kernel: add wrapper for creds, refine disable_seccomp, revert some changes

kernel/Makefile

@@ -11,8 +11,10 @@ kernelsu-objs += kernel_compat.o
 kernelsu-objs += selinux/selinux.o
 kernelsu-objs += selinux/sepolicy.o
 kernelsu-objs += selinux/rules.o
+
 ccflags-y += -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include
 ccflags-y += -I$(objtree)/security/selinux -include $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/errno.h
+ccflags-y += -include $(srctree)/$(src)/include/ksu_creds.h
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_KSU) += kernelsu.o
 

kernel/core_hook.c

@@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ static inline bool is_allow_su()
 		// we are manager, allow!
 		return true;
 	}
-	return ksu_is_allow_uid(current_uid().val);
+	return ksu_is_allow_uid(ksu_current_uid());
 }
 
-static inline bool is_unsupported_app_uid(uid_t uid)
+static inline bool is_unsupported_uid(uid_t uid)
 {
 #define LAST_APPLICATION_UID 19999
 	uid_t appid = uid % 100000;
@@ -120,7 +120,12 @@ static void setup_groups(struct root_profile *profile, struct cred *cred)
 
 static void disable_seccomp(void)
 {
-	assert_spin_locked(&current->sighand->siglock);
+	struct task_struct *tsk = get_current();
+
+	pr_info("%s++\n", __func__);
+	spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+	assert_spin_locked(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+
 	// disable seccomp
 #if defined(CONFIG_GENERIC_ENTRY) &&                                           \
 	LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(5, 11, 0)
@@ -130,40 +135,56 @@ static void disable_seccomp(void)
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
-	current->seccomp.mode = 0;
-	current->seccomp.filter = NULL;
+	tsk->seccomp.mode = 0;
+	if (tsk->seccomp.filter == NULL) {
+		pr_warn("tsk->seccomp.filter is NULL already!\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	// 5.9+ have filter_count and use seccomp_filter_release
+#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(5, 9, 0)
+	seccomp_filter_release(tsk);
+	atomic_set(&tsk->seccomp.filter_count, 0);
 #else
+	put_seccomp_filter(tsk);
+	tsk->seccomp.filter = NULL;
+#endif
 #endif
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+	pr_info("%s--\n", __func__);
 }
 
 void escape_to_root(void)
 {
-	struct cred *cred;
-
-	cred = prepare_creds();
-	if (!cred) {
+	struct cred *newcreds = prepare_creds();
+	if (newcreds == NULL) {
 		pr_err("%s: failed to allocate new cred.\n", __func__);
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if (cred->euid.val == 0) {
+	if (ksu_cred_euid(newcreds) == 0) {
 		pr_warn("Already root, don't escape!\n");
-		abort_creds(cred);
+		abort_creds(newcreds);
 		return;
 	}
 
-	struct root_profile *profile = ksu_get_root_profile(cred->uid.val);
+	struct root_profile *profile =
+		ksu_get_root_profile(ksu_cred_uid(newcreds));
+
+	ksu_cred_uid(newcreds) = profile->uid;
+	ksu_cred_suid(newcreds) = profile->uid;
+	ksu_cred_euid(newcreds) = profile->uid;
+	ksu_cred_fsuid(newcreds) = profile->uid;
 
-	cred->uid.val = profile->uid;
-	cred->suid.val = profile->uid;
-	cred->euid.val = profile->uid;
-	cred->fsuid.val = profile->uid;
+	ksu_cred_gid(newcreds) = profile->gid;
+	ksu_cred_fsgid(newcreds) = profile->gid;
+	ksu_cred_sgid(newcreds) = profile->gid;
+	ksu_cred_egid(newcreds) = profile->gid;
 
-	cred->gid.val = profile->gid;
-	cred->fsgid.val = profile->gid;
-	cred->sgid.val = profile->gid;
-	cred->egid.val = profile->gid;
-	cred->securebits = 0;
+	// no wrapper, ignore it.
+	newcreds->securebits = 0;
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(profile->capabilities.effective) !=
 		     sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
@@ -173,23 +194,17 @@ void escape_to_root(void)
 	// we add it here but don't add it to cap_inhertiable, it would be dropped automaticly after exec!
 	u64 cap_for_ksud =
 		profile->capabilities.effective | CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH;
-	memcpy(&cred->cap_effective, &cap_for_ksud,
-	       sizeof(cred->cap_effective));
-	memcpy(&cred->cap_permitted, &profile->capabilities.effective,
-	       sizeof(cred->cap_permitted));
-	memcpy(&cred->cap_bset, &profile->capabilities.effective,
-	       sizeof(cred->cap_bset));
-
-	setup_groups(profile, cred);
-
-	commit_creds(cred);
-
-	// Refer to kernel/seccomp.c: seccomp_set_mode_strict
-	// When disabling Seccomp, ensure that current->sighand->siglock is held during the operation.
-	spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+	memcpy(&newcreds->cap_effective, &cap_for_ksud,
+	       sizeof(newcreds->cap_effective));
+	memcpy(&newcreds->cap_permitted, &profile->capabilities.effective,
+	       sizeof(newcreds->cap_permitted));
+	memcpy(&newcreds->cap_bset, &profile->capabilities.effective,
+	       sizeof(newcreds->cap_bset));
+
+	setup_groups(profile, newcreds);
+	commit_creds(newcreds);
+
 	disable_seccomp();
-	spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
-
 	setup_selinux(profile->selinux_domain);
 }
 
@@ -200,7 +215,7 @@ int ksu_handle_rename(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct dentry *new_dentry)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (current_uid().val != 1000) {
+	if (ksu_current_uid() != 1000) {
 		// skip non system uid
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -268,14 +283,14 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 	}
 
 	// TODO: find it in throne tracker!
-	uid_t current_uid_val = current_uid().val;
+	uid_t current_uid_val = ksu_current_uid();
 	uid_t manager_uid = ksu_get_manager_uid();
 	if (current_uid_val != manager_uid &&
 	    current_uid_val % 100000 == manager_uid) {
 		ksu_set_manager_uid(current_uid_val);
 	}
 
-	bool from_root = 0 == current_uid().val;
+	bool from_root = 0 == ksu_current_uid();
 	bool from_manager = is_manager();
 
 	if (!from_root && !from_manager) {
@@ -299,7 +314,7 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 
 	if (arg2 == CMD_GRANT_ROOT) {
 		if (is_allow_su()) {
-			pr_info("allow root for: %d\n", current_uid().val);
+			pr_info("allow root for: %d\n", ksu_current_uid());
 			escape_to_root();
 			if (copy_to_user(result, &reply_ok, sizeof(reply_ok))) {
 				pr_err("grant_root: prctl reply error\n");
@@ -511,13 +526,14 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static bool is_non_appuid(kuid_t uid)
+static bool is_appuid(kuid_t uid)
 {
 #define PER_USER_RANGE 100000
 #define FIRST_APPLICATION_UID 10000
+#define LAST_APPLICATION_UID 19999
 
 	uid_t appid = uid.val % PER_USER_RANGE;
-	return appid < FIRST_APPLICATION_UID;
+	return appid >= FIRST_APPLICATION_UID && appid <= LAST_APPLICATION_UID;
 }
 
 static bool should_umount(struct path *path)
@@ -528,7 +544,7 @@ static bool should_umount(struct path *path)
 
 	if (current->nsproxy->mnt_ns == init_nsproxy.mnt_ns) {
 		pr_info("ignore global mnt namespace process: %d\n",
-			current_uid().val);
+			ksu_current_uid());
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -614,33 +630,29 @@ int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (is_non_appuid(new_uid)) {
-#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_DEBUG
-		pr_info("handle setuid ignore non application uid: %d\n", new_uid.val);
-#endif
+	if (!is_appuid(new_uid) || is_unsupported_uid(new_uid.val)) {
+		// pr_info("handle setuid ignore non application or isolated uid: %d\n", new_uid.val);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	// isolated process may be directly forked from zygote, always unmount
-	if (is_unsupported_app_uid(new_uid.val)) {
-#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_DEBUG
-		pr_info("handle umount for unsupported application uid: %d\n", new_uid.val);
-#endif
-		goto do_umount;
+	if (ksu_is_allow_uid(new_uid.val)) {
+		// pr_info("handle setuid ignore allowed application: %d\n", new_uid.val);
+		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (ksu_is_allow_uid(new_uid.val)) {
+	if (!ksu_uid_should_umount(new_uid.val)) {
+		return 0;
+	} else {
 #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_DEBUG
-		pr_info("handle setuid ignore allowed application: %d\n", new_uid.val);
+		pr_info("uid: %d should not umount!\n", current_uid().val);
 #endif
-		return 0;
 	}
 
-do_umount:
 	// check old process's selinux context, if it is not zygote, ignore it!
 	// because some su apps may setuid to untrusted_app but they are in global mount namespace
 	// when we umount for such process, that is a disaster!
-	if (!is_zygote(old->security)) {
+	bool is_zygote_child = is_zygote(old->security);
+	if (!is_zygote_child) {
 		pr_info("handle umount ignore non zygote child: %d\n",
 			current->pid);
 		return 0;

kernel/include/ksu_creds.h

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/*
+ * KernelSU creds wrapper
+ *
+ * Provide a wrapper for a few credentials use (e.g current_uid().val),
+ * so it would be easier to maintain
+ * some older linux versions.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __KSU_H_CREDS
+#define __KSU_H_CREDS
+
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/version.h>
+
+#if (LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(3, 5, 0) &&	\
+	defined(CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS)) ||	\
+	LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(3, 14, 0)
+#define ksu_cred_uid(x)		((x)->uid.val)
+#define ksu_cred_suid(x)	((x)->suid.val)
+#define ksu_cred_euid(x)	((x)->euid.val)
+#define ksu_cred_fsuid(x)	((x)->fsuid.val)
+#define ksu_cred_gid(x)		((x)->gid.val)
+#define ksu_cred_fsgid(x)	((x)->fsgid.val)
+#define ksu_cred_sgid(x)	((x)->sgid.val)
+#define ksu_cred_egid(x)	((x)->egid.val)
+#define ksu_current_uid()	(current_uid().val)
+#else
+#define ksu_cred_uid(x)		((x)->uid)
+#define ksu_cred_suid(x)	((x)->suid)
+#define ksu_cred_euid(x)	((x)->euid)
+#define ksu_cred_fsuid(x)	((x)->fsuid)
+#define ksu_cred_gid(x)		((x)->gid)
+#define ksu_cred_fsgid(x)	((x)->fsgid)
+#define ksu_cred_sgid(x)	((x)->sgid)
+#define ksu_cred_egid(x)	((x)->egid)
+#define ksu_current_uid()	(current_uid())
+#endif
+
+#endif

kernel/manager.h

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ static inline bool ksu_is_manager_uid_valid()
 
 static inline bool is_manager()
 {
-	return unlikely(ksu_manager_uid == current_uid().val);
+	return unlikely(ksu_manager_uid == ksu_current_uid());
 }
 
 static inline uid_t ksu_get_manager_uid()

kernel/sucompat.c

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static inline bool __is_su_allowed(const void *ptr_to_check)
 	if (!ksu_sucompat_hook_state)
 		return false;
 #endif
-	if (likely(!ksu_is_allow_uid(current_uid().val)))
+	if (likely(!ksu_is_allow_uid(ksu_current_uid())))
 		return false;
 
 	if (unlikely(!ptr_to_check))
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static int ksu_inline_handle_devpts(struct inode *inode)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	uid_t uid = current_uid().val;
+	uid_t uid = ksu_current_uid();
 	if (uid % 100000 < 10000) {
 		// not untrusted_app, ignore it
 		return 0;