Fix authentication failure handling in decryption path of Go implementations #4
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Whenever decrypt() reports an authentication failure, don't increment the nonce in CipherState. Doing so will result in all subsequent packets being rejected as their nonces will not match anymore. This might also be abused for DoS attacks.
nadimkobeissi
approved these changes
Aug 19, 2023
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Thank you @iokill ! |
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Hi!
I noticed an issue in the Go implementation of
decryptWithAd(): Wheneverdecrypt()reports an authentication failure, the nonce in CipherState is still incremented unconditionally. Doing so will result in all subsequent packets being rejected as their nonces will not match anymore. This might also be abused for DoS attacks.A similar issue has been reported and fixed in flynn/noise: GHSA-g9mp-8g3h-3c5c