-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 62
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
fix(deps): update module github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 to v2.11.6 [security] - autoclosed #408
Conversation
⚠ Artifact update problemRenovate failed to update an artifact related to this branch. You probably do not want to merge this PR as-is. ♻ Renovate will retry this branch, including artifacts, only when one of the following happens:
The artifact failure details are included below: File name: go.sum
|
4afc2c6
to
a77595f
Compare
a77595f
to
e0d8969
Compare
e0d8969
to
291b814
Compare
1b80bbd
to
f7deda3
Compare
f7deda3
to
8ea2bc5
Compare
043a2a9
to
4d19674
Compare
4d19674
to
06da5a3
Compare
06da5a3
to
26f1d2c
Compare
26f1d2c
to
ff571cd
Compare
|
126daaa
to
5b10b89
Compare
a48e725
to
43418a6
Compare
43418a6
to
069bda1
Compare
17dac27
to
3c8596b
Compare
add25f1
to
542b99e
Compare
542b99e
to
5eeefbf
Compare
5eeefbf
to
edc8992
Compare
edc8992
to
7c04fa8
Compare
7c04fa8
to
5967fa8
Compare
5967fa8
to
68aa00c
Compare
This PR contains the following updates:
v2.9.10
->v2.11.6
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2023-47106
Summary
When a request is sent to Traefik with a URL fragment, Traefik automatically URL encodes and forwards the fragment to the backend server. This violates the RFC because in the origin-form the URL should only contain the absolute path and the query.
When this is combined with another frontend proxy like Nginx, it can be used to bypass frontend proxy URI-based access control
restrictions.
Details
For example, we have this Nginx configuration:
This can be bypassed when the attacker is requesting to /#/../admin
This won’t be vulnerable if the backend server follows the RFC and ignores any characters after the fragment.
However, if Nginx is chained with another reverse proxy which automatically URL encode the character # (Traefik) the URL will become
/%23/../admin
And allow the attacker to completely bypass the Access Restriction from the Nginx Front-End proxy.
Here is a diagram to summarize the attack:
PoC
This is the POC docker I've set up. It contains Nginx, Traefik proxies and a backend server running PHP.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1vLnA0g7N7ZKhLNmHmuJ4JJjV_J2akNMt/view?usp=sharing
Impact
This allows the attacker to completely bypass the Access Restriction from Front-End proxy.
CVE-2023-47124
Impact
There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik managing the ACME HTTP challenge.
When Traefik is configured to use the HTTPChallenge to generate and renew the Let's Encrypt TLS certificates, the delay authorized to solve the challenge (50 seconds) can be exploited by attackers (slowloris attack).
Patches
Workarounds
Replace the HTTPChallenge with the TLSChallenge or the DNSChallenge.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
CVE-2023-47633
Summary
The traefik docker container uses 100% CPU when it serves as its own backend, which is an automatically generated route resulting from the Docker integration in the default configuration.
Details
While attempting to set up Traefik to handle traffic for Docker containers, I observed in the webUI a rule with the following information:
Host(traefik-service) | webwebsecure | traefik-service@docker | traefik-service
I assumed that this is something internal; however, I wondered why it would have a host rule on the web entrypoint configured.
So I have send a request with that hostname with
curl -v --resolve "traefik-service:80:xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx" http://traefik-service
. That made my whole server unresponsive.I assume the name comes from a docker container with that name, traefik itself:
PoC
Start traefik with
docker run --rm -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock -p 80:80 --name foo -p 8080:8080 traefik:v2.10 --api.insecure=true --providers.docker
curl -v --resolve "foo:80:127.0.0.1" http://foo
looks like this creates an endless loop of request.
Knowing the name of the docker container seems to be enough to trigger this, if the docker backend is used.
Impact
Server is unreachable and uses 100% CPU
CVE-2024-28869
There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik managing requests with
Content-length
and nobody
.Sending a
GET
request to any Traefik endpoint with theContent-length
request header results in an indefinite hang with the default configuration. This vulnerability can be exploited by attackers to induce a denial of service.Patches
Workarounds
For affected versions, this vulnerability can be mitigated by configuring the readTimeout option.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
GHSA-7f4j-64p6-5h5v
There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik managing HTTP/2 connections.
More details in the CVE-2023-45288.
Patches
Workarounds
No workaround
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
GHSA-f7cq-5v43-8pwp
Impact
There is a vulnerability in GO managing malformed DNS message, which impacts Traefik.
This vulnerability could be exploited to cause a denial of service.
References
Patches
Workarounds
No workaround.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
GHSA-7jmw-8259-q9jx
Impact
There is a vulnerability in Go managing various Is methods (IsPrivate, IsLoopback, etc) for IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses.
They didn't work as expected returning false for addresses which would return true in their traditional IPv4 forms.
References
Patches
Workarounds
No workaround.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
GHSA-rvj4-q8q5-8grf
Impact
There is a vulnerability in Azure Identity Libraries and Microsoft Authentication Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability.
References
Patches
Workarounds
No workaround.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
CVE-2024-39321
Impact
There is a vulnerability in Traefik that allows bypassing IP allow-lists via HTTP/3 early data requests in QUIC 0-RTT handshakes sent with spoofed IP addresses.
Patches
Workarounds
No workaround.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description
Summary
Bypassing IP allow-lists in traefik via HTTP/3 early data requests in QUIC 0-RTT handshakes sent with spoofed IP addresses.
Details
HTTP/3 supports sending HTTP requests as early data during QUIC 0-RTT handshakes to reduce RTT overhead for connection resumptions. Early data is sent and received before the handshake is completed and the client's IP address is validated.
The initial packet containing the QUIC 0-RTT handshake information and the early data HTTP request are sent as a single UDP datagram. Due to UDP being used by QUIC, the source IP address can be spoofed. When HTTP/3 servers process early data requests, the application layer only sees the unvalidated - possibly spoofed - IP address.
First, attackers have to obtain a session ticket from the HTTP/3 server. For that, attackers have to establish an HTTP/3 connection to the server - using their real IP address - and wait for the server to send a session ticket. Note that attackers do not have to send an actual HTTP request over the established connection. After obtaining the session ticket, the attacker can close the connection. In the second step, attackers need to prepare a UDP datagram containing a QUIC initial packet with a TLS ClientHello and the session ticket, a QUIC 0-RTT packet with early data encrypted with the pre-shared key from the session ticket, and an HTTP/3 request (open request stream, HEADERS frame, optionally DATA frame). This prepared UDP datagram can then be sent to the server with an arbitrarily spoofed source IP address in the IP packet header. When processing the HTTP request, the server trusts the spoofed IP address, which can be used to bypass IP-allow/block-lists.
A prerequisite for this attack to succeed is that HTTP/3 servers have implemented and enabled 0-RTT early data for HTTP/3 requests (and no mitigations are in place). A caveat is that attackers are not able to receive the server's response because the response is sent to the spoofed source IP address, making it a blind attack. Another limitation is that the request has to fit in a single UDP datagram, whose size is limited by the network path's MTU (minus some bytes for headers of encapsulating protocols such as HTTP/3, QUIC, UDP, IPv4/IPv6).
Impact
IP allow-lists can be bypassed. Early data in QUIC 0-RTT handshakes is enabled when HTTP/3 support is enabled.
Mitigation
ipAllowList.sourceRange
middleware. See RFC 8470 Section 3 for more information.ipAllowList.sourceRange
middleware.Additionally, it is recommended to implement RFC 8470 and set the
Early-Data: 1
header when forwarding early data requests to backend services. Currently, applications are not able to distinguish between 0-RTT early data requests and regular requests. When applications use the client's IP inX-Forwarded-For
headers (e.g. for rate limiting), they are not able to detect potential IP spoofing on the application layer.Proof of Concept
Traefik is used as a HTTP/3 reverse proxy for a backend application. An IP allow list is configured to only allow access from the IP address 1.3.3.7.
By performing the steps described above, attackers are able to bypass the IP allow list and send requests to the backend application. The security impact depends on the application's logic.
Please find attached a proof-of-concept docker-compose setup to demonstrate the vulnerability. It consists of a traefik reverse proxy, a backend application, and an attacker container. The attack script performs following request:
Note: We use a custom python script because,
curl
does not support QUIC 0-RTT requests and session resumtion yet.proof-of-concept.zip
Here are logs of a successful exploitation in the attached docker compose setup:
Release Notes
traefik/traefik (github.com/traefik/traefik/v2)
v2.11.6
Compare Source
All Commits
Bug fixes:
Documentation:
v2.11.5
Compare Source
All Commits
Bug fixes:
Documentation:
v2.11.4
Compare Source
All Commits
Bug fixes:
Documentation:
v2.11.3
Compare Source
All Commits
Bug fixes:
Documentation:
v2.11.2
Compare Source
All Commits
Bug fixes:
v2.11.1
Compare Source
All Commits
Bug fixes:
Documentation:
Misc:
v2.11.0
Compare Source
All Commits
Enhancements:
Bug fixes:
Documentation:
v2.10.7
Compare Source
All Commits
Bug fixes:
v2.10.6
Compare Source
All Commits
Bug fixes:
Documentation:
v2.10.5
Compare Source
All Commits
Bug fixes:
Documentation:
v2.10.4
Compare Source
All Commits
Bug fixes:
Documentation:
Misc:
v2.10.3
Compare Source
All Commits
Bug fixes:
v2.10.2
Compare Source
All Commits
Bug fixes:
Documentation:
v2.10.1
Compare Source
All Commits
Bug fixes:
be5cf38
(#9874 by rtribotte)Documentation:
v2.10.0
Compare Source
All Commits
Enhancements:
Bug fixes:
03de175
(#9849 by longit644)Documentation:
Misc:
Configuration
📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).
🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.