fix(tauri): enforce ACL for remote origins even without AppManifest

.changes/enforce-acl-remote-origins.md

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+'tauri': 'patch:sec'
+---
+
+Enforce ACL checks for IPC requests from remote origins even when no `AppManifest` is configured. Previously, custom (non-plugin) commands bypassed ACL entirely without an `AppManifest`, allowing any origin to invoke them. Now, remote origins are always subject to ACL resolution, and can only reach custom commands if an explicit `remote` capability has been granted.

crates/tauri/src/test/mod.rs

@@ -216,7 +216,11 @@ pub fn mock_app() -> App<MockRuntime> {
 ///             cmd: "ping".into(),
 ///             callback: tauri::ipc::CallbackFn(0),
 ///             error: tauri::ipc::CallbackFn(1),
-///             url: "http://tauri.localhost".parse().unwrap(),
+///             url: if cfg!(any(windows, target_os = "android")) {
+///                 "http://tauri.localhost"
+///             } else {
+///                 "tauri://localhost"
+///             }.parse().unwrap(),
 ///             body: tauri::ipc::InvokeBody::default(),
 ///             headers: Default::default(),
 ///             invoke_key: tauri::test::INVOKE_KEY.to_string(),
@@ -275,7 +279,11 @@ pub fn assert_ipc_response<
 ///             cmd: "ping".into(),
 ///             callback: tauri::ipc::CallbackFn(0),
 ///             error: tauri::ipc::CallbackFn(1),
-///             url: "http://tauri.localhost".parse().unwrap(),
+///             url: if cfg!(any(windows, target_os = "android")) {
+///                 "http://tauri.localhost"
+///             } else {
+///                 "tauri://localhost"
+///             }.parse().unwrap(),
 ///             body: tauri::ipc::InvokeBody::default(),
 ///             headers: Default::default(),
 ///             invoke_key: tauri::test::INVOKE_KEY.to_string(),

crates/tauri/src/webview/mod.rs

@@ -1793,8 +1793,11 @@ tauri::Builder::default()
       (plugin, command)
     });
 
-    // we only check ACL on plugin commands or if the app defined its ACL manifest
-    if (plugin_command.is_some() || has_app_acl_manifest)
+    // Check ACL on plugin commands, when the app defined its ACL manifest,
+    // or when the request comes from a non-local (remote) origin.  This
+    // ensures remote content can never reach custom commands unless an
+    // explicit `remote` capability has been configured for them.
+    if (plugin_command.is_some() || has_app_acl_manifest || !is_local)
       // TODO: Remove this special check in v3
       && request.cmd != crate::ipc::channel::FETCH_CHANNEL_DATA_COMMAND
       && invoke.acl.is_none()
@@ -2334,6 +2337,66 @@ mod tests {
     crate::test_utils::assert_sync::<super::Webview>();
   }
 
+  /// Custom (non-plugin) commands must be rejected when the IPC request
+  /// originates from a remote URL, even when no `AppManifest` has been
+  /// configured.  Only local (bundled) origins should be able to reach
+  /// custom commands.
+  #[test]
+  fn remote_origin_blocked_for_custom_commands_without_app_manifest() {
+    use crate::test::{mock_builder, mock_context, noop_assets, INVOKE_KEY};
+    use crate::webview::InvokeRequest;
+
+    let app = mock_builder().build(mock_context(noop_assets())).unwrap();
+
+    let webview = crate::WebviewWindowBuilder::new(&app, "main", Default::default())
+      .build()
+      .unwrap();
+
+    // Request from a remote origin for a custom (non-plugin) command
+    // – should be rejected even without an AppManifest.
+    let remote_result = crate::test::get_ipc_response(
+      &webview,
+      InvokeRequest {
+        cmd: "any_custom_command".into(),
+        callback: crate::ipc::CallbackFn(0),
+        error: crate::ipc::CallbackFn(1),
+        url: "https://evil.com".parse().unwrap(),
+        body: crate::ipc::InvokeBody::default(),
+        headers: Default::default(),
+        invoke_key: INVOKE_KEY.to_string(),
+      },
+    );
+    assert!(
+      remote_result.is_err(),
+      "custom command should be rejected from a remote origin"
+    );
+
+    // Same command from the local origin – should NOT be rejected by the
+    // remote-origin guard (it may still fail because the command doesn't
+    // exist, but the error message will be different).
+    let local_result = crate::test::get_ipc_response(
+      &webview,
+      InvokeRequest {
+        cmd: "any_custom_command".into(),
+        callback: crate::ipc::CallbackFn(0),
+        error: crate::ipc::CallbackFn(1),
+        url: "tauri://localhost".parse().unwrap(),
+        body: crate::ipc::InvokeBody::default(),
+        headers: Default::default(),
+        invoke_key: INVOKE_KEY.to_string(),
+      },
+    );
+    // The local request should either succeed or fail for a reason OTHER
+    // than "not allowed from remote context".
+    if let Err(e) = &local_result {
+      let msg = e.to_string();
+      assert!(
+        !msg.contains("not allowed from remote context"),
+        "local origin should not be blocked by the remote-origin guard, got: {msg}"
+      );
+    }
+  }
+
   #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
   #[test]
   fn test_webview_window_has_set_simple_fullscreen_method() {