Harden API requestor code against malicious URLs - #3441
Merged
Conversation
xavdid
marked this pull request as ready for review
August 28, 2026 21:24
xavdid
enabled auto-merge (squash)
August 28, 2026 21:24
jar-stripe
approved these changes
Aug 31, 2026
jar-stripe
left a comment
jar-stripe
left a comment
Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment.
approving to unblock, but consider relocating the content of that long ValidatePath comment
This was referenced Sep 2, 2026
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
2 participants
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Why?
If an attacker got access to a user's webhook secret (or the user wasn't validating incoming webhook signatures) and a user was calling the built-in
event_notification.fetch_related_object()method, a malicious webhook payload could cause a user integration to make an authenticated request to an attacker-controlled domain (leaking the secret key)To solve, we're being more careful during url construction to ensure user input can't be used to send requests to non-
stripe.comdomains (on a per-request basis).What?
See Also