Support raw ByteSpan values correctly in SafeAttributePersistenceProvider #34306
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…ider The DefaultAttributePersistenceProvider implementation of SafeReadValue() had the undocumented behavior of enforcing that the value exactly filled the provided buffer. This does not make sense for an API that purports to store general ByteSpan values. Instead move this validation into ReadScalarValue() in SafeAttributePersistenceProvider, and separate InternalReadValue() into one method that does the only the actual read, and a second one that performs the additional validation for reading typed ember attributes (strings with length prefixes etc). Use the former one from SafeReadValue(). Also fix possible out of bounds access when reading ember strings by ensuring we have read the length byte(s) before attempting to interpret them.
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PR #34306: Size comparison from d856745 to 3f74144 Full report (85 builds for bl602, bl702, bl702l, cc13x4_26x4, cc32xx, cyw30739, efr32, esp32, linux, mbed, nrfconnect, nxp, psoc6, qpg, stm32, telink, tizen)
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PR #34306: Size comparison from d856745 to 7602515 Increases above 0.2%:
Full report (85 builds for bl602, bl702, bl702l, cc13x4_26x4, cc32xx, cyw30739, efr32, esp32, linux, mbed, nrfconnect, nxp, psoc6, qpg, stm32, telink, tizen)
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…ider (project-chip#34306) * Support raw ByteSpan values correctly in SafeattributePersistenceProvider The DefaultAttributePersistenceProvider implementation of SafeReadValue() had the undocumented behavior of enforcing that the value exactly filled the provided buffer. This does not make sense for an API that purports to store general ByteSpan values. Instead move this validation into ReadScalarValue() in SafeAttributePersistenceProvider, and separate InternalReadValue() into one method that does the only the actual read, and a second one that performs the additional validation for reading typed ember attributes (strings with length prefixes etc). Use the former one from SafeReadValue(). Also fix possible out of bounds access when reading ember strings by ensuring we have read the length byte(s) before attempting to interpret them. * Take integral argument T by value * Add test
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Jul 18, 2024
…ider (project-chip#34306) * Support raw ByteSpan values correctly in SafeattributePersistenceProvider The DefaultAttributePersistenceProvider implementation of SafeReadValue() had the undocumented behavior of enforcing that the value exactly filled the provided buffer. This does not make sense for an API that purports to store general ByteSpan values. Instead move this validation into ReadScalarValue() in SafeAttributePersistenceProvider, and separate InternalReadValue() into one method that does the only the actual read, and a second one that performs the additional validation for reading typed ember attributes (strings with length prefixes etc). Use the former one from SafeReadValue(). Also fix possible out of bounds access when reading ember strings by ensuring we have read the length byte(s) before attempting to interpret them. * Take integral argument T by value * Add test
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The
DefaultAttributePersistenceProviderimplementation ofSafeReadValue()had the undocumented behavior of enforcing that the value exactly filled the provided buffer. This does not make sense for an API that purports to store general ByteSpan values. (Note thatSafeReadValue()was previously protected inSafeAttributePersistenceProvider, but public in theDefaultAttributePersistenceProviderimplementation.)Instead move this validation into
ReadScalarValue()inSafeAttributePersistenceProvider, and separateInternalReadValue()into one method that does the only the actual read, and a second one that performs the additional validation for reading typed ember attributes (strings with length prefixes etc). Use the former one fromSafeReadValue().Also fix possible out of bounds access when reading ember strings by ensuring we have read the length byte(s) before attempting to interpret them.