Remove activated feature for removing inactive delegations from stakes cache (backport #21732)

rpc/src/rpc.rs

@@ -2037,10 +2037,6 @@ fn verify_transaction(
         return Err(RpcCustomError::TransactionPrecompileVerificationFailure(e).into());
     }
 
-    if !transaction.verify_signatures_len() {
-        return Err(RpcCustomError::TransactionSignatureVerificationFailure.into());
-    }
-
     Ok(())
 }
 

runtime/src/bank.rs

@@ -5246,10 +5246,6 @@ impl Bank {
             })
         }?;
 
-        if self.verify_tx_signatures_len_enabled() && !sanitized_tx.verify_signatures_len() {
-            return Err(TransactionError::SanitizeFailure);
-        }
-
         if verification_mode == TransactionVerificationMode::HashAndVerifyPrecompiles
             || verification_mode == TransactionVerificationMode::FullVerification
         {
@@ -5734,11 +5730,6 @@ impl Bank {
             .is_active(&feature_set::no_overflow_rent_distribution::id())
     }
 
-    pub fn verify_tx_signatures_len_enabled(&self) -> bool {
-        self.feature_set
-            .is_active(&feature_set::verify_tx_signatures_len::id())
-    }
-
     pub fn versioned_tx_message_enabled(&self) -> bool {
         self.feature_set
             .is_active(&feature_set::versioned_tx_message_enabled::id())
@@ -14973,12 +14964,14 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
                 Some(TransactionError::SanitizeFailure),
             );
         }
-        // Too many signatures: Success without feature switch
+        // Too many signatures: Sanitization failure
         {
             let tx = make_transaction(TestCase::AddSignature);
-            assert!(bank
-                .verify_transaction(tx.into(), TransactionVerificationMode::FullVerification)
-                .is_ok());
+            assert_eq!(
+                bank.verify_transaction(tx.into(), TransactionVerificationMode::FullVerification)
+                    .err(),
+                Some(TransactionError::SanitizeFailure),
+            );
         }
     }
 

sdk/src/transaction/mod.rs

@@ -303,11 +303,6 @@ impl Transaction {
         Signature::default()
     }
 
-    /// Verify the length of signatures matches the value in the message header
-    pub fn verify_signatures_len(&self) -> bool {
-        self.signatures.len() == self.message.header.num_required_signatures as usize
-    }
-
     /// Verify the transaction and hash its message
     pub fn verify_and_hash_message(&self) -> Result<Hash> {
         let message_bytes = self.message_data();

sdk/src/transaction/sanitized.rs

@@ -200,11 +200,6 @@ impl SanitizedTransaction {
         }
     }
 
-    /// Verify the length of signatures matches the value in the message header
-    pub fn verify_signatures_len(&self) -> bool {
-        self.signatures.len() == self.message.header().num_required_signatures as usize
-    }
-
     /// Verify the transaction signatures
     pub fn verify(&self) -> Result<()> {
         let message_bytes = self.message_data();

sdk/src/transaction/versioned.rs

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ use {
         transaction::{Result, Transaction, TransactionError},
     },
     serde::Serialize,
+    std::cmp::Ordering,
 };
 
 // NOTE: Serialization-related changes must be paired with the direct read at sigverify.
@@ -29,11 +30,12 @@ impl Sanitize for VersionedTransaction {
     fn sanitize(&self) -> std::result::Result<(), SanitizeError> {
         self.message.sanitize()?;
 
-        // Once the "verify_tx_signatures_len" feature is enabled, this may be
-        // updated to an equality check.
-        if usize::from(self.message.header().num_required_signatures) > self.signatures.len() {
-            return Err(SanitizeError::IndexOutOfBounds);
-        }
+        let num_required_signatures = usize::from(self.message.header().num_required_signatures);
+        match num_required_signatures.cmp(&self.signatures.len()) {
+            Ordering::Greater => Err(SanitizeError::IndexOutOfBounds),
+            Ordering::Less => Err(SanitizeError::InvalidValue),
+            Ordering::Equal => Ok(()),
+        }?;
 
         // Signatures are verified before message keys are mapped so all signers
         // must correspond to unmapped keys.