fix: trying to solve the arm build process issue. #365
Conversation
WalkthroughThis pull request introduces comprehensive updates to Docker image building and publishing workflows across multiple configuration files. The changes focus on standardizing base images, enhancing multi-platform support, and improving build processes for Docker images. Key modifications include the deletion of specific ARM-related workflow files, updates to workflows to support multiple architectures (AMD64, ARM64, ARM/v7), the introduction of new jobs for digest management, and the refactoring of Dockerfiles to use public ECR and GitHub Container Registry images. Changes
Sequence DiagramsequenceDiagram
participant Workflow as GitHub Actions Workflow
participant BuildX as Docker Buildx
participant Registry as Docker Registry
Workflow->>BuildX: Set up multi-platform build
BuildX->>Registry: Login to registries
BuildX->>BuildX: Extract metadata
BuildX->>BuildX: Build image for each platform
BuildX->>Registry: Push image digests
Workflow->>Registry: Create manifest list
Workflow->>Workflow: Verify image provenance
Possibly Related PRs
Suggested Labels
Security Recommendations
📜 Recent review detailsConfiguration used: CodeRabbit UI 📒 Files selected for processing (2)
🧰 Additional context used🪛 actionlint (1.7.4).github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml52-52: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting (shellcheck) 52-52: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:4:34: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting (shellcheck) 171-171: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting (shellcheck) 171-171: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting (shellcheck) 171-171: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:3:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting (shellcheck) 171-171: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:4:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting (shellcheck) .github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml50-50: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting (shellcheck) 50-50: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:4:34: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting (shellcheck) 166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting (shellcheck) 166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting (shellcheck) 166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:3:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting (shellcheck) 166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:4:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting (shellcheck) 🪛 yamllint (1.35.1).github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml[error] 38-38: trailing spaces (trailing-spaces) [error] 57-57: trailing spaces (trailing-spaces) 🔇 Additional comments (4)
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.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (2)
108-120:
⚠️ Potential issueFix: Incorrect step reference in digest export
The digest export step contains an error in the step reference:
- digest="${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}" + digest="${{ steps.build-and-push.outputs.digest }}"📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.- name: Export digest run: | mkdir -p /tmp/digests digest="${{ steps.build-and-push.outputs.digest }}" touch "/tmp/digests/${digest#sha256:}" - name: Upload digest uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 with: name: digests-${{ env.PLATFORM_PAIR }} path: /tmp/digests/* if-no-files-found: error retention-days: 1🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
109-109: property "build" is not defined in object type {build-and-push: {conclusion: string; outcome: string; outputs: {digest: string; imageid: string; metadata: string}}; meta: {conclusion: string; outcome: string; outputs: {string => string}}}
(expression)
178-186:
⚠️ Potential issueSecurity: Fix command injection vulnerability
The manifest creation step has potential command injection vulnerabilities due to unquoted expansions:
- docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s ' *) + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s ' *)"📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.- name: Create manifest list and push working-directory: /tmp/digests run: | docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ "$(printf '${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s ' *)" - name: Inspect image run: | docker buildx imagetools inspect ${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}:${{ steps.meta.outputs.version }}🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
180-180: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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180-180: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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Actionable comments posted: 3
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (1)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (1)
37-44: Matrix strategy configuration looks good!The multi-platform build strategy effectively addresses the ARM build process issues. The
fail-fast: falsesetting ensures that a failure in one platform's build won't stop others.For enhanced security, consider adding platform-specific build arguments or environment variables if certain platforms require different security configurations.
🛑 Comments failed to post (3)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (3)
108-113:
⚠️ Potential issueFix incorrect step reference
The digest export step references
steps.build.outputs.digestbut the correct step ID isbuild-and-push. This will cause the digest export to fail.Apply this fix:
- digest="${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}" + digest="${{ steps.build-and-push.outputs.digest }}"📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.- name: Export digest run: | mkdir -p /tmp/digests digest="${{ steps.build-and-push.outputs.digest }}" touch "/tmp/digests/${digest#sha256:}"🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
109-109: property "build" is not defined in object type {build-and-push: {conclusion: string; outcome: string; outputs: {digest: string; imageid: string; metadata: string}}; meta: {conclusion: string; outcome: string; outputs: {string => string}}}
(expression)
99-99:
⚠️ Potential issueFix undefined environment variable
The
outputsconfiguration uses${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}which is not defined in the environment variables section. This will cause the build to fail.Add this to the env section at the top of the file:
env: REGISTRY: ghcr.io IMAGE_NAME: ${{ github.repository }} + REGISTRY_IMAGE: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.env: REGISTRY: ghcr.io IMAGE_NAME: ${{ github.repository }} REGISTRY_IMAGE: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}
178-182: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Secure the manifest creation command
The current implementation has potential command injection vulnerabilities due to unquoted expansions.
Apply these security improvements:
- docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s ' *) + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '%s' "${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s" *)"Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
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🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
180-180: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
180-180: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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Actionable comments posted: 3
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (1)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (1)
Line range hint
1-181: Security: Consider adding container scanningWhile the multi-platform build process is well-structured, consider adding container scanning to the workflow:
- Add a security scanning step using tools like Trivy or Snyk to scan for vulnerabilities in the built images
- Configure policy to fail builds on critical vulnerabilities
- Enable automatic dependency updates for the base images
Example implementation:
- name: Run Trivy vulnerability scanner uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master with: image: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }} format: 'table' exit-code: '1' ignore-unfixed: true vuln-type: 'os,library' severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
175-175: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
175-175: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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🛑 Comments failed to post (3)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (3)
14-14:
⚠️ Potential issueSecurity: Workflow trigger configuration needs review
The workflow is triggered on changes to any workflow file (
'.github/workflows/**'). This could potentially create workflow loops if workflows modify other workflow files.Consider restricting the path pattern to only the specific workflow files that should trigger this workflow:
- - '.github/workflows/**' + - '.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml' + - '.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml'Also applies to: 25-25
54-58:
⚠️ Potential issueSecurity: Shell script improvements needed
The shell scripts have potential security issues with unquoted variables and string manipulation:
Apply these security improvements:
- name: Prepare run: | - platform=${{ matrix.platform }} - echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> $GITHUB_ENV + platform="${{ matrix.platform }}" + echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" - name: Export digest run: | - mkdir -p /tmp/digests - digest="${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}" - touch "/tmp/digests/${digest#sha256:}" + mkdir -p "/tmp/digests" + digest="${{ steps.build-and-push.outputs.digest }}" + digest_file="/tmp/digests/${digest#sha256:}" + touch "$digest_file"Also applies to: 103-108
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
55-55: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
173-181:
⚠️ Potential issueSecurity: Secure the manifest creation script
The manifest creation script uses unquoted command substitution which could be unsafe:
Apply these security improvements:
- name: Create manifest list and push working-directory: /tmp/digests run: | - docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s ' *) + tags="$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" + digests="$(printf '%s' "${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s" *)" + docker buildx imagetools create "$tags" "$digests"Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
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🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
175-175: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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175-175: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
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Actionable comments posted: 5
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.github/workflows/ghcr-cleanup.yaml (2)
16-22:
⚠️ Potential issueEnhance image cleanup configuration
The current configuration might lead to unintended deletion of images. Consider:
- Pin the action version to a specific commit hash for security
- Add protection for specific tags/patterns
- Implement a dry-run mode initially
- uses: dataaxiom/ghcr-cleanup-action@v1 + uses: dataaxiom/[email protected]@{specific-commit-hash} with: token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} repository: ${{ github.repository }} delete-ghost-images: true delete-untagged: true older-than: 30d + protected-tags: | + latest + stable-* + v*.*.*Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🧰 Tools
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[warning] 18-18: wrong indentation: expected 12 but found 10
(indentation)
[error] 22-22: no new line character at the end of file
(new-line-at-end-of-file)
10-11: 💡 Codebase verification
⚠️ Add protection rules for critical container imagesThe GHCR cleanup workflow currently lacks safeguards for protecting critical images. The configuration shows:
- Untagged and ghost images are deleted
- Images older than 30 days are removed
- No exclusion patterns or protection rules are defined
To prevent accidental deletion of important images, please implement these security measures:
- Add
exclude-tagsparameter to protect production tags (e.g.,latest,stable,prod-*)- Pin the action to a specific commit hash instead of using
@v1for better security- Consider reducing permissions scope with
packages: deleteinstead of broadwriteaccessExample configuration:
permissions: packages: delete # More restrictive than 'write' steps: - uses: dataaxiom/ghcr-cleanup-action@5c19fb92ecd9c24f1715e8cd0a6d9d4d3c5cca3k # Pin to commit hash with: exclude-tags: "latest,stable,prod-*" # Protect critical tags🔗 Analysis chain
Review workflow permissions
The workflow has write permissions to packages which is necessary for cleanup but should be monitored. Consider implementing additional safeguards like protected tags for critical images.
Let me analyze the cleanup workflow configuration to understand the safeguards in place for protecting critical images.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for protected tags in repository settings gh api repos/${{ github.repository }}/tags --jq '.[].name' | grep -E 'prod|stable|latest'Length of output: 155
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for container image tags in the workflow file rg -U "tags:|tag:" .github/workflows/ghcr-cleanup.yaml # Check for any protection patterns or exclusions in the cleanup workflow rg -U "exclude|protect|keep" .github/workflows/ghcr-cleanup.yaml # Look for container image references in the repository rg -l "ghcr.io"Length of output: 196
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Get the full content of the cleanup workflow cat .github/workflows/ghcr-cleanup.yamlLength of output: 520
🧰 Tools
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[warning] 11-11: wrong indentation: expected 8 but found 6
(indentation)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (3)
94-97: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Secure build outputs configuration
The build configuration needs additional security controls:
- Add explicit cache configuration
- Enable BuildKit security features
context: Dockerfile.rootless outputs: type=image,name=${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }},push-by-digest=true,name-canonical=true,push=true labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }} platforms: ${{ matrix.platform }} + cache-from: type=gha + cache-to: type=gha,mode=max + security-opt: seccomp=defaultCommittable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
53-56:
⚠️ Potential issueFix potential command injection vulnerability
The platform variable handling could be vulnerable to command injection. Use proper quoting and validate the input.
- platform=${{ matrix.platform }} - echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> $GITHUB_ENV + platform="${{ matrix.platform }}" + # Validate platform format + if [[ ! "$platform" =~ ^linux/(amd64|arm64|arm/v7)$ ]]; then + echo "Invalid platform format" + exit 1 + fi + echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> $GITHUB_ENV📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.- name: Prepare run: | platform="${{ matrix.platform }}" # Validate platform format if [[ ! "$platform" =~ ^linux/(amd64|arm64|arm/v7)$ ]]; then echo "Invalid platform format" exit 1 fi echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> $GITHUB_ENV🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
54-54: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
172-176:
⚠️ Potential issueFix shell command injection vulnerabilities
The manifest creation step has potential command injection vulnerabilities in the shell script.
- docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s ' *) + # Create array of tags + readarray -t TAGS < <(jq -r '.tags[]' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") + # Build command array + cmd=(docker buildx imagetools create) + for tag in "${TAGS[@]}"; do + cmd+=(-t "$tag") + done + # Add digests + for digest in *; do + cmd+=("${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:${digest}") + done + "${cmd[@]}"📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.- name: Create manifest list and push working-directory: /tmp/digests run: | # Create array of tags readarray -t TAGS < <(jq -r '.tags[]' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") # Build command array cmd=(docker buildx imagetools create) for tag in "${TAGS[@]}"; do cmd+=(-t "$tag") done # Add digests for digest in *; do cmd+=("${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:${digest}") done "${cmd[@]}"🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
174-174: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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174-174: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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Actionable comments posted: 2
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.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (1)
174-179:
⚠️ Potential issueSecure manifest creation process
The manifest creation uses shell command substitution. Add error handling and input validation:
- docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s ' *) + if ! TAGS=$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON"); then + echo "Failed to process tags" >&2 + exit 1 + fi + if ! DIGESTS=$(printf '${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s ' *); then + echo "Failed to process digests" >&2 + exit 1 + fi + docker buildx imagetools create ${TAGS} ${DIGESTS}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.- name: Create manifest list and push working-directory: /tmp/digests run: | if ! TAGS=$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON"); then echo "Failed to process tags" >&2 exit 1 fi if ! DIGESTS=$(printf '${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s ' *); then echo "Failed to process digests" >&2 exit 1 fi docker buildx imagetools create ${TAGS} ${DIGESTS}🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
176-176: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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176-176: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (1)
35-43: 💡 Codebase verification
Documentation needed for critical security feature: rootless container builds
The codebase currently lacks comprehensive documentation about the security benefits of rootless container builds across different platforms. While there are references to rootless images, the security implications and platform-specific considerations are not documented. This is important for:
- Helping users understand the security advantages of running containers without root privileges
- Providing guidance on platform-specific security considerations for amd64, arm64, and arm/v7
- Explaining the security trade-offs and use cases for each supported platform
Suggested locations for documentation:
- Add a dedicated security section in README.md
- Create a new file at docs/container-security.md
- Include inline documentation in the docker-publish-rootless.yaml workflow
🔗 Analysis chain
Document rootless build security benefits
The matrix build strategy for rootless containers is a security enhancement. Consider documenting:
- Security benefits of rootless builds
- Platform-specific security considerations
- Use cases for each platform
Let me check if there's any additional documentation about security or rootless builds in other common documentation locations.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if rootless build benefits are documented fd -t f "README.md|docs/" -x rg -i "rootless|security|container security"Length of output: 168
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for documentation in various common locations fd -t f "(SECURITY|CONTRIBUTING|DEVELOPMENT|INSTALL|BUILD|DOCKER|Container)" -x rg -i "rootless|security|container security|unprivileged" # Also check yaml files for comments about rootless fd -e yaml -e yml -x rg -i "rootless|security|container security|unprivileged" # Check if there are any markdown files containing documentation fd -e md -x rg -i "rootless|security|container security|unprivileged"Length of output: 2364
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (1)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (1)
14-14: Consider restricting workflow trigger paths for better securityThe broad pattern
.github/workflows/**will trigger builds for any workflow file changes, which could potentially:
- Lead to unnecessary builds and resource consumption
- Create a potential attack vector through workflow file modifications
Consider restricting the pattern to only the specific workflow files that should trigger this build:
- '.github/workflows/**' + '.github/workflows/docker-publish*.yaml'Also applies to: 25-25
🛑 Comments failed to post (1)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (1)
54-56:
⚠️ Potential issueFix shell script security vulnerabilities
Several shell scripts have potential security issues:
- Unquoted variables that could lead to word splitting
- Potential command injection vulnerabilities
Apply these security fixes:
# In Prepare step - platform=${{ matrix.platform }} - echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> $GITHUB_ENV + platform="${{ matrix.platform }}" + echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" # In Export digest step - digest="${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}" - touch "/tmp/digests/${digest#sha256:}" + digest="${{ steps.build-and-push.outputs.digest }}" + touch "/tmp/digests/${digest#sha256:}" # In Create manifest list step - docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s ' *) + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s ' *)"Also applies to: 108-111, 179-181
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
54-54: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
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Actionable comments posted: 2
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (2)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (2)
37-43: LGTM: Multi-platform build setupThe matrix strategy with QEMU setup looks good for cross-platform builds. Consider adding a security scanning step for each platform's build artifacts.
Consider adding Trivy or Snyk container scanning:
- name: Run Trivy vulnerability scanner uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master with: image: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }} format: 'table' exit-code: '1' ignore-unfixed: true vuln-type: 'os,library'Also applies to: 72-74
129-182: LGTM: Secure manifest handlingThe merge job implementation looks good with proper permissions and authentication. Consider adding these security enhancements:
- Add image signing using cosign:
- name: Sign the images uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@main with: cosign-release: 'v1.13.1' - run: | cosign sign --key env://COSIGN_PRIVATE_KEY ${TAGS} env: COSIGN_PRIVATE_KEY: ${{ secrets.COSIGN_PRIVATE_KEY }}
- Add SHA-256 digest verification before pushing manifests
- Consider implementing rate limiting for registry operations
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
179-179: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
179-179: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
🛑 Comments failed to post (2)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (2)
14-14:
⚠️ Potential issueSecurity: Restrict workflow file trigger patterns
The pattern
.github/workflows/**could potentially create recursive workflow triggers if a workflow modifies another workflow file. Consider using more specific patterns or excluding workflow files from triggers to prevent potential CI/CD loops.- - '.github/workflows/**' + - '.github/workflows/docker-publish*.yaml'Also applies to: 25-25
54-56:
⚠️ Potential issueSecurity: Fix shell script injection vulnerabilities
Several shell scripts have potential command injection vulnerabilities due to improper quoting:
Apply these fixes:
- platform=${{ matrix.platform }} + platform="${{ matrix.platform }}" - echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> $GITHUB_ENV + echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" - digest="${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}" + digest="${{ steps.build-and-push.outputs.digest }}" - touch "/tmp/digests/${digest#sha256:}" + touch "/tmp/digests/${digest#sha256:}" - docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s ' *) + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s ' *)"Also applies to: 108-111, 179-181
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
54-54: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
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.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (2)
14-14:
⚠️ Potential issueSecurity: Restrict workflow path triggers
The path filter
.github/workflows/**could potentially allow workflow modification attacks. Consider restricting it to specific workflow files that this workflow depends on.- - '.github/workflows/**' + - '.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml' + - '.github/workflows/cleanup.yaml'Also applies to: 25-25
54-56:
⚠️ Potential issueSecurity: Fix shell script quoting
The shell scripts contain unquoted variables that could lead to command injection or word splitting issues.
Apply these fixes:
- platform=${{ matrix.platform }} - echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> $GITHUB_ENV + platform="${{ matrix.platform }}" + echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"- mkdir -p /tmp/digests - digest="${{ steps.build-and-push.outputs.digest }}" - touch "/tmp/digests/${digest#sha256:}" + mkdir -p "/tmp/digests" + digest="${{ steps.build-and-push.outputs.digest }}" + touch "/tmp/digests/${digest#sha256:}"Also applies to: 108-111
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
54-54: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (2)
177-179:
⚠️ Potential issueSecurity: Fix command injection vulnerability
The manifest creation step is vulnerable to command injection through unquoted command substitution.
- docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s ' *) + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s ' *)"📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.run: | docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ "$(printf '${{ env.REGISTRY_IMAGE }}@sha256:%s ' *)"🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
177-177: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
177-177: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
167-173:
⚠️ Potential issueSecurity: Review tag generation patterns
The semver tag patterns could potentially be manipulated in a PR. Consider:
- Restricting semver tags to release events only
- Adding tag signature verification
tags: | type=ref,event=branch type=ref,event=pr - type=semver,pattern={{version}} - type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}} - type=semver,pattern={{major}} + type=semver,pattern={{version}},enable=${{ github.event_name == 'release' }} + type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}},enable=${{ github.event_name == 'release' }} + type=semver,pattern={{major}},enable=${{ github.event_name == 'release' }}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.tags: | type=ref,event=branch type=ref,event=pr type=semver,pattern={{version}},enable=${{ github.event_name == 'release' }} type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}},enable=${{ github.event_name == 'release' }} type=semver,pattern={{major}},enable=${{ github.event_name == 'release' }} type=schedule,pattern=nightly
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🧹 Nitpick comments (3)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (2)
153-164: Add error handling for manifest creation and inspection.The manifest creation and inspection steps should handle potential failures gracefully.
Add error handling:
- name: Create manifest list and push working-directory: /tmp/digests run: | + set -euo pipefail docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ "$(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)" || exit 1 docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ "$(printf '${{ env.GHCR_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)" || exit 1 - name: Inspect image run: | + set -euo pipefail docker buildx imagetools inspect ${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}:${{ steps.meta.outputs.version }} || exit 1 docker buildx imagetools inspect ${{ env.GHCR_REPO }}:${{ steps.meta.outputs.version }} || exit 1🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
155-155: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
155-155: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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155-155: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:3:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
155-155: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:4:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 159-159: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
[error] 164-164: no new line character at the end of file
(new-line-at-end-of-file)
75-79: Consider additional security measures for Docker builds.While the current setup is secure, consider these enhancements:
- Add
--security-opt no-new-privilegesto Docker builds- Enable Docker content trust for image verification
- Consider implementing Cosign for signing container images
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (1)
42-47: Consider adding arm/v7 support for broader compatibility.While the current platform matrix works, consider adding linux/arm/v7 support for broader device compatibility:
matrix: platform: - linux/amd64 - linux/arm64 + - linux/arm/v7
🛑 Comments failed to post (1)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (1)
50-52:
⚠️ Potential issueFix shell script security vulnerabilities.
The shell scripts need proper quoting to prevent potential command injection:
Apply these fixes:
- platform=${{ matrix.platform }} - echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> $GITHUB_ENV + platform="${{ matrix.platform }}" + echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"- docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *) + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)"Also applies to: 155-159
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
50-50: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 52-52: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
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Actionable comments posted: 4
🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (1)
Line range hint
6-6: Security: Consider adding vulnerability scanningTo enhance the security of the multi-architecture builds, consider adding:
- Container image scanning (e.g., Trivy, Snyk)
- SBOM generation
- Image signing
This will help ensure the security of both regular and rootless images across all architectures.
🛑 Comments failed to post (4)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (3)
14-14:
⚠️ Potential issueSecurity: Restrict workflow file trigger patterns
The pattern
.github/workflows/**could potentially trigger recursive workflow runs. Consider using more specific patterns or implementing safeguards against recursive triggers.- - '.github/workflows/**' + - '.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml' + - '.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml'Also applies to: 25-25
49-52:
⚠️ Potential issueSecurity: Fix shell command injection vulnerability
The platform variable needs proper quoting to prevent potential command injection.
- platform=${{ matrix.platform }} - echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> $GITHUB_ENV + platform="${{ matrix.platform }}" + echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.- name: Prepare run: | platform="${{ matrix.platform }}" echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
50-50: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 52-52: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
153-159:
⚠️ Potential issueSecurity: Fix command injection vulnerabilities in manifest creation
The manifest creation step has multiple command injection vulnerabilities in the shell script.
- docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *) + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '%s' "${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:")"*Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
155-155: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
155-155: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
155-155: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:3:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
155-155: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:4:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 159-159: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (1)
65-66: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Security: Standardize Docker Hub authentication method
There's an inconsistency in Docker Hub authentication between the build and merge jobs:
- Build job uses DOCKER_USERNAME/DOCKER_PASSWORD
- Merge job uses DOCKERHUB_USERNAME/DOCKERHUB_TOKEN
Standardize on one approach, preferably using the more secure token-based authentication.
- username: ${{ secrets.DOCKER_USERNAME }} - password: ${{ secrets.DOCKER_PASSWORD }} + username: ${{ vars.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }} + password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}Also applies to: 125-126
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.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (3)
81-87: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Security: Add container scanning and signing
The build process could benefit from additional security measures:
- Vulnerability scanning
- Image signing with cosign
Add these steps after the build:
- name: Scan image for vulnerabilities uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master with: image: ${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}:${{ steps.meta.outputs.version }} format: 'table' exit-code: '1' ignore-unfixed: true vuln-type: 'os,library' severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH' - name: Sign the images with cosign if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@main with: cosign-release: 'v2.1.1'
153-159:
⚠️ Potential issueSecurity: Harden shell commands
The manifest creation commands use unquoted command substitution which could be vulnerable to word splitting or glob expansion.
Apply this fix:
- docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *) + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)"Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
155-155: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
155-155: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
155-155: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:3:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
155-155: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:4:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 159-159: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
14-14: 💡 Codebase verification
⚠️ Potential issue🔒 Security: Workflow trigger configuration needs tightening
After analyzing the workflows, I can confirm that both
docker-publish.yamlanddocker-publish-rootless.yamlare configured to trigger on changes to any workflow file (.github/workflows/**). This could indeed lead to security concerns:
- Both workflows build and push Docker images to registries with elevated permissions
- The wildcard trigger means any workflow file modification could trigger these sensitive operations
- Both workflows run on schedule, push, and pull request events, increasing the attack surface
To prevent potential security issues:
- Replace
.github/workflows/**with specific workflow files in both workflows:paths: - 'docker-publish.yaml' - 'docker-publish-rootless.yaml' - 'Dockerfile' - 'Dockerfile.rootless' # ... other relevant paths🔗 Analysis chain
Security: Consider restricting workflow file triggers
The wildcard pattern
.github/workflows/**allows any workflow file change to trigger this workflow. This could potentially be exploited for recursive workflow runs or denial of service.Consider restricting the path to specific workflow files:
- - '.github/workflows/**' + - '.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml' + - '.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml'Also applies to: 25-25
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for potential recursive workflow triggers rg -l "on:\s+(?s).+?paths:\s+(?s).+?\.github/workflows/\*\*" .github/workflows/Length of output: 81
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's check the actual content of the docker-publish.yaml to understand the trigger configuration cat .github/workflows/docker-publish.yamlLength of output: 4818
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's also check if there are any other workflow files that might be relevant fd -e yaml -e yml . .github/workflows/Length of output: 357
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for any references to docker-publish workflow from other workflows rg -l "docker-publish" .github/workflows/Length of output: 41
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's check the docker-publish-rootless.yaml to see if it has similar triggers cat .github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yamlLength of output: 4888
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's check if any workflow is triggered by changes to docker-publish workflow rg -A 5 "paths:.*\.github/workflows" .github/workflows/Length of output: 57
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (2)
126-126:
⚠️ Potential issueCritical: Fix typo in Docker Hub password secret
There's a typo in the secret name:
DOCKER_PASSOWRDshould beDOCKER_PASSWORD.Apply this fix:
- password: ${{ secrets.DOCKER_PASSOWRD }} + password: ${{ secrets.DOCKER_PASSWORD }}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.password: ${{ secrets.DOCKER_PASSWORD }}
152-154: 💡 Codebase verification
Security: Base images should be pinned to specific digests
The Dockerfile.rootless uses multiple base images without digest pinning:
node:18-alpinefor frontend stagesgolang:alpinefor builder stagesgcr.io/distroless/static:latestfor the final stageUsing floating tags like
alpine,latestcan lead to non-deterministic builds and potential supply chain attacks. Each base image should be pinned to a specific digest using the@sha256:notation for enhanced security and reproducibility.Example format:
FROM node:18-alpine@sha256:<digest>🔗 Analysis chain
Security: Consider pinning base image digests
While the workflow correctly adds rootless suffixes, consider pinning base image digests in the Dockerfile.rootless for better security.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if Dockerfile.rootless uses digest pinning rg -l "FROM\s+\w+/\w+(@sha256:)?" Dockerfile.rootlessLength of output: 55
Script:
#!/bin/bash # First check if Dockerfile.rootless exists fd "Dockerfile.rootless" # If it exists, let's see its content focusing on FROM statements rg "^FROM" Dockerfile.rootlessLength of output: 276
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Actionable comments posted: 5
🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (1)
Line range hint
33-48: Consider security implications of multi-platform builds.The matrix strategy for multi-platform builds is well-structured, but consider the security implications:
- Different architectures might have different security vulnerabilities
- ARM builds might use different base images with varying security patches
Recommendations:
- Implement architecture-specific vulnerability scanning
- Use consistent base images across architectures
- Consider implementing platform-specific security controls
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
51-51: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 53-53: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
[error] 61-61: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
[error] 101-101: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
🛑 Comments failed to post (5)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (4)
166-170:
⚠️ Potential issueFix shell script security issues.
The manifest creation script has potential command injection vulnerabilities due to unquoted command substitution.
Apply this diff to fix the shell script security issues:
- docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *) + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)"Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:3:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:4:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 170-170: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
76-79: 💡 Codebase verification
⚠️ Potential issue
⚠️ Security Risk: Replace custom QEMU image with official oneThe current setup uses a custom QEMU image (
ghcr.io/amitie10g/binfmt:latest) which poses several security concerns:
- The
latesttag is being used, which is mutable and can lead to non-deterministic builds- The image is from a third-party source rather than the official Docker QEMU image
- The same custom image is used in both regular and rootless workflows
The
docker/setup-qemu-action@v3action works with the official QEMU images by default and doesn't require explicit image specification unless there's a specific need.Remove the
withblock and image specification to use the default, more secure configuration:- name: Set up QEMU uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3This change should be applied to both:
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml🔗 Analysis chain
Verify the security of the QEMU setup image.
The workflow uses a custom QEMU setup image
ghcr.io/amitie10g/binfmt:latest. Using thelatesttag and an external image poses security risks.Let's verify the image's security profile:
Consider:
- Pin to a specific digest instead of using
latest- Use the official QEMU image from Docker Hub
- Implement vulnerability scanning in the workflow
Let me analyze the official action's documentation and any internal usage patterns before making the final recommendation about the QEMU setup image security.
The previous attempt showed that the image was last updated on "2024-12-19T08:01:02Z", which is relatively recent. However, we need more context about the recommended setup patterns.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check the last update time and potential vulnerabilities of the QEMU setup image # Check when the image was last updated gh api \ -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ -H "X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28" \ /users/amitie10g/packages/container/binfmt/versions | jq '.[0].updated_at' # Check for any security advisories gh api graphql -f query=' { securityVulnerabilities(first: 5, ecosystem: CONTAINER, package: "binfmt") { nodes { advisory { summary severity publishedAt } vulnerableVersionRange } } }'Length of output: 912
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's check if the official docker/setup-qemu-action recommends any specific image rg -A 5 "setup-qemu-action" .github/workflows/ # Let's also check if there are any other workflows using QEMU setup for comparison rg "docker/setup-qemu-action" . # Check if there's any documentation about QEMU setup fd README -t f -X cat {}Length of output: 3945
82-86: 💡 Codebase verification
⚠️ Potential issue
⚠️ Security Risk: Unverified Custom BuildKit ImageBased on the verification results, the custom BuildKit image
ghcr.io/amitie10g/buildkit:masterwas last updated on December 29, 2024. However, using this image presents several security concerns:
- The
mastertag is mutable and can be updated without notice, potentially introducing malicious code- The image is from a third-party source rather than the official Docker repositories
- No security scanning or image verification steps are implemented in the workflow
- There's no documentation or references about this custom image in the codebase
To ensure build environment security:
- Replace with the official image:
docker/buildx-builder:latestor preferably a specific version- If a custom image is necessary, pin to a specific digest instead of
master- Add container scanning step using tools like Trivy or Snyk before using the image
Example secure configuration:
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 with: driver-opts: | image=docker/buildx-builder:latest@sha256:<specific-digest>🔗 Analysis chain
Verify the security of the Buildx setup image.
Similar to the QEMU setup, the workflow uses a custom Buildx image
ghcr.io/amitie10g/buildkit:master. Using themastertag and an external image poses security risks.Let's verify the image's security profile:
Consider:
- Pin to a specific digest instead of using
master- Use the official Buildx image from Docker Hub
- Implement vulnerability scanning in the workflow
Let me analyze the image configuration and security measures in place. The previous attempt showed the image was last updated on December 29, 2024, but we need more context about its usage and any security measures in place.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check the last update time and potential vulnerabilities of the Buildx setup image # Check when the image was last updated gh api \ -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ -H "X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28" \ /users/amitie10g/packages/container/buildkit/versions | jq '.[0].updated_at' # Check for any security advisories gh api graphql -f query=' { securityVulnerabilities(first: 5, ecosystem: CONTAINER, package: "buildkit") { nodes { advisory { summary severity publishedAt } vulnerableVersionRange } } }'Length of output: 916
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's check if there's any documentation or references about this custom image rg -i "amitie10g/buildkit" -A 5 -B 5 # Check if there are any other Dockerfile or container configurations fd -e dockerfile -e yaml -e yml | xargs rg -i "buildkit|buildx" # Check if there are any security scanning or image verification steps fd -e yaml -e yml | xargs rg -i "vulnerability|security|scan"Length of output: 3589
94-95: 💡 Codebase verification
🔒 Cache Security Review: Improvements Needed
Based on the analysis of the Docker build configuration and cache usage, here are important security findings:
- The cache repository (
ghcr.io/sysadminsmedia/devcache) appears to be non-existent or inaccessible, which could lead to build failures- While the
.dockerignoreproperly excludes sensitive paths like.envandsecrets.dev.yaml, the cache is configured inmode=maxwhich stores all build stages- The workflow has appropriate GITHUB_TOKEN permissions scoped to
packages: writeSecurity recommendations:
- Create a dedicated cache repository with restricted access
- Use branch-specific cache tags (e.g.,
cache-to: type=registry,ref=ghcr.io/sysadminsmedia/devcache:homebox-${GITHUB_REF_NAME})- Consider using
mode=mininstead ofmode=maxto reduce cache exposure- Implement cache garbage collection with appropriate retention policies
- Add cache layer encryption using
--cache-from-encryption-keyand--cache-to-encryption-key🔗 Analysis chain
Review cache security implications.
The workflow uses a shared cache in GHCR. While this improves build performance, it could potentially expose sensitive data if not properly secured.
Let's check the cache repository permissions:
Consider:
- Implement cache key rotation
- Use branch-specific cache references
- Set appropriate retention policies
Let me try to verify the cache repository's existence and visibility first.
Let me check if there are any sensitive files that might be included in the build context and potentially cached.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check the permissions on the cache repository gh api \ -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ -H "X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28" \ /repos/sysadminsmedia/devcache/actions/permissions | jq .Length of output: 341
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if the cache repository exists and its visibility gh api \ -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ -H "X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28" \ /repos/sysadminsmedia/devcache | jq '.visibility, .permissions' # Check the workflow file for any access controls cat .github/workflows/docker-publish.yamlLength of output: 5442
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for potentially sensitive files in the repository cat .dockerignore 2>/dev/null || echo "No .dockerignore file found" # Look for common sensitive file patterns rg -l '(?i)(password|secret|key|token|credential)' --type yaml --type json --type envLength of output: 489
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (1)
168-172:
⚠️ Potential issueFix shell script security issues.
The manifest creation script has the same command injection vulnerabilities as in the main workflow.
Apply this diff to fix the shell script security issues:
- docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *) - docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.GHCR_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *) + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)" + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '${{ env.GHCR_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)"📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.run: | docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ "$(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)" docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ "$(printf '${{ env.GHCR_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)"🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
168-168: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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168-168: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 172-172: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
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Actionable comments posted: 3
🔭 Outside diff range comments (1)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (1)
Line range hint
1-177: Consider workflow reusability to reduce duplicationThis workflow is almost identical to
docker-publish.yaml. Consider:
- Creating a reusable workflow with parameters
- Using composite actions for common steps
- Implementing workflow inheritance
Example reusable workflow structure:
name: Reusable Docker Build on: workflow_call: inputs: suffix: type: string required: false default: "" secrets: DOCKER_USERNAME: required: true DOCKER_PASSWORD: required: true jobs: build: # ... common configuration ... steps: - uses: ./.github/actions/docker-build with: suffix: ${{ inputs.suffix }}🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
51-51: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
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🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 53-53: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
[error] 61-61: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
[error] 101-101: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (1)
Line range hint
1-177: Security: Implement additional hardening measuresConsider implementing these security best practices:
- Add
permissions: read-allat workflow level and only elevate specific job permissions- Use GITHUB_TOKEN with minimal required scopes
- Implement Docker content trust
- Add container scanning step
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
51-51: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
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166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:3:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:4:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 53-53: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
[error] 61-61: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
[error] 101-101: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
[error] 162-162: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
[error] 170-170: trailing spaces
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[error] 175-175: no new line character at the end of file
(new-line-at-end-of-file)
🛑 Comments failed to post (3)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (3)
164-170:
⚠️ Potential issueSecurity: Fix command injection vulnerability
The manifest creation script is vulnerable to command injection through unquoted command substitution.
- docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *) + tags="$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" + digests="$(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)" + docker buildx imagetools create "${tags}" "${digests}"📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.- name: Create manifest list and push working-directory: /tmp/digests run: | tags="$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" digests="$(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)" docker buildx imagetools create "${tags}" "${digests}" tags="$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" digests="$(printf '${{ env.GHCR_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)" docker buildx imagetools create "${tags}" "${digests}"🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:3:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:4:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 170-170: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
14-14: 💡 Codebase verification
🔒 Security Alert: Overly Permissive Workflow Triggers
The broad
.github/workflows/**path pattern could allow unauthorized workflow executions, potentially leading to unnecessary resource consumption and security risks. Based on the analysis:
Only two Docker-related workflows exist:
docker-publish.yamldocker-publish-rootless.yamlNo direct workflow dependencies require monitoring all workflow files.
To enhance security and follow the principle of least privilege:
- - '.github/workflows/**' + - '.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml' + - '.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml'This change will:
- Prevent unnecessary builds triggered by unrelated workflow changes
- Reduce the attack surface for potential workflow injection
- Improve resource utilization by eliminating redundant builds
- Maintain clear and explicit dependencies
🛡️ Security Best Practice: Always specify the minimum required paths in workflow triggers to prevent potential security vulnerabilities through unauthorized workflow executions.
🔗 Analysis chain
Consider restricting workflow file path patterns
The wildcard pattern
.github/workflows/**might trigger builds for changes to unrelated workflow files. Consider being more specific about which workflow files should trigger this workflow.- - '.github/workflows/**' + - '.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml' + - '.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml'Also applies to: 25-25
The above scripts will help us understand:
- The exact purpose of docker-publish workflow
- Which other workflows are Docker-related
- If there are any workflow dependencies that might justify the broad path pattern
This information will help determine if the broad path pattern is actually a security concern or if it serves a legitimate purpose.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # List all workflow files that could trigger this workflow fd -e yml -e yaml . .github/workflows/Length of output: 369
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check the content of docker-publish.yaml to understand its purpose cat .github/workflows/docker-publish.yamlLength of output: 5157
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if other workflow files are related to Docker operations rg -l "docker" .github/workflows/Length of output: 118
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for dependencies between workflows rg "workflow_run|workflow_call" .github/workflows/Length of output: 165
76-86: 💡 Codebase verification
⚠️ Potential issue
⚠️ Security: Third-party QEMU and BuildKit images require immediate attentionThe workflow uses unverified third-party images from
ghcr.io/amitie10gfor critical build infrastructure:
ghcr.io/amitie10g/binfmt:latestghcr.io/amitie10g/buildkit:masterThese pose significant supply chain security risks:
- Using
latestandmastertags instead of pinned digests- No image signature verification
- Images from a non-official source
- Failed to verify the existence of these packages in GHCR
Recommended actions:
- Replace with official images:
- uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3 # Remove custom image - uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 # Remove custom buildkit image- If custom images are absolutely necessary:
- Pin specific image digests
- Implement Cosign signature verification
- Document the security review process
- Set up automated vulnerability scanning
🔗 Analysis chain
Security: Verify third-party image integrity
Using custom QEMU and BuildKit images from
ghcr.io/amitie10gintroduces supply chain risks. Consider:
- Pinning specific image digests
- Using official images when possible
- Implementing image signature verification
Let me try to verify the image references and their usage patterns in the codebase. This will help us understand the scope of these third-party image dependencies.
These scripts will help us understand:
- The usage pattern of these third-party images
- When they were introduced
- If there's any documentation justifying their use
- Other Docker-related files that might be affected
Let me check the actual content of these files to understand the Docker image usage patterns and whether there are any existing security practices like image digest pinning in place.
This will help us understand:
- The overall Docker configuration
- Current image versioning practices
- The authenticity of the container registry source
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if these images have security advisories gh api graphql -f query=' { securityVulnerabilities(first: 5, package: "binfmt", ecosystem: CONTAINER) { nodes { advisory { summary severity } } } }'Length of output: 677
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's check if these images are being used elsewhere in the codebase rg -l "ghcr.io/amitie10g" --type yaml # Check if there are any other Docker-related files that might have image references fd -e dockerfile -e yaml -e yml --exec grep -l "docker" {}Length of output: 145
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's also check the commit history of this workflow file to see when these images were introduced git log --oneline .github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml | head -n 5Length of output: 0
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if there's any documentation about these image choices fd README -e md | xargs grep -l "amitie10g\|buildkit\|binfmt"Length of output: 63
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's check the content of docker-compose.yml to see if it uses official images cat docker-compose.yml # Let's also check if there are any image digests used in the workflow file cat .github/workflows/docker-publish.yamlLength of output: 5397
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's also check if these specific images exist on GitHub Container Registry gh api \ -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ -H "X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28" \ /users/amitie10g/packages?package_type=containerLength of output: 311
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Actionable comments posted: 2
🔭 Outside diff range comments (1)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (1)
🔒 Security Improvements Required for Workflow Configuration
Based on the analysis, while the workflow uses secrets appropriately, there are several security enhancements needed:
- The workflow lacks
paths-ignoreto prevent builds from triggering on sensitive file changes- The Docker credentials are exposed through repository secrets without environment protection rules
- The workflow has write permissions for
id-tokenwhich should be scoped more tightlyRecommended changes:
- Add paths-ignore to the workflow triggers:
paths-ignore: - '**/*.md' - '**/*.env*' - '**/config*.yml' - 'docs/**'
- Consider using environment protection rules for Docker credentials to restrict access
- Limit the
id-tokenwrite permission to only the jobs that require it- Add a condition to skip Docker publishing on pull requests from forks:
if: github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository🔗 Analysis chain
Line range hint
1-29: Enhance security controls for workflow triggersConsider implementing these security improvements:
- Add
paths-ignoreto prevent builds on sensitive file changes (e.g.,.env,secrets/)- Consider using repository environment protection rules for the Docker credentials
- Add branch protection rules to prevent unauthorized pushes to main
Let's verify the current branch protection rules:
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check branch protection rules for the main branch gh api repos/sysadminsmedia/homebox/branches/main/protectionLength of output: 283
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's check the paths in the repository to understand potential security implications fd -t f -e env -e yaml -e yml -H # Check if there are any sensitive paths that should be excluded fd -H secrets # Check for any existing paths-ignore in workflow files rg "paths-ignore:" .github/workflows/Length of output: 707
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's check the content of workflow files for any sensitive patterns rg -A 5 "password|token|secret|key" .github/workflows/ # Check for environment files that might contain sensitive data fd -H ".env" # Check Docker-related files for potential sensitive data exposure cat Dockerfile Dockerfile.rootless 2>/dev/nullLength of output: 12179
🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (1)
41-47: Approve matrix strategy for ARM build processThe implementation of a matrix strategy with separate builds for each platform is a solid approach to solve the ARM build timeout issues. This separation allows for:
- Independent scaling of build resources per platform
- Better failure isolation
- Improved caching efficiency
Consider implementing these additional improvements:
- Add platform-specific build arguments if needed
- Implement parallel builds with proper resource allocation
- Add platform-specific tests in the workflow
🛑 Comments failed to post (2)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (2)
87-91: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Improve cache security and shell script safety
- The cache check script needs proper error handling and quoting
- Cache references should use SHA digests for immutability
Apply these improvements:
- docker pull ghcr.io/sysadminsmedia/devcache:homebox || echo "Cache not found, proceeding with build." + if ! docker pull "ghcr.io/sysadminsmedia/devcache:homebox"; then + echo "Cache not found, proceeding with build." + fiAlso applies to: 99-101
75-78: 💡 Codebase verification
⚠️ Potential issue🚨 Security Alert: Unverified Custom Container Images in CI/CD Pipeline
Based on the verification results, there are significant security concerns:
- Both workflow files (
docker-publish-rootless.yamlanddocker-publish.yaml) use unverified custom images fromghcr.io/amitie10g:
- Using
binfmt:latestandbuildkit:latestin rootless workflow- Using
binfmt:latestandbuildkit:masterin regular workflow- No SHA256 digests are being used to pin the images
- No documentation found explaining the purpose or security measures of these custom images
- Images are from a third-party source rather than official Docker images
Recommendations to enhance security:
- Replace
ghcr.io/amitie10g/binfmt:latestwith officialtonistiigi/binfmt:latestimage- Replace custom buildkit image with official
moby/buildkit:latestimage- Pin all images using SHA256 digests
- If custom images are necessary, document their purpose and security measures in the repository
Example fix:
- name: Set up QEMU uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3 with: image: tonistiigi/binfmt@sha256:<digest>🔗 Analysis chain
Verify custom QEMU and Buildx images
Using custom images for QEMU and Buildx setup could pose security risks. Consider:
- Pinning to specific image digests instead of using
latesttag- Implementing SHA verification for the custom images
- Moving these images to your organization's registry for better control
Let's verify the image sources:
Also applies to: 81-85
Let me try a different approach to verify the image sources.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check image details and vulnerabilities docker pull ghcr.io/amitie10g/binfmt:latest docker pull ghcr.io/amitie10g/buildkit:latest docker inspect ghcr.io/amitie10g/binfmt:latest ghcr.io/amitie10g/buildkit:latestLength of output: 467
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check workflow files for image references rg -A 5 "ghcr.io/amitie10g" .github/workflows/Length of output: 2583
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if there are any other workflow files using custom images fd -e yaml -e yml . .github/workflows/ --exec grep -l "ghcr.io"Length of output: 148
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Look for any documentation about these custom images rg -i "binfmt|buildkit" README.md docs/ 2>/dev/nullLength of output: 41
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if there are any image digests or version pins in the codebase rg "@sha256:[a-f0-9]{64}" .github/workflows/Length of output: 46
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Actionable comments posted: 3
🧹 Nitpick comments (2)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (2)
Line range hint
1-28: 🔒 Consider restricting workflow triggers for enhanced securityThe current path triggers are quite broad and could potentially trigger unnecessary builds, which might be exploited for resource exhaustion. Consider:
- Restricting the workflow to specific paths that actually affect the Docker build
- Adding
paths-ignorefor non-essential changespaths: - 'backend/**' - 'frontend/**' - 'Dockerfile' - 'Dockerfile.rootless' - '.dockerignore' - '.github/workflows/**' + paths-ignore: + - '**/*.md' + - '**/*.txt' + - 'docs/**'🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
47-47: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
95-95: object, array, and null values should not be evaluated in template with ${{ }} but evaluating the value of type {digest: string; imageid: string; metadata: string}
(expression)
102-102: property "image" is not defined in object type {digest: string; imageid: string; metadata: string}
(expression)
110-110: property "image" is not defined in object type {digest: string; imageid: string; metadata: string}
(expression)
Line range hint
1-191: 🔒 Security Recommendations SummaryTo enhance the overall security of this workflow:
- Enable SLSA provenance generation for better supply chain security
- Add Cosign image signing
- Enable Vulnerability scanning in the workflow
Add these security features by including:
- name: Install cosign uses: sigstore/[email protected] - name: Generate SLSA provenance uses: slsa-framework/[email protected] with: artifact-path: /tmp/digests - name: Run Trivy vulnerability scanner uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master with: image-ref: '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}:${{ steps.meta.outputs.version }}' format: 'table' exit-code: '1' ignore-unfixed: true vuln-type: 'os,library' severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
47-47: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
95-95: object, array, and null values should not be evaluated in template with ${{ }} but evaluating the value of type {digest: string; imageid: string; metadata: string}
(expression)
102-102: property "image" is not defined in object type {digest: string; imageid: string; metadata: string}
(expression)
110-110: property "image" is not defined in object type {digest: string; imageid: string; metadata: string}
(expression)
🛑 Comments failed to post (3)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (3)
31-82:
⚠️ Potential issue🔒 Enhance security by pinning external images and limiting permissions
Several security improvements are recommended:
- Pin external images to specific SHA digests
- Limit job permissions to minimum required
- image: ghcr.io/amitie10g/binfmt:latest + image: ghcr.io/amitie10g/binfmt@sha256:<specific-sha> - image=ghcr.io/amitie10g/buildkit:master + image=ghcr.io/amitie10g/buildkit@sha256:<specific-sha> permissions: contents: read - packages: write + packages: read - attestations: write + attestations: none id-token: writeCommittable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
47-47: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
93-112:
⚠️ Potential issue🔒 Fix shell script security issues and add timeout to container checks
The debug steps have several security and reliability concerns:
- Unquoted variables could lead to command injection
- Container logs might expose sensitive information
- No timeout in the wait loop could lead to hung builds
- echo "Build outputs: ${{ steps.build.outputs }}" + echo "Build outputs: ${steps.build.outputs@Q}" - while ! docker ps -q --filter "name=${{ steps.build.outputs.image }}"; do + timeout 300 bash -c 'while ! docker ps -q --filter "name=${steps.build.outputs.image@Q}"; do echo "Waiting for container to start..." sleep 5 - done + done'Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
95-95: object, array, and null values should not be evaluated in template with ${{ }} but evaluating the value of type {digest: string; imageid: string; metadata: string}
(expression)
102-102: property "image" is not defined in object type {digest: string; imageid: string; metadata: string}
(expression)
110-110: property "image" is not defined in object type {digest: string; imageid: string; metadata: string}
(expression)
180-191:
⚠️ Potential issue🔒 Secure manifest creation and add artifact validation
The manifest creation process needs security improvements:
- Shell script quoting issues could lead to command injection
- No validation of downloaded artifacts before use
create manifest list and push working-directory: /tmp/digests run: | + # Validate downloaded artifacts + for digest in *; do + if ! echo "$digest" | grep -qE '^[a-f0-9]{64}$'; then + echo "Invalid digest format: $digest" + exit 1 + fi + done - docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ - $(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *) + "$(printf '%s@sha256:%s ' "${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}" *)"Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
182-182: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
182-182: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
182-182: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:3:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
182-182: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:4:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
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Actionable comments posted: 4
♻️ Duplicate comments (1)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (1)
163-169:⚠️ Potential issueFix command injection vulnerability in manifest creation (rootless variant).
Similar to the main workflow, the manifest creation commands need proper quoting.
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
165-165: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
165-165: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
165-165: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:3:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
165-165: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:4:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (1)
72-84: Consider implementing build cache security measures.While caching improves build performance, ensure cache poisoning prevention:
- Consider using scoped cache keys with commit SHA
- Implement cache invalidation strategy
- Add cache hit/miss monitoring
🛑 Comments failed to post (4)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (3)
172-178:
⚠️ Potential issueFix potential command injection vulnerability in manifest creation.
The current implementation is vulnerable to command injection through unquoted command substitution. The
jqandprintfoutputs should be properly quoted.Apply this fix:
- docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *) - docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.GHCR_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *) + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)" + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '${{ env.GHCR_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)"📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.- name: Create manifest list and push working-directory: /tmp/digests run: | docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ "$(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)" docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ "$(printf '${{ env.GHCR_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)"🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
174-174: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
174-174: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
174-174: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:3:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
174-174: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:4:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
86-89: 💡 Codebase verification
⚠️ Security Risk: Switch to Official QEMU Image RecommendedBased on the verification results:
- The custom image
ghcr.io/amitie10g/binfmtwas last updated on Dec 19, 2024- The official
tonistiigi/binfmtimage was updated on Dec 13, 2024- Unable to verify the security posture of the custom image (repository not accessible)
- No access to Dockerfile or security advisories for the custom image
For enhanced security:
- Replace
ghcr.io/amitie10g/binfmt:latestwithtonistiigi/binfmt:latest- The official image is well-maintained by Docker and has transparent security practices
- Avoid using custom images from unknown sources for critical infrastructure components like QEMU
🔗 Analysis chain
Security: Verify the custom QEMU image.
Using a custom QEMU image from
ghcr.io/amitie10g/binfmt:latestinstead of the official Docker image introduces potential security risks. Consider using the officialtonistiigi/binfmtimage which is well-maintained and regularly updated with security patches.Run this script to check the image's last update and potential vulnerabilities:
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check when the custom binfmt image was last updated gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ /users/amitie10g/packages/container/binfmt/versions | \ jq '.[0] | {created_at, updated_at}' # Compare with official image curl -s https://registry.hub.docker.com/v2/repositories/tonistiigi/binfmt/tags | \ jq '.results[0] | {last_updated}'Length of output: 392
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if the custom image has any security advisories or issues gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ /repos/amitie10g/binfmt/security/advisories | \ jq '.[].summary' # Check the Dockerfile used to build the custom image gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ /repos/amitie10g/binfmt/contents/Dockerfile | \ jq -r '.content' | base64 -d # Check if there are any recent issues related to security gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ /repos/amitie10g/binfmt/issues?state=all | \ jq '.[] | select(.title | test("security|vulnerability|exploit"; "i")) | {title, created_at}'Length of output: 731
92-95: 💡 Codebase verification
⚠️ Security Risk: Switch to Official BuildKit ImageBased on the verification results:
- The custom BuildKit image (
ghcr.io/amitie10g/buildkit:master) was last updated on Dec 29, 2024- The repository hosting the image source code is not publicly accessible (404 errors)
- Unable to verify the Dockerfile, security advisories, or community trust metrics
For enhanced security:
- Replace with official image:
moby/buildkit:latest(last updated Dec 16, 2024)- Remove the custom
driver-optsconfiguration- This ensures you're using a well-maintained, community-vetted image with transparent source code
🔗 Analysis chain
Security: Verify the custom buildkit image.
Similar to the QEMU image, using a custom buildkit image (
ghcr.io/amitie10g/buildkit:master) from a third-party source poses security risks. Consider using the officialmoby/buildkitimage.Run this script to check the image's update frequency and potential vulnerabilities:
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check when the custom buildkit image was last updated gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ /users/amitie10g/packages/container/buildkit/versions | \ jq '.[0] | {created_at, updated_at}' # Compare with official image curl -s https://registry.hub.docker.com/v2/repositories/moby/buildkit/tags | \ jq '.results[0] | {last_updated}'Length of output: 390
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if the custom buildkit image has a Dockerfile or source available gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ /repos/amitie10g/buildkit/contents | \ jq -r '.[] | select(.name == "Dockerfile" or .name == "dockerfile") | .name' # Check stars and forks as a proxy for community trust gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ /repos/amitie10g/buildkit | \ jq '{stargazers_count, forks_count, updated_at, created_at}' # Check if there are any security advisories gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ /repos/amitie10g/buildkit/security-advisories | \ jq '.[0:2]'Length of output: 708
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (1)
91-93: 💡 Codebase verification
⚠️ Security Risk: Public Cache Registry DetectedThe cache registry
ghcr.io/sysadminsmedia/devcache:homeboxis currently set to public visibility, which poses a significant security risk. Public caches can be:
- Tampered with by malicious actors (cache poisoning)
- Used to exfiltrate sensitive data
- Exploited to inject malicious artifacts
Recommendations:
- Change the cache registry visibility to
private- Consider using repository-scoped cache registry instead of organization-wide
- Implement strict access controls for cache read/write operations
- Enable security advisories and vulnerability scanning
🔗 Analysis chain
Security: Review cache registry permissions.
The workflow is using a shared cache registry (
ghcr.io/sysadminsmedia/devcache:homebox). This could lead to potential cache poisoning if not properly secured.Run this script to check cache registry permissions:
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check cache registry permissions gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ /orgs/sysadminsmedia/packages/container/devcache/versions | \ jq '.[0] | {visibility, security_advisories_enabled}'Length of output: 227
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's check if we can get package visibility directly gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ /orgs/sysadminsmedia/packages/container/devcache | \ jq '{visibility, updated_at}' # Also check repository permissions where the cache is used gh api -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \ /repos/sysadminsmedia/homebox/actions/permissions | \ jq '{enabled, allowed_actions, selected_actions_url}'Length of output: 490
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Actionable comments posted: 3
🔭 Outside diff range comments (1)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (1)
Line range hint
109-174: Enhance manifest creation securityThe manifest creation process needs additional security measures:
- Add error handling and input validation:
working-directory: /tmp/digests run: | + set -euo pipefail + if [ ! -d "/tmp/digests" ]; then + echo "Error: Digest directory not found" >&2 + exit 1 + fi docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ $(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)
- Add manifest verification step:
- name: Verify manifest run: | for tag in $(jq -r '.tags[]' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON"); do docker manifest inspect "${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}:$tag" docker manifest inspect "${{ env.GHCR_REPO }}:$tag" done🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
49-49: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 38-38: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
🧹 Nitpick comments (3)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (1)
Line range hint
1-168: Security: Add SLSA provenance generationTo enhance the security of your container images, consider implementing SLSA (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts) provenance generation. This will:
- Provide verifiable build metadata
- Enable supply chain security monitoring
- Help detect tampering with build artifacts
Would you like me to provide an example configuration for implementing SLSA provenance in this workflow?
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (2)
Line range hint
1-28: Consider tightening workflow trigger paths for enhanced securityThe current path filters include broad patterns like
backend/**andfrontend/**. While comprehensive, this could potentially trigger builds for non-Docker related changes.Consider restricting the paths to Docker-specific files and critical infrastructure changes:
paths: - - 'backend/**' - - 'frontend/**' + - 'backend/Dockerfile*' + - 'backend/docker/**' + - 'frontend/Dockerfile*' + - 'frontend/docker/**' - 'Dockerfile' - 'Dockerfile.rootless' - '.dockerignore' - '.github/workflows/**'🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
49-49: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 38-38: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
Line range hint
1-174: Security Advisory: Implement Container Security Best PracticesTo enhance the overall security posture of the Docker workflow:
Consider implementing these security measures:
- Add Cosign for image signing
- Enable Docker Content Trust
- Implement vulnerability scanning
- Add BuildKit's RUN --security=insecure option for privileged operations
Add this configuration to enable security features:
- name: Configure security options run: | echo "DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=1" >> $GITHUB_ENV echo "DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1" >> $GITHUB_ENV echo "BUILDKIT_STEP_LOG_MAX_SIZE=10485760" >> $GITHUB_ENV - name: Scan for vulnerabilities uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master with: image-ref: '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}:${{ steps.meta.outputs.version }}' format: 'table' exit-code: '1' ignore-unfixed: true vuln-type: 'os,library' severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
49-49: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 38-38: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
🛑 Comments failed to post (3)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (2)
157-163:
⚠️ Potential issueSecurity: Fix shell script injection vulnerabilities
The manifest creation commands have potential command injection vulnerabilities due to unquoted expansions. Additionally, the static analysis tool correctly identified word splitting issues.
Apply this fix:
- docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *) - docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.GHCR_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *) + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)" + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '${{ env.GHCR_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)"📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.- name: Create manifest list and push working-directory: /tmp/digests run: | docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ "$(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)" docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ "$(printf '${{ env.GHCR_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)"🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
159-159: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
159-159: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
159-159: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:3:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
159-159: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:4:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
70-74: 💡 Codebase verification
🚨 Security Alert: Unverified Custom Container Images in CI Pipeline
The workflow is using custom container images from
ghcr.io/amitie10g/*for critical build infrastructure (QEMU and BuildKit) without proper security controls. Based on the investigation:
- These images are used in both regular and rootless workflows
- No Dependabot configuration exists for Docker image updates
- No documentation exists about these custom images
- No container scanning is implemented in the CI pipeline
To improve security:
- Replace
ghcr.io/amitie10g/binfmt:latestwith the officialtonistiigi/binfmt:latestimage- Replace
ghcr.io/amitie10g/buildkit:masterwith the officialmoby/buildkit:masterimage- Add Dependabot configuration for Docker image updates
- Implement container scanning in the CI pipeline using Trivy or similar tools
🔗 Analysis chain
Security: Verify custom images
Using custom images for QEMU and BuildKit from
ghcr.io/amitie10g/*introduces potential security risks. Ensure these images are:
- Regularly scanned for vulnerabilities
- Built from trusted base images
- Maintained with security updates
Also applies to: 78-80
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if these images are referenced elsewhere in the codebase rg "ghcr.io/amitie10g" --type yamlLength of output: 34
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check the entire workflow file content to understand the context better cat .github/workflows/docker-publish.yamlLength of output: 5174
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if there are any other workflow files using docker fd -e yaml -e yml . .github/workflows/ --exec grep -l "docker" {}Length of output: 152
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Look for any documentation about these custom images fd README -t fLength of output: 26
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if there are any security scanning workflows fd -e yaml -e yml . .github/workflows/ --exec grep -l "security" {}Length of output: 69
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if there are any Dockerfile definitions fd DockerfileLength of output: 46
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's check the content of the README for any documentation about these images cat README.mdLength of output: 2970
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check the rootless workflow to see if it uses the same images cat .github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yamlLength of output: 5448
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if there are any Dependabot configurations for Docker fd dependabot -e yaml -e ymlLength of output: 30
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if there are any security policies fd SECURITY.mdLength of output: 28
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's check the security policy content cat SECURITY.mdLength of output: 367
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if there's any GitHub Actions security configuration fd -e yml -e yaml . .github/ --exec grep -l "permissions:"Length of output: 191
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if these custom images are referenced in any documentation rg -i "amitie10g/(binfmt|buildkit)" --type md --type yamlLength of output: 59
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (1)
85-108:
⚠️ Potential issueSecure build cache and fix shell script quoting
The build process has potential security considerations:
- Fix shell script quoting to prevent command injection:
- digest="${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}" + digest="${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}" - touch "/tmp/digests/${digest#sha256:}" + touch "/tmp/digests/${digest#sha256:?}"
- Add cache security measures:
cache-from: type=registry,ref=ghcr.io/sysadminsmedia/devcache - cache-to: type=registry,ref=ghcr.io/sysadminsmedia/devcache,mode=max + cache-to: type=registry,ref=ghcr.io/sysadminsmedia/devcache,mode=max,compression=zstd
- Consider adding Buildx security options:
uses: docker/build-push-action@v6 with: + security-opt: seccomp=unconfined + security-opt: no-new-privileges=true platforms: ${{ matrix.platform }}Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
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Inline review comments failed to post. This is likely due to GitHub's limits when posting large numbers of comments.
Actionable comments posted: 1
🧹 Nitpick comments (2)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (2)
25-26: Consider using repository secrets for registry URLsWhile not strictly necessary, consider moving the registry URLs to repository secrets for better flexibility and security management.
- DOCKERHUB_REPO: sysadminsmedia/homebox - GHCR_REPO: ghcr.io/sysadminsmedia/homebox + DOCKERHUB_REPO: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_REPO }} + GHCR_REPO: ${{ secrets.GHCR_REPO }}
96-97: Consider adding image signing for enhanced securityThe build step could benefit from image signing to ensure supply chain security.
Add the following to the build step:
with: platforms: ${{ matrix.platform }} labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }} + provenance: true + sbom: true
🛑 Comments failed to post (1)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (1)
167-171:
⚠️ Potential issueFix shell script quoting issues
The manifest creation commands have potential word splitting issues.
Apply this fix:
- docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *) + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)"📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.run: | docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ "$(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)" docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ "$(printf '${{ env.GHCR_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)"🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
167-167: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
167-167: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
167-167: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:3:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
167-167: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:4:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Caution
Inline review comments failed to post. This is likely due to GitHub's limits when posting large numbers of comments.
Actionable comments posted: 3
🔭 Outside diff range comments (2)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (2)
Line range hint
1-181: Add security scanning and signing stepsThe workflow would benefit from additional security measures:
- Container image scanning
- Image signing with cosign
Add these security steps after the build:
- name: Install Trivy uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master with: image-ref: '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}:${{ steps.meta.outputs.version }}' format: 'table' exit-code: '1' ignore-unfixed: true vuln-type: 'os,library' severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH' - name: Sign the images with cosign uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@main with: cosign-release: 'v2.1.1'🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
52-52: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
52-52: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:4:34: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 38-38: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
[error] 58-58: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
Workflow permissions are already well-configured, but PR triggers need enhancement
The workflow already implements good security practices with explicit permissions:
permissions: contents: read packages: write id-token: write attestations: writeHowever, to further enhance security:
- The workflow should use
pull_request_targetinstead ofpull_requestto safely handle secrets in PR builds- Add explicit
pull-requests: readpermission to minimize attack surface- Consider adding a
concurrencylimit to prevent resource exhaustion from multiple PR buildsExample configuration:
on: pull_request_target: branches: [ "main" ] paths: [...] permissions: contents: read packages: write id-token: write attestations: write pull-requests: read concurrency: group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }} cancel-in-progress: true🔗 Analysis chain
Line range hint
1-29: Review security implications of workflow triggersThe current workflow configuration has potential security implications:
- PR triggers could expose secrets or allow resource exhaustion attacks
- Broad path patterns (
**) might trigger unnecessary buildsConsider these security enhancements:
- Add
pull_request_targetinstead ofpull_requestfor better secrets handling- Restrict PR access with:
permissions: pull-requests: read
- Add branch protection rules to prevent direct pushes to main
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Error: No shell scripts found
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for existing workflow permissions and branch protection configurations fd -e yaml -e yml . .github/workflows/ -x cat {} # Check if there are any other workflow files that might have similar security configurations rg -l "pull_request_target|permissions:" .github/workflows/Length of output: 19508
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
52-52: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
52-52: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:4:34: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 38-38: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
[error] 58-58: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
🛑 Comments failed to post (3)
.github/workflows/docker-publish-rootless.yaml (3)
81-91:
⚠️ Potential issuePin external image versions for security
Using latest tags and unpinned versions for QEMU and BuildKit images poses security risks.
Recommendations:
- Pin the QEMU image to a specific digest:
- image: ghcr.io/amitie10g/binfmt:latest + image: ghcr.io/amitie10g/binfmt@sha256:<specific-digest>
- Pin the BuildKit image:
- image=ghcr.io/amitie10g/buildkit:master + image=ghcr.io/amitie10g/buildkit@sha256:<specific-digest>Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
51-58:
⚠️ Potential issueFix shell script quoting issues in Prepare step
The prepare step has potential word splitting vulnerabilities in shell scripts.
Apply this fix:
- echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> $GITHUB_ENV - echo "BRANCH=${branch//\//-}" >> $GITHUB_ENV + echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//\-}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" + echo "BRANCH=${branch//\//\-}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
52-52: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
52-52: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:4:34: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
(shellcheck)
🪛 yamllint (1.35.1)
[error] 58-58: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
170-177:
⚠️ Potential issueSecure manifest creation script and add error handling
The manifest creation script has potential command injection vulnerabilities and lacks error handling.
Apply these security fixes:
working-directory: /tmp/digests run: | + set -euo pipefail + # Validate JSON output + if ! echo "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON" | jq empty; then + echo "Invalid JSON metadata" >&2 + exit 1 + fi - docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *) + TAGS="$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" + DIGESTS="$(printf '%s@sha256:%s ' "${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}" *)" + docker buildx imagetools create ${TAGS} ${DIGESTS}Also add error checking for the GHCR push.
Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
172-172: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
172-172: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
(shellcheck)
172-172: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:3:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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172-172: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:4:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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Actionable comments posted: 2
🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (1)
88-96: Consider adding security scanning stepWhile the build configuration is solid, consider adding a security scanning step before pushing the images.
Add Trivy scanner before the push:
+ - name: Run Trivy vulnerability scanner + uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master + with: + scan-type: 'fs' + security-checks: 'vuln,secret,config' + severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'
🛑 Comments failed to post (2)
.github/workflows/docker-publish.yaml (2)
49-54:
⚠️ Potential issueFix shell script quoting issues
The shell script needs proper quoting to prevent word splitting and potential security issues.
Apply this diff:
- platform=${{ matrix.platform }} - echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> $GITHUB_ENV - branch=${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref_name }} - echo "BRANCH=${branch//\//-}" >> $GITHUB_ENV + platform="${{ matrix.platform }}" + echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" + branch="${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref_name }}" + echo "BRANCH=${branch//\//-}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.- name: Prepare run: | platform="${{ matrix.platform }}" echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=${platform//\//-}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" branch="${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref_name }}" echo "BRANCH=${branch//\//-}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
50-50: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:2:43: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
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50-50: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2086:info:4:34: Double quote to prevent globbing and word splitting
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164-170:
⚠️ Potential issueFix word splitting in manifest creation script
The manifest creation script needs proper quoting to prevent word splitting and potential security issues.
Apply this diff:
- docker buildx imagetools create $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *) + docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ + "$(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)"📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.- name: Create manifest list and push working-directory: /tmp/digests run: | docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ "$(printf '${{ env.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)" docker buildx imagetools create "$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")" \ "$(printf '${{ env.GHCR_REPO }}@sha256:%s ' *)"🧰 Tools
🪛 actionlint (1.7.4)
166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:1:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:2:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:3:33: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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166-166: shellcheck reported issue in this script: SC2046:warning:4:3: Quote this to prevent word splitting
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What type of PR is this?
What this PR does / why we need it:
This PR attempts to use the matrix and separate build processes for all the different platforms. Which should prevent ARM from breaking builds via timeout, while still letting us validate that docker builds functions properly for PRs quickly.
Details from https://docs.docker.com/build/ci/github-actions/multi-platform/#distribute-build-across-multiple-runners
Summary by CodeRabbit
Workflow Changes
Dockerfile Updates
Infrastructure Improvements