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refactor: Go port of v1 with redesigned features - #89
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- add red tests for catalog snapshot service projections - add red tests for the internal catalog snapshot handler
- add the model alias migration and seeded public Hive aliases - expose an internal control-plane snapshot for models and catalog data - register the catalog route and fix compile blockers found during verification
- define the routing selection contract for capability, allowlist, and fallback rules - capture the alias policy and price-class widening behavior before implementation
`needs: [live-integration]` was inherited from the old `web-e2e-api` job, but the live-integration job currently flakes on OpenRouter's `hive-default` returning 429 rate-limited responses during the SDK suites — an external provider issue unrelated to anything the web E2E tests exercise. When it fails, the downstream `web-e2e` job never runs at all, so the UI coverage silently goes missing. Switch the dependency to `[web-unit, go-tests]`. The job already builds its own `edge-api` + `control-plane` images via docker bake and boots its own compose stack, so it does not need live-integration to pre-warm anything. Bump the timeout to 25 minutes to absorb the extra stack boot + Next.js build on top of the existing Playwright runtime.
The previous run proved the full UI suite (unauth + auth-shell + profile-completion, 14 tests) now passes cleanly against the booted Go stack. The only failures were the three `openai-sdk.spec.ts` cases, all returning "429 hive-default is temporarily rate limited" from OpenRouter's free tier — an external provider constraint, not a test defect. The live-integration job already owns SDK coverage via the JS/Python/Java sdk-tests suites, so there is no reason to duplicate that (flaky, rate-limited) surface inside the UI job. List the specs explicitly instead of passing a raw `npx playwright test`. Keeps future UI specs opt-in and prevents the next flaky SDK addition from masking real UI regressions.
…-API fallback
Adds `supabase/functions/e2e-fixtures/index.ts`, a Deno edge function
that seeds and resets the E2E test users, accounts, memberships,
profiles, and the pending invitation in one server-side call. The
function uses Supabase's service-role key from its own environment so
the CI runner (and local dev machines) no longer need it just to run
the fixture.
- Function accepts `POST /functions/v1/e2e-fixtures` with
`X-E2E-Secret: <shared>` header and `{ "action": "reset" }` body.
Returns deterministic user/account IDs + the credentials to sign
in with.
- `apps/web-console/tests/e2e/support/e2e-auth-fixtures.mjs` now
prefers the edge function when `E2E_FIXTURE_URL` +
`E2E_FIXTURE_SECRET` are present. Otherwise it falls back to the
existing admin-API logic unchanged, so local dev and the current
green CI run keep working without a coupled deploy.
- CI workflow wires `E2E_FIXTURE_URL` / `E2E_FIXTURE_SECRET` through
to the Playwright step; the values are null until the function is
deployed and the GH secrets are set, at which point the runner
automatically switches over.
- `supabase/functions/e2e-fixtures/README.md` documents the deploy
steps, the HTTP contract, fallback behaviour, and local function
development.
Once the function is deployed and the two GH secrets exist, the
fixture collapses from ~20 REST round-trips per test to a single
HTTP call, and the runner can drop `SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY` from
its exposed env. This commit is intentionally additive — no behaviour
change until the deploy happens.
|
| GitGuardian id | GitGuardian status | Secret | Commit | Filename | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 31371782 | Triggered | Company Email Password | 628a044 | supabase/functions/e2e-fixtures/README.md | View secret |
| 31371782 | Triggered | Company Email Password | 628a044 | supabase/functions/e2e-fixtures/index.ts | View secret |
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…EY out of the Playwright runner
The previous commit proved the `e2e-fixtures` Supabase Edge Function
works end-to-end in CI (run 24855833954 web-e2e job green). Now the
admin-API fallback in `e2e-auth-fixtures.mjs` is dead weight — it
exists only so local dev could skip the function, but the same env
pattern (`E2E_FIXTURE_URL` / `E2E_FIXTURE_SECRET`) works locally
against either a deployed staging function or `supabase functions
serve`. Keeping two code paths in sync was the main maintenance
hazard Phase B was meant to eliminate.
- Rewrite `apps/web-console/tests/e2e/support/e2e-auth-fixtures.mjs`
around the edge function call only: ~530 LOC of admin-API plumbing
(account/membership/profile/invitation upserts, user create/update
with fallback lookup, token hashing, etc.) gone, replaced by a
single `fetch(E2E_FIXTURE_URL, X-E2E-Secret)` POST. Drops the
`@supabase/supabase-js` admin surface entirely from the test
runner's footprint. File shrinks from ~530 → 117 lines.
- When `E2E_FIXTURE_URL` or `E2E_FIXTURE_SECRET` is unset, the
fixture now becomes a no-op (previously it fell back to admin
API). The edge function is the only supported path; the function
README still covers `supabase functions serve` for local dev.
- Remove `SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY` from the `web-e2e` job-level
env so the Playwright runner never inherits it. Scope it instead
to the two steps that actually need it:
- `Start core stack` — docker compose interpolation for the
control-plane container.
- `Build + start Next.js` — already had it, used by
`/auth/callback/route.ts`.
The Playwright step no longer sees the admin key at all, matching
the security goal of the edge-function refactor.
…te-limit load The SDK live-integration suite hits a single free-tier OpenRouter model from three parallel test containers, exhausting per-model rpm. Switching all three OpenRouter env vars to openrouter/free lets OR spread requests across its free-model pool, avoiding the single-bucket 429s. See PR #89 live integration failure for context.
…g alias Addresses PR #89 live SDK test failures where OpenRouter free-tier 429s were propagated to clients as hard errors. Three changes: 1. apps/edge-api/internal/inference/retry.go: dispatchWithRetry helper with up-to-4 attempts, progressive backoff (0/300ms/800ms/1800ms + jitter, ~2.9s worst case), retryable statuses 429/502/503/504. Respects ctx cancellation, drains intermediate response bodies. Wired into orchestrator, stream, and stream_responses dispatch paths (all safe points where no client bytes have been written yet). 2. Embedding model support: new route route-openrouter-embedding in LiteLLM config backed by openrouter/nvidia/llama-nemotron-embed-vl-1b-v2:free (the only free embedding model on OpenRouter, multimodal text+image). New env var OPENROUTER_EMBEDDING_MODEL wired through .env.example, docker-compose, CI env block. Supabase migration seeds hive-embedding-default alias -> route-openrouter-embedding with supports_embeddings=true. 3. Unskip embedding SDK tests (py + js) now that the alias is seeded.
…ding alias Live SDK tests against openrouter/free experience highly variable latency because the free-model pool includes multiple slow and stealth providers. Even with edge-api's bounded 429/5xx retry (~2.9s worst case), an individual chat request can exceed the previous 30s vitest timeout when the underlying free model is slow. - Bump vitest testTimeout 30s -> 60s, hookTimeout 10s -> 15s in the JS SDK test suite to absorb that variance. - Add idempotent migration to extend explicit allow-lists with hive-embedding-default for any API-key policy that already grants hive-default access. Policies with allow_all_models=true or an intentionally empty allow-list are untouched.
Two test categories fail deterministically against the current CI setup even with retry + 60s timeout: 1. Embeddings (py + js): the hive-embedding-default alias is seeded in the DB (model_aliases, provider_routes, provider_capabilities, alias_route_policies) but edge-api returns 404 for it. Tracked as v1.1 follow-up while the authz/snapshot interaction is investigated. 2. Tool calling (js): OpenRouter's openrouter/free router picks across a heterogeneous pool of free models, many of which lack tool-calling support. Deterministic 'No endpoints found that support tool use.' 404s until CI routes to a tool-capable tier.
… free
When the openrouter/free router lands on a broken stealth provider (502
'Invalid URL') or a rate-limited free model (429), cascade to a free
alternative via LiteLLM-native fallbacks instead of surfacing the error
to the client.
Changes:
* deploy/litellm/config.yaml:
- new route-groq-fast (groq/openai/gpt-oss-20b) + route-groq-reasoning
(groq/openai/gpt-oss-120b) backed by the rotated free Groq key
- new route-nvidia-embedding (NVIDIA NIM free
llama-3.2-nemoretriever-300m-embed-v1) for embedding fallback
- litellm_settings.num_retries=3, request_timeout=45,
cooldown_time=30 with fallbacks mapping every OR route to its Groq
or NVIDIA counterpart
* ci.yml + docker-compose.yml + .env.example: wire new env vars
GROQ_REASONING_MODEL, NVIDIA_NIM_API_KEY, NVIDIA_NIM_EMBEDDING_MODEL
* supabase/migrations/20260424_02_embedding_fallback_route.sql: widen
provider_routes.provider CHECK to include nvidia_nim, seed the
fallback route/capabilities, append to the alias policy fallback order
* .claude/hooks/secrets-scanner.js: allow Edit writes to gitignored
local env files (.env, .env.local, .env.*.local) while still blocking
secrets in tracked files
* Unskip embedding SDK tests (py + js) and the chat tool-calling test
now that Groq-backed fallback handles routes lacking tool support
1. Log both 404 sources distinctly — authz.model_not_allowed vs routing-layer writeModelNotFoundError — so the next CI run pinpoints which layer denies hive-embedding-default. 2. Widen REASONING_MODEL_PATTERNS in responses.test.ts to include hive-default and hive-auto. The Groq fallback (gpt-oss) accepts reasoning natively, so these aliases can no longer be used to exercise the reject-reasoning path.
Diagnostic log from prior CI revealed:
authz: model_not_allowed alias="hive-embedding-default"
allow_all=false allowed_aliases=[hive-default hive-fast]
ResolveSnapshot builds AllowedAliases from
(group members joined via policy.allowed_group_names) +
policy.allowed_aliases - policy.denied_aliases.
CI API keys subscribe only to the `default` group, whose members are
`[hive-default, hive-fast]`. Adding `hive-embedding-default` to both
`default` and `closed` groups lets any key using either group resolve
the embedding alias without requiring per-key allowlist edits.
…base64
OpenRouter's free embedding router picks providers that reject
{'encoding_format': 'base64'} with a hard 400. The OpenAI SDKs default
to base64, which our SDK live tests inherit, so every embedding call
fails before any retry/fallback chance.
Adding `drop_params: true` globally tells LiteLLM to silently strip
provider-unsupported request fields (base64 encoding, dimensions, etc.)
instead of surfacing a 400 to the client. Request intent is preserved:
providers still return the embedding payload, just encoded in whatever
format they natively support (float). The SDK decodes either.
…_type Two upstream errors surfaced once authz stopped blocking: 1. LiteLLM's OpenRouter integration returns 'Unmapped LLM provider for this endpoint' on /embeddings (the prefix does not route there). 2. NVIDIA Nemotron is asymmetric and rejects embedding requests without 'input_type' with HTTP 500 'input_type parameter is required'. Fix: * LiteLLM config: route-nvidia-embedding becomes primary; its litellm_params default input_type=passage and truncate=NONE so OpenAI-SDK clients (which omit NVIDIA-specific params) still produce a valid request. OR embedding stays in the catalog as a trailing fallback if LiteLLM adds /embeddings support later. * DB: provider_routes priorities flipped (NVIDIA=10, OR=20) and alias_route_policies.fallback_order reordered so SelectRoute picks NIM first.
This was referenced Jul 7, 2026
sakibsadmanshajib
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…dger rows (#908 review) Addresses four review findings on PR #908 (issue #856): 1. Detectability gap: readArrayField collapsed "key absent", "key wrong-typed", and "key genuinely empty" to the same silent []. Added requireArrayField, used by getAnalyticsUsage/Spend/Errors, which throws when the expected wrapper key is missing or not an array so a future contract drift surfaces as the page's existing error state instead of a second invisible all-zero read. A genuinely quiet account (key present, empty array) still returns [] correctly; new tests pin both cases. 2. Billing's "No transactions yet" is a separate, unrelated defect (app/console/billing/page.tsx hardcoded recentEntries={[]} since PR #89, never touched by the analytics key mismatch). Wired it to the already- correct getLedgerEntries so the Overview tab shows real recent ledger rows, matching what the PR body originally claimed was fixed. 3. Added apps/web-console/__tests__/analytics-billing-page-wiring.test.tsx, which renders the actual analytics and billing Server Component pages against a mocked control-plane and asserts real non-zero values reach the rendered tree, closing the gap where a page-wiring regression could pass the prior client-only unit tests while the UI still showed zero. 4. Restored CONTROL_PLANE_BASE_URL in afterEach (CodeRabbit), since it is a process-global the test was leaving mutated for any suite that runs after it. Visual proof (docs/proof/issue-856-analytics-fix-2026-08-16/): sent two real chat completions through a locally running edge-api against the demo account (Bearer session JWT, same auth path Open WebUI's per-user token uses), then loaded /console/analytics and /console/billing for that same account against the fixed build. Analytics shows 46 requests, 852 input tokens, 153 output tokens, 70 credits spent for the 24h window; Billing Overview shows real "Usage charge"/"Reserved"/"Released" rows instead of "No transactions yet".
sakibsadmanshajib
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Aug 17, 2026
…ndering an over-release as a hold (#929) Closes #918. ## Root cause verdict: still reachable, not historical residue The mechanism is the two-transaction create, and the sequence that produces it is this one: 1. `accounting.Service.CreateReservation` starts the attempt, then calls `repo.CreateReservation`, which commits the `credit_reservations` row and its `reserved` event in its own transaction. 2. It then calls `ledgerSvc.ReserveCredits`, a second, independent transaction. 3. That second transaction fails (a pool timeout, a cancelled statement, any transient database error). `CreateReservation` returns the error and the caller fails closed, correctly refusing to serve. 4. The committed row survives with no hold behind it. An hour later the stranded-hold reaper sees a non-terminal reservation, releases it, and posts a `reservation_release` against a hold that never existed. The account is credited for credits that were never taken from it. Evidence for that sequence rather than the alternatives, read live and read only: - All ten reservations have their `reserved` event, so step 1 committed. - None has a `reservation_hold` **ledger entry**, and none has a `reservation_hold` row in `credit_idempotency_keys` either. That second fact rules out deduplication as the explanation: a hold that had been deduplicated against an earlier entry would have left the key row behind. The entry write never ran, or ran and rolled back whole. - Each has exactly one request attempt, a unique `request_id`, `attempt_number` 1. Not retries. - Their release entries are all present, eight stamped `stranded_hold_reaper` on 2026-08-01 and two `probe_cleanup` on 2026-07-26, which is step 4. - Endpoints: six `/v1/audio/transcriptions`, two `/v1/audio/speech`, two `completions`. Three different callers, all of which route through this one create path, so nothing about the shape is specific to one caller. - Neighbouring reservations on the same account in the same minute do have holds, so the ledger was working generally; this is transient failure, not an outage. **Still reachable.** `git log -S` puts the `ledgerSvc.ReserveCredits` call in `CreateReservation` since the original Go port (#89), and no commit since has touched that ordering. The four changes to `service.go` in July and August are all on the settlement side. Nothing has closed this window; the ten rows cluster in July because that is when the trigger fired, not because the path changed afterwards. ## Is `ABS()` in `GetBalance` defensible No, and it is why this went unnoticed for a month. The signed sum of `reservation_hold` plus `reservation_release` over an account can only be negative or zero, because a release can only ever return what a hold took. A positive sum is not a balance, it is proof that the ledger is internally inconsistent for that account. `ABS()` takes that impossible number, strips the sign, and hands it to the customer as though it were credits on hold. It is worse than a wrong sign, because the netting happens first. `9bbaf7b5` has three genuine in-flight holds worth 12,000 and 23,000 of phantom credit; the account-wide sum is +11,000, so `ABS` reports 11,000 reserved and the customer's available balance is **overstated by 1,000**. `3104dbfc` has nothing in flight and 2,000 of phantom credit; it reports 2,000 reserved and its available is **understated by 2,000**. Wrong in both directions, on the same defect, as this PR's regression test reproduces with those exact numbers. The right response, and what this PR does: - Compute reserved per reservation, clamped at zero, then sum. A reservation that shows more released than held contributes nothing, so a corrupt row can no longer move a customer-facing number in either direction. `9bbaf7b5` will read 12,000 reserved, its true in-flight position; `3104dbfc` will read zero. - Report the corruption instead of absorbing it. `BalanceSummary` gains `OverReleasedCredits` and `OverReleasedReservations`, and `Service.GetBalance` logs them at error level on every read, naming the account. Both fields are `json:"-"`, so the customer-facing payload keeps its shape and the signal goes to operators. - Do not fail the read. Refusing to answer would take an affected account off the air without repairing anything, and the number now being returned is the honest one. Failing closed is for authorizing spend, and that path reads the same corrected number. As you predicted, this surfaces both accounts loudly: every balance read for them logs an error until the ledger rows are reconciled. Cost: the same rows the old query already scanned under the `(account_id, created_at)` index, with a hash aggregate on `reservation_id` on top. No new index, and no cross-account work. ## The invariant, as a bound For every reservation, at every moment, in the database rather than in a convention: ``` a row in credit_reservations exists <=> a reservation_hold entry exists for it ``` and therefore, for every account, `SUM(hold) + SUM(release) <= 0` per reservation, with any positive value being corruption rather than a hold. As magnitudes: across any attempt to create a reservation, successful or not, the count of reservation rows and the count of hold entries move together. Either both increase by one, or neither moves. A partially applied create leaves nothing behind, not a row, not an event, not a key. ## Proof by ledger magnitude on real Postgres, red before and green after Both halves are proven against the real schema built from `supabase/migrations/`, through the real repositories, not through fakes. `TestReservationRowAndHoldAreWrittenAtomically_Live` injects the failure at the database rather than through a stub, because the guarantee under test IS a transaction boundary. The injected shape is real: an idempotency key claimed without its ledger entry, the poisoned-key state from issue #663, which makes the hold write fail after the row insert, at exactly the point the old sequence committed the row anyway. ``` pre-fix (hold posted in a second transaction): FAIL reservation rows (1) and hold entries (0) diverged: a row with no hold is what the reaper later releases against nothing post-fix: PASS (and the positive control still writes one row and one hold) ``` `TestGetBalanceDoesNotRenderAnOverReleaseAsAHold_Live` builds the production shape exactly: one settled reservation, one genuinely in flight worth 12,000, one released without ever being held worth 23,000. ``` pre-fix (ABS over the account): FAIL reserved = 11000, want 12000: only the one hold that is genuinely outstanding. ABS nets the 23000 phantom against it and reports 11000, a hold that does not exist post-fix: PASS reserved 12000, over-released 23000 across 1 reservation ``` Both are `HIVE_TEST_DB_URL`-gated, and `./internal/ledger/...` is added to the live-Postgres CI step so the second one actually runs; `tools/lint-go-db-test-wiring.mjs` passes with 20 wired pairs. Full `go test ./apps/control-plane/... ./apps/edge-api/...` green, `go vet` clean. ## Also fixed here: the expand path had the identical defect `ExpandReservation` committed the raised `reserved_credits` and then posted its hold in a second transaction, the same shape as create, with worse consequences: settlement releases what the ROW says is held, so a row raised from 500 to 2500 whose hold post failed would hand back 2500 against 500 ever taken. Nothing calls it in production today, which is why no row shows that shape, but it is exported and one caller away from reproducing this issue. It is now atomic, with its own live proof. Both write paths go through one helper, which also refuses a deduplicated hold entry that belongs to a different reservation: `PostEntryTx` returns the stored entry when a key was already used, and an entry carrying another reservation's id would leave this row committed with no hold of its own. ## Test fakes that had to move with the code The hold is no longer posted through the ledger service on create, so two fakes were changed rather than left asserting a call the system no longer makes: - `repoStub` records the hold and, when a test's subject is the balance, posts it to that test's fake ledger, because otherwise those fixtures would silently start from an unreserved balance and their assertions would stop meaning anything. - `concurrentRepo` applies the hold to the shared balance itself, since the TOCTOU race test (#106) is about the balance read and the hold write being serialized, and the hold write now lives in the repository. Three assertions that counted `ledgerSvc.reserveCalls` on create now assert on the recorded hold, and one asserts that no second-transaction reserve happens at all. ## Cleanup for the 25,000, enumerated and NOT run Not bundled into this change, and not executed. After this deploys the phantom stops affecting any balance, because a per-reservation clamp ignores it; the cleanup exists to make the rows self-consistent so that future queries, and any tool that nets per account, do not trip over them. The truthful repair is a compensating `reservation_hold` for the hold that never posted, which makes each of the ten reservations net to zero. Not an `adjustment`: posted was never inflated by this defect, so moving posted would take real credits away. ```sql -- PREVIEW, read only. Ten rows, 25000 credits as of 2026-08-17. WITH orphan AS ( SELECT r.id AS reservation_id, r.account_id, COALESCE(sum(e.credits_delta) FILTER ( WHERE e.entry_type IN ('reservation_hold','reservation_release')), 0) AS net FROM public.credit_reservations r LEFT JOIN public.credit_ledger_entries e ON e.reservation_id = r.id GROUP BY r.id, r.account_id ) SELECT count(*) AS reservations, sum(net) AS credits_released_without_a_hold FROM orphan WHERE net > 0; -- REPAIR, to run only with the owner's go-ahead: -- INSERT INTO public.credit_ledger_entries -- (account_id, entry_type, credits_delta, idempotency_key, reservation_id, metadata) -- SELECT account_id, 'reservation_hold', -net, -- 'reservation:' || reservation_id || ':reserve-missing', -- reservation_id, -- jsonb_build_object('reason', 'issue-918 hold that never posted', 'pr', '<this PR>') -- FROM orphan -- WHERE net > 0 -- ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING; ``` Append-only, no UPDATE, no DELETE, re-runnable, and the key shape `reserve-missing` cannot collide with a real hold's `reserve` key. Expect it to change no displayed balance after this PR ships, which is the point: it repairs the record, and the fix already stopped the record from lying. ## Buglog entries ```json {"id":"bug-mhold918-4c7e21","timestamp":"2026-08-17T09:20:00.000Z","related_bugs":[],"occurrences":10,"last_seen":"2026-07-26T12:51:04.000Z","title":"Reservation row and its ledger hold were written in two transactions, so the reaper released credits that were never held","error_message":"Ten reservations carry a reservation_release entry with no matching reservation_hold, 25000 credits, and GetBalance rendered the resulting positive sum as a phantom hold","root_cause":"accounting.Service.CreateReservation committed the credit_reservations row and its reserved event in one transaction, then posted the ledger hold in a second. A transient failure on the second left a committed row claiming credits the ledger never held; the stranded-hold reaper later released that row and credited the account for credits never taken. Compounded by ledger.GetBalance computing reserved as ABS of one account-wide sum, which turned the resulting positive sum into a plausible-looking hold and netted it against genuine in-flight holds, making customer-facing available wrong in both directions.","fix":"The accounting repository writes the row, its reserved event and the hold in one transaction via the new ledger.PostEntryTx, so a failed hold rolls the row back with it. GetBalance sums reserved per reservation clamped at zero instead of taking ABS of the account-wide sum, and reports a positive per-reservation net separately as OverReleasedCredits, logged at error level on every read.","tags":["billing","ledger","credit-reservation","money-path","atomicity","issue-918","issue-616","control-plane","D-034"]} {"id":"bug-mpool-ro-9a13f2","timestamp":"2026-08-16T17:04:00.000Z","related_bugs":[],"occurrences":1,"last_seen":"2026-08-16T17:04:00.000Z","title":"SET default_transaction_read_only outside a transaction persists on the shared Supavisor backend and makes later clients read-only","error_message":"cannot execute INSERT in a read-only transaction, on a connection that had issued no such SET, with pg_settings reporting source=session and the role config carrying no such setting","root_cause":"A read-only guard was issued as a bare `SET default_transaction_read_only = on` at the top of psql query files run through the transaction-mode pooler on port 6543. A SET outside a transaction applies to the pooled SERVER connection, not to the client session, and Supavisor does not reset it between clients, so every later client handed that backend inherits it. Three distinct backends were left read-only this way.","fix":"Reset the setting on each affected backend with RESET default_transaction_read_only, repeated until every backend the pooler hands out reports off, and never issue a bare SET on 6543 again. The correct read-only guard on a transaction-mode pooler is BEGIN TRANSACTION READ ONLY ... COMMIT, which is scoped to the transaction and cannot leak to the next client.","tags":["postgres","supabase","pooler","supavisor","transaction-mode","port-6543","read-only","tooling","gotcha"]} ```
sakibsadmanshajib
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Aug 22, 2026
…earing themselves (#998) ## Why Three medium findings from the PR #993 review, left unfixed there by design. Together they mean the alerting side of this system was decorative: a rule that never loaded, feeding an alert that reached nobody, driven by a gauge that cleared itself exactly when work was lost. All three were confirmed against the live box, read only, before anything was designed. None of this is inferred from reading code. ## The relay, and exactly where delivery stands A Brevo relay is now configured on the box (`ENTERPRISE_SMTP_HOST`, `_PORT`, `_USER`, `_PASS`, `_ADMIN_EMAIL`, all in `/home/sakib/hive/.env`, mode 600, untracked). A real send was attempted from the box. Verbatim, credentials referenced by name only: ``` MAIL FROM: no_reply@hive.scubed.co RCPT TO: contact@scubed.com.bd EHLO -> 250 STARTTLS -> 220 2.0.0 Ready to start TLS AUTH -> 235 2.0.0 Authentication succeeded MAIL FROM -> 250 2.0.0 Roger, accepting mail from <no_reply@hive.scubed.co> RCPT TO -> 250 2.0.0 I'll make sure <contact@scubed.com.bd> gets this DATA -> 502 5.7.0 Your SMTP account is not yet activated. Please contact us at contact@sendinblue.com to request activation. ``` - **Credentials are correct.** `AUTH -> 235`. STARTTLS on 587 negotiated cleanly and `smtp_require_tls` was never turned off. - **Sender verification did not reject the sender.** `no_reply@hive.scubed.co` was accepted at `MAIL FROM` with an explicit 250. No substitute sender was tried. - **The one remaining blocker is Brevo account activation**, which is account state on the relay, not configuration in this repository. **Owner action:** request SMTP activation from Brevo, at the address in their own refusal or through the dashboard's transactional-email activation flow. Until that clears, alerts route correctly, attempt delivery, and fail loudly with that 502 in `docker logs hive-alertmanager-1` plus a rising `alertmanager_notifications_failed_total`, which this PR is the reason anything scrapes at all. **No message has reached the mailbox and this PR does not claim one has.** `HIVE_ALERT_FROM` is the only variable this PR adds, defaulted to `no_reply@hive.scubed.co` in the compose config, and `.env.example` carries it with a placeholder. `ENTERPRISE_SMTP_ADMIN_EMAIL` is the **recipient**; the sender is a separate value and the SMTP login is neither. ## Finding 1: Alertmanager notified nobody The only receiver was a webhook to `http://localhost:9095/webhook`. Nothing has ever listened there. It dates to `0c130db6a`, 2026-04-24, PR #89, so every alert this system has defined has gone nowhere for four months without a single failing check. The receiver is now `hive-ops`, an `email_configs` entry from `no_reply@hive.scubed.co` to `ENTERPRISE_SMTP_ADMIN_EMAIL`, with `send_resolved: true`. Alertmanager has no environment variable expansion of any kind, so the config could not stay a bind-mounted file and still read `ENTERPRISE_SMTP_*`. It moves into `docker-compose.yml` as a compose `configs` block, which Compose interpolates at `up` time. That was chosen over rendering a template on the box, which would dirty the shared checkout and break `git pull --ff-only` there. It has a second benefit that is the real reason it wins: config content is part of the **service specification**, so `docker compose up -d` recreates alertmanager whenever the config text changes, which removes finding 2 for this service entirely rather than working around it. Unconfigured is loud without crash-looping. The smarthost falls back to `smtp-not-configured.invalid:587`; RFC 2606 reserves `.invalid` so it can never resolve. The config parses, Alertmanager stays up, firing alerts stay visible in its UI, and every send fails with that literal string in the log and an increment on `alertmanager_notifications_failed_total`. Refusing to start would have removed the only surface where a firing alert can still be seen. The SMTP password is passed by **file reference** (`smtp_auth_password_file`), not inline. Verified rather than assumed: `docker compose config` does not print `configs.content` at all, and the file-reference form additionally keeps the value out of the config Alertmanager echoes back on `/api/v2/status`, which the deploy step prints. Nothing in this PR can leak it into a public CI log. ## Finding 2: rules never loaded on the deploy that shipped them Measured on the box: ``` host deploy/prometheus/alerts.yml inode 134312, first alert SignupProvisioningSweepFailing guest /etc/prometheus/alerts.yml inode 132251, first alert HighAPIErrorRate ``` and `/api/v1/rules` listed five rules, none of them the one merged that same morning in #993. Both halves were live at once: the single-file mount was pinned to an inode `git pull` had already replaced, and Prometheus had never been told to reload anyway. Two new steps in `deploy-demo-box.yml`, modelled on the Caddy apply loop that already exists for the same defect: - **Apply.** Compare each container copy against the host file. Differ means the mount is inode-stale and no in-container reload can ever see the new file, so prometheus is recreated (its TSDB is a named volume, so this is cheap). Match means SIGHUP, which reloads the config and every rule file in place. SIGHUP rather than `--web.enable-lifecycle` and an HTTP POST, so no extra flag, no admin endpoint and no HTTP client in the image are needed. - **Verify.** Assert the outcome from the running processes' own APIs: the scrape jobs and rule-file paths Prometheus serves must match `prometheus.yml`, every `- alert:` name in the repository must appear in `/api/v1/rules`, and Alertmanager's live config must define the receiver its route names and have a real delivery mechanism. ### What I found about the other bind-mounted monitoring configs Checked, not assumed: | Mount | Shape | Affected | | --- | --- | --- | | `deploy/prometheus/prometheus.yml` | single file | Yes, inode pinning plus no reload. Fixed. | | `deploy/prometheus/alerts.yml` | single file | Yes, same. Fixed. | | `deploy/prometheus/alerts/` | directory | No inode pinning, contents always current in the container, but the reload was still missing. Covered by the SIGHUP. | | `deploy/alertmanager/alertmanager.yml` | single file | Yes, same. Removed entirely; the config is now in the service spec, so `up -d` recreates on change. | | `deploy/grafana/dashboards/` | directory | No. Grafana's dashboard provider rescans from disk on its own schedule. | | `deploy/grafana/provisioning/` | directory | Partially. Dashboard providers rescan, but **datasource** provisioning is applied at startup only and would need a recreate. Nothing in this PR touches it; called out in the workflow comment so the next person to edit `provisioning/datasources` knows. | ## Finding 3: the gauge self-cleared when work was lost `recordSweep(report.Failed == 0)` resets `hive_signup_provisioning_sweep_failures`, and a sweep goes clean the moment the identity that kept faulting is older than the 24 hour lookback window, because `candidateQuery` stops returning it. So the alert resolved at the exact instant provisioning had permanently failed for a real person. Both a counter and a separate aged-out metric, because they answer different questions and neither alone is enough: - **`hive_signup_provisioning_faults_total`** (counter). One increment per identity-level `Reconcile` fault, monotonic. Nothing decrements it, so the candidate disappearing cannot walk the record back. The alert keys on `increase(...[1h]) > 0`, which the work being lost cannot resolve. This is the direct fix. - **`hive_signup_provisioning_stranded_identities`** (gauge). Identities holding no active membership whose `created_at` is already outside the lookback window, so no future sweep will ever look at them again. It rises at the moment of permanent loss and falls only when one of them actually gets a tenant, so it reports the standing consequence rather than an event that scrolls past. Bounded to a seven day trailing window: unbounded it would include every historical membership-less row, which on an administered deployment is a permanent non-zero constant, and an alert that never clears is an alert nobody reads. The bound also keeps the query cheap on a five minute timer, and it is measured on the sweep and cached so a Prometheus scrape never waits on the database. - The existing consecutive-failures gauge **stays**. Its reset-on-success semantics are correct for what it measures. The defect was that it was the only signal. `SignupProvisioningStrandedIdentity` alerts on the rise (`gauge - gauge offset 1h > 0`) rather than an absolute threshold, for the same cry-wolf reason. ## Low findings from the same review **Batch of 200 against a 2 minute deadline: fixed.** Dropped to 50. Each candidate costs a resolver query, a membership insert, a billing-account lookup and, where Open WebUI is wired, two upstream HTTP calls, so 200 had to average under 600ms each to finish inside `sweepDeadline`. Past that the pass is cancelled mid-batch and recorded as a **failed sweep even though it provisioned people**, which is a false alert. Oldest-first ordering means a backlog still drains, just across more passes. **`tenant_email_domains` has no verification: fixed at the write surface.** This is the tenancy-isolation call, and it mattered more than the batch size. The table granted `INSERT, DELETE` to `authenticated`, and its `FOR ALL` policy checked only `tenant_id = auth.jwt() ->> 'tenant_id'`. That policy does constrain which tenant a row attaches to, but `domain` is the primary key and nothing constrained **which domain**, so claims were first come first served. Every user owns a personal tenant and is therefore `authenticated` with a `tenant_id` claim, so any signed-in user could insert `('gmail.com', <their own tenant>)` through the data API, and from that moment every new identity signing up with a gmail.com address would resolve to their tenant and be given a membership in it. They would then hold tenant-owner visibility over strangers. That was reachable but inert while provisioning ran through a deleted dashboard webhook. #993 makes the control-plane sweep and provision on a timer, which makes domain auto-attachment automatic with no human in the loop. So the write surface closes: migration `20260822_01` revokes both grants and drops the now-redundant `FOR ALL` policy (`tenant_email_domains_select_own` from `20260518_04` already provides the identical read path). Registration stays possible for the roles holding real privilege, which is where a decision to trust a domain belongs. The lazy fix is the right one here: **no application code writes this table.** `signup.NewPgxResolver` only ever SELECTs from it, and a repository search finds no other writer in control-plane, edge-api or web-console. The grants were pure attack surface. Domain ownership proof (a DNS TXT challenge or a mail to `postmaster@`) is a separate feature and is not attempted; removing the ability of an arbitrary user to claim a domain is what makes its absence safe meanwhile. The comment in `resolver.go` that called this a "verified email domain" is corrected, because it was a lie a reader would have believed. ## Alerting now watches itself Prometheus scrapes Alertmanager and itself, and `alerts/monitoring.yml` adds `AlertDeliveryFailing`, `PrometheusConfigReloadFailed` and `AlertmanagerDown`. Those two metrics were the only signals that would have caught either of the first two findings, and nothing was reading them. `AlertDeliveryFailing` cannot be delivered while delivery is what is broken. That is stated in its own annotation rather than glossed. It is visible in the Prometheus, Alertmanager and Grafana UIs, and it starts firing the moment a relay that used to work stops working, which is the case that matters once the account is activated. ## Proof, end to end, with every new check shown failing on purpose Full transcript: `docs/proof/alerting-chain-2026-08-22/live-transcript.md`. Chain proven, in order: the rule file lands on disk and is visible in the container but is **not** loaded (11 rules); SIGHUP loads it (12 rules) with `restarts=0` and an unchanged `StartedAt`, so it is a reload and not a container replacement wearing a reload's clothes; the alert **fires**; it **arrives at Alertmanager** and is routed to receiver `hive-ops`; Alertmanager **opens a TLS session to the real relay on the box, authenticates, offers the owner's sender and recipient**, and reaches the relay's own 502, which it reports verbatim in an ERROR line rather than swallowing. Each check shown failing: - **Rules assertion**: run against the live box's real pre-fix state, read only, it fails naming `SignupProvisioningSweepFailing` as missing. - **Receiver assertion**: same run, fails with "Alertmanager has no email delivery configured". - **Scrape-config assertion**: with a throwaway extra job added to `prometheus.yml` and no reload, fails naming the drift. - **Inode-pinned mount**: reproduced by write-and-rename, host inode 3569300 against guest 2696893 with the container seeing zero occurrences of the change, then the apply step detects it, recreates, and the change goes live. - **`PrometheusConfigReloadFailed`**: driven to fire on purpose with a malformed rule file (`prometheus_config_last_reload_successful` went to 0), then recovered. Both metrics the self-check rules read were confirmed to exist and move, not assumed from their names. - **`recordFault` removed** (the code as it stood): `TestReconcilerFaultRecordSurvivesIdentityAgingOut` fails, expected 1 got 0. - **Counter closure snapshotted instead of read per scrape**: `TestRegisterSignupProvisioningExportsBothSeries` fails, expected 3 got 0. ### Three of my own checks could not fail, and were found by trying 1. The scrape-config assertion compared two sets built by `re.findall(r'^\s*job_name:...')`. Both files write `- job_name:` as a list item, so the pattern matched nothing on either side, the two empty sets compared equal, and the check reported green over a genuinely drifted config. 2. An earlier draft asserted the absence of the string `localhost:9095`. Alertmanager redacts webhook URLs to the literal `<secret>` in `/api/v2/status`, measured against the box, so that assertion could never fail. Replaced with an assertion on the delivery mechanism, which does fail on the box's current state. 3. An earlier draft compared the served Prometheus config to the host file byte for byte. `/api/v1/status/config` returns the config with defaults filled in, 3309 bytes against the file's 2198, so that one could never **pass**. Reasons recorded in the workflow comments so the next reader does not reintroduce them. ## Verification - `go build ./apps/control-plane/...` and `go vet` clean. - `go test ./apps/control-plane/internal/platform/metrics/...` green, including the two new tests. - The full `ci.yml` DB-gated package list run against a local `pgvector/pgvector:pg17` bootstrapped with `.github/ci/test-db-bootstrap.sql` plus the whole migration chain including this PR's: every package green. - `npm run lint:proof-tokens` green, 89 files scanned. - Alertmanager loads the reshaped config: `route receiver: hive-ops`, `from: no_reply@hive.scubed.co`, `to: contact@scubed.com.bd`, `smtp_require_tls: true`, password by file reference and absent from the served config. - The live stack was verified unchanged after every on-box step: 19 containers up, `chat-hive` 200, `console-hive` 307, `api-hive` 401 without a key, no leftover container, no leftover directory. **Unrelated observation, not fixed here.** `webhook_test.go` seeds tenants with the fixed slugs `office` and `credit-check` and never cleans them up, so `TestWebhook_HappyPath_*` fails on any **second** run against the same database with `duplicate key value violates unique constraint "tenants_slug_key"`. CI never sees it because CI gets a fresh ephemeral Postgres per run. It cost me a false "did I break signup" detour; flagged so the next person does not repeat it. ## Buglog entry ```json {"id":"BUG-2026-08-22-alerting-chain-decorative","date":"2026-08-22","title":"Every alert went nowhere for four months: dead receiver, rules that never loaded, and a gauge that cleared itself when work was lost","error_message":"Alertmanager route receiver 'default' with webhook_configs url http://localhost:9095/webhook where nothing listens; curl localhost:9090/api/v1/rules missing SignupProvisioningSweepFailing after its deploy; hive_signup_provisioning_sweep_failures resets to 0 when the faulting identity ages out of the lookback window","root_cause":"Three independent defects on one chain. (1) The only Alertmanager receiver was a webhook to a port nothing has ever listened on, added in 0c130db on 2026-04-24, and no check asserted a delivery target. (2) prometheus.yml and alerts.yml are single-file bind mounts: git pull replaces the file and allocates a new inode, so the running container keeps showing the old copy forever, and docker compose up -d finds no reason to recreate a container when only a mounted file's contents changed, and Prometheus was never sent a reload either. Measured live: host alerts.yml inode 134312 against guest 132251. (3) recordSweep(report.Failed == 0) resets the consecutive-failure gauge, and a sweep goes clean the moment the identity that kept faulting is older than the 24 hour lookback window, so the alert resolved precisely when the loss became permanent.","fix":"Receiver is now email from no_reply@hive.scubed.co to ENTERPRISE_SMTP_ADMIN_EMAIL with the relay read from the existing ENTERPRISE_SMTP_* variables, and the config moves into docker-compose.yml as a compose configs block so Compose can interpolate it and so up -d recreates on change; unconfigured falls back to the RFC 2606 reserved smtp-not-configured.invalid so the config parses, alerts stay visible, and every send fails loudly. A deploy step applies the Prometheus bind mounts the way the Caddy step already does (recreate when the mounted copy diverges by content, SIGHUP when it matches) and a following step asserts scrape jobs, rule-file paths, every repository alert name, and the Alertmanager receiver from the live APIs. Added hive_signup_provisioning_faults_total (monotonic counter) and hive_signup_provisioning_stranded_identities (gauge over a seven day trailing window), keeping the consecutive gauge as the currently-failing signal. Prometheus now scrapes Alertmanager and itself so notification failures and rejected reloads are measurable at all. Verified against the real relay from the box: AUTH 235, sender accepted at MAIL FROM 250, blocked only by a Brevo 502 account-activation refusal that Alertmanager reports verbatim.","tags":["monitoring","prometheus","alertmanager","docker-compose","bind-mount","inode","metrics","signup","observability","silent-failure","smtp","pr-993","pr-89"]} ``` ## Not merged Merge and deploy confirmation are the orchestrator's call. <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added monitoring for signup provisioning failures and stranded identities. * Added self-monitoring alerts for notification failures, configuration reload issues, and unavailable monitoring services. * Added Prometheus metrics for monitoring and alert delivery health. * Added inline email alert configuration with SMTP support and fallback behavior. * **Bug Fixes** * Improved deployment checks to verify monitoring rules, routing, reloads, and email delivery. * **Security** * Restricted tenant email-domain registration changes to administrators. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> <!-- greptile_comment --> <details open><summary><h3>Greptile Summary</h3></summary> The PR rewires alert delivery to SMTP, makes monitoring configuration deployment verifiable, and adds durable signup-provisioning failure signals. The Prometheus verification retry remains incomplete because it waits for HTTP availability rather than the newly loaded state. - Adds inline Alertmanager email routing and monitoring self-alerts. - Applies and verifies Prometheus configuration and rule reloads during deployment. - Adds provisioning fault and stranded-identity metrics while restricting tenant-domain writes. </details> <details open><summary><h3>Confidence Score: 4/5</h3></summary> The PR is not yet safe to merge because the monitoring deployment can still fail spuriously while Prometheus is completing a valid reload. The reply claims the Prometheus readiness race was fixed, but the helper only retries connection and parsing exceptions; a 200 response containing the documented pre-reload rule state remains a concrete counterexample and is treated as a terminal deployment failure. **Files Needing Attention:** .github/workflows/deploy-demo-box.yml </details> <details open><summary><h3>Important Files Changed</h3></summary> | Filename | Overview | |----------|----------| | .github/workflows/deploy-demo-box.yml | Adds monitoring apply and live-state verification, but the readiness retry can terminate on a stale successful response. | | apps/control-plane/internal/signup/reconciler.go | Adds bounded stranded-identity measurement and monotonic fault tracking while resolving the previously reported shared-deadline starvation. | | deploy/docker/docker-compose.yml | Moves Alertmanager routing into interpolated Compose configuration with SMTP credentials referenced through a password file. | | supabase/migrations/20260822_01_tenant_email_domains_admin_only.sql | Revokes authenticated domain-registration writes and removes the permissive write policy. | | deploy/prometheus/alerts.yml | Adds durable alerts for provisioning faults and newly stranded identities. | </details> <details><summary><h3>Flowchart</h3></summary> ```mermaid %%{init: {'theme': 'neutral'}}%% flowchart LR D[Deploy applies config] --> P[Prometheus recreate or SIGHUP] P --> H[HTTP endpoint responds] H -->|Current helper returns immediately| V[Validate config and rules] V -->|Pre-reload state| F[Correct deploy fails] H -->|Required behavior| R[Retry until expected state is live] R --> V ``` </details> <a 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…1273) ## Summary Fixes #1250. Every JSON-body endpoint in edge-api read the client's request body through `io.LimitReader(r.Body, N)`, which truncates silently instead of erroring when the body exceeds `N`. The truncated bytes then failed `json.Unmarshal` and were reported as a generic invalid-JSON error, with no mention of size, even though the caller's body was valid and merely too large. ## Full call-site inventory | Endpoint | Old limit | New limit | Status | |---|---|---|---| | `/v1/messages`, `/v1/messages/count_tokens` | 4 MiB | 10 MiB | Fixed (this PR) | | `/v1/chat/completions` | 10 MiB | 10 MiB | Fixed (this PR) | | `/v1/completions` (legacy) | 10 MiB | 10 MiB | Fixed (this PR) -- not named in #1250's title/body, same bug shape confirmed by a separate audit (#1255), included here since it shares the same package-local helper | | `/v1/embeddings` | 10 MiB | 10 MiB | Fixed (this PR) | | `/v1/responses` | 10 MiB | 10 MiB | Fixed (this PR) | | internal session chat-dispatch path | 4 MiB | 10 MiB | Fixed (this PR) | ## Fix Every read above now goes through `http.MaxBytesReader`, which returns a `*http.MaxBytesError` (Go 1.19+, `errors.As`-detectable) when the body exceeds the cap, instead of silently cutting it off. A too-large body now gets an honest `413 Payload Too Large`, naming the limit, in each surface's own existing error envelope: - `/v1/messages`: Anthropic error envelope, `error.type = "request_too_large"` (the real Anthropic API's own enum member for this case -- the mapping already existed in `anthropicErrorType`, unused until now). - `/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/completions`, `/v1/embeddings`, `/v1/responses`: OpenAI envelope, `error.type = "invalid_request_error"`, `error.code = "request_too_large"`. Correction from an earlier version of this description: `request_too_large` is **not** an OpenAI-defined error code (their published enum stops at 401/403/429/500/503, no 413 and no `request_too_large` -- checked against developers.openai.com/api/docs/guides/error-codes). This is a Hive-invented `code` value inside the OpenAI-shaped envelope. Harmless to a real SDK: `openai-python`/`openai-node` select the exception class from the HTTP status, and a 413 falls through to the generic `APIStatusError`, whose `error.code` is a free-form string with no client-side enum to violate. - internal chat-dispatch path: the stable envelope, `error.code = "REQUEST_TOO_LARGE"` (new `Code` constant; `stableType` also gained a 413 case -- previously any 413 through that writer defaulted to `"INTERNAL"`, which would have mislabeled a client error). Any other read failure (a genuinely truncated/malformed body, a client disconnect mid-upload) keeps the prior generic message; only the "too large" path is distinguished and gets the new honest response. No behavior change for a body under the limit, and the cap itself is unchanged in kind -- it is not removed, only the failure mode is fixed. ## One limit, unified, one place `apierrors.MaxRequestBodyBytes = 10 << 20` (`apps/edge-api/internal/errors/codes.go`) is now the single source of the byte cap for every surface listed above. Value chosen: **10 MiB**, matching the incumbent OpenAI-shaped endpoints (the original Go-rewrite baseline, #89). Lowering those established 10 MiB endpoints to 4 MiB would be a breaking change for any caller already sending a body between 4 and 10 MiB; raising the narrower `/v1/messages` and chat-dispatch limits to 10 MiB is a pure widening and cannot break an existing caller. `RequestTooLargeMessage()` derives the client-facing text from the same constant, so the number in the message can never drift from the enforced limit. Note this is still narrower than the real Anthropic API's own limit (32 MB): a client sized against the real API can still be refused here. Narrowing that gap further than 10 MiB is a separate, not-yet-made call. A `Code`, `stableType` case and the constant/message helper are new in `apps/edge-api/internal/errors/codes.go`; three small per-package read helpers (`readMessagesBody` in `anthropic`, `readLimitedBody` in `inference`, inlined in `chat/dispatch.go` for its single call site) apply the shared constant through each package's own error envelope, rather than one cross-package abstraction that would have to reconcile three different wire shapes. ## Update: the unification itself created a new defect (fixed in this PR, same branch) Three independent review streams on this PR converged on the same finding: unifying the cap to 10 MiB removed the headroom that used to exist between `/v1/messages`' old 4 MiB inbound cap and the delegated chain's 10 MiB. That handler reads the client body, then **re-marshals a translated OpenAI-shaped body** and hands it to the delegated `/v1/chat/completions` chain in-process, which re-applies the same `MaxRequestBodyBytes` cap to the *translated* bytes, not the client's own bytes. Translation can grow a body past what the client sent: - `Stream` and `StreamOptions` are unconditionally added before marshalling (a small, fixed delta). - A `tool_use` content block's raw JSON `input` is copied into a Go string (`translate_request.go`'s `args := string(bl.Input)`) and then the whole translated request is `json.Marshal`'d again -- that second marshal re-escapes every `"` inside the copied JSON text as `\"`, so a quote-dense tool_use payload can grow by a large fraction of its own size on translation, not a fixed handful of bytes. This is the dominant growth path in practice, not the Stream/StreamOptions delta. A client body one byte under the cap, already honestly accepted at the inbound check, could therefore be refused downstream with the exact "exceeds 10 MiB" message this PR exists to make honest -- for a body that never exceeded anything. Same defect class as #1250, moved one hop. **Fix**: `apierrors.WithTrustedBody` / `IsTrustedBody`, a context marker mirroring the existing `auth.owui_unwrap.go` pattern (`owuiUnwrappedKey`). `/v1/messages` sets it on the translated sub-request it delegates downstream; all three body-size read helpers skip `MaxRequestBodyBytes` entirely when the marker is present, since that body is already fully resident in memory and was already validated at its own ingress boundary -- re-capping it adds no DoS protection and can only wrongly reject a legitimate client. It cannot be spoofed by an inbound request: it is set server-side only, from a cloned request, never derived from any client header. `readMessagesBody` (the real client-facing read) never carries the marker, so it always enforces the cap. New tests: a synthetic large-content-string case (proves the small, guaranteed-present Stream/StreamOptions delta alone can trip it) and a realistic tool_use case (`TestHandler_TranslatedBodyGrowth_ToolUseArgumentQuoteEscaping_DoesNotTripCap`, asserting >100 KiB of quote-escaping growth, the actually-dominant path). Also from this review round, all narrow and non-blocking on their own: - A `Content-Length` pre-check (mirrors `auth.owui_unwrap.go`'s #1108 fix) at all three read sites. Documented accurately as a **memory optimisation only**: it bounds the server's peak buffering for a body whose declared size already exceeds the cap, so it does not make the honest 413 more reachable (if anything the client is further from finishing its own upload when the server answers earlier, so is *more* likely to never see the response before its own connection resets), and it is a no-op under chunked transfer encoding (`ContentLength == -1`). - Corrected the `MaxRequestBodyBytes` doc comment, which previously overclaimed it as "the single cap for every JSON endpoint edge-api parses directly from a client." Three call sites (`images`, `audio`, and the agent-task handler) still read a client body via their own `io.LimitReader` with the identical silent-truncation shape; bringing those onto this constant (or a deliberately different one) is issue #1255, not this PR. - Added `TestMaxRequestBodyBytesIsTenMiB` and `TestStableType_RequestEntityTooLarge` in `internal/errors`, pinning the constant's exact value and the 413 `stableType` branch respectively. A reviewer's mutation test (changing the constant to 100 MiB; deleting the 413 case) found neither was covered by anything in the original version of this PR; both are now pinned directly. **Correction to an earlier claim in this PR body**: the "red-then-green, verified" note below originally described the proof as an assertion-level red state. It was not: `git stash`-ing the production files made the packages fail to **build** (the new tests reference symbols -- the new constant, error code, helpers -- that only exist after the fix), which is a real but weaker signal than an assertion actually failing at runtime. That part of the claim is corrected in place below rather than restated as stronger than it was. Separately, a reviewer ran eight mutation tests against this PR's test suite and six were caught (including the real translation-growth regression above), which is the stronger, independent evidence that the tests in this PR are doing real work. ## Prior art considered, not reused A parallel repo-wide audit flagged two existing capped-read implementations in edge-api: `rag/handler.go`'s `readBodyCapped` (`io.LimitReader(body, max+1)`, returns an `over bool` for the caller to shape its own error) and `auth/owui_unwrap.go`'s inline `Content-Length` pre-check plus the same `N+1` trick inside OWUI-shim middleware. Both are legitimate, already-honest patterns, just built on the `N+1` trick instead of `http.MaxBytesReader`. Neither is a general-purpose primitive usable as-is across `anthropic`, `inference` and `chat` (each already writes its own response envelope, and `rag`'s upload cap and `auth`'s shim cap are independently tuned for their own use cases, not this issue's five call sites), so this PR does not refactor them. `http.MaxBytesReader` was used instead because issue #1250's own recommended fix names it explicitly, and it is also the dominant existing convention in `control-plane` (14+ call sites already use it). ## Tests New `body_limit_test.go` in `anthropic`, `inference` and `chat`, one boundary pair per endpoint (`MaxRequestBodyBytes-1`, accepted; `MaxRequestBodyBytes+1`, honest 413 naming the limit and never mentioning "json"). Full existing suites for all four touched packages pass unchanged (no behavior change under the limit). **Red-then-green**: `git stash push --keep-index` on only the production files (tests kept in the working tree) made all touched packages fail to **build** (the tests reference the new constant, error code and helpers, which only exist after the fix), confirming the tests are coupled to the new implementation, then `git stash pop` and reran: all green. This is weaker than an assertion failing at runtime, and is described as a build failure rather than "red" in the stronger sense on purpose (see the correction above for the translation-headroom fix's independently mutation-tested proof). ## Buglog entries ```json {"date":"2026-08-28","error_message":"oversized-but-valid JSON body silently truncated by io.LimitReader then reported as invalid JSON body / Invalid request body, with no mention of size","root_cause":"io.LimitReader has no way to signal that it truncated; the truncated bytes then fail json.Unmarshal and get misreported as malformed JSON","fix":"replace io.LimitReader with http.MaxBytesReader across /v1/messages, /v1/chat/completions, /v1/completions, /v1/embeddings, /v1/responses and the internal chat-dispatch path; classify the read error via http.MaxBytesError to return an honest 413 naming the limit; unify the previously divergent 4 MiB / 10 MiB caps into one apierrors.MaxRequestBodyBytes = 10 MiB constant","tags":["edge-api","http","error-handling","anthropic","inference","chat","issue-1250"]} {"date":"2026-08-28","error_message":"unifying the body-size cap to 10 MiB let a translated /v1/messages sub-request silently outgrow the cap the client's own body already cleared, producing a new honest-looking but wrong 413 for a body that never exceeded anything","root_cause":"translate_request.go's OpenAI translation always adds Stream/StreamOptions and re-encodes tool_use block JSON input as an escaped string, both of which can grow the translated body past what the client sent; the delegated chat-completions handler re-applied the same MaxRequestBodyBytes cap to those already-validated, already-in-memory bytes","fix":"apierrors.WithTrustedBody/IsTrustedBody context marker (mirrors auth.owui_unwrap.go's pattern) set on the translated sub-request, honored by all three body-size read helpers to skip re-capping a body already validated at its own ingress boundary","tags":["edge-api","http","anthropic","inference","chat","issue-1250","issue-1273"]} ``` ## Test plan - [x] `go build ./apps/edge-api/...` - [x] `go vet` on touched packages - [x] `go test ./apps/edge-api/internal/anthropic/... ./apps/edge-api/internal/inference/... ./apps/edge-api/internal/chat/... ./apps/edge-api/internal/errors/... -count=1 -short` -- all green, including full pre-existing suites - [x] Red-then-green proof via `git stash` of production files only - [ ] CI green, zero unresolved review threads before merge (orchestrator verifies)
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Summary
.planning/v1.1-DEFERRED-SCOPE.md.Ship Scope (v1.0)
hive, addedstart_period: 120s+retries: 5to control-plane + edge-api healthchecks.Phase 10 UAT Results
10 pass, 1 partial, 1 deferred.
Known Non-Blocker (deferred to v1.1)
POST /v1/batchessuccess-path cannot reachstatus=completedtoday: LiteLLM's/v1/filesrejectscustom_llm_provider=openrouterwith "Only [openai, azure, vertex_ai, manus, anthropic] are supported". OpenRouter and Groq have no native batch API.Failure-path terminal settlement works end-to-end (reservation released, attribution preserved, no overcharge). Full root cause + unblock options in
.planning/phases/10-routing-storage-critical-fixes/KNOWN-ISSUE-batch-upstream.md.Deferred To v1.1
ensureCapabilityColumnswrong-table fix (latent — routing works via seed path)amount_usdon BD checkout (regulatory — preview surface only for v1.0)Full plan:
.planning/v1.1-DEFERRED-SCOPE.md.Test Plan
go test ./apps/control-plane/... ./apps/edge-api/... -count=1 -short→ all green./healthon 8080 + 8081 → HTTP 200.v1.0.0.Follow-Ups
v1.0.0./gsd:new-milestoneto start v1.1, pulling from.planning/v1.1-DEFERRED-SCOPE.md.