+0x88/0x108) [<c0476348>] (driver_register) from [<c0541600>] (i2c_register_driver+0x3c/0x90) [<c0541600>] (i2c_register_driver) from [<bf003018>] (pcf857x_init+0x18/0x24 [gpio_pcf857x]) [<bf003018>] (pcf857x_init [gpio_pcf857x]) from [<c000998c>] (do_one_initcall+0x128/0x1e8) [<c000998c>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c06a4220>] (do_init_module+0x6c/0x1bc) [<c06a4220>] (do_init_module) from [<c00dd0c8>] (load_module+0x18e8/0x21c4) [<c00dd0c8>] (load_module) from [<c00ddaa0>] (SyS_init_module+0xfc/0x158) [<c00ddaa0>] (SyS_init_module) from [<c000ff40>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) The IRQ chip interface defines only two callbacks which are executed in non-atomic contex - irq_bus_lock/irq_bus_sync_unlock, so lets move PM runtime calls there. Cc: <[email protected]> Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]> Tested-by: Austin Schuh <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Grygorii Strashko <[email protected]>

commit 3d46a44 upstream. PID: 614 TASK: ffff882a739da580 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "ocfs2dc" #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5 #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8 #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0 #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5 torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208] RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940 RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0 RFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 000000000000654b RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDX: 00000000000017d9 RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318 RBP: ffff882ecc375d20 R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60 R9: ffff88301f272200 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffffffffff R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2] torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2] torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2] assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR. Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert. system_call_fastpath -> my_chmod -> sys_chmod -> sys_fchmodat -> notify_change -> ocfs2_setattr -> posix_acl_chmod -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl -> ocfs2_set_acl -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode Here is how. 1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 1120 { 1247 ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do. .. 1258 if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) { 1259 status = posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode); 519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode) 520 { .. 539 ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS); 287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ... 288 { 289 return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL); 224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle, 225 struct inode *inode, ... 231 { .. 252 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh, 253 handle, mode); 168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ... 170 { 183 if (handle == NULL) { >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<< 184 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb), 185 OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS); ocfs2_setattr.#1247 we unlock and at #1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX mode (it should be). How this could have happended? We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in ocfs2_setattr.#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc). Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL) for the request. ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does, takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two. Orabug: 20189959 Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Cc: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>

lkl: Add offload (TSO4, CSUM) support to LKL device, #2 of 2

commit 3d46a44 upstream. PID: 614 TASK: ffff882a739da580 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "ocfs2dc" #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5 #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8 #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0 #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5 torvalds#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208] RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940 RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0 RFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 000000000000654b RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDX: 00000000000017d9 RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318 RBP: ffff882ecc375d20 R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60 R9: ffff88301f272200 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffffffffff R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 torvalds#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2] torvalds#8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2] torvalds#9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2] assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR. Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert. system_call_fastpath -> my_chmod -> sys_chmod -> sys_fchmodat -> notify_change -> ocfs2_setattr -> posix_acl_chmod -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl -> ocfs2_set_acl -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode Here is how. 1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 1120 { 1247 ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do. .. 1258 if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) { 1259 status = posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode); 519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode) 520 { .. 539 ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS); 287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ... 288 { 289 return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL); 224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle, 225 struct inode *inode, ... 231 { .. 252 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh, 253 handle, mode); 168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ... 170 { 183 if (handle == NULL) { >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<< 184 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb), 185 OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS); ocfs2_setattr.#1247 we unlock and at #1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX mode (it should be). How this could have happended? We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in ocfs2_setattr.#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc). Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL) for the request. ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does, takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two. Orabug: 20189959 Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Cc: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>

…from increase_ipc_memory to processor-sdk-linux-4.19.y * commit '1b430bd15bc7612371157d64f11ddffec4e484fe': TEMP: arm64: dts: ti: k3-am654-base-board: Increase reserve memory for RTOS IPC

This commit fixes the following checkpatch.pl errors: ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#170: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:170: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_PowerOnSetting(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#171: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:171: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_InitHwConfig(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bWifiOnly); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#172: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:172: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_InitCoexDm(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#173: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:173: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_IpsNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#174: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:174: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_LpsNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#175: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:175: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_ScanNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#176: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:176: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_ConnectNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#177: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:177: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_MediaStatusNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#178: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:178: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_SpecialPacketNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#180: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:180: + struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 *tmpBuf, u8 length ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#182: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:182: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_HaltNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#183: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:183: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_PnpNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 pnpState); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#184: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:184: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_Periodical(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#185: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:185: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_DisplayCoexInfo(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist); Signed-off-by: Marco Cesati <[email protected]>

This commit fixes the following checkpatch.pl errors: ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#170: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:170: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_PowerOnSetting(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#171: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:171: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_InitHwConfig(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bWifiOnly); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#172: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:172: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_InitCoexDm(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#173: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:173: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_IpsNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#174: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:174: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_LpsNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#175: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:175: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_ScanNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#176: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:176: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_ConnectNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#177: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:177: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_MediaStatusNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#178: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:178: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_SpecialPacketNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#180: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:180: + struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 *tmpBuf, u8 length ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#182: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:182: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_HaltNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#183: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:183: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_PnpNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 pnpState); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#184: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:184: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_Periodical(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist); ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" torvalds#185: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b1Ant.h:185: +void EXhalbtc8723b1ant_DisplayCoexInfo(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist); Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marco Cesati <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

A few improvements

Use the __string() machinery provided by the tracing subystem to make a copy of the string literals consumed by the "nested VM-Enter failed" tracepoint. A complete copy is necessary to ensure that the tracepoint can't outlive the data/memory it consumes and deference stale memory. Because the tracepoint itself is defined by kvm, if kvm-intel and/or kvm-amd are built as modules, the memory holding the string literals defined by the vendor modules will be freed when the module is unloaded, whereas the tracepoint and its data in the ring buffer will live until kvm is unloaded (or "indefinitely" if kvm is built-in). This bug has existed since the tracepoint was added, but was recently exposed by a new check in tracing to detect exactly this type of bug. fmt: '%s%s ' current_buffer: ' vmx_dirty_log_t-140127 [003] .... 2274.083042: kvm_nested_vmenter_failed: ' WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 140134 at kernel/trace/trace.c:3759 trace_check_vprintf+0x3be/0x3e0 CPU: 3 PID: 140134 Comm: less Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1-ce2e73ce600a-req torvalds#184 Hardware name: ASUS Q87M-E/Q87M-E, BIOS 1102 03/03/2014 RIP: 0010:trace_check_vprintf+0x3be/0x3e0 Code: <0f> 0b 44 8b 4c 24 1c e9 a9 fe ff ff c6 44 02 ff 00 49 8b 97 b0 20 RSP: 0018:ffffa895cc37bcb0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa895cc37bd08 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 0000000000000027 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: ffff9766cfad74f8 RBP: ffffffffc0a041d4 R08: ffff9766cfad74f0 R09: ffffa895cc37bad8 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffc0a041d4 R13: ffffffffc0f4dba8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff976409f2c000 FS: 00007f92fa200740(0000) GS:ffff9766cfac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000559bd11b0000 CR3: 000000019fbaa002 CR4: 00000000001726e0 Call Trace: trace_event_printf+0x5e/0x80 trace_raw_output_kvm_nested_vmenter_failed+0x3a/0x60 [kvm] print_trace_line+0x1dd/0x4e0 s_show+0x45/0x150 seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x4c0 seq_read+0x106/0x150 vfs_read+0x98/0x180 ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]> Fixes: 380e005 ("KVM: nVMX: trace nested VM-Enter failures detected by H/W") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Use the __string() machinery provided by the tracing subystem to make a copy of the string literals consumed by the "nested VM-Enter failed" tracepoint. A complete copy is necessary to ensure that the tracepoint can't outlive the data/memory it consumes and deference stale memory. Because the tracepoint itself is defined by kvm, if kvm-intel and/or kvm-amd are built as modules, the memory holding the string literals defined by the vendor modules will be freed when the module is unloaded, whereas the tracepoint and its data in the ring buffer will live until kvm is unloaded (or "indefinitely" if kvm is built-in). This bug has existed since the tracepoint was added, but was recently exposed by a new check in tracing to detect exactly this type of bug. fmt: '%s%s ' current_buffer: ' vmx_dirty_log_t-140127 [003] .... kvm_nested_vmenter_failed: ' WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 140134 at kernel/trace/trace.c:3759 trace_check_vprintf+0x3be/0x3e0 CPU: 3 PID: 140134 Comm: less Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1-ce2e73ce600a-req torvalds#184 Hardware name: ASUS Q87M-E/Q87M-E, BIOS 1102 03/03/2014 RIP: 0010:trace_check_vprintf+0x3be/0x3e0 Code: <0f> 0b 44 8b 4c 24 1c e9 a9 fe ff ff c6 44 02 ff 00 49 8b 97 b0 20 RSP: 0018:ffffa895cc37bcb0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa895cc37bd08 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 0000000000000027 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: ffff9766cfad74f8 RBP: ffffffffc0a041d4 R08: ffff9766cfad74f0 R09: ffffa895cc37bad8 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffc0a041d4 R13: ffffffffc0f4dba8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff976409f2c000 FS: 00007f92fa200740(0000) GS:ffff9766cfac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000559bd11b0000 CR3: 000000019fbaa002 CR4: 00000000001726e0 Call Trace: trace_event_printf+0x5e/0x80 trace_raw_output_kvm_nested_vmenter_failed+0x3a/0x60 [kvm] print_trace_line+0x1dd/0x4e0 s_show+0x45/0x150 seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x4c0 seq_read+0x106/0x150 vfs_read+0x98/0x180 ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]> Fixes: 380e005 ("KVM: nVMX: trace nested VM-Enter failures detected by H/W") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Use the __string() machinery provided by the tracing subystem to make a copy of the string literals consumed by the "nested VM-Enter failed" tracepoint. A complete copy is necessary to ensure that the tracepoint can't outlive the data/memory it consumes and deference stale memory. Because the tracepoint itself is defined by kvm, if kvm-intel and/or kvm-amd are built as modules, the memory holding the string literals defined by the vendor modules will be freed when the module is unloaded, whereas the tracepoint and its data in the ring buffer will live until kvm is unloaded (or "indefinitely" if kvm is built-in). This bug has existed since the tracepoint was added, but was recently exposed by a new check in tracing to detect exactly this type of bug. fmt: '%s%s ' current_buffer: ' vmx_dirty_log_t-140127 [003] .... kvm_nested_vmenter_failed: ' WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 140134 at kernel/trace/trace.c:3759 trace_check_vprintf+0x3be/0x3e0 CPU: 3 PID: 140134 Comm: less Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1-ce2e73ce600a-req torvalds#184 Hardware name: ASUS Q87M-E/Q87M-E, BIOS 1102 03/03/2014 RIP: 0010:trace_check_vprintf+0x3be/0x3e0 Code: <0f> 0b 44 8b 4c 24 1c e9 a9 fe ff ff c6 44 02 ff 00 49 8b 97 b0 20 RSP: 0018:ffffa895cc37bcb0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa895cc37bd08 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 0000000000000027 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: ffff9766cfad74f8 RBP: ffffffffc0a041d4 R08: ffff9766cfad74f0 R09: ffffa895cc37bad8 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffc0a041d4 R13: ffffffffc0f4dba8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff976409f2c000 FS: 00007f92fa200740(0000) GS:ffff9766cfac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000559bd11b0000 CR3: 000000019fbaa002 CR4: 00000000001726e0 Call Trace: trace_event_printf+0x5e/0x80 trace_raw_output_kvm_nested_vmenter_failed+0x3a/0x60 [kvm] print_trace_line+0x1dd/0x4e0 s_show+0x45/0x150 seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x4c0 seq_read+0x106/0x150 vfs_read+0x98/0x180 ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]> Fixes: 380e005 ("KVM: nVMX: trace nested VM-Enter failures detected by H/W") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]>

commit f31500b upstream. Use the __string() machinery provided by the tracing subystem to make a copy of the string literals consumed by the "nested VM-Enter failed" tracepoint. A complete copy is necessary to ensure that the tracepoint can't outlive the data/memory it consumes and deference stale memory. Because the tracepoint itself is defined by kvm, if kvm-intel and/or kvm-amd are built as modules, the memory holding the string literals defined by the vendor modules will be freed when the module is unloaded, whereas the tracepoint and its data in the ring buffer will live until kvm is unloaded (or "indefinitely" if kvm is built-in). This bug has existed since the tracepoint was added, but was recently exposed by a new check in tracing to detect exactly this type of bug. fmt: '%s%s ' current_buffer: ' vmx_dirty_log_t-140127 [003] .... kvm_nested_vmenter_failed: ' WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 140134 at kernel/trace/trace.c:3759 trace_check_vprintf+0x3be/0x3e0 CPU: 3 PID: 140134 Comm: less Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1-ce2e73ce600a-req torvalds#184 Hardware name: ASUS Q87M-E/Q87M-E, BIOS 1102 03/03/2014 RIP: 0010:trace_check_vprintf+0x3be/0x3e0 Code: <0f> 0b 44 8b 4c 24 1c e9 a9 fe ff ff c6 44 02 ff 00 49 8b 97 b0 20 RSP: 0018:ffffa895cc37bcb0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa895cc37bd08 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 0000000000000027 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: ffff9766cfad74f8 RBP: ffffffffc0a041d4 R08: ffff9766cfad74f0 R09: ffffa895cc37bad8 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffc0a041d4 R13: ffffffffc0f4dba8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff976409f2c000 FS: 00007f92fa200740(0000) GS:ffff9766cfac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000559bd11b0000 CR3: 000000019fbaa002 CR4: 00000000001726e0 Call Trace: trace_event_printf+0x5e/0x80 trace_raw_output_kvm_nested_vmenter_failed+0x3a/0x60 [kvm] print_trace_line+0x1dd/0x4e0 s_show+0x45/0x150 seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x4c0 seq_read+0x106/0x150 vfs_read+0x98/0x180 ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]> Fixes: 380e005 ("KVM: nVMX: trace nested VM-Enter failures detected by H/W") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Add a big batch of selftest to extend test_progs with various tc link, attach ops and old-style tc BPF attachments via libbpf APIs. Also test multi-program attachments including mixing the various attach options: # ./test_progs -t tc_link torvalds#179 tc_link_base:OK torvalds#180 tc_link_detach:OK torvalds#181 tc_link_mix:OK torvalds#182 tc_link_opts:OK torvalds#183 tc_link_run_base:OK torvalds#184 tc_link_run_chain:OK Summary: 6/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED All new and existing test cases pass. Co-developed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>

Add a big batch of selftest to extend test_progs with various tc link, attach ops and old-style tc BPF attachments via libbpf APIs. Also test multi-program attachments including mixing the various attach options: # ./test_progs -t tc_link torvalds#179 tc_link_base:OK torvalds#180 tc_link_detach:OK torvalds#181 tc_link_mix:OK torvalds#182 tc_link_opts:OK torvalds#183 tc_link_run_base:OK torvalds#184 tc_link_run_chain:OK Summary: 6/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED All new and existing test cases pass. Co-developed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>

ANBZ: torvalds#184 It seems no need to print bootstrap and blob_dir path since they takes about ~2ms, which impacts boot speed of light-weight containers: {"msg":"[ 1.092236] erofs: (device erofs): RAFS bootstrap_path /run/kata-containers/shared/containers/rafs/[..]/bootstrap/image.boot","level":"INFO","ts":"2021-12-21T08:53:12.178819781+08:00","subsystem":"dmesg"} {"msg":"[ 1.094299] erofs: (device erofs): RAFS blob_dir_path /run/kata-containers/shared/containers/rafs/[..]/blob_cache_dir","level":"INFO","ts":"2021-12-21T08:53:12.180775832+08:00","subsystem":"dmesg"} Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeffle Xu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <[email protected]>

The current source pushes skb into dev->done queue by calling skb_queue_tail() and then, call skb_dequeue() to pop for rx_cleanup state to free urb and skb next in usbnet_bh(). It wastes CPU resource with extra instructions. Instead, use return values jumping to rx_cleanup case directly to free them. Therefore calling skb_queue_tail() and skb_dequeue() is not necessary. The follows are just showing difference between calling skb_queue_tail() and using return values jumping to rx_cleanup state directly in usbnet_bh() in Arm64 instructions with perf tool. ----------- calling skb_queue_tail() ----------- │ if (!(dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_RX_ASSEMBLE)) 7.58 │248: ldr x0, [x20, torvalds#16] 2.46 │24c: ldr w0, [x0, torvalds#8] 1.64 │250: ↑ tbnz w0, torvalds#14, 16c │ dev->net->stats.rx_errors++; 0.57 │254: ldr x1, [x20, torvalds#184] 1.64 │258: ldr x0, [x1, torvalds#336] 2.65 │25c: add x0, x0, #0x1 │260: str x0, [x1, torvalds#336] │ skb_queue_tail(&dev->done, skb); 0.38 │264: mov x1, x19 │268: mov x0, x21 2.27 │26c: → bl skb_queue_tail 0.57 │270: ↑ b 44 // branch to call skb_dequeue() ----------- jumping to rx_cleanup state ----------- │ if (!(dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_RX_ASSEMBLE)) 1.69 │25c: ldr x0, [x21, torvalds#16] 4.78 │260: ldr w0, [x0, torvalds#8] 3.28 │264: ↑ tbnz w0, torvalds#14, e4 // jump to 'rx_cleanup' state │ dev->net->stats.rx_errors++; 0.09 │268: ldr x1, [x21, torvalds#184] 2.72 │26c: ldr x0, [x1, torvalds#336] 3.37 │270: add x0, x0, #0x1 0.09 │274: str x0, [x1, torvalds#336] 0.66 │278: ↑ b e4 // branch to 'rx_cleanup' state Signed-off-by: Leesoo Ahn <[email protected]>

When executing mm selftests run_vmtests.sh, there is such error: BUG: Bad page state in process uffd-unit-tests pfn:00000 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x0 flags: 0xffff0000002000(reserved|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0xffff) raw: 00ffff0000002000 ffffbf0000000008 ffffbf0000000008 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_seq snd_seq_device rfkill vfat fat virtio_balloon efi_pstore virtio_net pstore net_failover failover fuse nfnetlink virtio_scsi virtio_gpu virtio_dma_buf dm_multipath efivarfs CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1913 Comm: uffd-unit-tests Not tainted 6.12.0 torvalds#184 Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 Stack : 900000047c8ac000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a7c 900000047c8ac000 900000047c8af690 900000047c8af698 0000000000000000 900000047c8af7d8 900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af5b0 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 900000047c8af698 10b3c7d53da40d26 0000010000000000 0000000000000022 0000000fffffffff fffffffffe000000 ffff800000000000 000000000000002f 0000800000000000 000000017a6d4000 90000000028f8940 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 90000000025aa5e0 9000000002905000 0000000000000000 90000000028f8940 ffff800000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a94 000000012001839c 00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000071c1d ... Call Trace: [<9000000000223a94>] show_stack+0x5c/0x180 [<9000000001c3fd64>] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0xa0 [<900000000056aa08>] bad_page+0x1a0/0x1f0 [<9000000000574978>] free_unref_folios+0xbf0/0xd20 [<90000000004e65cc>] folios_put_refs+0x1a4/0x2b8 [<9000000000599a0c>] free_pages_and_swap_cache+0x164/0x260 [<9000000000547698>] tlb_batch_pages_flush+0xa8/0x1c0 [<9000000000547f30>] tlb_finish_mmu+0xa8/0x218 [<9000000000543cb8>] exit_mmap+0x1a0/0x360 [<9000000000247658>] __mmput+0x78/0x200 [<900000000025583c>] do_exit+0x43c/0xde8 [<9000000000256490>] do_group_exit+0x68/0x110 [<9000000000256554>] sys_exit_group+0x1c/0x20 [<9000000001c413b4>] do_syscall+0x94/0x130 [<90000000002216d8>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -16384 On LoongArch system, invalid huge pte entry should be invalid_pte_table or _PAGE_HUGE. And it need be the same with invalid pmd entry, since pmd_none() is called by function free_pgd_range(), pmd_none() return 0 by huge_pte_clear(). So _PAGE_HUGE is treated as valid pte table and free_pte_range() will be called in free_pmd_range(). free_pmd_range() pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr); do { next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end); if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd)) continue; free_pte_range(tlb, pmd, addr); } while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end); Here invalid_pte_table is used for both invalid huge pte entry and pmd entry. Fixes: 09cfefb ("LoongArch: Add memory management") Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <[email protected]>

When executing mm selftests run_vmtests.sh, there is such an error: BUG: Bad page state in process uffd-unit-tests pfn:00000 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x0 flags: 0xffff0000002000(reserved|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0xffff) raw: 00ffff0000002000 ffffbf0000000008 ffffbf0000000008 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_seq snd_seq_device rfkill vfat fat virtio_balloon efi_pstore virtio_net pstore net_failover failover fuse nfnetlink virtio_scsi virtio_gpu virtio_dma_buf dm_multipath efivarfs CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1913 Comm: uffd-unit-tests Not tainted 6.12.0 torvalds#184 Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 Stack : 900000047c8ac000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a7c 900000047c8ac000 900000047c8af690 900000047c8af698 0000000000000000 900000047c8af7d8 900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af5b0 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 900000047c8af698 10b3c7d53da40d26 0000010000000000 0000000000000022 0000000fffffffff fffffffffe000000 ffff800000000000 000000000000002f 0000800000000000 000000017a6d4000 90000000028f8940 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 90000000025aa5e0 9000000002905000 0000000000000000 90000000028f8940 ffff800000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a94 000000012001839c 00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000071c1d ... Call Trace: [<9000000000223a94>] show_stack+0x5c/0x180 [<9000000001c3fd64>] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0xa0 [<900000000056aa08>] bad_page+0x1a0/0x1f0 [<9000000000574978>] free_unref_folios+0xbf0/0xd20 [<90000000004e65cc>] folios_put_refs+0x1a4/0x2b8 [<9000000000599a0c>] free_pages_and_swap_cache+0x164/0x260 [<9000000000547698>] tlb_batch_pages_flush+0xa8/0x1c0 [<9000000000547f30>] tlb_finish_mmu+0xa8/0x218 [<9000000000543cb8>] exit_mmap+0x1a0/0x360 [<9000000000247658>] __mmput+0x78/0x200 [<900000000025583c>] do_exit+0x43c/0xde8 [<9000000000256490>] do_group_exit+0x68/0x110 [<9000000000256554>] sys_exit_group+0x1c/0x20 [<9000000001c413b4>] do_syscall+0x94/0x130 [<90000000002216d8>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -16384 On LoongArch system, invalid huge pte entry should be invalid_pte_table or a single _PAGE_HUGE bit rather than a zero value. And it should be the same with invalid pmd entry, since pmd_none() is called by function free_pgd_range() and pmd_none() return 0 by huge_pte_clear(). So single _PAGE_HUGE bit is also treated as a valid pte table and free_pte_range() will be called in free_pmd_range(). free_pmd_range() pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr); do { next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end); if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd)) continue; free_pte_range(tlb, pmd, addr); } while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end); Here invalid_pte_table is used for both invalid huge pte entry and pmd entry. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 09cfefb ("LoongArch: Add memory management") Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <[email protected]>

commit 7cd1f5f upstream. When executing mm selftests run_vmtests.sh, there is such an error: BUG: Bad page state in process uffd-unit-tests pfn:00000 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x0 flags: 0xffff0000002000(reserved|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0xffff) raw: 00ffff0000002000 ffffbf0000000008 ffffbf0000000008 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_seq snd_seq_device rfkill vfat fat virtio_balloon efi_pstore virtio_net pstore net_failover failover fuse nfnetlink virtio_scsi virtio_gpu virtio_dma_buf dm_multipath efivarfs CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1913 Comm: uffd-unit-tests Not tainted 6.12.0 torvalds#184 Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 Stack : 900000047c8ac000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a7c 900000047c8ac000 900000047c8af690 900000047c8af698 0000000000000000 900000047c8af7d8 900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af5b0 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 900000047c8af698 10b3c7d53da40d26 0000010000000000 0000000000000022 0000000fffffffff fffffffffe000000 ffff800000000000 000000000000002f 0000800000000000 000000017a6d4000 90000000028f8940 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 90000000025aa5e0 9000000002905000 0000000000000000 90000000028f8940 ffff800000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a94 000000012001839c 00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000071c1d ... Call Trace: [<9000000000223a94>] show_stack+0x5c/0x180 [<9000000001c3fd64>] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0xa0 [<900000000056aa08>] bad_page+0x1a0/0x1f0 [<9000000000574978>] free_unref_folios+0xbf0/0xd20 [<90000000004e65cc>] folios_put_refs+0x1a4/0x2b8 [<9000000000599a0c>] free_pages_and_swap_cache+0x164/0x260 [<9000000000547698>] tlb_batch_pages_flush+0xa8/0x1c0 [<9000000000547f30>] tlb_finish_mmu+0xa8/0x218 [<9000000000543cb8>] exit_mmap+0x1a0/0x360 [<9000000000247658>] __mmput+0x78/0x200 [<900000000025583c>] do_exit+0x43c/0xde8 [<9000000000256490>] do_group_exit+0x68/0x110 [<9000000000256554>] sys_exit_group+0x1c/0x20 [<9000000001c413b4>] do_syscall+0x94/0x130 [<90000000002216d8>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -16384 On LoongArch system, invalid huge pte entry should be invalid_pte_table or a single _PAGE_HUGE bit rather than a zero value. And it should be the same with invalid pmd entry, since pmd_none() is called by function free_pgd_range() and pmd_none() return 0 by huge_pte_clear(). So single _PAGE_HUGE bit is also treated as a valid pte table and free_pte_range() will be called in free_pmd_range(). free_pmd_range() pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr); do { next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end); if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd)) continue; free_pte_range(tlb, pmd, addr); } while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end); Here invalid_pte_table is used for both invalid huge pte entry and pmd entry. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 09cfefb ("LoongArch: Add memory management") Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Update HOWTO

02acfc4

laijs pushed a commit to laijs/linux that referenced this pull request Feb 13, 2017

Merge pull request torvalds#184 from hkchu/offload

bafaea1

lkl: Add offload (TSO4, CSUM) support to LKL device, #2 of 2

mpe pushed a commit to mpe/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 13, 2021

Merge pull request torvalds#184 from ojeda/improv

1fa10de

A few improvements

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fixed spelling errors #184

fixed spelling errors #184

dgucsekelly commented May 11, 2015

ecnepsnai commented May 11, 2015

fixed spelling errors #184

Are you sure you want to change the base?

fixed spelling errors #184

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dgucsekelly commented May 11, 2015

ecnepsnai commented May 11, 2015